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Abstract 
This thesis by publication, The Logics of Deflation: Autonomy, Negation and the 
Avant-Garde, collects essays recently published in various journals (Radical 
Philosophy, Historical Materialism, Oxford Art Journal, Third Text) and in 
museum publications. The publications address a number of key issues affecting 
the production and interpretation of contemporary art and the' everyday', art's 
institutionalization and art's autonomy, the role of the avant-garde after 
postmodernism, the meaning of conceptual art, performativity and authorship, 
art's relationship to popular culture, and the crisis of the' politics of 
representation' . 
The central argument of the thesis is that when art abandons the possibility of the 
'new' art falls back into heteronomy and the academic. As such, there can be no 
renewal of art without it resisting, negating, reworking, what has become 
tradition. But this link between the' new' and value should not be confused with 
conventional modernist notions of formal' advance' or supersession in art. 
Rather, the' new' here, I argue, is the restless, ever vigilant positioning of art's 
critical relationship to its own traditions of intellectual and cultural 
administration. The mistake postmodernism and contemporary critics of the 
avant-garde make, therefore, is that they identify art's claims to autonomy not 
with art's necessary reflection on its own conditions of possi bility, but with 
simplistic notions of elitism and formalism. As a consequence autonomy is 
treated undialectically. Following Adorno's notion of autonomy in art as a social 
relation between art's production and reception, I insist, that for art to continue to 
define itself as modern it is inescapably bound up with the negation of the 
institutional arrangements and traditions in which it finds itself. Indeed, there can 
be no critical future for art without this temporal experience of art as being' out of 
joint' with the traditions and institutions which have brought it into being. The 
content of art continues to be implicated in the mediation of the critique of the 
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category of art. 
Looking at conceptual art as a defining moment of this logic I defend the 
changing anti-art strategies of modern and contemporary art practice - in 
particular British and American art of the 1990s - as the means by which art has 
recently pursued this double process of negation and self-negation. In this way it 
is the continuous redefinition of the boundaries of anti-art which forms the basis 
by which art negates what has been previously designated autonomous in order to 
constitute autonomy in art anew. 
In conclusion the thesis links this process of negation and self-negation to the 
idea of the avant-garde as a kind of placeholder for art's autonomy. In other 
words, I claim that the avant-garde is another name for the possibility of art's 
continuing self-realization under the instrumentalizing force of the commodity-
form. Bridging philosophy, art history and art theory, this thesis repoliticizes the 
issue of autonomy and the avant-garde. 
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Introduction: Art and Its Negations 
Prologue 
In August 1993 I visited a massive installation at the Battlebridge Centre in 
King's Cross, the site of a former bus depot. I had been encouraged to go there 
having met one of the artists involved. He had written to me asking for a letter of 
support in order that he and the other artists in the group he was part of could 
raise money and gain access to the site. As I walked through the entrance, what 
was immediately entrancing about the installation was its ingenuity and sheer 
scale: it stretched almost to the length of a football pitch, and invited a mazy walk 
through its geometric interior. At the entrance it was impossible to see the 
installation's furthermost point. The artists had built, out of hundreds of 
cardboard packing boxes, a crude approximation of an city-centre environment, 
each cluster of boxes standing alone as an architectural feature. Some of these 
reached almost to the ceiling, some were flat like a minimalist floor sculpture. 
Suspended from the ceiling between these simple architectural forms were 
eighteen large painted canvases. These images, as the press release put it, ranged 
"from the now almost forgotten media events of the eighties and nineties, through 
the push of commercial interests that explored a new freedom and individualism": 
and were painted by members of the group and invited artists. The images 
included the Oocklands development, an Eternity perfume advert, an Aids 
awareness benefit concert, a Keith Haring, Princess Oi and a Somalian child, 
Bernard Tschumi' s deconstructionist development 'Parc de Vi lIete', Terry 
Farrell's Charing Cross development, and a Body Shop cartoon. The urbanist 
irony of the work was familiar from the large body of critical postmodernist \\ork 
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on the representations of modernity in the 1980s. Its transmutation of capitalist 
accumulation into an image of pasteboard transience (at the time the London 
homeless's cardboard city still occupied an underpass at Waterloo station) 
mocked the speculative property frenzy of the late eighties and early nineties. In 
this the work touched on the 'architectural turn' in the critique of modernist 
hubris in much US and European eighties art. I Yet, for all its indebtedness to 
critical postmodernism the installation had a lightness in its execution and 
perverse disregard for the paintings exhibited (they were merely' decorati ve' 
intrusions) that made it stand out. I was impressed. In fact, I was more than 
impressed I sensed that something had coalesced here and that it chimed with my 
own frustrations with the art of the moment. For the location and the form of the 
installation established a certain tone of disregard: it set its face against late 
modernist implacability as all serious art had been doing in the eighties, but it 
also set its face against the dominant form of this implacability: photo-text neo-
conceptualism. Inert paintings-by-numbers and the stagy arrangement of stacked 
boxes were not going to win many friends in the world of lens-based 
assiduousness, or for that matter, in the burgeoning area of the archeological 
ready-made. There was something slightly impertinent and underperformed about 
the work. Neither a collection of first-order paintings nor a sculptural installation 
of ambition, or, significantly, a reflection on the violence of the spectacle in the 
found materials and the media of the spectacle ( perhaps the central criterion of 
seriousness of the art of the 1980s), its relationship to its materials was self-
consciously clunky and autistic. 
This impressive work was 'Natural History', the first of a number of elaborate, 
extensive and humorous installations produced by the group Bank in the 1990s; 
and directly memorable for their narrative re-presentation of both their own work 
and the work of other artists. Indeed the palpable disregard for the ideal viewing 
conditions of their own art and the art of others came to define what was 
1 For example Tom Lawson, Laurie Simmonds and Richard Prince. 
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engaging about their work in the mid-1990s, and what made the work stand out 
for me at Battlebridge. The work had absorbed the lessons of conceptual art, it 
clearly had a politics, it was maliciously ironic, yet it didn't do what advanced art 
was supposed to do: present ideas of theoretical high-seriousness. with clarity of 
form and authorship in pure-white spaces. On the contrary. the installations were 
messy, disputatious, ugly, composite things, deliberately confusing the work of 
invited artists with the collective work of the group, and the work on the walls 
with the installation itself. The titles of the shows were a kind of give away: 'The 
Charge of the Light Brigade', 'Zombie Golf', 'Cocaine Orgasm'. Moreover, these 
shows were presented in dilapidated (non-art) spaces run by the artists 
themselves. Work, group-authorship and exhibition space became indivisible. in 
an echo of 1960s art collectives. 
At their space at Burbage House in Curtain Road on the edge of the City and then 
at the galleries Dog and Poo Poo in Underwood Street. close by. Bank established 
a profound shift in the dominant viewing habits of art for a younger generation of 
artists in London? Making art without clearly defined boundaries of authorship 
in spaces that were self-run, and that made no concessions to publicly funded 
notions of radical practice, they reintroduced notions of del inquency and disorder 
into critical practice, revealing how much of the official advanced and critical art 
of the period had come to settle into habit and self-regard. In a climate of 
artworld identity politics and deconstructionist propriety this was invigorating, 
and I began to follow what they were doing, eventually writing about their work 
and even contributing (anonymously) to their scurrilous and riotously funny 
satirical art magazine The Bank ( 'You Can Bank On US! Beauty, Integrity. 
2 Interestingly, I, along with my co-organizer, David Goldenberg, rented the space at 
Burbage House for two months in January 1996 from Bank after the group had vacated 
it, in order to install our artists-work-for-answering machines 50x50x50x50. The space is 
now an office, just as Curtain Road and the surrounding area, so central to the 
emergence of the new art in the mid-1990s with its cheap rents and semi-derelict 
properties, is now thoroughly established with bars and clubs. 
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Interrelations). 3 I also began to immerse myself in the emerging young London 
art scene, of which Bank space, was beginning to playa defining role. This was 
something I had not done with any enthusiasm since the mid-1980s. In 1994 I 
published an edited collection Art has No History!: The Making and Unmaking of 
Modern Art, a wide-ranging assessment of the new radical histories of art and 
contemporary critical practices which had come to dominate the teaching of art 
history during the 1980s.4 One of the themes of my introduction was how 
smoothly self-sufficient this New Art History and these critical practices had 
become, and as a consequence, how generally undertheorized the defence of the 
interrelationship between theory and practice now was for a late 60s generation 
that had entered the professorate, and who were busily preoccupied with the 
institutional status of post-conceptual critical practice. The new art in London 
provided a focus for these problems, as a new generation of artists began to 
emerge who paid little respect to the model of artist-intellectual which had 
underwritten the ambitions of so much post-conceptual art in the 1980s. The new 
work opened other ways of being critically engaged and responsible in art. 
As such, this moment of localized dissent offered a way of being able to think 
through what had emerged for me as the increasing problem of the 
institutionalization of the critique of modernism in critical postmodernism in the 
early 1990s. The critique of representation, of identity, of artistic autonomy, of 
3 See, John Roberts, 'Mad for It! Bank and the New British Art', Everything Magazine, 
No 18 Jan 1996. Everything, an artists' run magazine, was an important (and sardonic) 
forum for the discussion of the new British art in the mid-1990s, and also a space for 
younger artists to present new work. A good indication of the tenor of the magazine was 
the free gift in issue N018: a fake LSD tab in a tiny plastic bag. Everything was the only 
magazine that existed critically within the space of yba. The 'Mad for It!' , article 
generated a flurry of debate. See in particular, Stewart Home, 'The Art of Chauvinism in 
Britain and France', Everything, No 19 March 1996, Dave Beech, 'Chill Out', Everything, 
No 20, July 1996, Paula Smithard, 'Grabbing the Phallus By the Balls: Recent Art By 
Women', Everything, No 21, Jan 1997. See also my reply to Home, 'Home 'truths", 
Everything, No 20 July 1996, and 'Taking Stock', Everything, Vol 2 Issue 1, March 1997. 
4 John Roberts, ed., Art Has No History!: The Making and Unmaking of Modern Art, 
Verso, 1994 
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the art institution - key themes of the assault on modernism in 1980s critical 
postmodernism - were now official academic positions. 5 The issue for a younger 
generation of artists, then, was not so much how these 'freedoms' might be put 
into action, but how the autonomy of artists might be renewed in the face of the 
academicization of critique in advanced art. The rapid dissemination of the' new 
theory' meant that younger artists not only had to find their way through the 
critique of modernism but through the orthodoxies of critical postmodernism 
itself. This issue had been on my critical radar since the mid-eighties when I 
began to take my distance from the counter-hegemonic model of critical practice 
in critical postmodernism ( largely post-Althusserian in origins) in favour of a 
return to the issue of autonomy in Adorno. What was important about Adorno's 
model of autonomy - autonomy for Adorno was another name for Hegelian self-
reflection and not an expression of art's social transcendence - was that it allowed 
for a defence of art against heteronomous notions of art as social practice from 
within the space of art as social practice. In short, it was a dialectical model of 
art's political relationship to its conditions of production and reception, and not a 
code word for artistic quietude, elitism, and formalism. In this, it enabled a 
defence of the' politics of art' to avoid the problems of political substitutional ism 
which had seemed to beset the whole history of art's politicization from the WWl 
and Berlin Dada onwards. For Adorno the idea that particular kinds of social 
location and critical content in art might secure art's effectivity, always failed to 
address how such moves tended to produce an instrumental ization of art's form 
and use-values. 6 Art's materials, its sensuous manifestation in the world of things 
5 By this I mean the extensive literature on the 'critique of representation' in the wake of 
Hal Foster's edited anthology, Postmodern Culture, Bay Press, 1983. By the early 
1990s such a critique was well established in many art schools, art history and cultural 
studies departments in the US and Britain, in loose alliance with the new identity politics. 
See for example, Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures, edited by 
Russell Ferguson, Martha Gever, Tinh T.Minh-ha and Cornel West, with a foreward by 
Marcia Tucker and images selected by Felix Gonzalez-Torres, The New Museum of 
Contem porary Art and M IT, 1990. 
6 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984 
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not like art, was always subject to external criteria of success, to the world of 
things not like art. Hence for Adorno, once art's politicization is harnessed to 
audience requirements, its internal development is frozen into predigested themes 
and expectations. This could only lead to self-censorship and a sentimentalized 
understanding of art's possible claims on truth. In other words Adorno's concept 
of autonomy and defence of modernism - as principle of self-development - was, 
an attack, precisely, on that section of the cultural left that believed that after late 
modernism, all art needed to be free of the market and art institution was to insert 
itself in 'everyday life'. Adorno's writings on autonomy were a poweIi~ul way of 
countering the idealist tendencies of this transformative model of art's praxis. 
Adorno, therefore, sought to restore the necessary negati ve content of art under 
the commodity form. That is, if art's relationshi p to freedom was not just a matter 
of the formal representation of emancipatory content, then art's use of its 
inherited materials must emerge from the pressures of heteronomous thinking 
itself. If art was still to have a transformative bearing on those materials, art's 
relationshi p to its audience and to its own histories must remain fundamentally 
one of renunciation and asociality. There could be no possibility of art's renewal 
without art being 'out of joint' with the circumstances and traditions in which it 
finds itself. In this sense Adorno's sensitivity to the issue of autonomy allowed 
the politicization of art's form (that is, its critique of heteronomy) to coincide, or 
at least make tentative alliance, with an anti-Stalinist cultural politics that was in 
fact quite alien to Adorno's critical theory, and thereby redress the political 
limitations of Adorno: non academic Trotskyism. In similar dark times, Trotsky 
had also defended the autonomy of art against art's instrumentralization, and like 
Adorno had made important alliances with artists for direct pol itical reasons. 7 In 
this way, the Adorno-Trotsky alliance was an important critical resource in the 
late ei ohties for a oeneration of British art historians, art critics and cultural 
b b 
theorists who had been formed politically by non-orthodox Trotskyism, myself 
7 See John Roberts, Postmodernism, Politics and Art, Manchester University Press, 
1990, pp18-23 
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included. 8 Adorno's and Trotsky's emphasis on the renunciati\'e content of ~lar\ 
- that is the break with the form of capitalist relations - allowed the relationship 
between autonomy and negation to be sustained as an immanent problem of art's 
form, and not, contrary to the assertions of postmodernism, a redundant 
expression of modernist teleology.9 
The problem of negation in art, though, was not something I addressed seriously 
until the mid-1990s when I began reading Hegel intensely for the first time.1O In 
this respect Art Has No History! is decidedly transitional. On the one hand my 
introduction develops an Adornoite negation of critical postmodernism as the best 
way of keeping the category of art open and attending to the art object, yet on the 
8 Non-orthodox Trotskyism emphasizes a state-capitalist analysis of the old Soviet Union 
rather than a degenerated worker's state position as in Trotsky, and dissents from 
Trotsky's late apocalyptic writings about the fundamental crisis of capitalism. The 
Adorno-Trotsky milieu is yet to be framed and analysed, but nevertheless its extensive 
impact on art history, cultural theory and studio practice in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s 
is indisputable. Although many of the following writers and artist-writers would, no doubt, 
not sign themselves up as fully paid up members of this milieu - some clearly owe more 
to Adorno than Trotsky, some more to Trotsky as a friend of modernism than Adorno as 
a theorist of art's autonomy - they all have worked in its sphere of influence: Caroline 
Arscott, Fred Orton, Mike Baldwin and Mel Ramsden of Art & Language, Andrew 
Hemingway, Esther Leslie, Gail Day, David Batchelor, Terry Atkinson, Ben Watson, Paul 
Wood, Steve Edwards. This represents a sizable and significant cross-section of the art-
theoretical left of the period; and it has produced many fruitful exchanges and joint-
projects between its participants. We might contrast this with the use of Adorno in the 
American academy in the late 80s and 90s (overall a weaker presence than in Britain 
and Europe), where his work has tended to be confined to a conservative reading of the 
Frankfurt School, and as such limited to historical debates on philosophical aesthetics, 
with the exception perhaps of Jameson (although Jameson's Adorno is very distant from 
the vicissitudes of artistic practice). In Britain Adorno was a way of marking out an 
ambitious anti-Stalinist, Marxist cultural space in the face of the generalized onslaught of 
postmodernist modes. The study of the way in which Adorno was read in Britain against 
the grain of his leftist detractors, would be a worthy research project. 
9 I developed this Adorno-Trotsky alliance in my work on realism and painting in the early 
1990s. See 'Approaches to Realism', Bluecoat Gallery publications, 1990. Reprinted in 
Selected Errors Writings on Art and Politics, 1981-1990, Pluto Press 1993. 
10 Here, it is important to acknowledge my conversations with Gail Day. Day's work on 
Hegel - through T.J. Clark and Paul de Man - was a source of stimulation. De Man, in 
particular, became a stalking horse for what kind of Hegel might be worthy of Hegel's 
legacy. 
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other hand its historical materialism is very anti-Hegelian~ now reading it again. 
embarrassingly so. This omission mostly had to do with the two major formations 
of my intellectual development during the 1980s: British philosophical realism 
(in particular Roy Bhaskar and David-Hillel Ruben)11 which tended to see 
Marxism as closer to natural science than to dialectical theory. and Anglo-
American analytical philosophy, in particular language philosophy (John Searle 
and Donald Davidson).12 My Adornoite-Trotsky-philosophical realist framework 
tended to be 'filled' out with analytical reflections on 'intention', 'agency' and 
'representation'. Being, ontology, determinate negation were not things that 
entered this analytical landscape - well, not in any conscious and formed way. In 
this sense the second half of the 1990s was an attempt on my part to become a 
better student of Hegel - and by doing so a better theorist of the artistic subject -
given the imperative of thinking through the problems of negation in art and 
culture without just rehearsing an Adornoite position. It is worth mentioning here 
another transitional text that I published in the same year as Art Has No History! : 
'Muntage, Dialectica i Facultaci6/Montage, Dialectics and Empowerment'. 
This essay was written for an extensive show of photo-based critical practice, 
Domini publici Public Domain, at the SantaM6niCA museum in Barcelona. 13 The 
exhi bition contained many leading critical postmodernists of the period (Gran 
Fury, the Guerrilla Girls, Mitra Tabrizian, Dan Graham), and, as in many other 
museum shows of the time emphasized the importance of institutional critique 
and identity politics to critical postmodernism. My essay rehearsed the political 
11 See in particular, Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, Leeds Books, 1975, and 
David-Hillel Ruben, Marxism and Materialism: A Study in Marxist Theory of Knowledge, 
Harvester Press, 1975 
12 See John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in The Philosophy of Mind, Cambidge 
University Press, 1983, and Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation, 
Oxford University Press, 1984 
13 John Roberts,'Muntage, Dialectica i Facultacio/Montage, Dialectics and 
Empowerment', in Domini public/Public Domain, SantaMoniCA museum, Barcelona, 
1994 
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formation of this politicized post-conceptual work in relation to a discussion of 
montage and dialectics in early avant-garde film and photography. My 
understanding of the neo-avant-garde extension of this tradition, though, was 
more sceptical than that of the organizers, and indeed, I ended up taking my 
distance from the institutional-critique model of practice, which, in the work Dan 
Graham, Andrea Fraser, Hans Haacke and Michael Asher, largely dominated the 
framework of critical postmodernism.14 I did this by stressing the need for a 
model of the politics of representation which moved beyond the simple inclusion 
of the popular or non-specialist spectator. At the time Haacke talked about this 
inclusion as involving a process of empowerment for the non-specialist spectator. 
15 As he argued a few years later: "If one pays attention to the forms and 
language that are accessible to an uninitiated public, one can discover things that 
could enrich the esoteric repertoire. ,,16 However, for all Haacke's and other 
artists' (Fred Wilson, Alfredo Jarr, Renee Green) work on unpacking professional 
forms of attention, this process of inclusion invariably failed to acknowledge the 
conflictual realities of the "uninitiated" spectator: that is, what is excluded is not 
necessarily waiting to be included, or rather waiting to be included on the terms 
set by those doing the including. In this regard the inclusive 'popular' spectator of 
professionalized critical postmodernism always appeared to be a product of the 
phantasies of the artist and art institution, and bore little relationship to the 
consciousness of actual culturally excluded spectators. Indeed, the failure of this 
phantasized popular spectator to have any empirical basis in class-relations was 
the very basis of Adorno's critique of notions of political accessibility. This is 
because such a position is unable to recognise both the resistance to the recei ved 
notion of culture on the part of of the culturally excluded spectator, and at the 
14 See Benjamin H.Buchloh, Neo-Avant garde and Culture Industry: Essays on European 
and American Art from 1955 to 1975, MIT, 2003 
15 See, Hans Haacke, 'A Conversation with Hans Haacke', by Yve-Alain Bois, Douglas 
Crimp and Rosalind Krauss, in October: The First Decade, 1976-1986, MIT Press 1987. 
See also Tom Crow, 'The Simple Life', October No 63 Winter 1993 
16 Hans Haacke and Pierre Bourdieu, Free Exchange, Polity Press, 1995, p107 
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same time, the actual critical intelligence of this spectator, his or her desire for 
self-transformation., (although this is not to say that this dialectic is ever made 
explicit in Adorno).There was an important debate to be had, therefore, about 
representation and cultural and social division that didn't turn one-dimensionally 
on questions of accessibility, but on the uses and interpretation of art 'from 
below'. The emphasis on non-specialist forms of attention of art as a possible 
reflective disturbance of high-culture, was a way of breaking with what I saw as 
the professionalization of the politics of representation 'from above' within the 
area of postmodernist institutional critique. As such, this was not an argument 
about the 'effectivity' of art outside the institution (which I don't hold to in any 
absolute sense), but rather about the limits of the popular prevailing in currents 
definitions of critical practice. As I outlined in 'Montage, Dialectics and 
Empowerment', cultural democracy does not begin simply when the spectator 
feels incl uded in the world of art, but when the claims of the art are "brought into 
dispute and use by the non-specialist". 17 The ideal horizon for any 'politics of 
representation' does not end with what is presented as critically meaningful to the 
spectator, but whether art and spectator engage in a process of equal exchange at 
the point of reception. The importance of artistic form as political issue in 
Adorno, then, is related to the way forms of critical attentiveness are central to 
spectatorship as a self-transformative process. Cultural democracy can only issue 
in actual collective participation from below through such a process, and not 
through a discourse of popular (and passive) inclusion. Accordingly, this process 
of participation of necessity involves the dismantling of the meanings of 
dominating by the dominated. 
During this period, these arguments become singularly important to my 
development as a writer. For a rhetorics of emancipation seemed to dominate the 
reception of the new critical postmodernism without any reference to social and 
17 John Roberts, 'Muntage, dialectica i facultaci6', in Domini public,SantaM6niCA 
museum, Barcelona, 1994, p30. 
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cultural division and the actual consciousness of those supposedly to be included 
in the new benighted postmodern audience of art. In 1990 I had met the artist 
Dave Beech when he was one half of the artist duo Inter Alia with Mark 
Hutchinson (he had read an essay I had written on Art & Language and sought 
me out) and in the following two years we began to share our ideas and concerns 
about these issues. Like myself, Beech saw the construction of a popular or 
inclusive spectator in critical postmodernism as a fundamental exclusion of class 
subjectivities in the formation of a postmodernist cultural democracy. IS Beech 
began to do some writing on the subjectivity of power and cultural exclusion, 
which became the spectral figure of the 'philistine', and eventually our 
collaboration developed into a full blown project on philistinism itself. Working 
with artists has always played a big part in my writing: in many ways my 
principal site of production was the art school and artworld in the 1980s and 
1990s, just as it is today, although the philosophy conference and seminar room 
has perhaps tended to take over from the machinations of the artworld proper. 19 
The collaboration with Dave Beech, therefore, was not just a philosophical 
reflection on the' politics of representation' but a confrontation between the 
problems of studio practice and the wider conditions of art's production and 
reception. In this sense it could not have been written without bringing the 
philosophical demands and problems Adorno highlighted into alignment with the 
problems of contemporary practice. We used an Adornian philosophy to break 
down the self-image of prevailing practices, and the possibility of other practices 
18 At the time I was also working on problems relating to class, photography and 
representation. How is it possible to think photography in relation to the representation of 
class subjectivity? See the discussion of the amateur below. John Roberts 'Class, 
Modernity and Photography', in Renegotiations: Class, Modernity and Photography, 
Norwich Gallery, 1993 
19 From 1995-1997 I was working as the curator at Camerawork Gallery, London. It was 
here that I did the majority of my writing on conceptual art and photography, which 
became the exhibition and book, The Impossible Document. (1997)For a discussion of 
my tenure there in relation to the emerging British art of the 1990s, see John Roberts 
interviewed by Jorge Ribalta, in ed, Jorge Ribalta, Servicio Publico: Conversaciones 
sabre financiacion publica yarte contemporaneo, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 
1998 
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to break down the (modernist) self-image of contemporary philosophy. 20 This 
meant, for my writing at least, that any kind of dialectical theory worth its salt 
had to embark on a reassessment of the prevailing or approved categories of art 
theory and art criticism. So, just as the ideal of the popular spectator needed to be 
qualified by the actualities of social and cultural division, terms such as the avant-
garde and autonomy needed to be rethought against the grain of their 
conservative post modern assimilation or dismissal. 
This relationship between the reflective requirements of philosophical discourse 
and the corrective demands of actual practices, is what marks out the body of 
writing in this PhD thesis. In this it is the culmination of an extended process of 
thinking about how contemporary art and the self-reflective demands of 
philosophy can live with each other. It is the abiding strength of Adorno's writing 
on art that it is contemporary art - the art which has emerged from tradition, from 
heteronomy - that has to guide the demands of value and judgement. Thus a 
recognition of the novel in art is not simply a defence of the new for the sake of 
the new, but the space where the autonomy and renewal of art is to be defined and 
struggled over. Without this speculative leap, this risk of identification with what 
remains unmarked, there can be no defence of art as a space of freedom, of 
autonomy. This thesis, then, sits very much within this philosophical tradition as 
a defence of the unknown as the place where we come to transform our 
relationship to the known in order to reflect on what we think we know. 
Autonomy and the avant-garde 
This thesis - 'Logics of Deflation: Autonomy, Negation and the Avant-Garde' -
brings together essays published in various journals and museum and gallery 
publications since the late 1990s. As such the chapters included here reflect a 
variety of sites of production across the academic, magazine publishing and the 
20 See Dave Beech and John Roberts, The Philistine Controversy, Verso 2002 
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artworld, bringing different theoretical demands to bear on my writing. However. 
if these essays have different origins and possess different voices, they all share 
the same terrain of enquiry: how is it possible to 'think' art after Conceptual art 
and thereby think the meaning of art's continuing emergence? How, and with 
what, is art to be made, not just after modernism's assimilation of the readymade, 
but after the systematization and dispersal of the ready made as a mode of 
production? What skills and values might artists bring to the work of art when the 
labour involved in the work of art is no longer reliant on any, or very limited, 
traditional craft skills, when, indeed, many artists chose to absent themselves 
from the physical production of the work altogether? In this respect, the central 
argument of this thesis is that the defence of autonomy is fundamentally a 
question of how value is connected to the relations between skill, deskilling and 
reskilling. 
For aesthetic conservatives in the 20th and 21st century the reign of the 
dissol ution of form and the rise of the readymade (assemblage, photography, 
post-object aesthetics generally) has been seen as one long drawn out diversion 
from classical values of proportion, harmony and hand-based craftsmanship. 
Indeed, some conservatives hold out that this tradition of negation is a mere 
historical rupture, linked to the divisive rise of cultural pluralism and technology 
under capitalism, and that its life under capitalism is limited. 2 ! Admittedly, this 
conservative classicism is largely a minor position these days, even on the right, 
but nevertheless, there remains a widespread view that somehow the negations of 
art might, and can, stop. All that prevents these negations from ending is a change 
in attitude amongst artists, critics, and particularly museums (the heart of all the 
corruption) who, in egregious opposition to their traditional role, openly support 
art in defiance of what people actually want. Attached to this conservative 
classicism is a liberal sanguinity that the history of the modern will eventually 
21 See for example, Hilton Kramer, ed., The New Criterion Reader: The First Five Years, 
New York, 1988 
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play itself out, or will fall into line if other kinds of critical persuasion are brought 
to bear, as if the modern in art was susceptible to some kind of kindly cultural 
therapy. 
Art's tradition of negation persists though. It persists because negation persists, 
because negation in art is what of necessity mediates skill (or lack of skill), form 
and meaning. And what drives this negation is the very 'asociality' of art under 
capitalism, the fact that for art to remain art (rather than transform itself into 
design, fashion or social theory) it must experience itself as being 'out of joint' 
both with its place in the world and within its own traditions. In fact being 'out 
of joint' with one means being 'out of joint' with the other. For without this drive 
to autonomy art would simply cease to exist as a tradition of aesthetic and 
intellectual achievement and, more importantly, as a means of resistance to the 
heteronomy of capitalist exchange. This is why this tradition of negation 
continues to produce work of value and quality, despite the crisis of the original 
avant-garde and the dispersal and assimilation of modernism, and despite art's 
constant submission to the demands of entertainment and commerce and 
institutional legitimation. Art is irreduci ble to its own histories and to the 
heteronomous forces of capitalist exchange because art is that which starts from 
a position of negation. (See Chapter 1 'After Adorno: Art, Autonomy, and 
Critique' ). 
However, to see art as an irreducible force of negation, is not to deny that the 
practices and institutions of art under late capitalism are in irrevocable crisis, and 
that culture is in a state of fundamental decline. To defend the dynamic logic of 
negation is not thereby to cast art adrift from its social constraints. In fact both are 
interdependent. Under commodity culture the substantive decline of culture and 
the critical renewal of art are interwoven within the history of modernism and the 
modern. Far from being that which damns art to absolute dissolution, cultural 
decline is the very ground of modern art's unfolding and reinvention. This means 
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that the experience and mediation of decline is indivisible from the judgements of 
value and critical materials that art is able to bring to bear on its own traditions 
and representation of the world. Thus, even in an epoch of decline the cognitive 
demands and the openness to meaning of art are not in themselves in desuetude. 
For if this was so this would imply that at some previous point the alienated 
conditions of art's production and reception were somehow richer and more 
perspicacious than the alienated conditions of art's production now or yesterday. 
On these grounds - in order to defend art against the critics of its dissolution - we 
should look for quality and value in periods of relative social stability, for it is 
there we are likely to find works of high quality. This is plainly absurd. In fact, 
the negations of art are continually able to reanimate themselves because the 
negations of art are inexhaustible so long as asociality remains the underlying 
dynamic of art's production, and human beings are capable of finding meaning in 
this dynamism. To assume otherwise is to believe that asociality is a discrete 
product of the art - the result of what artists claim to experience - and not the 
basis under which the conditions of art, irrespective of the particular ideologies 
professed by artists, are produced and enter social relations. 
Thus, there is a general historical principle at stake here: the decadence or decline 
of a culture is certainly not irrelevant to how art's conditions of production are 
able to reproduce themselves, but it has little bearing on the value and quality of 
the art produced. What truly affects the quality of art is art's direct repression or 
coercive intervention and censorship by the state. When art is driven out of 
productio/l, then clearly the motor of art's social negation is also driven into 
reverse. But even without the public transmission of art's val ue, the negations of 
art may not even stop there. Even in the most culturally impoverished 
circumstances and clandestine conditions of existence art becomes a focus for the 
contradictions and alienations of social experience. Art's negations, therefore, are 
not something that art touches lightly on, but that which secures art's conditions 
of visibility and autonomy. It is that which gives shape to its unfolding. 
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This collection is a defence of this tradition of negation and of the negative. As 
such the central argument of my thesis is that when art abandons the possibility of 
the 'new' it falls back into heteronomy and the academic. In this way there can be 
no renewal of art without art resisting, reworking, dissolving what has become 
tradition, what has become heteronomous. But this link between the 'new' and 
value should not be confused with conventional modernist notions of formal 
'advance' or supersession in art or, nihilistically, with the destruction of tradition 
tout court. Rather, the 'new' here is the restless, ever vigilant positioning of art's 
critical relationship to its own traditions of intellectual and cultural 
administration. The mistake postmodernism and contemporary critics of the 
avant-garde make, therefore, is that they identify art's claim to autonomy not with 
art's necessary reflection on its own conditions of possi bility, but with simplistic 
notions of elitism and historicism.22 As a consequence autonomy is treated 
undialectically. 
Following Adorno's notion of autonomy in art as a social relation between art's 
production and reception, I argue, that for art to define itself as modern, it is 
bound up inescapably with the negation of the institutional arrangements, social 
circumstances and traditions in which it finds itself. There can be no critical 
future for art without this experience of disjunction, of art being' out of joint' 
with the traditions and institutions which have brought it into being. The content 
of art continues to be implicated in the mediation of the critique of art as a 
category. Thus, key to a defence of this tradition of negation is the continuing 
possibility of the avant-garde. 
The avant-garde is currently much maligned and misunderstood. Treated, 
overwhelmingly, as an historical category by conservatives and postmodernists 
22 See, for example, Hal Foster ed., Postmodern Culture, Bay Press, 1983 
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alike in the wake of the demise of the original avant-gardes, its continuing 
dynamism and critical content has been either denied or foreshortened. Indeed in 
Britain and the US in the 1980s and 1990s it suffered from either caricature or 
enfeeblement. However, as Marjorie Perloff has argued: 
if we take the term "avant-garde" more narrowly and literally as the advance 
guard of the army, that flank of artists who are in the forefront, and hence, as the 
cliche would have it, "ahead of their time," avant-garde art continues to be a 
reality. There is no reason to believe, in other words, that radical art practices will 
not continue to manifest themselves (often where least expected), even as their 
gradual assimilation into mainstream culture will not necessarily ensure their 
commodifi cati on. 23 
In other words, there is a world of difference between the artwork entering the 
culture and being assimilated into critical discourse, and the artwork coming to 
speak/or the interests of the dominant culture, that is, finding an identity with it. 
On this basis much historical and recent avant-garde art is clearly not assimilable 
to the interests of bourgeois culture. We need to distinguish, then, between very 
different senses of assimilation here - between notions of acceptance, tolerance, 
incorporation and assent. Certain works and practices are obviously tolerated and 
accepted, but nevertheless the culture finds it hard, or even impossible, to give 
assent to their content. In this way certain avant-garde practices remain lodged in 
renunciative spaces, spaces that capitalism finds too difficult to penetrate and 
mediate. The complacent notion that high culture and popular culture now share 
an identical space (of pleasures and artistic ambition) is, therefore, wholly 
misguided. This is because the would-be erosion of the distinctions between high 
and low is invariably presented from the point of view of the popular assimilation 
of high-cultural form, rather than from the perspective of avant-garde works 
23 Marjorie Perloff, Radical Artifice: Writing Poetry in the Age of Media, University of 
Chicago Press, 1991, p201 
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themselves, which on closer inspection reveal real levels of discord and dissent 
from the expectations of the popular text (at the same time as incorporating and 
transforming the popular text). The avant-garde continues to exert its renunciative 
force even in conditions of (partial) assimilation and general marginalization. It is 
more fruitful to look at the avant-garde as a kind of residual placeholder for art's 
autonomy and, as such, it is better understood as a spatial concept rather than as a 
supersessive procession of formalized groups or movements. 
The avant-garde after avant-gardism is that space of relations across practices 
and disciplines where artists, writers and intellectuals, test, and probe the 
historical and self-normalizing conditions of the category of art, a space in which 
the conditions of art's asociality are continuously brought to self-consciousness. 
In this sense the avant-garde is another name for the possi bility of art's 
continuing self-realization under the instrumentalizing forces of the commodity-
form and the art institution, and, concomitantly, the site where critical thinking 
on art meets and coalesces. Consequently, it will tend to be formed in those 
centres where the critique of prevailing practices have a chance of critical 
legitimation based on prior critical (avant-garde) practice. It is a space, then, that 
continuously shifts cultural and national location and personnel. Moreover, the 
practices internal to this cross-cultural space, and which seek to prevail within 
this space, will not necessarily share the same social and political perspectives. It 
is a space that not only shifts cultural and national location and personnel 
continuously, but is, in intra-artistic terms, unstable and conflictual. 
Crucial to the bringing into self-consciousness of the asociality of art is how these 
various claims on art's negation and self-negation produces the' new'. If the new 
is not simply that which coheres to produce a distinct, founding, collective style, 
(after the demise of the great modernist stylistic transformations) then how is 
'newness' produced and mediated? How is novelty to be facilitated and 
recognized? If it is impossible to talk about the new in quite the same way as 
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under modernism, then, indeed, is it possible to talk about 'newness' at all? 
Postmodernism has tended to answer these questions by assuming that' newness' 
is now merely a (faded) effect of pastness, the mixing and reworking of previous 
styles, and as such this should be seen as a liberation from the would-be 
repressive teleology of modernist negation. The arguments for this are very 
familiar and represent a fundamental retreat to a neo-classicized model of artistic 
production: what can be made from art is only that which can be made from the 
institutionally ascribed conventions of art. In doing so they represent a retreat 
from modern art's diremptive, expressive content, the thing that modernism 
shaped, channelled and made its own in its interlocking progress with the 
development of subjectivity under early capitalism. What makes modernism and 
the avant-garde so protean is the harnessing of form as a process of subjective 
resistance and struggle. Hence, what postmodernism' s academicization of 
'newness' produces, essentially, is a suppression or delimitation of this struggle 
and expressive function of art - the fact that under conditions of art's alienation, 
the materials, forms and means of expression of art will of themselves be 
necessarily alienated. Art's reflection on its own condition is not just mediated by 
reflection on its own traditions, but on the extra-artistic conditions of possibility 
of those traditions. The idea, therefore, that the production of art is now solely an 
autopoietic process is a formalistic reduction of art's reflective and expressive 
content. 
Autopoiesis and the avant-garde 
Nicholas Luhmann is, perhaps, the most theoretically astute defender after 
postmodernism of the autopoietic position. For Luhmann the renewal of art is 
possible only in art's terms. "Of course, artistic communication could never come 
about without society. without consciousness, without life or material. But in 
order to determine how the autopoiesis of art is possi ble. one must observe the art 
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system and treat every thing else as environment" .24 ("environment" meaning. 
here, everything that is external to the internal determinations of art). Indeed the 
evol ution of art is "its own accomplishment. It cannot be caused by external 
intervention". 25 Which for Luhmann does not mean that under the conditions of 
autopoiesis that the content of art is predictable from the past content of art, but 
that the internal schemas of art will of themselves of necessity provide the 
differential moves art is able to make. 
However, despite the emphasis on art's recursive renewal and expansion, 
Luhmann's system has a marginal place for the agency of the artist and for the 
incursions of the non-artistic real into art, and as such, has little interest in 
autonomy in art as the mediated site of conflict and division. 26 Autonomy is 
simply that which pulls art's recursiveness along: that which gives internal shape 
to art's unfolding. In this way the role of art is to mark its difference from other 
works of art, without dissolving its critically observable identity as art. Luhmann 
has no sympathy for the extra-artistic content of the avant-garde' s negation of the 
category of art: that is, the positi~'e reali~ation of art in society. The autopoietic 
content of art is system-autonomous, it is not the expression of cultural and social 
division.27 This leaves his theory of negation without any universalizable social 
content. Indeed, autopoiesis on Luhmann's account is thoroughly particularist, 
given the ease with which its logic is identifiable with the logic of the 
24 Nicholas Luhmann, Art as a Social System, translated by Eve. M.Knodt, Stanford 
University Press, 2001, p51 
25 Luhmann, ibid, p235 
26 This not to say that Luhmann has forgotten the 'subject', but that he believes you do 
not need subjects to account for change; change is supra-agentive. 
27 The closed, internalist identity of Luhmann's theory of autopoietic production, is neatly 
summed up by Norbert Bolz in a comparison between Adorno and Luhmann. In Adorno 
the search for meaning "must be outside, I must go out flee, away from society. Whereas 
this idea in Weber, Gehlen, and Luhmann is precisely the reverse: You are nothing until 
you go in." 'Gnosis and Systems Theory: A Conversation between Norbert Bolz and 
Michael Hirsch', Adorno: Die M6glichkeit Des Unm6glichenIThe Impossibility of the 
Impossible, Lukas & Sternberg, 2003, p103 
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commodity-form itself: the constant figural remaking of the object. Nothing 
breaks in to shift the social relations of art's production and as such nothing 
mediates difference as the critique of existing social and property relations. This 
account leads to a fundamental split in his theory between what we might call, 
following Hegel, the first-negation of autopoiesis and second negation. By first-
negation I mean the recursive conditions of art's autopoiesis, its commodity-
specific conditions of production; by second-negation I mean the leap to freedom 
through the negation of the negation that Hegel understood as the force of 
liberation immanent to human beings and that he termed Absolute negativity. 
Autopoiesis, first-negation and second negation are not categories I employ in the 
main body of this thesis. Their elaboration here is the result of my reflection on 
my discussion of autonomy and the avant-garde in the very writing of this 
introduction. However, their content is implicit at all times in my arguments. 
In the Science of Logic, Hegel attacks the impatience of those who wish to go 
beyond the determinate and arrive immediately in the Absolute (universal 
freedom), which is nothing but the "infinite abstract". Hegel calls this version of 
the absolute an imaginary absolute: impatience oversteps the 'becoming richer' of 
the dialectical progress of freedom, short-circuits it, if you like. But for Hegel this 
need to recognise freedom as a path from simplicity to complexity is not infinite. 
The process reaches a stage of 'finalization' in what Hegel calls the pure Idea, in 
which determinateness of the Notion (the principle of freedom) is raised to the 
actuality of the Notion, to an absolute liberation. There is no point of transition in 
this stage of freedom. Rather, the Idea freely releases itself in "self-security and 
self-repose". The Idea posits itself. In this sense the Absolute is not the end of 
consciousness and difference but the "identity of the theoretical and the practical 
idea".28 This understanding of the Absolute and negation, however, is not shared 
by many contemporary philosophers and cultural theorists on the left (for 
28 G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic [1830], translated by William Wallace, with a foreword 
by J.N. Finlay, Oxford University Press, 1975, p292. 
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example, Deleuze, Derrida, Negri, Habermas, Moishe Postone), who read Hegel's 
'--
Absolute as an interminable machine of heteronomy.29 Nor is it shared by 
Adorno. In fact Adorno underpins much of this heterodox left's anti-Hegelianism 
(despite being a partisan Hegelian), by identifying Hegel's Absolute indefatigably 
with a totalising subject that subsumes the actual. 30 For Adorno, famously, 
Hegel's Absolute is seen as providing a justification for the self-expanding logic 
of capital. However, this limited understanding of negativity was not shared by 
Marx. Marx certainly dismissed the tendency of Hegel's system to overthrow the 
actual, but at no point did he ever reject Hegel's 'negation of the negation' as 
idealist.3! Thus he did not view Hegel's concept of dialectical self-development 
as limited to capital. On the contrary he believed that the collective struggle of 
workers was capable of shattering first negation and directing the dialectic of 
Absolute negativity. In this way Hegel's absolute underwrites Marx's critique of 
the capitalist law of value: both stress the link between freedom and the unity of 
practice and Idea. As Raya Dunayeskaya puts it - perhaps the most theoretically 
suasive defender of the notion of second negation in Hegel - "it is not a question 
only of meeting the challenge from practice, but of being able to meet the 
challenge from the self-development of the Idea, and of deepening theory to the 
point where it reaches Marx's concept of the philosophy of 'revolution in 
permanence"'. 32 The power of negativity is turned back upon itself, upon the 
internal as much as the external boundaries to self-movement. 
29 See for example, Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, 
University of Chicago Press, 1978, JOrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, VoL, translated by Thomas McCarthy, Beacon Press, 1978, Moishe Postone, 
Time, Labour, and Social Domination, Cambridge University Press, 1993 
30 See Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, translated by E.B.Ashton, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973 
31 Karl Marx, Capital Vol 1, Lawrence & Wishart, 1970. 
32 Raya Dunayevskaya, The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in 
Hegel and Marx, edited and introduced by Peter Hudis and Kevin B.Anderson, Lexington 
Books, 2002, p8 
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The 'challenge from the self-development of the Idea' is very much missing from 
Luhmann's theory of difference. But nevertheless Luhmann's position does have 
the virtue of making the question of autonomy within the circumscri bed social 
and cultural conditions of late capitalism a critical priority, given the simplicity 
with which the defenders of post-autonomous art claim to dissolve art into the 
social and social technik. Autopoiesis is a theory of the internal constraints of 
art's self-unfolding. Autopoiesis, then, needs to be taken seriously in any 
discussion of negation, as way of holding onto the critical content of art's 
autonomy within the sphere of first negation. But it needs to be qualified and 
transformed by notions of resistance, struggle and disaffirmation, in short by the 
subjective legacy of aesthetic negativity. This is the crucial distinction that this 
thesis develops across a range of materials, identities and practices. 
Thus, if the challenge of negation in art is not simply the supersession or 
transgression of tradition or art itself, then, it must conform, following Hegel, to a 
process of determinate negation, in which reversal, parody and paradox and other 
rhetorical strategies of displacement prevail. In this Luhmann is at least correct: 
art is a self-destablizing, recursive process. This means, to produce novelty does 
not mean producing that which is without precedent - a founding myth of the 
production of modernist style - but rather, to engage in a process in which signs 
and materials are incorporated into new constellations, yielding non-customary 
forms of attention and therefore requiring from the spectator a renewed 
engagement with art as a non-heteronomous experience. Hence the production of 
'novelty' is better understood as the transformation of given range of mediums 
into diverse and unanticipated forms on the basis of the subject's marking of an 
'unmarked-marked' space. But contra Luhmann, this marking of unmarked space 
- what after Spencer Brown he calls the calculus of form - is also driven by the 
diremptions of the subject, the subject who is himself or herself 'out of joint' 
with the traditions he or she inhabits and performs. The internal recursivity of art, 
therefore, is not just a formal process based on matters of taste or semiotic 
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playfulness, art's recursivity is the very means by which certain epistemological 
claims about the world (realism) are made. To mark the unmarked is to mark a 
space in the name of art's extra-artistic claims on the real. The determinate 
negations of art are also claims on the universal content of art in a future post-
capitalist world. In wresting meaning from non-meaning the making of meaning 
dissolves the finititude of given forms. 
But by what means is this negation of the negation mediated in art? By what 
means is this non-identitary content of art produced? If negation is of necessity a 
process of determinate negation, and this, in turn, is mediated by the alienated 
conditions of art's prevailing materials, then non-identity means those forms and 
experience that art cannot assimilate, that lie beyond its given boundaries, and 
that therefore reveals the contingency of art as a category - in short the materials 
and forms of anti-art. Without anti-art as the place where assimilated aesthetic 
experience is tested, art can only reproduce itself as academic precedent and 
heteronomous experience. As such, it is the continuous redefinition of the 
boundaries of art by the strategies of anti-art which forms the basis by which art 
negates what has been previously designated autonomous and aesthetic in order 
to constitute autonomy and aesthetic experience anew. Anti-art is the category 
through which negation and self-negation are brought to consciousness in art 
(first negation and second negation), the set of relations between what is coherent 
and incoherent, illicit and licit, competent and incompetent, that questions and 
probes the boundaries of prevailing notions of aesthetic experience. Anti-art, 
then, is fundamental to the material content of negation and the marking of the 
unmarked space. 
In these terms, the strategies of anti-art as they played out in some aspects of 
contemporary art are one of the primary concerns of this thesis. These strategies 
can be grouped under two main categories: the performance of scepticism and the 
performance of incompetence or failure. These two categories overlap. but they 
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retain enough internal differentiation to remain conceptually distinct. The 
performance of scepticism is the general enactment of the category of art as a 
contingent or open category; and the performance of incompetence refers to those 
specific strategies and forms that embody this performance of scepticism. Indeed, 
these strategies provide the key part of the title of this thesis and also define the 
role of anti-art generally within this work: 'amateurism', the 'trickster', 
'imageless truth', 'ventriloquism', 'iconophobia', 'iatrogenesis' (co-dependence). 
These are strategies which have become crucial to the production of avant-garde 
art since the 1960s, and in important ways define the shift from conceptual art to 
post-conceptualism. That is, they are first and foremost deflationary categories, 
and it is the deflation of artistic form and authorship, which has overwhelmingly 
come to identify the art of the period. What do I mean by deflation? 
Modernism and deflation 
Modernism's moves against the academy and the legacy of classicism was 
characterized by the ironization of genre, gesture, pose and convention. For 
example in Manet's Le Dijeuner sur l'herbe, (1863) and Picasso's Les 
Demoiselles d'Avignon (1907) the female nude is rendered incongruous. In Manet 
it takes the form of a perverse exhibitionism, thereby ridiculing the 
proprietariness of the nude in the classical landscape, and in Picasso the sensual 
contours of the female body associated with the traditional' courtesan picture' 
become opaque and ugly. The effect in both cases is to lower the tone, so to 
speak, by bringing the ideal into conflict with the prosaic and crude.33 
33 This view of modernism as a confrontation with the academic female nude has shaped 
a whole generation of artist historians reading of Second Empire modernism and after. 
For instance, T.J. Clark ( The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and his 
Followers ,Thames & Hudson, 1985), Paul Wood ( The Challenge of the Avant-Garde, 
Yale University/Open University Press, 1999), Griselda Pollock ( Vision and Difference: 
Femininity, Feminism and Histories of Art, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), Rosalind 
Krauss ( The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths ,MIT, 1986), 
Jeffrey Weiss (The Popular Culture of Modern Art: Picasso, Duchamp, and the Avant-
Garde, Yale University Press, 1994), and others, have all used the problem of the 
representation of the female body to stage their understanding of modernist irony and its 
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Here the deflation of classical form is an intra-painterly issue: by displacing the 
female nude from classical balance painting is made to forfeit its expected 
coherence and sensuous integrity. In this respect deflation is attached to the 
conspicuous failure to paint within the framework of harmonious balance and 
proportion. Indeed, in these two works Manet and Picasso invite the threat of 
incoherence, especially in Picasso where the violent flattening of form and 
noxious colour pushes the tentative disassemblage of space explored in Manet 
into inchoateness. In both works deflation is marked by the wish to expel 
painterly expression from stable figure ground relations, and as such, is 
distinguished by its desire to wrest painting as a two-dimensional surface from 
naturalistic ill usion. When Picasso introduced coli aged elements into the space of 
painting this deflationary content changed, however, and changed forever. The 
incorporation of found mass printed materials into the early papier collages, for 
the first time, places the deflationary logic of modernist anti-classicism in 
opposition to painting and to the aesthetic boundedness of art. That is, with the 
readymade deflation entered the realm of anti-art, positioning art's strategies of 
negation in conflict with the canon of painterly achievement tout court. As a 
result deflation becomes embodied in a radical reorientation and expansion of 
artistic skill: collage, photography, assemblage, link the negation of painting with 
the development of forms of non-artistic technique. The measure of artistic 
competence shifts from mark making to the positioning, arranging, and 
conjunction of pregiven processes and prefabricated forms. This compositional 
shift is very familiar in histories of modernism.34 But the nature of its 
immanent critique of tradition. My concept of deflation - in contrast to such cognates as 
adulteration, recoding, gaucherie or, blague, etc - however, differs from much of this 
literature, in linking its belittling strategies to a dialectic of de-skilling and re-skilling, 
which encompasses both painting and post-painting practice. That is, after Duchamp, 
deflation becomes a matter of art's relationship to general social technique, and not a 
problem internal to the painterly representation of the figure. In this sense deflation is 
what happens to technique in art across of all art's skill-bases once de-skilling becomes 
a socially objective fact. 
34 See for example, Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-Garde, op cit 
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deflationary content is rarely commented on. With the shift to a deflationary logic 
outside the painting, the position of the artist also shifts. The artists marks, 
breaks, interrupts the surface of the painting - the artist thereby reaching into the 
space of the painting - in a way that signals that the painting is now historically 
'in the way', so to speak, of art's technical demands. That is, Picasso and Braque 
recognise that the problem of making a convincing painting is also now an 
external one: paintings can be made and accomplished without carrying through 
painting as an aesthetically bounded totality. Paintings can be made of alien, non-
painterly things, and as such they can be made with very little labour. Or rather, 
painting can easily incorporate non-painterly things without failing as paintings 
or as autonomous aesthetic objects. 
This objectification of art's deflationary's logic in the form of the readymade in 
the artwork is what represents the great seismic shift of 20th century art. 
Modernist art's negations are now directed not just to the genres and conventions 
of painting, but to the formal hierarchies in which painting is itself positioned.35 
Art's negations are now located in opposition to/and tension with, the forms of 
painting. Duchamp, of course, is the first artist to systematize this break, through 
the readymade, providing the ground rules for the deflationary strategies of 20th 
century art. By locating meaning in the aesthetically chosen found object (that is 
the object of artistic discrimination) the artist is no longer bounded by the 
expressive demands of a covering a surface, but by the demands of organizing, 
and giving meaning to, extant signs and objects. "It is a kind of rendezvous" said 
Duchamp. 36 The deflationary content of art is subject to the thoroughgoing 
35 For recent discussions of the relations between modernist painting and the readymade, 
see Thierry De Duve, Kant After Duchamp, MIT, 1996, and David Joselit, Infinite 
Regress: Marcel Duchamp1910-1941, MIT, 1998 
36 Marcel Duchamp, The Essential Writings of Marcel Duchamp, edited by Michael 
Sanouillet & Elmer Peterson, Thames and Hudson, 1975 p32 
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dismantling of the metaphysics of hand, of handicraft, of the handmade. This 
means the eye and the hand experience a general redirection through the 
deflationary impact of the readymade. If the post-cubist painter is compelled to 
place something into the space of the painting in order to render that space 
believable as a painting, the Duchampian artist is free to place any object in any 
art context, without recourse to the organizational disci pline of the painterly 
frame. The production of meaning as the act of placing becomes indeterminate in 
this sense. Hence, if in the post-cubist painting hand and eye are no longer 
contained by the dictates of bringing coherence to an orderly progression mark-
making, in the Duchampian artist this freedom becomes limitless. This means that 
the readymade's deflationary logic invites more than a critique of painting's 
circumscribed sense of artistic craft. Rather, what is important about the 
readymade is that it reorders the way hand and eye have traditionally determined 
the form and content of art. The Duchampian readymade disperses the hand and 
eye to a world of signifers and materials that require forms of mapping, 
superimposition and coordination other than those circumscribed by painterly 
forms. This means that Duchampian deflation is not simply a negation of the 
status of painting, but an actual extension of art's competences. The deflation of 
painting carries with it the inflationary force of non-aesthetic technical skills, 
skills drawn from other cognitive and practical domains: film, photography, 
architecture, literature, philosophy, just as the separation of conception from 
execution places the artist's labour within an extended division of labour. 
Effectively, Duchampian deflation is the historical site where art's negation is 
brought into alignment with the technical base of early 20th century mass 
production. 
In this regard the convergence between Duchampian deflation and mass 
production, impacts with the huge drive to cultural democracy after the Russian 
revolution. The revol utionary transformation of the artisanal base of the old 
academy in Russia, brings the inflationary possibilities of non-aesthetic skills in 
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art into conjunction with the demands of cultural democracy and the institutional 
demolition of bourgeois artistic forms. There is a massive disinvestment of art 
from both the confines of singular authorship and from auratic, or privativized. 
forms of spectatorship. Mechanical reproduction becomes the motor of art's 
passage into the everyday and collective experience. By the 1920s. then, the 
deflationary content of art had shed much of its intra-painting content, to be 
identifiable solely with the revolutionary appropriation of non-art practices. 
Constructivism and productivism, for example, are central to this transformation. 
37 The singular discrete (painterly) object is dissolved into the extra-artistic 
demands of social transformation (architecture, public monuments, propaganda, 
design). Art object and social process coincide. In this light it is perhaps a 
misjudgement actually to call this process deflationary: for the moment of 
ironization, belittlement, adulteration. that is constitutive of modernism's intra-
painterly deflationary logic has passed into the production of an art without the 
art turning its host. In short, first negation has passed into second negation. It is 
better to call this period of radical cultural democracy art's dissolution into social 
technik. (the unification of technology, technique and artistic form). Yet, if 
deflation is not what happened strictly to the production of art in the 1920s in the 
Soviet Union, the deflationary is certainly what continues to bring this brief 
moment to our attention, and what defines its reception in the US and Europe in 
the 1950s and I960s. The ironized strategies of certain kinds of American art in 
the I950s and I 960s (Fluxus, Ed Keinholz, Ed Ruscha and Andy Warhol) are 
directly indebted to the (faded) memory of the radical democratic content of the 
deflationary-democratic content of the Soviet and European-Sovietized avant-
garde of the 1920s. But with the Stalinist and Nazi destruction of the avant-garde. 
and with the global reconstitution of art within the confines of the market after 
WW II, the memory of this deflationary content of art is brought back into the 
37 For a discusssion of Constructivism and Productivism and the re-definition of artistic 
labour, see Victor Margolin, The Struggle for Utopia: Rodchenko, Lissitzky, Moholy-Nagy. 
1917-1946, University of Chicago, 1997 
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ironized domain of neo-avant-garde first negation. Nevertheless, if this is the 
deflation of deflation of itself, the return of deflation to first negation, though, is 
qualitatively different from the early years of modernism - the years of Manet and 
Picasso. For irrespective of the dissolution of the early avant-garde, the 
intervening historical presence of the Soviet and European avant-garde means 
that art's deflationary logic now carries with it the collective memory of the 
revolutionary Event. Art's first negations under capitalism might discount the 
claims of second negation, but these negations enter the imaginary space of first 
negations. And this intrusion is something that hard defenders of autopoietic first 
negation, like Luhmann, fail to register. This is why even an artist like Warhol 
who had no explicit radical agenda in the late 1950s, could, in the period from the 
early sixties up to 1968, invoke the term 'Commonism' to describe his 
commitment to an 'assembly-line' art. 38 This commitment admittedly didn't last 
long, yet it points to how after WWll second-negation continues to haunt and 
inscribe the first negations of avant-garde practices. Even in those practices that 
return to some model of painterly sensuousness, such as Abstract Expressionism, 
there is embedded in their anxious negations of figure-ground relations and the 
eradication of representation, the utopian moment of second negation.39 
Indeed, the burying of second negation in the neo-avant-gardes of the 60s, finally 
explodes into view with Conceptual art in the late sixties, as American 
Modernism's attenuated version of first negation in the writings of Greenberg 
came to look merely like a version of crisis management. Conceptual art is the 
moment in recent memory where first-negation and second-negation meet 
(openly) again.40 The revolutionary impact of May 68 did not produce 
Conceptual art - that is clear - however, it did allow art's deflationary dynamic to 
38 For a discussion of the term 'Commonism', see Caroline A. Jones, Machine in the 
Studio: Constructing the Postwar Artist, University of Chicago, 1996 
39 T J Clark, offers a hint of this in Farewell to an Idea: Episodes From a History of 
Modernism, Yale University Press, 1999 
40 Conceptual art is the point where the deflationary characteristics of modernism are 
repositioned within the deflected radicalism of the neo-avant-garde. 
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pass back over Modernism into some reengagement with the social and the 
political as first-order activities. Conceptual art's critique of authorship, the 
deprivileging of painterly sensuousness, the erosion of the division between 
image and text, and the rejection of the museum as the primary exhibition space 
of art in favour of the small private gallery, brought first negation back into the 
realm of second negation. The dissolution of form and the re-expansion of art's 
technical base reconnected modernism to the interdisciplinarity of the early 
avant-garde. Art again became linked to a critique of the division of labour. By 
exchanging studio fabrication for industrial fabrication, artisanal production for 
group production, the foundry and the canvas for the photo-lab and the kitchen, 
the museum for the non-artistic context, art was reopened to the avant-garde' s 
liquidation of the barrier between artistic technique and general social technique. 
The collective production and extra-studio location of art became the constitutive 
means of producing new artistic publics. 
But if these processes were soon subject to retardation and re-enclosure by the 
art-market this does not obviate their historical penetration of the technical 
domain of art. Indeed, Conceptual art reveals how much first negation and second 
negation are now intertwined at the point of art's production and reception. We 
live in an epoch where the possibility of second negation is implicated in the 
technical and aesthetic decisions taken in the domain of first negation. The 
liquidation of the barrier between artistic technique and general social technique 
is the everyday horizon of art after Conceptual art. However, this is not to say that 
this constitutes a democracy of art in waiting, as assumed in much critical 
postmodernism .. ~l But rather, that the technical 'deskilling' of art after 
Conceptual art is not, as in conservative opinion, evidence of the dissol ution of 
artistic value, but its actual equalization. Oeskilling, in other words, is where 
41 See for instance, Carol Squires ed., The Critical Image: Essays on Contemporary 
Photography, Bay Press, 1990 
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second negation - as general social technique - is produced and sustained. 42 
Similarly, this is not to say that the presence of second negation in the technical 
domain of contemporary art constitute the materials for pre-revolutionary 
practice, but, rather, that its utopian content is inscri bed in the finite actuality of 
everyday practices. Second negation ghosts first negation. It is the thing that the 
autopoiesis of first negation cannot suppress, the thing that autopoiesis 
continually calls on to mark its marked-unmarked space. And, essentially, this is 
what these chapters, with their different voices and materials, are concerned with: 
the infiltration, or memory, or unconscious trace of second-negation in the 
dominant art of first negation of our times. 
As a consequence many of the practices I talk about (Bank's grotesqueries, 
Emma Kay's memorization of the Bible and Shakespeare and Rod Dickinson's 
crop-circles) have a host-like or residual feel to them in their relationship to the 
recent traditions and forms of the modern in art; and, as result, this is why notions 
of 'amateurism', 'incompetence', 'ventriloquism' and 'iatrogenesis' are so 
important for reading the art's aporias and absences of this art. The deflationary 
strategies of these artists produce a concrete delimitation of what constitutes skill 
and value in art, which leaves the viewer with a strong sense of the work's 
'failure'. Hence my reading of this art is not about stepping forward to defend the 
emergence of a new and robust tradition. The art after post-conceptualism, after 
critical postmodernism, does not constitute some confident winning back of the 
cultural high-ground. On the contrary its qualities and achievements are shot 
through with all the inherited insecurities and disabled fealties of the epoch - only 
more so. These diminished expectations, in turn. leave these deflationary 
strategies in a very different position to that of the deflationary in modernism we 
are accustomed to and which I have already discussed. There is an overriding 
42 For a discussion of deskilling and production see, Harry Braverman, Labor and 
Monoply Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, introduction by John 
Bellamy Foster, Monthly Review Press, 1998 
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sense in contemporary practice that the artist is a 'faded' category, something 
which is hollowed out, epicene even. (Remember this is a generation whose 
relationship to the artist-myths of Romanticism is even more denuded than that of 
Conceptual art). The artist is seen merely as an ensemble of (limited) skills and 
attributes, hence the extensive move within this generation to collaborative 
practice and group work.43 But this 'fading' of the artist is not a posture, or an 
expression of the critical 'defeat' of art. Under bourgeois democracy there can be 
no demise of art. This 'fading', rather, is the extenuated internalization of art's 
cultural crisis. It is, therefore, a symptom of art's limited social praxis, and 
consequently as an experience of historical and political constraint not so easily 
ameliorated or transmuted. Artists of confident first-order second negation indeed 
exist, and some of the most interesting art-theoretical work currently being done 
is, paradoxically in this area.44 But this work is always being recalled to the 
'artworld', so to speak, in order to make itself visible as art. The social and 
political criteria required for first-order negation to function transparently as the 
liquidation of the barrier between artistic technique and social technique do not 
exist at present. And this is why the 'faded' artistic category of the amateur, in 
particular, is so significant for the claims of this thesis. 
The amateur's rebuke 
I became concerned with the category of the amateur in the mid-1990s whilst 
working on my book on photography the Art of Interruption: Realism, 
Photography and the El'eryday (1998)45 and on the edited collection The 
Impossible Docliment: Photography and Conceptual Art in Britain, 1966- I 976 
43 See John Roberts and Stephen Wright eds., special issue on Collaboration, Third 
Text, December 2004. 
44 See for example the work associated with the cultural/political journals Mouvements 
and Multitudes in Paris, and The Newspaper of the Engaged Platform in St.Petersburg. 
45 John Roberts, The Art of Interruption: Realism, Photography and the Everyday, 
Manchester University Press, 1998 
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(1997).46 It had become clearer to me - tentatively confirmed by my experience 
of the new art in Britain and the US in the 1990s - that the category of the 
amateur provided an important framework for exploring the links between artistic 
subjectivity and the deflationary dynamics of nineteenth and twentieth century art 
.47 This was particularly the case in the area of photography, where the 
withdrawal from, or critique of, professional notions of skill, finesse and fine-art 
ideology, had played a key part in the theorization of photography's self-declared 
cognitive distance from painting and its would-be democratic ethos from the 
1920s onwards. What photography's mass reproducibility opened up, with its 
standardization of artistic skills, was the erosion of the distinction between 
specialist and non-specialist. The history of photography is inseparable from this 
profound dismantling of art's application of traditional skills, and is thus 
precisely a history of the corruption and dissolution of professionally endorsed 
fine-art ideology. Nevertheless the notion of the amateur does not really exist in 
the theories and practices of photography from the 1920s to Conceptual art. It has 
a residual empirical presence, particularly in Conceptual art, but not an explicit 
theoretical one. This is because its theoretical cognates - the author as producer, 
the artist as non-specialist, the artist as technician - held the political high-
ground.48 But, as the political high-ground fell away in the early seventies, the 
46 John Roberts, ed, The Impossible Document: Photography and Conceptual Art in 
Britain, Camerawords, 1997 
47 This theorization of the amateur had been predated from the mid-eighties by an 
interest on my part in Terry Atkinson's notion of painterly 'botching' and Leon Golub's 
notion of painterly 'awkwardness'. 'Botching' for Atkinson was a conceptual-art derived 
constraint on 'representational transparency'. The introduction of caricature, 
misregistration and anachronistic detail in his WW1 drawings deflated the hubris of social 
realist truthfulness (while remaining faithful to some notion of realist relevance and 
adequacy in art). Golub's notion of 'awkwardness' was derived from trying to match the 
immanent uncertainty of painting with the cognitive violence of mass culture. Both, 
though, derived their impetus from the modernist necessity for gaucherie. The debate on 
incompetence and competence didn't develop far in the 1980s. This had much to do with 
its location in painting, which linked incompetence primarily to 'pictorial breakdown' or 
adulteration. See also TJ Clark, on this question, 'Arguments About Modernism: A Reply 
to Michael Fried', in ed., Francis Frascina, Pollock and After: The Critical Debate, Harper 
& Row, 1985 
48 See for example, Allan Sekula, Dismal Science, Photo Works 1972-1996, University 
42 
generally undertheorized category of the amateur, in an ironic reversal, became 
available for political theorization. That is, in a situation where the transformative 
functions of avant-garde culture were blocked, it represented a place where 
avant-garde subjectivity could continue to be explored. Hence its constitutive 
place within the deflationary dynamics of contemporary art. Two essays also 
published in the mid-1990s, confirmed and developed this argument for me, Jeff 
Wall's "'Marks of Indifference": Aspects of Photography, in, or as, Conceptual 
Art' (1995),49 , which traced the presence of the amateur in and out of 
photographic Modernism, and Art & Language's 'We Aim to Be Amateurs' 
(1996), which presented a polemical identification between the group's critique 
of professionalized postmodern modes and the disaffirmative content of the 
parochiaIllocaI. 50 On this basis, the amateur was able to take on a clearer 
functional identity for me. I would argue that the amateur is one of the key 
mediatory figures in contemporary practice because of the way it' stabilizes' the 
performance of scepticism and the fading of the artist across the divide between 
first negation and second negation. The amateur represents both an imaginary 
figure or ego ideal that secures a space for the deflationary in art against 
institutional professionalisation; and the 'democratic' expression of art's 
technological equalization of skill. It is a disaffirmative figure, a figure that 
identifies with 'failure' and cultural exclusion as the price of authentic 
expression, for it is only in the realm of 'failure' (of that which doesn't meet 
prevailing criteria of success), that the new and unanticipated, and therefore the 
non-heteronomous in art, might emerge. 
Galleries of llinois State University, 1999 
49 Jeff Wall,"'Marks of Indifference": Aspects of Photography, in, or as, Conceptual Art', in 
eds., Ann Goldstein and Anne Rorimer, Reconsidering the Object of Art: 1965-1975, 
Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles, 1995 
50 Art & Language, 'We Aim to Be Amateurs', Kunstalle St.Gallen, 1996. See also 'We 
Aimed to Be Amateurs', in Alex Alberro and Blake Stimpson, eds, Conceptual Art, MIT, 
2000 
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What distinguishes the amateur is that he or she is a 'low cultural figure', a figure 
of cultural exclusion and disdain. But this does not necessarily make him or her 
technically incompetent. Rather, as a figure who aspires to, but fails meet to 
professional standards, the amateur's failure lies in his or her inability to see what 
these requirements consist of, and this can take the form, equally, of technical 
bravura as of technical incompetence. For example many amateur painters and 
photographers are eager to reproduce techniques that appear to have a high-
cultural imprimatur, or mimic the most technically advanced aspects of the art of 
the moment. Conversely there are professional artists (artists who are identified 
by the profession as artists) who are inadvertently or self-consciously 
incompetent technically. The first kind of amateur is overlooked no matter what 
he or she achieves, the latter is not, irrespective of how amateurish or lacking in 
adroitness their work is. The modern artist's identification with the amateur, then, 
does not lie in actual feelings of cultural exclusion, but in the way cultural 
exclusion forces the amateur to strives and fail, strive and fail in order to reach 
their desired object. For in this failure to achieve a professional identity lies the 
dilemma of modern art the necessity of 'mis-seeing' or mistranslation as the 
source of artistic autonomy. Modern art therefore finds an inverted or displaced 
avant-gardism in the amateur artist's failure to stabilise his or her object of desire. 
This in turn finds its metonymic expression for the modern artist in the 'low 
forms' and perceived technical awkwardness of the amateur aspirant. Much 
contemporary art, with its encoding of incompetence-as-competence, and a DIY 
sensibility, embraces these strategies. But, of course, the modern artist at no point 
seeks to be an amateur in any strict and unambiguous sense (see Chapter 6). The 
modern artist-as-amateur is, rather, a performative identity.51 The artist only 
claims to be an amateur - or amateurish - in so far as he or she does not want to 
be seen as a particular kind of professional: an artist possessed of what passes 
51 See John Roberts, 'In Character', in ed., Charles Harrison, Art & Language in Practice 
,Vol 2, Fundaci6 Antoni Tapies, Barcelona, 1999 
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institutionally for competence and' good taste' .52 The modern artist-as-amateur, 
then, is a struggle over art's relationship to inherited practices, forms of attention 
and cultural identities, on the basis that these inherited practices, forms of 
attention and identities lead art in to heteronomy and the academic. The amateur, 
consequently, is by no means a uniquely 20th century figure. In fact it has been 
singularly important to the deflationary moves and strategies of Western 
modernist art of the last 150 years. Manet and Picasso did not actually profess 
amateurism, but nevertheless their gaucherie is metonymically linked to that of 
the amateur, for to paint inchoately is to deliberately invite accusations of 
professional incompetence. The amateur, therefore, is the deflationary figure par 
excellence of modern art's self-exculpation, the figure that shadows modern art's 
restive relationship to its classical forbears. But this performance of the amateur 
today is qualitati vely different from the modernisms of the past, insofar as after 
Duchamp, and after Conceptual art, the amateur has become the counter-cultural 
figure of our times. In fact so advanced is the critique of traditional and modern 
professionalization in contemporary art that art is now largely tutored within this 
framework. Staged incompetence and formal dissoluteness have become the 
modern academic language of the moment. Where does this leave the figure of 
the amateur and where does it leave the issue of deflation? 
The figure of the amateur has been thoroughly incorporated into the technical 
relations of contemporary art. By this I mean that it now functions as an internal 
form of 'self-censorship' when the artist is faced with the threat of the internal or 
external aestheticization of his or her practice. The artist restricts what he or she 
defines as skilful in advance for fear of producing something too knowing, too 
clever, too familiar, too polished, too seeking in approval. The amateurish is not a 
position the artist adopts in opposition to the percei ved constraints of an 
immovable academic tradition, as was the case in early modernism and the avant-
garde. Rather, it is a set of 'no-dos' and forms of attention that delimit -
52 Thanks to Mike Baldwin for discussions on these points. 
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contextually - what or what is not acceptable. And this turns crucially on the issue 
of how artistic skill is perceived by the artist in the wake of the way the 
readymade has stripped the conventional pictorial and artisanal competences from 
art's making. 
The amateur as a category now operates in a post-readymade art-world in which 
the advanced technical relations of art are available to everyone, irrespective of 
their professional schooling. This means that pretty much anyone can produce art 
that looks like advanced art. The acknowledgement of formal incompetence has 
become diminished. Accordingly, this involves a change in how we identify 
amateurism as an artistic category. Whereas to paint inchoately like Manet in 
Dejeuner sur l'herbe was to invite accusations of amateurism because of its 
failure to reach an academic norm, and therefore to claim the amateur as the 
authentic 'other' to bourgeois culture, to arrange a group of found photographs in 
a manner similar to the ordinary family album, for example, is today to invite an 
identification between art and non-artistic practices, and therefore to accept that 
art's skills are open to the non-artist. The skills of the amateur and professional 
become interchangeable. This means that with the equivalization of artistic skills 
after the ready made the definition of the amateur has tended to shift into its 
'democratic' register: amateurism as a concept of shared social technique. 
This is something I analyze at length in Part 2 on photography after Conceptual 
Art. Since Conceptual art, photography has been the primary area where the 
identity of the amateur and the equalization of artistic skills has been debated. 
Indeed, as an avant-garde cognate of the artist-as-technician the amateur here is 
explored as a kind of footnote to Walter Benjamin's familiar productivist 
understanding of the photographer as a new category of artist. 53 As a result the 
amateur becomes the avant-garde figure that is generalisable for advanced art in 
53 Walter Benjamin, 'The Author as Producer', in Victor Burgin, ed., Thinking Photography, 
Macmillan 1982 
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conditions where second-negation artistic identities such as artist-engineer or 
artist-technician are not so easily amenable to appropriation. Hence, in these 
terms the amateur is the figure that mediates between first negation and second 
negation on the basis of the figure's openness to the democratization of art's 
skills. The amateur becomes the (ironized, reflective, self-deflecting) bridge 
between artistic technique and general social technique under conditions of art's 
limited social praxis. This is why deflation in art is no longer merely an intra-
artistic or intra-painting question, but the permanently deflected convergence of 
artistic technique and general social technique. The deflationary strategies of 
contemporary art are conscious or unconscious placeholder for second negation, 
glimpses of the Absolute in the actual, to borrow Hegel's formulation. 54 This 
leaves the deflationary strategies of contemporary art in a paradoxical position: 
their very assimilation as common practice dissolves their functional distance 
from bourgeois culture into the modern bourgeois autopoietic. Which, in turn, 
means that the deflationary as the 'new' requires greater power of internal 
differencing in order to sustain its logic. That which is deflationary is now caught 
up in its own internal deflationary tendency. 
The question of the significance of these deflationary strategies is at the material 
core of this thesis. It is what I try to elaborate and evaluate through various case 
studies ( Part 2 and Part 3) and various theoretical interventions ( Part 1). This is 
not to say, however, that case study and theoretical analysis are separated in Part 
2 and Part 3. Thus, by drawing the deflationary into the dialectic of first negation 
and second negation I propose that we need to understand its strategies if we are 
to understand the autopoiesis of first negation in modern and contemporary art. 
Deflation, in other words, is the very motor of art's semiotic labour on its own 
conditions of possibility. But as I have also adumbrated, as a mediation of second 
negation, it also represents the transcendental ground of autopoiesis. This is why 
54 G.W.F Hegel, Science of Logic, translated by William Wallace, with a foreward by J.N. 
Findlay, Oxford University Press, 1975 
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the deflationary strategies of works which appear ostensibly antipathetic to overt 
political reading, can often carry the displaced dynamism of second negation or 
the utopian content of general social technique. 
yBas, philistines, and aesthetes 
This capacity of ostensibly non-critical work to carry second-negation meaning 
was reflected in much of the new art in Britain in the early-to-mid 1990s, where 
the figure of the 'faded' artist and the faux-amateur dominated the output of a 
local neo-conceptualism. This art has gone under the monicker of Young British 
Art, and since its emergence has received an enormous amount of press attention, 
although very little serious criticism.55 Much of it has suffered from either 
condescension or bland encomiums. Indeed, the general conflation of the art with 
the sins of narcissism, whimsy and cynicism, fails to distinguish very different 
moments and projects within its orbit, and in doing so, refuses or conceals what is 
conceptually productive about the disorderliness and delinquency of the art as a 
whole: its engagement with subjectivity and the mass mediation of the capitalist 
everyday in the languages of distraction and compulsion.The attention the work 
has received, therefore, has been in banal disproportion to what has made the 
work compelling: its refusal to invest in art as anything other than a contingent 
and 'ordinary' category of experience. My interest here is in how various 
deflationary strategies and modes of attention bear upon this commitment to the 
would-be 'ordinary' and contingent (the diaristic and confessional, distracted 
pleasures and autodidactic know ledges), and, in turn, how these commitments 
function as a resistance to, and an expression of. social and cultural division. 
Consequently, these commitments presuppose two related questions: in what 
ways has art's sceptical performance of itself as a category in the 1990s 
55 Julian Stallabrass's High-Art Lite, Verso, 2000, attempted to remedy this. But as with 
many yBa supporters he was unwilling to recognise what is conceptually significant 
about the art. Stallabrass moved from an initial position of support of yba, to a general 
critique. 
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embedded itself in popular modes of attention? and, as such, how is the 
deflationary mediated by the popular? Indeed, these were the major lines of 
enquiry that faced anyone in the mid-1990s trying to come to terms with the new 
art. 56 But, as I have stressed in my criticism of critical postmodernism above, for 
me these are not questions about the postmodern incorporation of the popular 
sign into critical practice. On the contrary my interest in the new art's 
engagement with the 'ordinary' lies in the way it openly rejects any intellectual 
condescension towards the popular, that is, the way it identifies the popular not so 
much with 'accessibility', but with the more cognitively interesting notion of 
'shared subjectivity'. In this art the use of popular pleasures and modes of 
attention are taken as the pregiven terrain of critical practice. In these terms my 
concern lay with how the popular was being put to work in the new art. and how 
this continued or deflected the deflationary drive of modern practice. It was 
important, therefore, in order to register the cultural di visions external and 
internal to popular culture to explore the ways in which first negations were 
produced out of the forms of popular culture, and how deflation was produced out 
of, and as a critique of, the popular. This has created a need for a renewed 
development of the theory of art's alienation, and the concept of the philistine in 
my writing in the late 1990s has, I think, contri buted to this. 
Faced with the general incorporation of art into an expanded 'popular culture' a 
theory of artistic subject and spectator that was adequate to the divisions and 
occl usions of both high-culture and popular culture was needed. But this had to 
be theory that refused to see the resolution of these divisions in the popular, as 
critical postmodernism and cultural studies have tended to do. What is productive 
about the philistine here is that it is identifiable with the culturally excluded, but, 
as an empirical entity, it could not be said to reside in the realm of the dominated 
56 For a significant overview of these debates, see David Burro~s, ed., W~o's Afr~i? of 
Red, White & Blue? attitudes to popular & mass culture, celebnty. alternatIve & cntlcal 
practice & identity politics in recent British art, ARTicle Press, 1997 
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and the popular. Philistine rejection of learned culture is not translatable simply 
into a defence a/popular culture. It is too disaffirmative as category to equate 
with the pleasures of the popular image and text. Consequently it took on a 
fugitive and viral character, discharging its negativity into the realms of the 
populist and aesthete alike. Thus by looking at the idea of the philistine, counter-
intuitively, as a productive critique of aesthetic experience from within both 
popular culture and high-culture, the concept became emblematic of the wider 
cultural shifts in contemporary art and in the transformed conditions of art's 
autonomy. With the increasing production of art within the realm of the popular, 
art of necessity has to define its autonomy from within this process of 
assimilation. Some of this debate is evident in a number of the following chapters 
(in particular Chapter 5 and 6), but on the whole I do not make much reference in 
the thesis to the philistine. This is because I do not want the concept to be seen as 
a master code for understanding the deflationary in contemporary art. The 
philistine and the deflationary are not the same thing. Although the deflationary is 
clearly mediated by the effects of cultural and social di vision, it is not in itself a 
mode of attention as philistinism is. Similarly, to deflate something maybe 
cognate with the moment of negation in philistinism (the rejection of dominant or 
required taste), but deflation and philistinism are driven by very different 
expectations. Deflation is a concept internal to art, and philistinism is not. That is, 
philistinism is the internalisation of cultural exclusion as a judgement upon 
aesthetic experience, and therefore a judgement that is not necessarily specific to 
art. This is one of the reasons I have excluded my essay 'Mad for It!: 
Philistinism, the New British Art and the Everyday' - what might have been 
thought of as a companion text for Chapter 10 - from this collection. 57 Gi ven the 
link I establish between the philistine and various deflationary attributes of the 
new art, the polemical emphasis on the philistine in this article is open to 
57 John Roberts, 'Mad For It! Philistinism, the New British Art and the Everyday', Third 
Text, No 35, Summer 1996. This is extended version of the piece which appeared in 
Everything magazine, No 18, op cit. 
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misunderstanding 
The idea of the philistine as the more aggressive twin of the amateur is, 
nevertheless, something that haunts the deflationary logic of this thesis. It runs 
like a thread - or sore, if you like - through this collection. But what makes 
amateur and philistine estranged partners in the end is that the aggression and 
intractability of the philistine is not so amenable to artistic performativity: the risk 
is too great. To push the philistine into the open, so to speak, is to face the weight 
of its reactive prehistory as a concept, which no amount of radical counter-
intuitive work can easily dislodge. But if this is precisely why the concept 
possesses real cultural power, it doesn't make it any easier for artists and writers 
to identify openly with it, or perform it. Unlike the amateur, the philistine puts the 
very possibility of a bridge between artistic technique and general social 
technique under threat. Its resistance 'from below' to art (from below the 
threshold of appropriate aesthetic jUdgement) does not necessarily issue in a 
commitment to anti-art and the renewal of art's autonomy. It can just as easily 
issue in the eradication of art altogether. Hence the philistine courts nihilism in 
the way the amateur does not. But this does not make it of any less significance 
for contemporary art and the position of art generally in relation to cultural and 
social division. This is because as the ambiguous agency of anti-art, the philistine, 
or philistine modes of attention, perform the required violation of bourgeois 
cultural values that is necessary for the emergence of second negation. No 
revolution is possible without acts of iconoclasm and the destruction of the 
ossified social relations of bourgeois cultural production, just as no autonomous 
art practice today is conceivable without art's resistance to its own 
aestheticization. This is why, as I mentioned earlier, despite the seeming political 
indifference of various aspects of art in the 1990s, its' philistine' mediation of the 
popular was a way of pushing back the creeping aestheticization of art's social 
relations, particularly on the left. Indeed, the turn to collaborati ve work in a lot of 
art in this period, was, in these terms, precisely an expression of a resistance to 
the notion of the 'return to aesthetics' as a substitute for politics. This anti-
aestheticism, unfortunately has been written out of the recent histories of this 
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moment. The critical subterfuges of the new art have been exchanged for either a 
PR celebration of a new version of a (depoliticized) British of American Pop art 
or, conversely, a dismissal of the period as a falling away from the rigours of 70s 
high-seriousness. Seriousness though comes in many forms. This is because art's 
deflationary logic cannot be secured against some imagined notion of stable 
critical practice. It is always a rejoinder or rebuke to the notion of art's 
unassailable virtue. It is craven therefore to assume that art which supposedly 
negates its own 'best interests' does not open onto to the Absolute. For to attack 
one's own 'best interests' is not simply an act of self-abnegation, or rather it 
doesn't end in self-abnegation; it's a way of testing the very limits of first 
negation. 
Epilogue 
This thesis represents just over five years of work on the problems of 
contemporary art and culture. As I noted at the beginning my critical and 
theoretical voice tends to shift from essay to essay and from section to section. 
But if Part 1, is the most apparently philosophical of all the sections, there is a 
general philosophical debt to Adorno throughout the writing. In fact Adorno is 
the bridge between the notion of the primacy of negation of this thesis and 
various aspects of my work over the last ten years. For example, it is Adorno's 
passing remarks on the philistine in Aesthetic Theory (1970),58 that provided one 
of the added spurs to myself and Dave Beech in the mid-1990s to think through 
the concept of the philistine in relation to the problems of contemporary culture 
and what we dubbed the New Aestheticism.59 Similarly without the rigorous 
precedent of Adorno the dialectical theory of culture here would either be an 
impossibility or severely diminished (despite the absence of a theory of second 
58 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, translated by C.Lenhardt, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1984 
59 See Dave Beech and John Roberts 'The Spectres of the Aesthetic', New Left Review, 
No 218, July August, 1996, reprinted in Dave Beech and John Roberts, The Philistine 
Controversy, Verso 2002 
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negation in Adorno, Adorno, par excellence, is the theorist of first negation). This 
is why this thesis is of necessity post-Adornian in its Adornian defence of 
autonomy and the possibility of the avant-garde. Section 2 expands this 
dialectical logic in relation to the problems of contemporary photography as the 
possible ground of art's deflationary content today. 
Photography is where artistic technique and general social technique continue to 
meet at their most explicit, as they did for the original avant-garde. But today 
there can be no unmediated defence of photography as general social technique, 
as if photography was enabling of social transformation in the way it was held to 
be in the 1920s and 1930s. Photography has passed into the realm of general 
aesthetic discourse, as evidenced by its widespread assimilation into the canon of 
modern art in the museum. Section 2 addresses this issue as one of the defining 
problems of art's deflationary logic now. Photography and artists' film as the 
great avant-garde disrespectors of the painterly colonization of aesthetics, have 
themselves fallen under its institutional gaze, requiring that photography re-
examine its institutional location. But if photography is now subject to the 
aesthetic discourse of the art institution, this does obviate what remains 
intractable about it as medi um: its spontaneity once placed in the hands of the 
non-specialist, and its power of ostension, the fact that the photographer' points' 
at things and in doing so is engaged (potentially) in an act of interruption, a break 
in the continuum of alienated appearances. This latter represents the 'traumatic' 
content of the photographic document; and this, I argue, still has a significant 
critical and deflationary function, as evidenced by the various and widespread 
uses of the snapshot in contemporary practice. Finally, Part 3 employs a 
philosophical art history to explore the continuities and discontinuities of 
Conceptual art in the art of the late 1990s. The art of the 1990s doesn't simply 
rehearse the moves and strategies of Conceptual art. On the contrary, as I have 
stressed, it transcribes them into a new intellectual context by asking them a 
different set of questions. The notion of a philosophised art history is pertinent 
here, then, particularly in relation to my defence of a dialectical art theory 
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informed by an Hegelian model of first negation and second negation. For both 
conventional art history and radical art history studiously avoid the conceptual 
problem of form and meaning. The development of art is either narrated as the 
aesthetic resolution of inherited artistic problems or as the history of possible or 
failed social interventions.60 It is rarely discussed as a problem of critical 
emergence, of art's forms' winning or asserting a space for themselves in the face 
of all those forces - artistic and social - that would delimit its conceptual novelty. 
As a consequence of this, art history fails to address how the 'new' in art remains 
a problem of intellectual speculation, relying too frequently instead on a 
normative understanding of value. But over a hundred and fifty years of the 
modern in art suggests otherwise. For the 'new' is not a falling away from the 
past or recent past, or simply a reversal of the achievements of the past, just as it 
is not the place where the past is sleekly superseded. One of the demands of 
dialectical art theory is that it resists art history's premature judgements on the 
'new' (as much as it spoils the empty celebration of the contemporary). The 
'new', rather, is the place where the past is reinscribed in the light of the 
problems and historical blockages of the present. Historicism in contrast - as the 
other of dialectical theory - only leads to the endless diffusion of the same as the 
new. 
60 See recently, for example, Thierry De Ouve's Kant After Duchamp, MIT Press, 1996 
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Part 1: Autonomy and the Avant - Garde 
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Chapter 1: After Adorno: Art, Autonomy, and Critique 
In conversation with two artist friends recently they both declared that Adorno 
was a far more serious and productive guide to their practices than any other 
philosopher or aesthetician. Given their work and histories as artists - one had 
lived through the period of conceptual art and had been won over briefly to its 
arguments, the other emerged out of its ruins - this was a surprise. Like many 
artists in the late seventies and early eighties both had fallen under the sway of 
Walter Benjamin, and were convinced, in their respective ways, that the 
dissolution of the category of Art into the forms of modern technology and 
everyday life was a good thing. Indeed both artists were proselytisers for 
photography and its powers of social reference and communality. Discussions of 
art's autonomy were not on their check list of priorities. In fact, if autonomy was 
discussed or thought of at all it was denounced as bourgeois and idealist. 
Autonomy was what Clement Greenberg and modernist painters believed in, and 
the bane of all materialist art criticism. It was not what serious post-conceptualist 
artists, armed with the 'critique of representation' and theories of the social 
production of art, should be worrying about. 
Today, however, the confidence of their admonitions has diminished 
considerably. Where there was a commitment to the possibility of a non-specialist 
audience for art, and a consideration of art's social role in their thinking, now 
there is a turn to the space and time and immanent problems of the artwork itself. 
The question of autonomy, accordingly, has resurfaced, only now in a setting 
which is far more sympathetic to its claims. 
Why is this so? It is of course highly dubious to credit the work of one author 
with effecting this kind of change. Yet, since the publication of Aesthetic Theory 
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in English in 1984, Adorno's writing has had an extensive influence on the 
rethinking of the question of autonomy in Anglophone art theory and 
philosophical aesthetics. Indeed, the views of my two anonymous artists are not 
that unusual~ Adorno's work has undergone a widespread revival of interest, 
generating by the late 1990s a minor academic industry in Europe and North 
America. This is because there is an increasing recognition that both the critique 
and the defence of autonomy have been undertheorized since the seventies~ and 
this being so, Adorno's work is well-placed to give a number of powerful reasons 
why. 
The return to Adorno, needs to be seen, therefore, as part of a deeper response to 
what is perceived as the wider crisis in art and theory in the wake of the 
institutional demise of American modernism and the successful rise of 
postmodernism prior to, and out of the ruins of, the collapse of European 
communism and the current crisis of the left. In fact it is the struggle over the 
ideological legitimation of postmodernism that has allowed Adorno to find a new 
critical readership today. For amongst anti-postmodernists Adorno is being read 
not so much as an elitist defender of high modernism - although of course some 
do read him in this way - but primarily as the scourge of the false or premature 
democracy of postmodernism. Despite postmodernism' s purported attack on 
elitism its critique of autonomy is judged as having produced little in the way of 
actual transformati ve social institutions and collective cultural practice. Since the 
late seventies the dominant form of postmodernism - critical postmodernism - has 
become linked with the cultural aspirations of the new middle class, as it 
reinvents the basis of artistic professionalism out of the struggles of feminism and 
anti-racism, post-colonial theory and queer theory. The outcome is a convergence 
61 
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory [1970] translated by C.Lenhardt, London, 
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in art between the critique of the mass media, social identity, representation and 
the institutions of art, and new forms of bourgeois social and academic 
administration. 
This influence of this liberal-left agenda within some of the major cultural and 
academic institutions of our time is seen by many as a progressive historical 
achievement. Modernism's dedifferentiated, socially abstract subject has been 
decisively challenged by the cultural impact of subaltern and marginalized 
subjectivities, irredeemably damaging the case against familiar conservative 
accusations of the 'lowering of standards'. But, if postmodernism is in a position 
of some strength against the critics of multiculturalism and' anti-aestheticism', it 
is extremely vulnerable when its claims to cultural emancipation are examined in 
the light of the narrow class composition of its social base. lust as 
postmodernism's critique of the avant-garde presents insuperable problems once 
art's negation of tradition is abandoned for the moral authority of social and 
political intervention. 
Indeed, it is the dissolution of the normative basis of modern art's negation of 
tradition that has generated the renewed interest in Adorno. For Adorno's defence 
of autonomy is based on the fundamental premise that art's continued critical 
potential rests on its resistance to the authority of tradition, whether or not this 
tradition speaks in the name of social emancipation and enlightenment. Without 
this process of renewal the transmission of value and meaning in art becomes 
subject to the positivity of an external, self-legitimating authority and the pieties 
of 'commitment'. In short, art defines itself through its received codes and 
protocols, denying the demands of the present in the name of the securities of the 
past. 
Given this, Adorno's defence of autonomy is not to be confused with the 
transcendental separation of art from its social base or traditional aesthetic 
58 
conservativism. Rather, autonomy is the name given to the process of formal and 
cognitive self-criticism which art must undergo in order to constitute the 
conditions of its very possibility and emergence. In a world which continually 
reduces the discursive and non-discursive complexities of art to the 
reconciliations of entertainment, fashion and (recently) social and cultural theory, 
this self-criticism is an ethical necessity. 
The postmodern critique of autonomy, then, confuses the process of self-criticism 
with simplistic modernist claims of formal development or advance in art. 
Accordingly, it fails to scrutinise its own academic and idealist conditions of 
production and reception, insisting that the technological dissol uti on of art into 
everyday life claimed by much contemporary practice makes the intimacy 
between formal values and ethics historically redundant. But this 
misunderstanding about autonomy is not confined to Adorno's postmodern 
critics. A number of Adorno's defenders are themselves guilty of traducing its 
dialectical content. The move' back to' to Adorno has also generated a proto-
conservative reading of autonomy, in which postmodernism is attacked without 
any proper critical consideration of the expanded social base of the bourgeois 
institutions of art in the 1980s and 1990s and the critical content of the art since 
conceptualism. 
Fifteen years after the publication of Aesthetic Theory, Adorno's new readership 
stands at the centre of a number of competing critiques of postmodernism. In the 
following I examine the claims of these positions in the ongoing debate on 
postmodernism and art, as the basis for an assessment of the possibility of 
Adorno's continuing relevance for philosophical aesthetics and art theory. 
It is possible to divide contemporary Adornian studies into five main categories: 
1) The dialogic critics of Adorno, as in the school of post-60s German Critical 
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Theory, specifically, JUrgen Habermas and Albrecht Wellmer; 2) Peter BUrger's 
Brechtian critique of Adorno's aesthetic autonomy as a retreat from social praxis; 
63 3) the philosophical defenders of Adorno as a radical aesthete, as in the writing 
of philosophers JM Bernstein, Andrew Bowie, and the recent translator of the 
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new edition of Aesthetic Theory, Robert Hullot-Kentor; 4) the anti-Habermasian 
interpretation of Adorno as the great theorist of 'totality' and 'reification', as in 
65 
Fredric Jameson; and 5) the defenders of Adorno as the dialectical theorist of 
autonomy, as in the philosophical aesthetics of Lambert Zuidervaart and Peter 
66 
Osborne. 
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Category (1) has affinities with the postmodern critique of Adorno and autonomy, 
despite its antipathy to postmodernism as a cultural category and philosophical 
phenomenon. 
Both Habermas and Well mer argue that Adorno's defence of autonomy is falsely 
opposed to instrumental rationality, and therefore, judge that the work of art is 
overdetermined as a model of truth. By insisting on autonomy as the basis of 
artistic value, Adorno opens up an irreconcilable gap between the artwork and 
socially shared knowledge and social transformation. In sum, Adorno's aesthetic 
theory for Habermas and Wellmer lacks any proper or reasonable dialogic 
content. This is because Adorno's hieratic model of reification reduces the 
conversational and communicative potential of the artwork to a bare minimum. In 
fact, Adorno always opposes the 'expressive' truth of the artwork to its socially 
communicative function. The upshot of this is that Adorno has no interest in how 
people actually experience and use works of art, how their content is mediated in 
everyday life. Art, insist Habermas and Wellmer, does not signify by virtue of its 
'intrinsic' expressi veness, but through the intersubjective agency of a given 
discursive community of reception. 
For Burger, in category (2), this objection to Adorno's would-be indifference to 
art's discursive functions, forms an explicit political defence of art as social 
praxis. Whereas Habermas and Wellmer reclaim the notion of art's autonomy 
under a quasi-Kantian transcendental reason, Burger dispenses with the dialectics 
of autonomy altogether. This is based on what Burger sees as Adorno's wilful 
historical misrepresentation of the role and function of the avant-garde. By 
subsuming the post-autonomous artistic claims of the original revolutionary 
Soviet and German avant-garde under the critical model of the modern neo-avant-
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garde, Adorno fails to recognise the qualitatively distinctive moment of the 
original, namely, that it broke with the high-cultural institutions of art. Adorno's 
model of autonomy simply continues the death-throes of art's aesthetic and 
esoteric specialization. 
Well mer's and Habermas's model has had a certain amount of influence, 
particularly within feminist cultural criticism, which sees Adorno's theory of 
autonomy as modelled on the repression of bodily pleasures and women's 
everyday experience. By insisting on modernism as the dissonant negation of 
sensual pleasure Adorno inherits the iconophobic rationalization of art in post-
Platonic philosophy. The Kantian and Hegelian skepticism about sensible form 
becomes the fear of sensuality as a loss of intellectual control, and as such an 
unconscious fear of bodily pleasure. However, as Sabine Wilke and Heidi 
Schlipphacke, argue, this is not because Adorno's modernism allows no place for 
sensuality and non-disaffirmative pleasures ( Adorno is keen on the somatic 
playfulness of the circus for instance), but that bodily pleasures and sexual 
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difference are left behind "on the trajectory towards aesthetic autonomy". 
Wilke and Schlipphacke note that this repression is there at the very beginning of 
Aesthetic Theory, when Adorno defines autonomy in emphatic Hegelian terms as 
a parting of the ways from bodily determination.With Romanticism "art 
emancipated itself from cuisine and pornography, an emancipation that has 
68 
become irrevocable". 
I n contrast to categories (l) and (2), Bernstein and Bowie in category. (3), defend 
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Adorno's dialectic of enlightenment against what is judged to be the sanguine and 
conciliatory critique of modernity in the dialogic model of art and the premature 
dissol uti on of art into everyday life in Burger. 
In this respect this position sets out to redefine the redemptive content of 
Adorno's claim for art's autonomy. In Adorno the defence of autonomy is 
construed ontologically, first and foremost, as a defence of aesthetic semblance or 
illusion. By this Adorno means that it is the artefactual character of the artwork 
that secures its autonomy, because it is the artefectual character of art which 
establishes the possibility of aesthetic rationality overcoming instrumental 
rationality. As socialised, non-coercieve labour, or purposeless purposiveness in 
the language of Kant, the artwork's fabricated uselessness is able to recall for the 
viewer the human, non-instrumental purpose of production. Famously this notion 
of aesthetic form as a redemption of alienated labour becomes a defence of what 
Adorno calls the process of mimesis internal to the autonomous artwork: its 
capacity to sustain a relationship of non-instrumental affinity between subject and 
object. Autonomous artworks, in this sense, both preserve and present the 
possibility of other kinds of experience. As Bernstein puts it: 
the question of aesthetic semblance is the question of the possibility of 
possibility, of a conception of possible experience that transcends what is now 
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taken to be the parameters of possible experience. 
From this perspective, Bernstein, Bowie and other radical aesthetes draw two 
si onificant conclusions from the notion of art as the enactment of a promise, 
b 
which set them off sharply from the dialogic critics of Adorno. The promise of 
happiness is separate from the mere satisfaction of desire or bodily pleasure -
69 Jay M. Bernstein, 1997 'Why Rescue Semblance? Metaphysical Experience and the 
Possibility of Ethics', in Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart, eds., The Semblance of 
Subjectivity:Adorno's Aesthetic Theory, Massachusetts:MIT, 1997, p198 
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hence the criticisms of the kind made by Wilke and Schlipphacke are misplaced; 
and that particular things can be un subsumable under conceptual categories and 
yet remain sources of meaning. As a consequence it is the transcendent promise 
of the reconciliation between sensuality and spirituality in the autonomous 
artwork, that grounds the truth-claims of art. 
Category (4) is similarly preoccupied with the transcendent promise of the 
artwork. But for Fredric Jameson what is of general concern is how this promise 
has come into its own again in an historical period of continued stalled social and 
political transformation. Whereas in the 1970s in the age of national liberation, 
high-levels of class struggle, and radical cultural transformation, Adorno's 
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promise was seen as an "encumbrance" and "embarrassment", today it keeps 
alive the untruth of capitalist rationality and freedom. This is because the very 
historical possibility of the autonomous artwork is what exposes the false totality 
of capitalist production. Through a deeper commitment to aesthetic truth as the 
non-negotiable source of dereification and disalienation, Adorno demonstrates 
that aesthetic theory is never merely aesthetic. What is of paramount significance 
in Adorno for Jameson, therefore, is that all aesthetic questions are taken to be 
fundamentally historical ones. But, as a consequence of this, Jameson refrains 
from making actual judgements about modernist works themselves; this is 
because it is not so much the specific content of Adorno's defence of various 
kinds of modernist art that counts, but the implications of aesthetic praxis as 
redemption as a whole. The outcome is a reticence and, even, guardedness about 
what constitutes the content and boundaries of autonomous art today. Indeed, 
there is a clear tendency in both the philosophical aesthetics of category (3), and 
Jameson's position, to evacuate the problems and contradictions of contemporary 
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art practice for the promise of the promise itself. This is the result in Jameson. as 
in Bernstein and Bowie, of an undialectical interpretation of the social content of 
Adorno's concept of autonomy. 
What distinguishes Adorno's theory of autonomy from the early Romantics, the 
neo-conservative New Criticism of the 1950s, and Greenbergian modernists, is 
that art is seen simultaneously as socially determined and autonomous. Or rather, 
the autonomy of the art object is something which is produced out of the social 
relations which constitute the institution of art itself. It is not something which is 
produced immanently out of the object and therefore transmittable as a particular 
'style' or 'look'. This means that autonomy is the practical and theoretical 
outcome of the contradiction between the artwork's exchange value and use-
value. Because of the perpetual threat of the loss of the artwork's use-value. art is 
continually propelled by its own conditions of alienation to find aesthetic 
strategies which might resist or obviate this process of critical and aesthetic 
dissolution - the history of the 'new' in modernism derives from the resistance of 
art to its exchange value. But, at the same time. under capitalism art derives its 
social identity and value from this process. Thus authentic modern art acquires 
identity and value in a double movement of negation and self-negation: art 
achieves visibility through positioning itself in relation to the prevailing norms. 
interests and protocols of the market and intellectual academy. But once the work 
achieves institutional and market visibility, the artist is forced to resist the work's 
own subsumption under a new set of norms if he or she values the thing that 
defined the work's initial moment of production: its critical difference or 
aesthetic 'otherness'. For once the value of the new work is institutionally 
established. the work finds itself part of a new set of prevailing norms and 
protocols. The exchange value of the artwork, therefore, operates as a kind of 
'fiction': artists seek to transform the normative values of the market and the 
critical academy in their own image, but in the interests of escaping from these 
values and self-image. That is. the 'fiction' of autonomy has to be dismantled by 
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the artist if the pursuit of autonomy is to be able to continue to prosecute art's 
failure to realise its freedom from social dependency. Art's autonomy is 
necessarily dependent, on the alienated conditions of its realization, because it is 
through art's connection to the' unresolved antagonisms' of reality that the social 
content of autonomy is generated. Commodification, then, locks art into an 
impossible logic: art can only renew itself through undermining or disrupting 
those qualities that bring it into being. Yet, if this logic is impossible for Adorno 
it is necessary and inescapable under current relations of production, because, 
paradoxically, it is this logic which sustains the possibility of art's (and human) 
freedom. In this sense the possibility of art's autonomy is socially driven. 
This expansive notion of autonomy is something that is explored in detail in the 
dialectical theory of autonomy in category (5), particularly in the work of 
Lambert Zuidervaart and Peter Osborne. 
What these writers insist on (which I concur with) is the need for a sharper 
reintegration of the truth of autonomy into the cultural and social experience of 
recent art and postmodernism. That is, they call for a development of autonomy 
away from its grounding in modernist painting and sculpture into the area of new 
media and their interconnections. For if the value of autonomy rests on its 
commitment to finding new materials and forms of attention for the' unresolved 
antagonisms' of social experience, then this must of necessity be expanded into 
an analysis of the problems which confront the art of the present, without 
recourse to nostalgia or moralism. Without the establishment of the link between 
the expanded means and materials of the art of the last thirty years and the 
problem of autonomy, aesthetic value is forced back into a conservative reading 
of the modern. In this way Adorno's dialectics must be brought to bear on 
Adorno's categories themsel ves, as a recognition of the hi storicity of autonomy 
itself. 
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Importantly this means transforming the relationship between high-art and 
popular culture in Adorno's aesthetic theory, for it is the would-be fixture of this 
binary opposition between 'high' and 'low' that identifies the current historical 
limits of Adorno's defence of autonomy and that of his contemporary 
philosophical defenders, who tend to see the art of the last thirty years as a falling 
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away from the sensual achievements of modernism. The failure to acknowledge 
the expanded social content of autonomy on the part of these defenders is 
invariably the result of their condescension, or outright hostility, towards mass 
culture and popular culture. Yet the expanded content of the art of the last thirty 
years is incomprehensible without a recognition of how the' low' has challenged 
and reconfigured the' high'. But breaking with this condescension towards the 
popular is not an invitation to dissolve the 'high' into the 'low', as in the populist 
tendencies of postmodernism. Rather, it allows the possibility of a dialectics of 
'high' and 'low': that is, it reestablishes the opposition between 'high' and 'low' 
in the light of the contradictions inherent in both terms. And this, of course, is 
something that Adorno himself was highly sensitive to, and which first 
preoccupied him in the 1930s, even if his judgement on the 'low' was essentially 
sceptical. 
Adorno's antipathy to mass culture is notorious and much criticised. This is based 
on his view that although high-art or autonomous art, and mass culture or 
dependent art, are both commodities, dependent artworks are incapable of 
generating sustainable critical reflection on the part of the spectator and reader. 
Rather, mass culture offers compensatory forms of libidinal gratification, and as 
such, functions overall as a form of social repression. The pleasures of mass 
culture negate the promise of happiness of autonomous art. Yet when Adorno 
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actually talks about the 'high' and the 'low' in Aesthetic Theory the "high' refers 
to the interrelations between autonomy and dependency, of which autonomy is 
the dominant term. Similarly Adorno is well aware that in mass culture there are 
moments of autonomy. As he was to say in his letter to Benjamin on March 18, 
1936, "If you defend the kitsch film against the 'quality' film, no one can be more 
in agreement with you than I am; but ['art pour ['art is just as much in need of a 
7' 
defence". - It is important, therefore, to stress that Adorno does not identify mass 
culture with the culture industry; the culture industry is what capitalism does to 
mass culture. But two things interconnect to make his judgements about modern 
mass culture utterly marginal in his aesthetic theory: his totalizing view of the 
reification of mass experience; and as such his overwhelming commitment to 
analyzing mass culture from the standpoint of autonomous art. Thus, no popular 
art quite meets the highest standards of the best autonomous art, and the best of 
autonomous art is always compelled to preserve its boundaries against the 
encroachments of aesthetic dependency. 
In this respect, like categories (2), category (5) distances itself from autonomy as 
a precondition of the evaluation of all art. As with BUrger - and Habermas and 
Wellmer - the dialectical theory of autonomy accepts that the truth of autonomy is 
not the ultimate criterion of art's social significance. Indeed, this concI usion is 
self-evident in a culture where traditional modernist forms of autonomy no longer 
provide any moral or political challenge to the effects of reification, just as the 
pleasures of mass culture and popular culture do not have to negate the promise 
of happiness, but can, as Osborne says, at certain moments, "'heighten the sense of 
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frustration at the broken promise". As a consequence, it is hard to accept, in 
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Adorno's terms, that autonomous art is any more critically effective than 
dependent art when certain products of mass culture can subvert the conventions 
of the traditions they operate within and disclose, on occasions, radical 
aspirations. 
On this basis the debate on the dialectical content of autonomy is an attack on 
Adorno's traditional concern for normative evaluation. Irrespective of their levels 
of' autonomy' or 'social dependency' all works of art demonstrate a social 
function. However, unlike Burger and the postmodernists, to accept the multiple 
and variegated functions and forms of reception of artworks does not thereby 
mean accepting the abandonment of normativity altogether - the postmodernist 
syndrome of defining art as popular culture and popular culture as art. Rather, 
what is required is a more differentiated account of art's standards and criteria of 
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evaluation, what Zuidevaart calls a "complex normativity". This complex 
normativity might include not only "technical excellence, formal depth, aesthetic 
expressiveness" ( attributes conventionally associated with modernism) but also 
"social scope, potential effectiveness and historical truth": "Rarely would a 
particular work meet all these norms, nor would very many works display 
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exceptional merit with respect to every norm that they do meet". By this, 
Zuidevaart means that the supposedly elitist concern with autonomy allows us to 
rethink the dynamics of popular pleasure and technological development in art, at 
the same as the dynamics of popular pleasure and technological development in 
art can allow us to rethink the limits and content of autonomy. Indeed normativity 
is unavoidable once we accept that the critique of the category of art remains 
inseparable from the continuing conditions of art's possibility. 
74 
Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory.The Redemption of Illusion, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, MIT, 1991, p241 
75 
Zuidervaart, ibid, p246 
69 
Osborne adopts a similar position to this. But, in contrast to Zuidervaart, he is far 
more forceful in arguing that the implications of this dialectic are latent in 
Adorno's work itself. As he says: 
Adorno's own analysis suggests another, far more productive approach Ito the 
question of autonomy I: namely, to lay bare the structure of the dialectic of the 
dependent and the autonomous within dependent art, and to comprehend it 
through its opposition to autonomous art, as a distinctive part of a larger cultural 
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whole. 
This insistence on the solution to the problem of autonomy lying in the 
transformation of Adorno's categories themselves is held, rightly, by Osborne to 
be a political decision. To defend autonomy in the spirit of Adorno as an 
historical and interrelational concept is to resist those who would judge negation 
and the critique of tradition in art to be dead and buried. In this respect the 
continuing importance of Adorno lies in how his concept of autonomy 
incorporates the irreconcilability of art to its own alienated conditions and fate 
into the conditions of its own possibility. The idea, therefore, that art can resolve 
these conditions by claiming allegiance to a given aesthetic tradition or by 
dissolving itself into everyday life, is an avoidance of the realities of art's 
alienation, whether these forms of reconciliation are offered in the name of 
cultural democracy or not. Hence the fundamental problem with BUrger's, 
Habermas's and Wellmer's models - and postmodernism as a whole - is that in 
their various ways they fail to acknowledge the violence and misrepresentation 
which underwrite art's mediation of cultural and social division. As in the case of 
the postmodernists, Habermas and Wellmer assume far too easy an incorporation 
of the artwork into the principles of communicative rationality, despite the fact 
human suffering and reification are always threatening to dissolve this rationality 
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into incoherence, bad faith and sentimentality. Indeed the rejection of all forms of 
aesthetic and social compensation in Adorno's theory of autonomy is designed 
not in order to foreclose all possible communication, but to render the truth of art 
as existentially and formally continuous with the effects of alienation and 
reification. By defending a form of autonomy which is constituted through the 
negation of tradition the irreconcilability of art is coextensive with the 
irreconcilability of the subject's consciousness of being-in-the-world. 
Adorno's legacy, then, needs to be defended against those who would abandon 
normati vi ty for shallow defences of the 'popular' and art's basi sin communal 
discursivity, and all the political substitutional ism that inevitably comes with such 
positions. However, at the same time, it needs to be recognised that the 
theoretical resources in Adorno for sustaining the social content of autonomy, are 
highly attenuated, opening up room for misunderstanding and false departures, as 
in the writing of the Adornian philosophical aesthetes. This is not least because 
Adorno's notional recognition of the 'autonomous' in the 'dependent' and the 
'dependent' in the 'autonomous' leaves the social character of his concept of 
autonomy highly ambiguous. 
Viewed from this perspective, one of the problems with Adorno's writing for his 
philosophical aesthetic defenders is how to position the claims of anti-art in 
relation to the critique of tradition, particularly in the light of the most important 
art of the last thirty years, which has systematically expanded the forms and 
meanings of aesthetic experience through the strategies of anti-art. 
The moment of anti-art for Adorno is determinate for the renewal of art's 
autonomy: in order to distinguish itself from what has become aesthetic, art is 
forced to expand into, or reclaim non-aesthetic, experiences, forms or practices, 
(popular and discursi ve modes of attention, the ready made, the textual etc). But 
for Adorno this is heavily qualified by his view that such moves al ways threaten 
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to dissolve the artwork back into the real and the everyday. This leads him to 
attack the aesthetics of the ready made and to devalue photography. The radical 
aesthetes of category (3), tend to follow this line, settling for the formal 
evaluations of Adorno's misjudged conclusions, rather than the dialectical 
implications of his argument. Consequently, they maintain that Adorno's critical 
potential today lies in his resistance to the dissolution of the artefectual and 
sensual base of artistic practice. But if this critique is pursued in order to draw 
attention to the false democracy of the 'popular' and anti-form - critical 
postmodernism is uppermost in their minds - it also threatens to disengage 
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autonomy from Adorno's hermeneutical privileging of the 'new' out of anti-art. 
If the 'new' in art is the constitution of art's autonomy through the determinate 
negation of tradition, then the impulse of anti-art is integral to what has 
previously established itself as autonomous, and therefore essential to the social 
content of autonomy. Without this moment of negation autonomy in art 
degenerates into a confirmation of tradition and the present, meaning that, anti-art 
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is a transgression that autonomy must undergo in order to reconstitute itself. 
Accordingly, one of the reasons that there is a close identification between 
autonomy and the aesthetics of modernism in work of the writers in category (3), 
is that philosophical aesthetics takes the superseded and conventionalized forms 
of anti-art in modernism as its guide to contemporary practice, losing the 
positional logic of anti-art in the pursuit of art's autonomy. In this sense it is the 
positional logic of anti-art which drives the social content of art's autonomy. In 
this way the ambiguity of Adorno's legacy tends to be exacerbated by this kind of 
philosophical aesthetics, because it treats the concept of autonomy as an abstract 
philosophical postulate, and not as something determined by the prevailing 
conditions of art's autonomy. 
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Adorno's concept of autonomy, then, generates two interconnected problems for 
its radical aesthete defenders: 1) in the interests of stabilising aesthetic quality and 
high-culture's negation of mass culture it weakens the presence of anti-art within 
art's pursuit of autonomy~ and 2) in order to distinguish the authenticity of 
autonomy in art it represses the transcendent moment of autonomy immanent to 
all forms of culture. This leaves his defenders with very little to use aesthetically 
when coming to understand the art of the recent past and the massive expansion 
and diversification of popular cultures in the 1980s and 1990s. By identifying 
autonomy with tired modernist protocols and by defending an implausible 
account of ideology and popular culture - popular culture as fundamentally 
antithetical to the fulfilment of human needs - the radical aesthetes dissolve 
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autonomy into a defensive aestheticism. In this respect the dialectical critics of 
autonomy are correct: the interrelations between autonomy and mass culture are 
dead in the water unless retheorized as part of the critical expansion of art's 
normativity. By expanding the content of normativity the opposition between 
modernism/anti-reification mass culturelreification is revealed to be no longer 
functional as a source of absolute value - if ever it was. But, if the dialectical 
theorists of autonomy correctly relativize the issue of reification, there is, 
similarly, little sense what this might actually mean in terms of the problems of 
contemporary art and culture. Osborne's notion of the "critical potential of mass 
RO 
culture", is frustratingly vague. 
It is not of course the job of philosophy to answer such questions~ philosophy 
cannot predict or legislate the content of art's autonomy. However, what it can 
and should do is clarify the conditions for a defence of the social content of 
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autonomy against its premature aestheticization or dissolution. Hence, the 
dismantling of the opposition between a high modernist singular normativity and 
dependent popular culture, means little unless questions of value, meaning and 
pleasure are based on a theory of artistic subjectivity and spectatorship which 
adequately represent contemporary transformations in art and culture. 
The central problem with the philosophical aesthetes' defence of a version of the 
traditional modernist subject and spectator is, as I have stressed, its lack of 
cultural differentiation. What demands our attention, therefore, if we are to 
establish a workable notion of autonomy is the need to connect the expanded 
social and aesthetic conditions of art since the 1960s to a theory of negation in art 
- or anti-art - that does not merely reproduce or reverse the antinomy between 
'high' and' low'. By this I mean that if the concept of autonomy is no longer able 
to sustain its negati ve logic through modernism's classical forms of distantiation 
it requires an aesthetic subject/producer which derives its critical agency from the 
relations between an expanded notion of social identity and form in art and the 
excl usions and aporias of social and cultural di vision. In other words, an adequate 
notion of autonomy is to be derived from the aesthetic subject/producer's 
mediation of the interrelations of 'high' and 'low', and not merely from their 
abstract conjunction. 
Consequently, the concept of 'complex normativity' becomes clearer if we take 
the contemporary incorporation of popular modes of attention into the expanded 
social categories of art as a response to modernist 'expressiveness', as itself 
divided. The significance of the 'relativization of reification' for a complex 
normativity is not that it allows art to switch to the popular from the demands of 
critical distance, but that art's critical functions are structured within an 
understanding of the popular as both pleasurable and alienated. By stressing that 
popular modes of attention and pleasures define a shared space in which both 
'high' and 'low' position themselves in late capitalist culture. the demands of 
74 
autonomy are situated as internal to the determinations of dependency. Popular 
forms of attention are not so much the 'other' of authentic aesthetic life. but the 
dominant space out of which aesthetic pleasures and values are formed and 
struggled over. 
From this perspective the experience of aesthetic subject/producer is opened up to 
the pleasures of popular culture and mass culture without condescension, which is 
a significantly different proposition from Adorno's occasional embrace of 
popular pleasures as a kind of healthy antidote to middle-brow taste. In this way 
embodied popular pleasures are enjoyed precisely because they refuse to give 
unqualified assent to the supposed enlightened pleasures of high-culture. 
However, this refusal of assent does not imply that the taking of such pleasures is 
a negation of high-culture or that such pleasures are identifiable with an 
undiscriminating cultural pluralism. On this understanding of the aesthetic subject 
the taking of pleasures from the popular is not to be confused with the 
postmodern notion of the popular consumer. Rather, the aesthetic subject takes 
pleasure from the popular knowing such pleasures to be alienated. This is an 
important epistemological difference, for it reveals something significant that 
neither the Adornian philosophical aesthetes nor postmodernists take much notice 
of about the conditions of modern culture: that the pleasures taken from popular 
culture and high culture are mutually unstable for would-be popular consumers 
and' aesthetes' alike - even if this instability is in the final analysis subject to the 
wider constraints of class division, and therefore unstable in uneven ways. But 
the important ontological point is that the taking of such pleasures is itself a 
process of internal di vision and dissent, for, there is no such thing as the 
uncultured and unfeeling popular consumer - everybody comes to popular 
culture and to a work of art with some knowledge and powers of discrimination 
whatever thei r educational and cultural accomplishments. And, si milarly, this is 
precisely the point about the cultural limitations inherent in the position of the 
aesthete, for the aesthete is no less alienated than the popular cultural consumer -
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alienated by his or her own fantasy of aesthetic control. So, just as popular modes 
of attention are themselves internally differentiated under the demands of 
aesthetic discrimination, the aesthete's would-be disinterested pleasures are the 
constant, repressive reminder of the embodied and subaltern pleasures of the 
popular. 
Thus, what the concept of complex normativity is able to establish is that both 
works of autonomous art (high culture) and the products of popular culture share 
a common space of reification and dereification. This allows us to theorize artistic 
production and reception without recourse to a simplistic model of high culture as 
the protection of a single normativity and low culture as the degradation of 
normativity - of one (higher) form of autonomy subsuming another. Indeed the 
idea of the aesthete as the defender of a normative autonomy and the popular 
consumer as the undifferentiated consumer of mass culture is utterly regressi ve. 
Consequently, the aesthetic subject/producer who acknowledges the dependency 
in autonomy and moments of autonomy in dependency, might be said to be 
extending the implications of Adorno's aesthetic theory, but crucially, from 
within a critical space where cultural alienation is treated as complex and internal 
to both terms. For the overwhelming problem with the Adornian philosophical 
aesthetes, is that the conflicts of aesthetic experience are not viewed as the result 
of the actual and symbolic violence internal to high culture and popular culture. 
To link the question of aesthetics to symbolic violence is to make clear what 
connects the debate on art and the popular to what remains of importance in 
Adorno's writing on autonomy: the fact that the internal and external divisions of 
autonomy and mass culture are only comprehensible within a continuum of actual 
or symbolic violence. To analyse autonomy and dependency, in terms of the 
actual and symbolic violence perpetrated against works of art by the culture 
industry and aestheticism, and in terms of the symbolic yiolence internal to the 
social logic of art's autonomy, is to see how modern art's internal history and 
76 
external relations with mass culture in the 20th century exist in a continuum of 
destruction and derogation. What this discloses, importantly, is how symbolic and 
actual violence constitute the ontological condition of art's production and 
reception under capitalism. Thus to acknowledge the incorporation of the moment 
of anti-art into art in terms of the irreconcilability of art's being-in-the-world is to 
foreground the philosophical and cultural intimacy between negation (of identity) 
with violence. The logic of art's autonomy is its internal disidentification in the 
face of art's external derogation. 
Theories of aesthetics, however, are largely concerned with dissolving art's 
interpresence with symbolic and actual violence. As Paul de Man puts its it his 
critique of aesthetic ideology: "the aesthetic is not a separate category but a 
principle of articulation between various known categories, and modes of 
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cognition". But, an acceptance of this separation is what leads to the culturally 
undifferentiated aesthete and to the abandonment of a complex normativity and 
the exigencies of anti-art. The self-divided aesthetic subject, however, challenges 
this loss of differentiation, insofar as it restores an active recognition and critique 
of the structural violence internal and external to both the production and 
Xc 
reception of art and popular culture. The question of 'complex normativity' as 
the relativization of reification, therefore, remains incoherent if it does not make 
visible how the artist and spectator are now situated in a contested space between 
the modes of attention of popular culture and their critique. It is out of this space 
between the identification and disidentification of these modes that the 
contemporary conditions of a 'complex normativity' are currently being 
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produced. 
The threat to art's autonomy is immanent to the social conditions of art's 
existence. But it is the social conditions of art's production and reception which 
bring the autonomy of the artwork (its challenge to the instrumentalities of 
market and academy) into being. Autonomous art remains authentically 
autonomous inasmuch as the conditions of its production recognise this and resist 
its instrumental and extra-artistic logic. Adorno's expressive model in Aesthetic 
Theory, is, as I have outlined, based on this. But Adorno is unable to develop this 
because the social content of autonomy is prematurely separated from the 
negation of autonomy within autonomy - the moment of anti-art. He is unable to 
see - or trust fully - anti-art as the means by which autonomy is able to mediate 
art's futural condition and the relations between art and knowledge. This might be 
described as the moment of 'realism' in art's autonomy, the moment which 
grounds the dynamic movement of autonomy's social content. Adorno's 
philosophical followers, however, dissolve this movement, by resolving the issue 
of autonomy in terms of the defence of a single normativity - against what they 
see as the loss of all normativity in postmodernism. In this the philosophical 
defence of autonomy as the negation of aesthetic tradition and protocol remains 
imperative in the face of the aggressive rejection of normativity in postmodern 
cultural studies and the positivization of negation in philosophical aesthetics. But 
the dialectical defence of autonomy is no source of artistic val ue. It is only the 
practices and criticism of art that are able to open up the the social content of 
autonomy. Philosophy'sjob is to underwrite that possibility, not to substitute 
itself for that possibility. 
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Chapter 2: The Labour of Subjectivity/ the Subjectivit~· of Labour: 
Contemporary Political Theory and the Remaking of the Avant-garde 
Questioner: What do you prefer. Impressionism or Post-Impressionism? 
Rolf Harris: I've never been much of a one for putting labels on art movements 
relating to historical time, you know. I mean, I just like the painters that I like. I 
get a great kick out of Monet's work, and also Van Gogh, and they are 
completely different from each other.84 
I pick this dismal and banal item out not because the Australian entertainer Rolf 
Harris is an easy target for those who want to feel smart and superior about the 
popular representation of modern art, but because it stands for a symptom of 
cultural violence against meaning, historical periodization, and modernism in the 
broad sense. This is far from unfamiliar, but it does represent a new mode of 
detaching what is 'popular' from what is specialist and critical within art and 
visual culture, particularly in Britain. The willingness of the BBC to let Rolf 
Harris expound upon modern art is the reductio ad absurdium of the set of 
arguments that the BBC has used recently against the Open University's modern 
art course in an effort to replace academic presenters with celebrities: the 
pleasures of art are too important, the argument goes, to let its complexities and 
difficulties be disfigured by those who talk up such difficulties professionally -
artists included. The 'celebrity' is now the ur-democratic voice of anti-specialist 
and populist opinion. This is because the celebrity's high-recognition factor is 
held to secure an unassailable truthfulness in a world where such truthfulness is 
taken to be rare or unpredictable: the celebrity's voice is the secure, non-partisan 
imprimatur of authenticity. In this way celebrity now functions in a quasi-
Bonapartist fashion. It speaks to the popular classes over and above the 
84 Rolf Harris's web-site, quoted in the Evening Standard, London,31 July, 2002, p41 
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professional languages of cultural elites. The celebrity offers programme makers 
a voice of authority that is uncontaminated by the' vested interests' of traditional 
or sceptical commentors on art alike, from a popularizer of the treasures of the 
Western artistic canon like Kenneth Clark, to the demotic initiator into modern 
art's quizzical pathways like lohn Berger. By being unconstrained by such 
hierarchies and divisions the celebrity's status is seen as a guarantee of the 
immanent value of the work under discussion. As a result the artwork can be 
freed up for the popular audience and allowed to stand 'for itself' without the 
perversity of elaborate argument or justification. In other words, the' celebrity' 
confers truthfulness on the words he or she speaks by dint of the ineluctable aura 
of celebrity itself. 
This substitution of the celebrity voice for the popular-critical or specialist voice 
is contained primarily within the arts and culture, where the views of the 
specialist, particular the theoretically trained specialist, are seen as an imposture 
or irrelevance in the face of the would-be subjective content of all interpretation. 
This substitution is not so common in the hard sciences where the work of the 
scientist, as the positivized advocate of a veridical notion of truth, tends to be 
honoured in all its enigmatic complexity. The question of violence against 
meaning, history, intentionality, therefore, is not ideologically heteronomous, but 
confined predominantly to those disciplines where notions of positivi zed truth are 
weak or unavailable - as in art history, cultural studies and the humanities 
generally. The contested claims to truth in science are not so easily banished or 
ridiculed by the authority of the Bonapartist celebrity voice without a greater 
violence being done to capitalism' s structural investment in science and 
technology. For instance, the anti-scientific posturing of creationism, despite its 
toleration by the state. is ill-suited to being a popular voice, that is, it is too 
desecularizing and anti-scientific and therefore, at an important level, antithetical 
to the broad ideological sweep of contemporary social democracy. 
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The left recently has certainly had much to say on the 'celebrity' voice. But, 
beyond the routine denunciations of 'dumbing down' it doesn't really know what 
to do with the phenomenon's ideological fallout. It can't be seen to be defending 
some revived notion of high-culture without sounding crusty, elitist and Fabian, 
yet it cannot quite bring itself to attack popular culture head on without feeling 
that it will get left behind. It ends up, therefore, aligning itself with some form of 
soft anti-intellectualism (we need more art with accessible, user-friendly 
intellectual contextualization) rather than with the more brutal and comical anti-
intellectualism of the celebrity mongers (we need more art talk but with all the 
idea-stuff expunged). This is largely because the debate on culture in the mass 
media is now largely framed without any commitment to the clash and dispute of 
actual cultural agents. In Kenneth Clark's view of Western culture, for the critic 
to pick out what has value is to defend a cultural space where Europeanised 
civilising forms of artistic attention might contest the demise of the cultured ideal 
of the bourgeois spectator. In Berger's view of Western culture, for the critic to 
pick out what has value is to reflect on how complex and uncertain this defence 
of value actually is and therefore how much of a problem value is for bourgeois 
culture. Today though these two options - one affirmative of the highest reaches 
of the canon, the other critical of what those reaches might actually be - have long 
gone as openly stated and contested positions. Indeed, both conservative 
defenders and critics of the canon have become politically unmoored from their 
traditional and refractory constituencies: the culturally backward looking fraction 
of the bourgeoisie; and the would-be culturally progressive fraction of the labour 
movement. Now this is not to mourn the demise of these positions, as if a 
slanging match between defenders of bourgeois high culture and some politicized 
version of the social history of art, says everything there is to say about the 
Western canon, value, cultural division and modernism. Just as it would be 
imprudent to say that these positions do not continue to have an 'afterlife' in the 
hiohest reaches of university life (for example Harold Bloom's overbearing 
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defence of the Western literary canon) or in the nether regions of contemporary 
81 
Trotskyism ( high culture is good; high culture with political brass knobs on even 
better). But as social forces their demise as 'world views' is all apparent. Hence 
the unabashed confidence that the market apparatchiks demonstrate in employing 
Rolf Harris as a popular interpreter of modern art: the defence of high-culture is a 
joke; the critique of bourgeois high culture a bore; what is needed is all-round 
ecumenical enthusiasm; it is openness and charitableness that bridges divides and 
sutures enmities. In this respect the selection of Harris is a symptom of a more 
familiar ideological move in contemporary social democracy. In the place of 
culture as site of combativeness and opposition (no matter how cartoon-like) 
culture becomes the site of a post-class detente between high and low, expert and 
non-specialist, popular and elitist, modernism and its critics. In short the debate 
on culture is a place where all division, exclusion and hierarchy is reduced to a 
refulgent inclusivity. Because everything has its value - high and low - all cultural 
activity and forms can live off each other in a pan-historical multicultural 
melange. On this basis it is no surprise that sections of the left are good at 
condemning the contemporary market-populist mediation of art and culture, but 
less successful at thinking through the implications of this critique. Enfeebled by 
a residual anti-intellectualism, they don't know who they want to speak for and 
what cultural values they want to defend. In fact, in their fear of elitism, and in 
their half-hearted genuflection in front of popular culture, they end up cheering 
the Bonapartists on from the sidelines: keep politics out of art. 
Culture and the new democracy 
In isolating this smalL interpretative drama from the wider changes and 
challenges of contemporary culture, I am not taking the contemporary (UK) 
mediation of art on TV as a sign of irredeemable cultural decline or as an 
evidence of the final demise of modernism and the avant-garde in front of an 
imbecilic mass culture. On the contrary, as the main channel of social democratic 
consensus this is what TV is largely organized to do on a global basis: to de-
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agentify and diminish the diremptive content of social experience and cultural 
form. Asking Rolf Harris to be a gate-keeper for an (unconscious) 
deideologization of art, then, is hardly out of keeping with these forces. Rather 
what concerns me here, is the contemporary context in which this process now 
occurs, as the basis for a wider discussion of the depoliticization of culture. Thus, 
what is so shameless about the above is that for those who defended this series, 
and those who criticised it sardonically, the vacuousness of its content, in the end, 
didn't seem to matter that much, in fact, at some level it is possible to say that for 
critics and defenders alike its content may well have been vacuous, but, 
nevertheless overall the programmes were sensitive to the needs of their 
audience. This isn't just populism then - the distillation of scholarshi p into simple 
narratives and digestible and tendentious facts - but an unembarrassed refusal to 
practice any of the skills of historical description and critical attentiveness. In this 
respect, both the retarded indifference to the representation of agency and 
intention, and the merely benign disapproval of this indifference's stupefying 
effects, compels us to look deeper and wider than the usual arguments about the 
TV's ideological conformities in our examination of the symptoms of 
contemporary culture. 
The popular representation of art and culture is now not just part of what 
nominally is called the society of spectacle, but is actually contiguous with the 
depoliticizing functions of contemporary social democracy itself. Since the 
1980s, and particular, since the end of 'historical communism' in Eastern Europe, 
the immanent depoliticizing logic of capitalist democracy has strengthened its 
hold on the political process, social and cultural policy and mass representations 
of culture generally. This depoliticizing logic turns essentially on the 
manaoement of the crisis of consensus through the endless reinscription of 
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consensus, that is, the through a normative diffusion of conflict under the sign of 
'difference'. The expulsion and marginalization of discourses of crisis that 
involve a systemic opposition and critique of capitalism or introduce division as a 
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non-subsumptive category has been one of the major casualties of these 
processes. Revol utionary and socialist traditions of thought and practice have 
found themselves hounded from the academy by the right and centre-left alike, 
and ridiculed and suppressed in public life as outmoded, crude and lacking 
'realism'. This erosion of politics as site of division and collective grievance has 
been welcomed and defended not just by the right, always evanescent about the 
collapse of class-based politics, but by most of the left keen to retransform 'left' 
social democracy into an electable form. The defence of social democratic 
consensus in the1990s has been tenacious, therefore, as remnants of the old 
laborist left across Europe have sought to identify themselves with the interests of 
the market, and increasingly with the monopolistic forces of globalization. This 
new class detente (accompanied by a mass shift in wealth from the working class 
to the middle-class since the early 1980s) has been driven by a concerted attack 
on the left in parliamentary constituencies, trade unions and within the public 
services. As such it is no surprise that there is an increasing abstention of voters 
from the political process at national elections and on a local basis through trade 
unions, across much of Europe (with the partial exception of France),85 and in the 
US, where for twenty years or more there has been mass working class 
withdrawal from the voting process. Moreover, it is also no surprise that what 
seems to have been the victory of the professionalization of politics over 
collective forms of self-activity, has generated a widespread endorsement of the 
'end of politics' itself. Indeed this endorsement of the 'end of politics'( as the 
clash of classes; the insuperability of the market) as a new vision of the' end of 
history' found its most perfected form in the 1990s from within the very heart of 
this professionalized political clerisy; Francis Fukuyama' s 'The End of History?, 
(1989).86 Many others, particularly on the left, have followed this line hollowing 
85 For instance, the higher than average turn out in the recent Presidential elections in 
France' and the fact that despite the reality of the large vote for the fascist Le Pen in the 
first ro~nd of the election, there was also a high turn out for far left and revolutionary 
candidates. 
86 Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?" The National Interest, Summer 1989 
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out the divisions and conflicts of the present in the name of the inel uctability of 
contemporary social democracy. This kind of thinking has also found its way into 
the analysis of culture, no more so than in the UK and the US, where the 
discipline of cultural studies, with its increasing emphasis on semiotic models of 
cultural resistance, cultural hybridity and the politics of difference, found a ready 
set of allies and comforting points of 'post-Marxist' reference. Indeed the success 
of cultural studies in the UK and the US in the 1980s and 1990s provided a home 
for those who had abandoned class politics, or rather, who saw cultural politics as 
a means of continuing politics by 'other means'. In the process culture and 
politics both suffered. Culture was divested of concepts of reification, alienation 
and division (in the name of multicultural inclusivity) and politics was delivered 
over to forms of micrological dissent. This story, of course, is now a very familiar 
one, especially for those on the left who have lived through it, and have been 
critical of its trajectory. 
Yet if this story presents us with a powerful succession of images of closure, 
abandonment, and absence, this is less because these images are the result of 
some terrible historical trauma, some sundering of the contemporary from the 
past, than the result of the ratcheting up of the consensual management of the 
crisis of consensus in a period of massive capitalist reorganization. Since the mid-
seventies, in conditions of repeated economic recession, capitalism has fought a 
long, drawn out, and relatively successful battle for political and cultural 
restitution. The G8 economies led by the US have been successful in weakening 
the post-war, statist concessions to popular and collective forms of social 
provision through identifying democracy with market choice. During this period, 
however, the usual enemies and critics of the market on the left have, in fact, 
been some of the most impassioned advocates of this new settlement. The 
defence of market socialism has of course been part of the broad church of social 
democracy in the 20th century. Yet, in the 1990s, left social democracy's 
unambigllolls commitment to the market and consumer choice is unprecedented. 
85 
The market, particular in the area of cultural services and broadcasting (satellite 
and cable TV), has been taken as heralding a new era of consumer democracy. 
Contemporary cultural studies, then, has not lagged far behind in coming to 
theorise this new cultural terrain as a space in which the cultural consumers are 
now free to choose and manipulate symbolic goods (symbolic capital) in their 
own name. Obviously not all of the post-Iabourist new left is sanguine about the 
immediate consequences of this new settlement ( the fact that claims to choice 
and difference are channelled through the global expansion of Anglo-American 
mass culture and post-adolescent taste remains a strong focus of anti-corporate 
sentiment ). Nevertheless, the actuality of this expanded image reproduction and 
distribution is held to be broadly progressive insofar as it has cemented the shift 
away from forms of state paternalism and 'inflexible' collective identities to the 
creative and motile dictates of the consumer. Democracy and consumerism are 
mutually reinforced. This widespread defection to the market by the left has 
underwritten the management of the crisis of consensus through consensus. In 
fact, it has been instrumental in securing a bipartisan ideological grip on political 
debate across all the social democratic parties in the West and the southern asian 
economies. Even debates on 'green issues' and 'ecology' are repeatedly deflated 
by the new left in order to accommodate the pan-national agendas of the 
corporations. 
The ferocious intensity with which capitalism now pursues this consensual 
management of the crisis of consensus is the terrain upon which politics and 
cultural politics has been conducted since the mid-1980s. It would be foolish to 
underestimate, therefore, how successful this "labour of restoration"K~ has been. 
The gridlocking of the political process into a debate on 'rights' and 'community' 
has drained political discourse of an 'outside' to the due process of social 
democracy. But, capitalist order may impose itself but it doesn't necessarily 
87 Dominque Lecourt, The Mediocracy: French Philosophy Since the Mid-1970s, 
translated by Gregory Elliot, Verso 2001, p134 
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govern. That is, the weakness of capitalism - and paradoxically what drives its 
consensual logic - is that it cannot completely control the subjectivity of those 
without power that it seeks to represent under this model of democratic 
assimilation. The logic of inclusivity is always breaking down, or rather, more 
accurately, exists in a perpetual state of fungibility, constantly forcing the 
defenders of bourgeois democracy to recalibrate and extend who or what it means 
by the 'people' and 'community'. The history of capitalism is history of the 
revolutionary disruption and negation of these categories under their constant 
ideological adaption and renormalization. In this way the continuation of politics, 
and therefore, the destablization of the idea of post-politics, is bound up precisely 
with how the determinate political act and social agency are understood within 
the historical framework of this process of bourgeois assimilation and would-be 
failure. 1848,1871,1917,1956,1968,1974,1989 are not just the dates of 
attempted and actual revolution and acts of class resistance, but more precisely, 
direct collective interventions into an objective historical process. By this I mean 
men and women openly disregarded what was 'objectively' not possible in order 
to put in place an unnamed process of political transformation. In this the 
historical 'failure' or dissolution or 'success' of these moments needs to be 
placed against the important fact of their 'wilful' agency. That is, such moments 
were not the outcome of an ideal, objective set of conditions which allowed a 
class or set of social agents to act in their best interests, but the result of a 
practical willingness on the part of those agents to seize the moment in the hope 
of transforming themselves and the nature of the political process. In this sense 
the historical process produces moments which present collective historical 
aaents with a sianificant choice: to either accept the would-be objective nature of 
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a gi ven situation, or break the logic of this objectivity in the name of a new logic 
and a new objectivity. Hence all political, cultural and social interventions are at 
some significant level premature, that is, without guarantees. But if this 
prematurity remains largely premature - socially undetermined - under normal 
conditions of social reproduction and the balance of class forces, this does not 
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mean that the act or event cannot have productive, determinate effects under these 
conditions. Indeed the power of an intervention can have an impact that far 
outweighs its actual and immediate transformative consequences, for example, 
the Situationist interventions in and around the Sorbonne in Paris during May 68. 
However, since the late1920s and the epoch of Stalinism and the post-war rise of 
plural social democracy, the immanent force of this radical subjectivity has been 
systematically downgraded on the left, even more so after May 1968, whose 
'failure' has set the tone for so much contemporary post-political theory and the 
fracturing of political agency into cultural agency. Within both left social 
democracy and reformist socialist traditions, the disruptive, transcendentalizing 
power of revolutionary subjectivity has either been demonized as a form of 
misdirected 'spontanenism' or reduced to an enfeebled after image of past 
struggle, that may give a warm glow to comrades in the present but is no longer 
relevant. The link between practical agency and the transformation of what stands 
as 'objective', which Georg Lukacs, developed in History and Class 
Consciousness (1923 )88 against the dictates of orthodox Marxism, has been 
forced into the margins of ultraleftism or even more crudely anarchism. Yet it is 
only through the repositioning and retheorization of the interdependence of 
agency and class consciousness that the spectral hold of theories of commodity 
fetishism can be broken, and the historical process opened up to the active self-
consciousness of historical agents. The story of contemporary capitalism's 
'restitution' is a story therefore that certainly needs to be told from the point of 
view of the success of the commodity form - from a point of view inside of Rolf 
Harris's web site, so to speak - but also, more poignantly, from the point of view 
of the commodity form's potential fragility. 
This fundamental truth appears to have undergone a new critical and theoretical 
life recently. A commitment to radical subjectivity. to the immanent force of 
88 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 
translated Rodney Livingstone, Merlin Press, 1971 
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human freedom and social agency, has been one of the unifying factors in recent 
political philosophy and social theory's critique of the new capitalist restoration, 
or counter-reformation. Indeed, at the point where capitalism has been most 
successful at producing a 'post-political culture' in response to the governing 
consensus, and at the point where the academy under the auspices of 
postmodernism has been prepared to go along with aspects of this, there has been 
a vigorous renewal of revolutionary and (early) Marxist modes of thought and 
practice across a range of political traditions and disciplines. This has much to do 
with the conjunction of two post-68s political traditions' as they have joined the 
growing diaspora of political energies formed by the twin crises of Stalinism and 
social democracy after 1989, now nominally known as the anti-globalization 
movement: an Autonomist Marxism and a post, post-Althusserianism. 
Autonomist Marxism has its origins in the revolutionary politics in Italy in the 
early seventies, and post, post-Althusserianism emerges in France in the 
early 1980s out of the debris of Maoism and the critique of Althusser and 
'scientific' Marxism. Both are products of very different, even opposed, 
theoretical traditions - autonomist theory is indebted to an anti-Hegelian (really 
anti-Stalinist) 'anti-dialectical' Marxism, PPA, is indebted to Hegel and early 
German idealism - but both place a great stress on the immanent force of 
subjectivity and worker's self-activity. In this regard, the anti-globalization 
movement has fed off both these traditions, and at the same time foregrounded 
and reinvigorated them, insofar, as the movement has emerged in ways that have 
at an important level confirmed these traditions perspectives: the necessity for 
direct activity outside, and in general opposition to, official parties of the left. 
What distinouishes the movement, then, is that it was formed and guided by those 
b 
who made little or no concessions to the gridlocked mentality of social 
democratic power and its extraparliamentary opposition. However, even if the 
anti-olobalization movement demonstrates the force of some of the theses of 
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autonomist politics and PPA political philosophy, it is not the case that these 
exhaust or somehow represent the anti-globalization movement. On the contrary, 
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in most instances the concept of self-activity is theorized against all extant 
political traditions, in a kind of gestural avant-gardism. Yet what unites the 
general force of the movement and allows disparate marginal workers' traditions 
to be pulled into its orbit is precisely this issue of radical subjectivity. In this 
article I am less interested in what is made theoretically of this subjectivity by 
groups and individuals within the anti-globalization movement - much of which 
verges on pre-Marxist idealism - than in the theoretical possibilities of radical 
subjectivity itself. First and foremost, then, we need to be clear about what this 
irruption of activity has opened out philosophically, culturally and politically for 
discussion in relation to the question of subjectivity and social agency. 
The reconstitution of the revolutionary political subject is not a reconstitution of 
the self-identical subject. Rather what distinguishes the new autonomist writing 
and PPA is something more precise and more demanding: the subject's 
irreducible finitude, that is, its unifying negative and diremptive content. In this 
way recent political philosophy and theory has rediscovered an 'existential' 
model of the political act whose claims to spontaneity is not an effect of the 
misrecognition of an 'objective' process - a pseudo-event so to speak - but an 
ethical terrain for the genuinely interruptive and destablizing act, the act that 
forces through and breaks the deadlock of official channels of mediation. This 
radical subjectivity is not to be confused with subjectivization of politics in post-
structuralism and its idealist cognates that has dominated left-thinking in the 
academy and the' artworld' in the late 1980s and 1990s. Whereas atomistic, anti-
dialectical thinkers such as Deleuze, disperse the subjective act into a 
constellation of points of resistance as a perpetual transgression of the Law, other 
recent non-atomistic models of political philosophy have sought to redirect 
notions of resistance and agency away from false subversions of the symbolic to 
the idea of the' break' and' rupture' as a fidelity to the idea of a universal 
freedom. The sources for this political philosophy, distributed across a number of 
authors, and traditions, are multiform and therefore do not by any means share a 
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common political heritage, or feed homogeneously into this notion of freedom: 
Hegel, early Marx and Lukacs, figure prominently, but so do also Schelling, 
Spinoza, Korsch, Benjamin, the Situationists, and even artificial intelligence 
theorists and cognitive psychologists. Yet, what unites these disparate sources is a 
widespread antipathy to two powerful structuring intellectual forces that have 
shaped much of the cultural terrain and the possibilities of radical agency since 
1968: the notion of 'instrumental reason' (as it was Marxified in Aithussser, re-
Weberianized in Foucault, and is now being enculturated in post-Adornian 
contemporary critical theory) and the depositivized, counter-hegemonic 
subversion of 'instrumental reason' in post-structuralism ( the rejection of the 
philosophic triad of structure, subject and totality). Jettisoning both the view of 
modernity as an iron cage of reason, and its reified opposition in the idea of the 
deterritorialized subject, the force of this writing lies in its restitution of the 
transcendental, universalizing meaning of the contingent political and cultural act. 
And this is precisely is what is so significant about the anti-globalization 
movement: in framing political intervention directly through global capitalism, 
the space and agency of politics is again opened out to a universal and 
universalizing terrain of understanding. Thus, if the late 1980s and 90s has been 
witness to the rise of various apologetic sociological and cultural practices on the 
basis of the radical contingency or the implicit failure of the revolutionary act, it 
has also been a period in which a nascent set of critical traditions and practices 
which have refused to settle for a 'perverse' disruption of the symbolic have 
found new ground. In this regard, I want to look at this loose grouping of 
traditions and practices as the basis for a analysis of the development of art and 
culture in the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium, and their 
viability for a political critique of the consensual management of the crisis of 
consensus now. However, this is not a map for political praxis, or an uplifting 
account of the cultural possibilities of the anti-globalization movement. Rather it 
is reckoning with the recent past as a way of opening up the present, in conditions 
where past and present remain opposed under the hard and indefatigable logic of 
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consensus. 
Subjectivity, agency, labour 
Recent autonomist thinking on subjectivity and social agency perhaps finds its 
most cogent expression, in the much discussed, much lauded, Empire (2000) by 
Michael Hardt and Toni Negri. Negri's early involvement in the Italian 
autonomist movement clearly defines the content of Empire's theses, and gi ves 
its political positions their teleological confidence. The book has done much 
philosophically to broker the radical subjectivity of the new extra-parliamentary 
left politics. Indeed, remarkably, Empire, now seems to have replaced other 
sanctified critical-theoretical texts (such as Anti-Oedipus) as the new bible of 
action amongst a new generation of cultural practioners and artists trying to work 
their way out of the postmodernization of the subject. I am not so much interested 
in the problems relating to how Empire's theses are being applied in 
contemporary cultural practice than in the synthesising moves the text makes 
against prevailing postmodern orthodoxies. In this, the politicaL economic and 
philosophical weaknesses of the book are less important than its organizing 
function for debate, activity, speculation. Such texts are rare; when they arrive, 
therefore, they should be given their full pedagogic due. Ironically, as Althusser 
once argued: the theoretical efficacy of a text is produced through its 
unpredictable effects rather than its proclaimed self-sufficiency. Empire is a 
highly sufficient-insufficient text, so to speak, which as a consequence brings on 
the pressing debate on subjectivity and social agency. Hardt's and Negri's 
argument is broadly the following: under late capitalism and globalization the 
disciplinary society of the universal commodity form has passed into a system of 
total, integrated control. Yet at the same time, because the commodity form 
envelops all aspects of social life a plurality of subjectivities continually emerge 
to resist and transform this constellation of powers. The actuality of resistance, 
dissent, negation, then, is no longer marginal - that is confined to revolutionary 
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workers, radicals, intellectual, artists - on the edges of working class and 
bourgeois life, but is active in the centre of society and the daily experience of 
broad swathes of the masses on a global scale. The task of the revolutionary left, 
then, is to connect with these immanent forces of resistance and dissent in order 
to produce the conditions for subjectivities that will actually contest commodity 
fetishism and the global regime of homogenisation. For Hardt and Negri, 
however, this does not mean a simplistic defence of the' local' or micrological as 
a means of preserving the heterogeneous against the homogeneous. By arguing 
for the' local' against the' global' the activist and intellectual actually preserves 
and rearms those heterogenizing force which drives the homogenizing logic of 
the market. It is better, they argue, to "enter the terrain of Empire, and confront its 
homogenizing and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity".89 In this they 
take a sharp philosophical and political distance from the micrological content of 
postmodernism and a Deleuzian poststructuralism, (even if much of the language 
and structure of the book is derived from an anti-dialectical philosophy of 
immanence). The authors argue that their methodology moves beyond a "a 
critical and material deconstructionism,,90 to unite a critical and deconstructive 
model with a model which is constructive and ethico-political. In other words 
their model of subjectivity, social agency, and class consciousness, is, in the 
tradition of Lukacs' defence of the radical interjunction of pure reason and 
practical reason in Marx, first and foremost a producti~'e category. In this regard, 
their Marxism is quite orthodox in the face of postmodernist modes: self-
consciousness directly changes its object as part of practice. But what subverts 
this orthodoxy and makes the book highly tendentious as a defence of radical 
subjectivity and workers' self-activity are the ends to which the productivity of 
consciousness is put to work. Hardt and Negri argue that what has driven the 
reform and restructuring of capitalism since WW 11, but particularly since the 
89 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 2000, p46 
90 Hardt and Negri, ibid, p48 
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early 1970s - and therefore is indivisible from the logic of globalization - is the 
struggle of labour itself - its productivity, its resistances, its demands for social 
reform. Capitalism's survival and success has been depedendent, in their view. on 
its negotiation and struggle with the negative power of labour. For example, the 
resistance to Fordist forms of factory organization in the late 1960s - as part of a 
wider counter-cultural struggle against capitalist rationality - was instrumental in 
contributing to the shift in production in the1980s towards a more flexible and 
informational model and to increased concessions in the workplace. This model 
of the ontological primacy of the constitutive power of labour is rightly placed by 
Hardt and Negri at the centre of the process of capital accumulation. But the 
notion of labour resisting capital is overstated. Capital sustains itself by 
expropriating the labour-power of the mass of workers; and the withdrawal of 
workers labour-power is a destablizing reality for capitalists. But this does not 
mean that the forms of capital as a social relation have no significance. That is, 
capital accumulation is as much driven by the competition between capitals as it 
is by class struggle (strikes, acts of sabotage etc ).91 Struggles may provoke and 
extend a crisis for capital, but they do not determine the logic of the system. 
Furthermore, because Hardt and Negri's model of the constitutive power of 
labour fails to take any serious account of the defeat of labour in the 1970s and 
1980s, capital's drive to the casualisation of labour is written out of capital's new 
flexi ble model of production. As a consequence the authors misjudge the impact 
of immaterial labour (computer-based production) on the new forces and relations 
of production. Because the productivity of immaterial labour is difficult to 
measure, the law of value, they argue, is no longer operative in its classical form. 
But immaterial labour is only a fraction of the global labour force. and therefore 
any inflation of its impact distorts the reality of the global di vision of labour. 
These criticisms reflect unavoidable shortcomings in Hardt and Negri's theory of 
91 See Peter Green, 'The Passage from Imperialism to Empire: A Commentary on Empire 
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Historical Materialism, Vol 10, Issue 1, 2002 
94 
the constitutive power of labour. Their concept of labour in struggle 
undertheorises the power of ideology, and separates labour from the relations of 
capital ( labour exists within capitalist forms of constraint). But if these criticisms 
are meant to challenge the recidivist postmodernism of their growing band of 
cultural interpreters ( Hardt and Negri's concept of immaterial labour is 
unfortunately a boon to idealist apologists of the' information age ') this does not 
meant that their model of radical subjectivity does not have significant strengths. 
For what is powerful about Empire is that the content of subjectivity (specifically 
proletarian subjectivity or what they call the subjectivity of the "multitude", after 
Spinoza) is treated as a real, excessive force in the face of reification and the 
dominant order. And this is key to what I mean by radical subjectivity being 
central to recent political philosophy and theory's critique of the new capitalist 
restoration: negation is not nihilistic decomposition of meaning and agency, but a 
self-transformative, emancipatory social force. 92 This shifts an understanding of 
the place of struggle from the reformist leadership of the working class and its 
intellectual allies back to the disparate, unformed energies, experiences, and 
collective intellectual capacities of the working-class itself. The theory of the 
constitutive power of labour, then, is a way of bringing theories of class activity 
back into political view in a period in which the creative power of the working 
class has been written out of the political and cultural concerns of the left. And it 
is these concerns which have also preoccupied PPA, in particular the work of 
Jacques Ranciere, and also, recently, Slavoj Zizek, in the areas of political 
philosophy and the philosophy of the subject respectively. 
Since the late 1970s Ranciere has developed a critique of Althusser on the basis 
of a critique of the self-identity of working class as a labouring class. As Ranciere 
said in 1977, the understanding of the working class, "must be traversed by 
92 For a critical realist reading of negation as a productive force, see Roy Bhaskar, 
Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, Verso, 1993 
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something else, for it not to be the thought of a class collaboration ".93 That is, the 
real revolutionary threat to the existing order comes about when workers 
challenge the boundaries between primary producer and intellectual, worker and 
bourgeois, and thereby destabilise the division of labour which produces the self-
identity of the worker as worker. Ranciere has devoted a large amount of 
theoretical energy to recovering the experiences and writings of those workers 
(particularly in France in the early part of the 19th century when the identity of 
the working class as a labouring class was being formed) who, in their intellectual 
ambitions and cultural creativity, refused to settle for the passive, anti-intellectual 
images of their own class constructed by both their official' left' representati ves 
and the emergent bourgeoisie. This critique of proletarian identity from within 
has important epistemological implications, therefore, for the notion of radical 
subjectivity and social agency. By rejecting their assignment to their 'proper' 
place workers thereby carry out Marx's universal emancipation of labour at the 
level of intellectual desire. The worker not only needs scientific and scholarly 
knowledge, but also the opportunity to "entertain and maintain his passions and 
desires for another world. Otherwise the constraints of labour will level them 
down to the mere instinct for survival and subsistence".94 The similarities here 
with Hardt and Negri are obvious. However, what distinguishes Ranciere's 
position from their's is that the organization of this productive desire is formed 
and sustained by the intellectual achievements of bourgeois culture. Proletarian 
desire is cathected to the world of bourgeois achievements, that is, to the social 
and creative accomplishments of the educated and politically conscious middle 
class. For it is the 'otherness' of bourgeois accomplishment that secures the 
negation of the present social reality. This is close to Hegel's reading of 
proletarian struggle and identity: that what the proletariat wants is not all that 
93 Jacques Ranciere, IDe Pelloutiers a Hitler: Syndi~alisme et c~lIaboratio.n', Les Revoltes 
Logiques 4, Winter 1977, p61, quoted in Donald ReId, IntroductIon, Ranclere, The NIghts 
of Labor: The Workers' Dream in Nineteenth Century France, translated from the French 
by John Dury, Temple University Press, 1989. 
94 The Nights of Labor, ibid, p20 
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different from what the bourgeoisie wants.95 Marx rejected the non-revolutionary 
implications this out of hand, for good reason - the emancipation of labour can 
not be built out of a bourgeois defence of the capitalist state - but nevertheless, 
Marx was still left on the other side with the problem of the conflictual formation 
of class subjectivity and social agency. The divided nature of class subjectivity, 
then, is something that many Marxisms overwhelmingly preoccupied with the 
'ideal' worker or 'collective worker' have avoided or occluded, for fear of 
touching on the 'bad', 'improper' or 'dissolute' worker. Ranciere puts it 
succinctly: where did the workers movement "get the idea that workers cannot 
simultaneously love bourgeois people, and so battle with them"?96 This idea of 
proletarian culture operating homopathically within bourgeois culture's own 
conflictual domain, recovers a dialectical-genealogical understanding of 
revolutionary identity. Proletarian aspirations intermesh with bourgeois ideals at 
the point where they contest such ideals. Or rather proletarian desires for another 
world are mediated by these ideals. In this way we are able to clarify where the 
emancipatory and universal content of this process of identification and 
disidentification with the bourgeoisie actually lies: the refusal to participate in 
work solely as workers. 
The production of a theory of the political subject out of the immanent negativity 
of selfhood is also what governs Slavoj Zizek's recent attack on postmodern 
politics and culture. As with Hardt and Negri, and Ranciere, Zizek develops an 
account of the subject which is 'excessive' to its own social causes, enabling a 
fissure to open up in the objectivity of the real - although in his writing there is 
no theory of the labouring subject as such. Rather, what preoccupies Zizek is the 
ontolooical oround of this excessiveness on the terrain of contemporary consumer 
b b 
culture, what we might describe, in Hegelian fashion, as the labour of cultural 
95 For a reading of this issue see, David MacGregor, The Communist Ideal in Hegel and 
Marx, University of Toronto Press, 1984. 
96 The Nights of Labor, op cit, p22 
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subjectivity. 
For Zizek the decentred postmodern subject represents a fundamental 
philosophical misunderstanding about consciousness and selfhood. In rejecting 
the notion of a core, self-transparent subject and advocating subjectivity as a 
shifting constellation of subject-positions, post-Oedipal, postmodernist thinking 
on consciousness has emptied the theory of the subject of its ambiguous 
relationship with symbolic authority. The critique of authority is transformed into 
a compulsive, atomistic transgression of the Law. In this way the 'freedoms' 
identified with this subject in postmodernism simply replicate the polymorphous 
perverse subject of late capitalist multiculturalism: the subject who identifies 
freedom and the subversion of authority with the jouissance of difference and the 
repetitive injunction to enjoy. Zizek rejects this on the grounds that this dispersal 
of the subject avoids a crucial negative feature of subjectivity which forms an 
unacknowledged kernel of the cogito: its capacity for irreconcilable negativity, 
that is of being out of joint with the world, what Hegel once described as the 
powerful 'dismembering' function of the Imagination (the decomposing aspects 
of consciousness).97 Zizek, however, goes one better than Hegel and views this 
process as a primordial force of the pre-synthetic consciousness itself, a force 
which continually tears the fabric of intuition apart and reassembles patterns of 
meaning. In this way he asks: which of the two axes of consciousness (as 
proposed by German idealism and inherited by Marx) are of primary importance, 
the Imagination or the Understanding? Zizek doesn't so much pI ump for the one 
against the other as relocate the disruptive force of the Imagination within the 
synthesising force of Understanding. As he argues "the unity of the subject 
endeavours to impose on the sensuous multitude via its synthetic activity is 
always erratic, eccentric, unbalanced, 'unsound', something that is extremely and 
97 GWF Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford University 
Press, 1977 
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violently imposed on to the multitude".98 Contra Kant, the Understanding and 
Imagination exist in a brute tension, or rather the Understandino's drive to 
!::' 
synthesis is the continuous outcome of the destablizing work of the Imagination. 
What is stake here then, above all else, is an argument about political and 
revolutionary temporality. In the postmodernist schema of 'interminable 
subversion' nothing truly new can really come of the subject's resistance to the 
Law. Resistance and desire are subordinated to the facti city of the moment. The 
subliminal content of the theory of the irreconciled subject, on the other hand. 
produces a rupture in the natural and social chain of causality. The sUbject's 
irreconcilability with the reality opens or suspends the self-enclosed content of 
reality, allowing the possibility of fidelity to a transcendent or revol utionary 
politics. 99 In short, for Zizek the subject is a subject who is not yet caught up in 
the web of social necessity. 
Zizek's theory of revolutionary subjectivity, as with Hardt and Negri, reinvokes 
the latent power of the revolutionary will. However, this latent power is not 
without its problems. If Hardt and Negri's radical subjecti vity separates working 
class resistance too easily from the structural relations of capital, Zizek' s 
decisionism suffers from a weak location within institutional-political realities. 
Indeed, a paradox arises. In disentangling the irreconcilable negativity of the 
subject from the forces of social reduction, the social agency of the subject 
becomes abstract and ungrounded. This leaves hanging in the air a familiar set of 
Marxian issues around structure and agency, class subjectivity and collective 
class consciousness. Agency is not opposed to structure (social practice). but is 
actually the outcome of structure. Human actions take place under conditions 
98 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, Verso 
1999, p33 
99 That is, a fidelity to the revolutionary event. In this regard Zizek reworks Badiou's 
notion of the fiduciary Event, which the subject, in act of authentic identification, is 
compelled to internalize and repose, as the universal horizon of Truth. See Alain Badiou, 
L 'etre et /'evenement, Editions de Seuil, 1988 
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which are determined by structures, that is, the possibilities for action are based 
on, and embedded in, the structural capacities and resources possessed by agents. 
This means that agency and structure are interrelated in the realisation of needs. 
wants, desires.lOo As two of Zizek's critics, Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau 
argue it is not possible to invoke the subject as the ground of agency given that 
the subject is produced out of a primary and delimiting set of power relations. 
The subject's capacity for decision-making is always organized through and 
against a background of social practices. No subject's power of decision, 
therefore, is ever ex nihilo, but a displacement within existing social relations. 
This means the subject is only ever partially a subject. 101 But it is this invocation 
of the subject as a partial subject that is also precisely the problem 
philosophically with this position. In locating the subject in a chain of discursive 
displacements a kind of pacification of the irreconcilability of subjectivity takes 
place. The intransigent, disarticulatory act does not just emerge and Ii ve within a 
fixed set of horizons, continually called back passively to buttress its contours, 
but is able to redefine and shift the objectivity of those horizons. The 
irreconcilable content of Zizek's concept of the subject is what makes his theory 
in the end a more powerful political candidate: it fixes on those moments of 
rupture, breakdown, failure that generates a productive denaturalization of 
capitalist reality. 
Negation, production, the avant-garde 
Limitations and problems aside, then, what makes Zizek's and Hardt's and 
Negri's respective defences of radical subjectivity particularly important for 
cultural theory is that they openly theorize negation as a constitutive experiential 
100 For a nuanced discussion of agency and structure see, Alex Callinicos, Making 
History, Polity Press, 1987 
101 See, Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogue on the Left, Verso 2000 
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category. In my view, this is an urgent issue in the light of the narration of 
modernism and the avant-garde as exhausted ideologies within postmodern 
cultural studies, the new art history and radical art history alike, for what these 
disciplines have successfully produced in conjunction with dominant social 
theory is the deontologization of negation. Negation in art theory and cultural 
theory has been stripped of its constitutive subjectivities and installed as a 
reductive formal category. These arguments tend to have the following logic: the 
novelty, disorder, and non-trivial experimentation of modern art is so diminished 
in its impact as to be completely unidentifiable with the avant-gardes of the 1920s 
and 1930s, consequently, talk of the neo-avant-garde can only prolong the agony 
of this decline, a desperate recuperation of what remains irrecuperable. As Eric 
Hobsbawm has argued recently, "The avant-garde schools since the 1960s -since 
Pop Art - [areJ no longer in the business of revolutionizing art, but of declaring its 
bankruptcy".102 But what Hobsbawm, the conservative postmodernists, and other 
critics of the neo-avant-garde such as Peter BUrger fail to understand is that the 
political and social defeat of the originary avant-garde is not the same thing as the 
defeat of the category of the avant-garde. 103 The failed actuality of the one does 
not necessarily mean the failed productivity of the other, because the avant-garde 
is itself the product of its later theorization. Hence, in the 1960s at the point 
where the avant-garde was being reconstituted and rehistoricized as a political 
project across various artistic practices ( structuralist cinema, the Situationist 
International, conceptual art) the historical and conceptual framework of key 
works from the 1920s and 1930s were being made available for the first time. A 
striking discrepancy or conflict is put in place: at the same time as the concept of 
the avant-garde is being made available to a new generation - let us remember 
artists in the sixties and the seventies had very little working knowledge of Soviet 
102 Eric Hobsbawm, Behind The Times, The Decline and Fall of the Twentieth Century 
Avant-Gardes, Walter Neurath Memorial Lecture, Thames & Hudson, 1998 
103 See Peter Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde [1974], University of Minnesota Press, 
1984 
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and Weimar avant-garde practice - it was also being abandoned as a viable 
model theoretically by writers such as Burger. The post-war neo-avant-gardes, 
therefore, are not/ailed rehearsals of older practices, but the affirmation of what 
is judged to be living and available for further development in these practices. 
The concept of the avant-garde is given work to do, rather than revisited as a 
'style' or set of styles. This sense of the neo-avant-garde as a product of critical 
and producti ve reinscription is absent from Burger because the category of 
historical failure outweighs any redemptive model of practice and interpretation. 
In this respect the contribution of Adorno in the first wave of discussion on the 
avant-garde in the sixties is crucial to understanding the lopsided direction this 
debate took, and the limitations of Burger and contemporary anti-avant-gardists. 
In Aesthetic Theory (1970)104 Adorno recognises the historical defeat of the 
Soviet and Weilnar avant-gardes and the present impossibility of art's critical 
sublation into life. But, rather than sacrificing the negativity of the avant-garde to 
some untroubled notion of 'political art' or conservative restitution of an older 
modernism, he rearticulates the question of the avant-garde on the terrain of art's 
autonomy. He argues that with the consumerist assimilation of art into the 
capitalist 'everyday' and with the erosion of an older notion of modernist 
autonomy, both autonomy and the avant-garde are mutually transformed. The 
mediating force of this mutual transformation is what he calls the' new'. By the 
'new' Adorno does not mean the merely modish, but a subjective agency by 
which art is compelled to retain its critical independence from the forces of 
unreason, social and aesthetic. The' new', or the differential, wills non-identity 
just as the drive to non-identity wills the 'new'. As such the 'new' is the 
necessary outcome of the art object itself, the 'thing' yet to come that the artist 
wishes to bring about but does not know in what form he or she will bring it 
about. 
104 References in this essay from the first English translation.Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic 
TheorY,[1970], translated by C.Lenhardt, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984 
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Autonomy and the avant-garde, then, are the codeterminate names given to the 
production of the' new' as the condition of art's necessary emergence from 
heteronomy. I would argue, on this basis, that Adorno introduces a distinction 
between the avant-garde as Event and the avant-garde as the temporal, global 
experience of modernity. Rather than treating the avant-garde as the failed 
repetition of an original lost moment, he sees the neo-avant-garde as aesthetically 
and critically equivalent to the early avant-gardes. Accordingly, under conditions 
of the false sublation of art into everyday life in liberal social democracy the 
avant-garde is an experience of art's critical persistence, a continual restaging of 
art's own promise of freedom, the promise of art's reconciliation with collective 
social experience. In this respect, the question of the avant-garde' s vanguard role 
shifts from the sublation of art under the socialization of technology (as utopianly 
imagined by Walter Benjamin, but put to cynical work by the cultural industry) to 
the disaffirmation and rearticulation of modern artistic tradition itself. The' new' 
is the repetitive and continuous movement of art's emergence from artistic 
tradition. In other words, the' new' lies not in the prospect of formaL' stylistic' 
breakthroughs, but in the possibility of keeping alive art's non-identity in the face 
of its own institutionalization and, as such, in the face of the means-ends 
rationality of capitalist exchange value. As such these forms will of necessity 
attach themselves to those resources and practices that will requestion the 
traditions of which they are part. 
This understanding of the avant-garde as an open temporal experience rather than 
as a failed Event became the basis in the early nineties for a number of revisionist 
approaches to postmodernism. In response to the melancholic endism of 
postmodernist theories, that is, theories of the' end of modernism' and the' end of 
art', Hal Foster and Andrew Benjamin both looked to the reinvigoration of the 
artistic avant-garde as a way of out postmodernism's historicism. In 'What's Neo 
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About the Neo Avant-Garde?' (1994),105 Foster adopts the Freudian notion of 
Nachtraglichkeit (deferred meaning) in order to resist BUrger's punctual 
understanding of the avant-garde. Far from being a moment where the promise of 
art's sublation is lost, the effects and ideals of the original avant-garde are subject 
to a process of deferred action. The neo-avant-garde emerges through what Foster 
calls a process of, "protension and retention, a complex relay of reconstructed 
past and anticipated future". 106 The pasts of the avant-garde, then are not held in 
place by mourning, but opened up to reinscription, under changed social and 
political circumstances. Andrew Benjamin, proposes a similar kind of Freudian 
model in Art, Mimesis and the Avant-garde (1991).107 In opposition to the notion 
of the avant-garde's as an enervated tradition he argues that the emergence of the 
contemporary from the modern - and therefore by definition the emergence of 
the avant-garde - is never simply a repetition of the past, but its rearticulation, 
what he calls the possibility of art's "anoriginal difference" in the present. 
Because history remains open the future meanings of art cannot be determined in 
advance. The present then is fundamentally open to the risk of new meaning, 
even if the immediate social and political conditions which determine the 
conditions of such an action prevent such an action taking place. 
What unites Andrew Benjamin and Foster is a revision of the dialectic of the 
avant-garde. Both see the avant-garde as the promissory space in which art 
articulates and negotiates its open-ended place within artistic tradition rather than 
as the agency by which the institutions of art are to be dismantled and sublated 
into everyday life. The content of the avant-garde's 'after life' then ( the Freudian 
process of deferred meaning) is based on the reworking in a liberal social 
democratic context dominated by the museum and the mass media of the 
constitutive cognitive and epistemological breakthroughs and strategies of the 
105 Hal Foster, 'What's Neo About the Neo Avant-Garde', October No.74 Fall 1994 
106 Ibid, p30 
107 Andrew Benjamin, Art, Mimesis and the Avant-garde, Routledge 1991 
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early avant-garde (montage, simultaneity, the critique of the author, the use of the 
ready made). Whereas the original avant-garde identified a revolution in 
perception with proletarian political revolution, and therefore with the 
supersession of the museum, the neo-avant-garde identifies the promise of art's 
difference as a task of counter-representation from within the bourgeois art 
institution. The neo-avant-garde regrounds the avant-garde within the dynamics 
of capitalism's 'second-modernity'. On this score, Foster's avant-garde is close to 
a counter-hegemonic model in which the 'politics of representation' reroute the 
cognitive and epistemological strategies of the early avant-garde into a form of 
pluralizing cultural resistance. In Andrew Benjamin the counter-hegemonic 
model is absent, but the notion of the avant-garde as securing the possibility of 
art's emergence from heteronomy into difference is very similar. As Benjamin, 
says the task of art is to affirm the possibility of the plural present. 
There is a superficial similarity between Foster and Andrew Benjamin's avant-
garde and Adorno's avant-garde. All, in a sense relativiz.e the identity of the 
avant-garde against the notion of the avant-garde as a failed, punctual Event. The 
absence of the original collective and vanguard character of the original avant-
garde in contemporary neo-avant-gardes is not a block on the development of the 
avant-garde, but the basis by which the avant-garde rethinks its function, suitably 
qualified. But the implications and outcome are very different between Foster and 
Andrew Benjamin and Adorno. For Foster and Benjamin the theory of the open-
avant-garde is essentially a way of reconstituting the present and futures of art 
within the boundaries of a stable capitalist art institution. That is, art's emergence 
from heteronomy into difference is seen as a kind of a differential handing down 
of the past from within artistic tradition. As Foster stresses, contemporary neo-
avant-gardes enact the postmodern continuity of the early avant-gardes, just as 
Benjamin describes the contemporary avant-garde in terms of a kind of 
interdependent pluralizing of inherited tendencies and forms. For Adorno, 
though, the theory of the open-avant-garde is never so sanguine, because \\hat 
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Adorno call the "impossible trick"lo8 of art constantly trying to identify the non-
identical, is an inherently destablizing and self-negating process. Accordingly, 
there is a strong sense in which the temporality of the avant-garde in Adorno is 
one riven, ontologically, by internal and external violation, by the symbolic 
violence of aesthetic ideology - the conflation of art with aesthetics - and the 
actual violence of the culture industry. The consequence of this is that the 
emergence of difference from heteronomy in art is subject to forces and 
constraints incompatible with a notion of the differential handing down of 
tradition. Tradition is not so much a place open to undetermined reconstitution as 
a place where cultural and social division is mediated and struggled through and 
against. The counter-hegemonic entry of the neo-avant-garde in the 1980s into 
the postmodern art institution, therefore, may advance a formal continuity with 
the original avant-garde, but it also enacts in significant sense a violation of those 
violations which are not amenable to aesthetic redemption or semiotic recoding: 
cultural and social division. In Foster and Andrew Benjamin the space of the 
avant-garde is essentially de-classed. 
There are two things at stake in Adorno's understanding of the avant-garde, that 
make it (within limits) a more suitable candidate for a defence of the category of 
the avant-garde and the constitutive power of negation. First, by insisting on the 
mediation of cultural and social division as the ground of the production of art's 
difference out of the heteronomy of tradition, Adorno's theory of the avant-garde 
keeps faith with the 'violence' from below of the original avant-garde's rupture 
with the art institution: there can be no continuity with the original avant-garde 
that doesn't also recognise that the original avant-garde continues to expose the 
false totality of the neo-avant-garde; and secondly, by insisting on the necessary 
violations and self-violations involved in art's task of affirming the non-
identitical, the question of art's formal continuity with the avant-garde is placed 
on a more solid subjective footing. That is, if the production of the' new' is not to 
108 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, p33 
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be confused simplistically with fads and novelties this is because the' new' is the 
place where the subject's irreconcilability is produced. By irreconciliability I 
mean the sense that the subject is, as Zizek suggests, always 'out of joint'. or in 
discord, with the place in which it finds itself and consequently will continually 
produce aesthetic forms that invoke this. Adorno does not develop in any depth 
the temporality of the avant-garde as the temporality of the self-negating subject 
in Aesthetic Theory, but its significance for his theory makes its insistence all the 
more important for a workable theory of the avant-garde. We need, therefore, to 
return to Hegel and to Slavoj Zizek's reading of Hegel, in order to expand on this 
question. 
In arguing that there is always an intractable or irreducible remainder in the 
subject, that makes the subject resists its full absorption into its social 
surroundings, we allow for the possible link between the temporal-spatial 
dismemberment of the subject and the violating and self-violating forces at work 
within the avant-garde's mediation of social and cultural division. Indeed, we 
might develop the open-model of the avant-garde one step further and say that the 
temporality of the avant-garde is another name for the irreducible infinity of the 
subject. By identifying the temporal experience of the subject as 'out of joint' 
with the experience of the artist as 'out of joint' within tradition, the agency of 
the 'new' in art is no more nor less than the mediating category of the subject's 
resistance. The avant-garde is, thus, not something imposed on an heterogeneous 
community of practioners, but is the space in which the immanent logics of the 
artist's and theorist's relationship to tradition and the social world is practised. 
That is, it is not a calendrical and typological set of forms, but a temporal logic of 
neo-ation across and between different cultural formations; and this temporal logic 
b 
of negation is now a global - if vastly uneven - reality: Western and non- \Vestern 
modernisms intersect under the forces of globalization. 109 Yet, if contemporary 
109 For discussion of the temporal logicof modernism (as against its arthistorical and 
typological conception), see Peter Osborne, Philosophy in Cultural Theory, Routledge, 
2000 
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political theory allows us to think the avant-garde dialectically on these terms. 
most contemporary cultural theory has actually moved in the opposite direction. 
Indeed the possi bility of the dialectical content of the avant-garde after avant-
gardism seems to have capsized recently amongst those who have practised some 
version of the open avant-garde, including Foster himself. Foster, has lost faith 
with his neo-avant-gardist model, reasoning that the critical function of art is 
either utterly marginal to the production of most art or an effect of the 
spectacularised academy.IIO In a way he has (unconsciously) positioned his work 
in the 'endist' space he was critical of earlier. Criticism as mourning now shapes 
his narration of the formation, rise and demise of the original avant-garde. This 
'endism' has also affected the art historian TJ Clark, who is one of the few art 
historians to have based and sustained his critical practice and defence of 
modernism on an explicit theory of negation. In Farewell to all Idea (1999)."1 
however, the idea of modernism and the avant-garde as living energies is 
suspended altogether, or at least deemed improbable. Similarly, another 
modernist and Hegelian, Fredric Jameson, in his extensive work on 
postmodernism, has also made no bones about contemporary art's subsumption 
under the reign of the commodity as image. 112 There is a great deal of 
disappointment, then, out there framed. on the one hand by an unnuanced theory 
of commodity fetishism, and the other by the formalization of negation. This is 
why T J Clark's contri bution to this debate is particularly frustrating. Clark' s 
model of negation and modernism in Farewell to an Idea, is a powerful reminder 
of how modernism is not a compendium of styles but an open and contingent 
means of testing the symbols and forms of modernity. This would seem to give 
him the intellectual manoeuvrability to avoid anti-dialectical closure. yet he opts 
110 Hal Foster, Design and Crime, Verso 2002 
111 T J Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episodes from a History of Modernism, Yale University 
Press, 1999 
112 Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-
1998, Verso 1998 
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for a suspension of the dialectic in the name of his own cherished, lost object of 
modernism: post-40s American modernist painting. These moves can be traced to 
the exhaustion of a second-generation Situationist problematic. Under late 
bourgeois culture, where the commodity has become image, art can only be 
practised as a set of dead language over and above living sUbjectivity.113 This is 
not to say that Clark's Situationist model of the commodity derogates the 
possibility of art as such, but that in prizing the subjective authenticity of a 
particular kind of modernist practice, he hollows out a living subjectivity from the 
forms of contemporary art. In this light, what is striking about this writing and the 
work of the writers discussed above is its failure to reposition the complex 
interrelations between autonomy, negation, subjectivity and the 'everyday' within 
a new constellation of divisions inside and outside of the confines of the received 
history of the Western avant-garde, replicating the same historical problem of 
mourning that befell BUrger and others after 68 faced with the defeat of both the 
early avant-garde and the revolutionary upturn. Autonomy, negation, subjectivity, 
and the 'everyday' are either parcelled out and fetishized or provided with a 
merely contiguous relationship with each other, rather than subject to new 
politicized redescriptions. This absence is no less evident in those who have taken 
up a post-Situationist line, such as those writers associated with postmodernist 
post-colonial studies, who have tended to shuffle these categories around with 
abandon. There is much writing that fits this bill, but I want look briefly at one 
essay in particular, because of its symptomatic nature for my arguments and the 
fact that it refers directly to my own work. This is Nikos Paperstergiadis's 
reflections on the' everyday' in Third Text, which in an attempt to 'save' theory 
for contemporary art not only produces a tendentious reading of my intervention 
concerning the place of theory in mid-90s art in Britain, but also produces a 
highly problematic view of the politics of theory in contemporary culture.ll~ 
113 For a recent version of this argument see, Anselm Jaffe, Guy Debord, translated by 
Donald Nicholson-Smith, with a foreword by T.J.Clark, University of California Press, 
1999. For an anecdotal discussion of these issues, see Andrew Hussy, The Life and 
Death of Guy Debord, Jonathan Cape, 2001 
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My intervention on behalf of certain aspects of the YbA in 'Mad for It!'115 
addressed a particular critical task. It was not an attack on theory but on the 
undertheorization of the place of theory in the theori~ation of contemporary art 
and the contemporary art institution. A very different matter altogether, as any 
attentive reading would have suggested. The article was grounded in a Rancierian 
problematic: the relationship between power, knowledge and class within the 
academies of art and art history. Throughout the essay my focus is taken with the 
relations between forms of class dissidence in the new art (by way of the 
appropriation of popular modes of attention) and the bearing this might have on 
broader debates on cultural and social division, and, not on the YbA 's connection 
to some hypothetical idea of 'cool', or to nationalistic hubris - which I roundly 
deflate at the end of the article. Hence the concept of the philistinism employed 
by myself (and with Dave Beech),116 as a way of understanding some of the 
tendencies of mid-90s UK and US art, is not a counter or reactive critical position 
to an overtheorized domain of art (sic) but something far more ambitious and 
demanding, the mediating category for an ontological account of art and social 
division. This position on the philistine then is part of a wider, negative 
dialectical and anti-post-structuralist research project, which I have been engaged 
with over the last fifteen years. 117 Failing to address this, Paperstergiadis talks 
naively about theory as if Victor Burgin's 'politics of representation', 
postmodernist-post-colonialism and post-structuralism were not all embedded in 
114 Nikos Paperstergiadis, 'Everything That Surrounds': Theories of the Everyday, Art and 
Politics' Third Text NO.57 Winter 2001-02 , 
115 John Roberts,'Mad for It! Philistinism, the Everyday and the New British Art', Third 
Text, No 35, Summer 1996 
116 See Dave Beech and John Roberts, The Philistine Controversy, Verso, 2002 
117 See for example, John Roberts (ed) Art Has No History! The Making and Unmaking of 
Modern Art Verso 1994, The Art of Interruption: Realism, Photography and the 
Everyday, Manchester University Press, 1998, an~ '~hilosophiZin~ the Everyday: The 
Philosophy of Praxis and the Fate of Cultural Studies, RadIcal PhIlosophy, NovlDec 
1999 
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a reactionary account of epistemology, a reformist politics, and self-inflating 
account of intellectual work in the academy. In my view anything that challenges 
these things, including the delinquencies and dissidencies of art, is a significant 
contribution to emancipatory struggles. A commitment to 'theory', therefore must 
also be accompanied by the understanding that the production and dissemination 
of theory is embedded within bourgeois institutions of expertise. The important 
issue is always how theory finds itself in struggle and negation: and sometimes 
for art, this will involve the actual abandonment and desecration of would-be 
'enlightened' positions, because these positions have become bound up official 
and customary modes of attention and thinking. In this art is compelled to 
continue to find its resources in all kinds of unpromising and unprepossessing 
quarters, in order to continually renegotiate its space of autonomy as a set of 
immersive, critical struggles. And this, precisely, is what the open-space of the 
avant-garde after avant-gardism names and organizes culturally and politically: 
the' endless' mediation of the irreconcilable subject. Although Nicolas Bourriaud 
doesn't have a theory of the avant-garde, or a theory of negation as such, (to his 
detriment), his work perhaps more than other contemporary cultural theorist 
comes closest to what I am arguing here. Dismissing the idea of late capitalism as 
the realm of dead subjectivity and self-enclosed image-production he argues that 
the models of art which conform to these theories, simply deliver subjectivity 
over to the ruling forms and interests. 118 This collusion continues to be 
perpetrated through treating contemporary art as a Cartesian model of stylistic 
invention parasitic on some fundamental loss of value and cultural habitus, and 
not as a divided productivelreproductive site, a place where value is constantly 
renewed, remade and reframed within, and against, capitalist spectacle. The 
necessity of art lies in its power to inhabit, transplant, decontextualize, and 
thereby produce a kind of derollrage, in defiance of the mass sensorium. 
118 See, Nicolas Bourriaud, Esthetique Relationne//e , les presses du reel, (2001)' and 
Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World, Lukas & 
Sternberg (2002) 
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"IClontrary to the received idea, we are not saturated with images, but subjected 
to the lack of certain images, which must be produced to fill in the blanks if the 
official image of community".119 The expression of the principle maybe a bit 
clumsy but the sentiment is correct. There is no waiting on emancipation and 
meaning: "no sign must remain inert, no image must remain untouchable. Art 
represent a counter-power".120 I am also reminded here of Ranciere's reflections 
on bourgeois democracy. A community of equals can only achieve substantial 
form if it is tied to a continuous process of verification and reiteration, otherwise, 
it produces the opposite: the endless production of acquiescence in the name of 
equality and freedom.121 
However, there are important ontological implications in defending an open 
avant-garde model that necessarily also take us beyond Bourriaud's theory of 
counter-power in art and Ranciere' s model of democracy. For by establ ishing the 
subject as fundamentally 'out of joint', the possibility of the 'new' as a break 
from within tradition is also opened up to the possibil ity of the qualitati\'(!!y new, 
to the Event that doesn't just rework the already given, but emerges without 
precedent, to produce a rupture in the present: the Event which cannot be 
predicted with reference to pregiven circumstances and limits. One of the 
problems with the revisionist postmodernist version of the open-avant-garde 
model is that this qualitative break to the new within the 'new' as "anorginal 
difference" is repressed. In fact in revisionist postmodernism there is no past or 
futural Event that can possibly break through the present. because every Event 
falls back into a homogeneous, linear, schematized time. Revolutions are always 
being rewritten merely as interruptions. Accordingly \\' hat is absent from the 
revisionist postmodernist open-avant-garde model of "anoriginal difference" is 
119 Bourriaud, Postproduction, op cit, p46 
120 Bourriaud, ibid, p87 
121 Jacques Ranciere, On the Shores of Politics, Verso 1995, 
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that its understanding of art's emergence from heteronomy is unable to 
accommodate the possibility of an artistic act that is part of an Event that "tears 
the texture of reality apart,,122 without warning, and therefore breaks the 
preexisting symbolic network. 
In these terms I want to advance a theory of the avant-garde in which the avant-
garde as Event and temporal process interconnect. Or rather, I want to advance a 
theory in which the Event of the avant-garde imposes on the temporal avant-
garde model not as the failed Event which enervates tradition and which the 
present simply accommodates, but the failed Event that produces a repressed 
potentiality in the present that stands to break open tradition. This does not mean, 
for example, that the failed and interruptive Event of the original avant-garde is 
about to return fully emergent. But, rather that to hold to the truth of the failure of 
the original avant-garde is to always hold on to the truth of its unfulfilled 
universal dimension which the untruth of capitalism holds in place. This why we 
need a theory of open theory of the avant-garde which identities the freedom of 
art with that which is not yet caught up in the web of necessity. A theory of the 
avant-garde which incorporates the repressed potential of the failed revolutionary 
Event and the' irreconcilability' of the subject. 
122 Slavoj Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, op cit, p32 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual art and Imageless Truth 
Conceptual art often assigned to texts the privilege that was previously enjoyed 
by pictures. It put texts where pictures used to be. For many critics this was seen 
as the final formal reduction of post-war modern art - the dissolution of the 
artefactual into art-as-idea. Indeed, there were some who thought that Conceptual 
art was the very terminus of art itself, the absolute negation of all that Western art 
has traditionally valued and sustained. This sense of iconoclasm is, however, 
misleading, not least because 'anti-visuality' has deeper roots in art's past than 
the anti-mimeticism of the 20th century avant-garde. A distrust of mimesis and 
sensible form shapes the very development of autonomous art in the modern 
period, defines it even. As autonomous art arises with Romanticism the tradition 
of scepticism regarding the truthfulness of appearance in post-Platonist 
philosophy is transfigured into a scepticism about mimesis and sensible form in 
art as such. There grows a convergence between the distrust of empirical 
appearances as a source of truth in art and the fact that the sensible appearance of 
art are not just illusory but alienated from a wider engaged and worshipful 
community. This is why Hegel is the key philosopher of art's post-Platonic 
Enlightenment. Like Kant, Hegel inherits the post-Platonist distrust of mimetic 
appearances and sensible form, but he brings to this an unprecedented, modern, 
historical consciousness. 
For Hegel empirical reality is a 'crueller' illusion in its deceptive immediacy than 
the 'secondary' illusions of art. "Art liberates the real import of appearances from 
the semblance and deception of this bad and fleeting world and imparts to 
phenomenal semblances a higher reality born of mind".123 Yet despite the 
intellectual importance, which Hegel assigns to art, it is not the "absolute mode of 
123 G.W.F. Hegel, 'On Art', translated by Bernard Bosanquet, On Art, Religion, and the 
History of Philosophy: Introductory Lectures, (ed, J.Glenn Gray, intra. Tom Rockmore), 
Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1997, p31 
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bringing the mind's genuine interests into consciousness".12-+ Only a certain kind 
of - restricted - truth is available to modern art. This is because the intellectual 
redemption of the sensuous art object is itself a reflection of art's modern 
alienation. Romanticism represents the progressive flourishing of intellect in art, 
but it also signals its increasing separation from the embodiment of spirit in 
community. In the absence of traditional religious communities in which artistic 
works might be venerated, thought and reflection have outstripped the work of 
art. This observation is the basis of Hegel's notorious notion of the' end of art'. 
When Hegel says art's highest destiny is a thing of the past, he is arguing that its 
telos has been transformed into the domain of our ideas about art, losing its 
former collective basis in reality. In redeeming its sensuous appeal Romanticism 
is unable to make good modern art's Spiritual destiny. It therefore prepares the 
ground for its supersession by Thought itself. Accordingly, the forms of art, 
which come closest to this philosophical development of Spirit, are poetry and 
music for it is poetry and music, which are not reliant for their realisation on 
sensible appearance, but are able to launch themselves "exclusively in the inner 
space".125 Works which rely on sound and language reduce that alienating 
distance between spectator and object which is occasioned by the artefactual 
character of visual art. 
For Hegel, appearances lack intrinsic universality. Images may bear forth an 
intelligible aspect and carry spiritual content, but this only serves to demonstrate 
that the cognitive character of art has its origin outside the sensible realm. 
Although images present truths to the spectator, the form in which these truths are 
presented is inappropriate to the higher demands of Reason. The presentation of 
concepts by the means of images violates the infinite character of Reason. In this 
Hegel is close to Kant. Both acknowledge that sensible appearances are 
124 G.W.F. Hegel, ibid, p32 
125 G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics, translated by T.M.Knox, Oxford University Press, 1975. 
p123 
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inadequate in the presentation of the infinite, but Hegel refuses to accept Kant's 
view that the infinite must therefore be unknowable, rather, the infinite is 
knowable in the medium of Thought itself. For Hegel Kant's principle of 
reflective unity only operates within the faculty of judgement, which is quasi-
psychological. If a stronger concept of rationality is to be defended, the source of 
Reason and its infinite character is not to be located in the knowing 
transcendental subject at all, but in the absolute subject as part of an objective, 
unfolding world process or Spirit. Spirit is equivalent to the ex-post knowledge of 
things: subjects come to an understanding of their activities in the light of being 
interpreted, and are able thereby to adjust or transform their judgements and 
understanding accordingly. 
Hegel's notion of the self-development of Thought is best seen as a process of 
imageless truth. Indeed, Thought is itself the production of imageless truth in the 
sense that imageless truth is the dialectical outcome of the movement of Spirit. Or 
rather, dialectic is imageless truth, as the movement of consciousness cannot be 
expressed in descriptive form or ordinary language; it can only be experienced in 
motion. 126 Hegel's rejection of sense-experience and understanding as the 
foundation of truth, lies, therefore, in a positive reversal of the picture-theory of 
consciousness. The inability to fix truth in a picture is not to be considered as a 
limitation, but as the purposive and active basis of understanding. Truth is 
temporal rather than spatial. 
Hegel's temporal understanding of truth haunts Conceptual art. But unlike the 
critique of empiricism it doesn't haunt Conceptual art as a direct philosophical 
presence. Indeed in both Conceptual art as writing and in much writing about 
Conceptual art, Hegel's writing is largely ignored or rejected either as the source 
126 For a discussion of Hegel's 'imageless truth' see, Michael Rosen, Hegel's dialectic 
and its criticism, Cambridge University Press, 1982. For a discussion of Hegel, dialectic 
and ex-post knowledge see Allen W.Wood, 'Hegel and Marxism', Frederick C.Beiser, ed., 
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge University Press 1993 
116 
of the aesthetics comedy of 'inner necessity' or (mistakenly) as one of Clement 
Greenberg's and Michael Fried's philosophic mentors. On the other hand. for 
those who argue wrongly that Conceptual art subsumes art under philosophy. 
Hegel provides the critical model. 127 Yet Hegel's thinking plays a large part in 
framing the historical tensions and conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s, insofar as 
the questions art asks of itself in this period is informed by his understanding of 
Romanticism and the alienation of art. Hegel's distrust of sensible appearance on 
the grounds of the loss of art's spiritual satisfaction feeds into Conceptual art's 
critique of the commodity form and capitalist spectacle. This is, however, a Hegel 
who is mainly mediated by other writers, in particular Wittgenstein and Marx, 
and therefore a thinker whose ideas and themes remain embedded in contexts that 
have made it difficult to establish the specific influence and value of his writing 
on appearance and mimesis. 
In this essay I want to look at some Hegelian themes and problems that arise from 
Conceptual art's critique of Modernism, empiricism and the pictorial. I shall 
claim Hegel's concept of 'imageless truth' to be the unifying content of a number 
of key Conceptual art practices, and the basis of their eventual crisis. My 
argument is that the concept of 'imageless truth' overdetermines Conceptual art's 
critique of Modernism, yet is implicated in its most interesting formal and 
cognitive challenges. It is deflationary as well as inflationary: emancipatory as 
well as constraining. If this seems suitably antinomic and Hegelian it is largely 
because Conceptual art is one the major moments where reflection on art's 
conditions of production is driven by a dialectical consciousness of art's 
possibilities and boundaries, of sensible appearance and truth, of image and 
language. Conceptual art is the first avant-garde art to bring philosophical 
consciousness in practice to modern art's performance of its own alienation. Yet 
127 See, for example, Arthur C. Danto, 'The End of Art', The Philosophical 
Disenfranchisement of Art, Columbia University, 1986. 
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this does not mean that Conceptual artists conscious of the problems of 
philosophy saw themselves as philosophers, or pretended to be philosophers, or 
were even in professional terms any good at philosophy. Rather, thinking with 
and through philosophy became the constituti ve materials of theoretical work and 
daily conversation addressed to the crisis of Modernism. Philosophy, then, was 
not something that was brought to bear on art, but an analytical toolkit, which 
could be used - properly or improperly, seriously or insolently - in the gaps 
between art and its transformation. Far from working out what was pertinent in 
philosophy in order to construct a philosophy of art, artists' worked at philosophy 
in an Hegelian sense in order to find out what the relationship between various 
types of philosophy and art was and whether in fact some philosophy (the 
philosophy of language in particular) was useful for art and its criticism. The 
outcome was that philosophy in Conceptual art was a means of having different -
and more exacting - kinds of conversations with those from whom the artist might 
learn and with those who might want to listen. And from this willing dialogue, a 
more demanding and expanded conversation was thought to be possible with 
those who wouldn't listen - those who possessed bourgeois intellectual and 
cultural authority and had no need of that kind of unsightly and troublesome 
theory. In this respect philosophy was not a discipline artists turned to in order to 
explicate Conceptual art, as if Conceptual art existed prior to artists use of 
philosophical categories. Rather the use of philosophy by (some) Conceptual 
artists was governed by the conversational requirements of learning in the face of 
perceived artistic problems and intractabilities. This dialogical ideal obviously 
does not cover all work that falls under the heading of Conceptual art in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Joseph Kosuth's work for instance can be seen as leading 
philosophy in art back into an (expanded) Modernism, narrowing the open 
conversational conditions of practice; just as later Conceptual artists took 
Conceptual art to mean in simple historicist fashion, a philosophical break \vith 
aesthetics tout court. Yet, despite recent attempts to categorise Conceptual art as 
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culturally repressive, the dialogic aspirations of Conceptual art for a short while 
established the conditions of an open artistic community. 
In addressing Conceptual art's critique of Modernism I want to look at the work 
of three artists in particular: Lawrence Weiner, Robert Barry, Joseph Kosuth; and 
the group Art & Language. In this I will concentrate on those aspects of their 
practices, which bring conceptual's art's presentation of 'imageless truth' and a 
critique of the picture-theory of consciousness into focus. These aspects can be 
adumbrated as follows: the rejection of empirical, perspectival and expressive 
forms as the sole models of artistic truth; the privileging of textual and 
mathematical linearity over sensual spatiality; and broadly, the categorisation of 
the artwork and its interpretation as an unfolding discursive 'event'. 
The notion of 'event' in Conceptual art is conventionally held to have emerged 
out of the 'democratisation' effected by the Minimalist installation in creating an 
interactive spectator. By directly incorporating the spectator's consciousness of 
their own body in their evaluation of the art object Minimalism's theatricality is 
judged to have brought about a double breakdown of the Modernist axioms that 
stress formal reticence on the part of the art object and naturalise the spectator as 
inviolate 'aesthete'. In enlivening and expanding the material and cognitive 
possi bilities of the art object Minimalism renders these twin axioms of 
Modernism untenable. Minimalism's shift to the context of art's reception, to its 
institutional formation and perception, provides the space for reflection not just 
on the 'what' and the 'how' but importantly the where of art. It is into this' gap' 
that Conceptual art is able to insert a more vigorous sense of the artist and 
spectator as makers of meaning, rather than as bearers of a formal tradition. This 
is because the spell of art's formal character is dissolved into the disparate 
functions of artistic activity itself. By this, I mean that the discursive development 
of art in this period goes hand in hand with the demand for a non-emotivist kind 
of spectator and therefore a new ethical and practical domain for thinking and 
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talking about art. The relationship between the spectator and artwork is treated 
not as a place of aesthetic communion but as a space of cogniti ve attentiveness. 
'Imageless truth' in Conceptual art, then, is the discursive production and 
extension of the' event' , a movement of the consciousness of consciousness 
materialised in an inversion of the relations of privilege, which had existed, 
between looking and reading, picturing and talking. In this sense, the notion of 
'event' in Conceptual art is qualitatively different from that in Modernism. 
Whereas Modernism is overwhelmingly concerned with the incommensurability 
between the contingent aesthetic object and our fugitive cognition of the world, 
Conceptual art is preoccupied with the unfolding, transitive possibilities of the 
materialization of art as set of formally open cognitive processes. 
There are three distinct dialogical operations in the early period of Conceptual 
art: 1) as the basis for the formation of various ideaL imagined or actual 
communities of practioners and/or spectators; 2) as an exchange between the 
categories of philosophical discourse and the traditional and modern discourses of 
art; and 3) as means of analysing the propositional and referential conditions of 
language and art in order to say substantive things about art as a kind of 
discursive' event'. The third operation is what is commonly meant by the 
'linguistic turn' in the practices of Conceptual art: the reflexive incorporation of 
language into the visual field of art itself; art is conceived as entailing or being a 
form of reading - a diachronic process - and not as something' coming before 
one's mind', in the anti-mentalist Hegelian/Wittgensteinian sense of the phrase. 
On this understanding we need to be clear, therefore, about the different 
dialogical voices of Conceptual art, which distinguish the different temporal 
forms, and critical inflections of Conceptual art's' imageless truth'. For the notion 
of art as 'event' is complexly contested in the work of Weiner, Kosuth, Barry, Art 
& Lanouaoe (and others) across these different dialogical orders. 
o 0 
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Since the late sixties Lawrence Weiner has presented the propositional and 
referential functions of language as artistic materials. In the form of statements in 
artists' books and later as large graphic statements on external urban walls or in 
galleries, he has used language in order to divest art of what he sees as the 
inhibiting pregiven metaphoric functions of pictorial art and literary content in 
art. The requirement placed on the viewer to interpret a metaphor reproduces the 
conservative relationshi p between the artist as 'creator' of meaning and spectator 
as the passive recipient of its aesthetic truth. Weiner's refusal of metaphor is by 
extension a disinvestment of language-use of its' transparent' interpretation. 
Through the insistent use of the past participle Weiner's short statements suspend 
the hierarchical imperative of interpretation, allowing the emphasis to be placed 
on the production of meaning as a productive activity between spectator and 
artist, and therefore on the metaphor-producing faculties of the spectator itself. 'A 
2" Wide 1" Deep Trench Cut Across A Standard One Car Driveway' (from 
Statements, Louis Kellner Foundation/Seth Sieglaub, 1968).128 Hence the past 
participle's active function: the apparent conclusiveness of each statement also 
takes on the form of a directive. Each statement functions elliptically as a 
description of a past action and as a suggested action. This enunciative voice is, 
therefore, participatory and futural, although of course, each statement is not 
given as a directive to be performed; the sense is of the described action being 
repeatable if and when it is feasible or necessary. Each statement, then, 
exemplifies and anticipates a dialogical ideal: the production of the meanings of 
art as an ideologically unencumbered passage from one self-directed, autonomOllS 
individual to another. From this perspective 'Weiner's' dialogic model is not 
reliant on, or attributable to, the personality, personal inclinations or ego of the 
artist; rather its purpose is appelative: to summon up and challenge the meaning-
creating capabilities of its audiences. This disinclination to represent mimetically, 
therefore, is an open invitation to see art from a place outside its traditional 
128 For a survey of the early works see, Dieter Schwarz, Catalogue Raisonne: Lawrence 
Weiner, Books 1968-1989, Verlag der Buchandlung Walter Konig KolnlLe Nouveau 
Musee, 1989 
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symbolic mediation of the 'other'. As Weiner says: "Something is not of value 
because it resembles something else".129 
Weiner's rejection of reflectionist and expressionist models of representation 
defines the early moment of Conceptual art as a radical disenchantment with the 
temporal and spatial constraints of Modernism. Indeed, Weiner's linguistic 
respatialization of the art object contributes to the principal challenge of the 
dialogism of this period: the refusal of the separation of the faculties of reason 
and aesthetic judgement, enshrined in the post-Kantian demotion of the 
epistemological character of the artwork. For Kant aesthetic experience is 
different from theoretical understanding in that aesthetic appreciation of the 
artwork is not identifiable with any knowledge of the object but is the outcome of 
the aesthetic faculty coming into playas a result of the sensuous properties of the 
object. 130 The outcome is a focus on art's judgement, rather than on its 
understanding. This produces a harmonious closure within the act of perception 
itself, insofar as Kant is overwhelmingly concerned with bringing together the 
spontaneous synthesis of the sensuous in intuition - what Kant calls the 
Imagination - into the Understanding, or discursive reason. Inevitably the focus of 
post-Kantian notions of synthesis is the pursuit of aesthetic fitness and beauty as 
an ideology of happy reciprocity between art and the world. There is little 
recognition of - or rather a fear of - the perpetually unstable and disrupti ve 
processes of the Imagination's transcendental spontaneity and its perpetually 
unstable and disruptive effects on reason and art. Hegel, though, makes no 
distinction between the Imagination and Understanding. The Imagination 
continually tears the Understanding Uudgement) apart, this is then subject to 
129 Lawrence Weiner, 'Intervention' (1997), in Lawrence Weiner, Phaidon 1998, p134 
130 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, translated by J.Harper, Harper 1968 
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resynthesis and further "dismemberment", and so on. 131 This is Hegel's ex-post 
knowledge of things as a drama of misrecognition, according to which our aims 
and outcomes constantly mismatch each other and instate yet another revised aim 
and action. 132 Understanding is not an impassive synthesis, but a process that is 
always subject to the disruptive activity of the Imagination. Thus, paradoxically, 
at the same time as Hegel fails to reincorporate art back into Understanding 
(philosophy) and identifies Romanticism with the 'end of art', he also opens art 
up historically to its discursive redescription. By placing art into the temporal 
space of history's drama of misrecognition, art's unfolding becomes intelligible 
in terms of the risk of positing and failing and positing again in order to risk 
further failure. For Weiner and Conceptual art then, Modernism's post-Kantian 
inflation of aesthetic experience as sensuous judgement, occludes this risk, by 
driving a wedge between the disruptive and unstable relations between language 
and looking, form and meaning. 
Admittedly, the Hegel being put to use here is a different Hegel than the one 
usually identified with post-Kantianism (Schiller, Coleridge). The Hegel of post-
Kantianism is very much the Hegel of reconciliation and not the 'open' Hegel of 
negation, of the Phenomenology of Spirit. 133 Indeed, it is not too difficult to 
condemn Hegel as the philosopher of closure. Art's disappearance into 
philosophy (reflective reason) leaves Hegel with a theory of art that is unable to 
account for artistic subjectivity. By arguing that consciousness can only develop 
via its relation to the development of Spirit, the expressive truth of a work of 
131 G.W.F. Hegel, The PhenomenologyofSpiri~1807], translated by A.V.Miller, foreward 
by J.N.Finlay, Oxford University Press 1977, p30 
132 For a discussion of misrecognition and reason, see Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes 
the Law: Philosophy and Representation, Cambridge University Press, 1996 
133 For recent defences of the 'open' Hegel see, Rose, op cit, and Slavoj Zizek, The 
Ticklish Subject, Verso, 1999. For a 'closed' reading of Hegel in relation to the critique of 
post-Kantianism, see Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism, Columbia University 
Press, 1984. In his later writings, published posthumously, his position, however, moved 
closer to a greater acceptance of the earlier 'open' Hegel. 
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visual art functions in subordinate relation to philosophy's Conceptual 
articulation of freedom. In this regard Hegel's Reason is the Reason of a fledgling 
capitalism and is yet to experience the full weight of the repressions of 
modernity. He does not acknowledge a contradiction at the level of artistic form 
between the Spirit's systematic subordination of aesthetic awareness embodied in 
a sensuous object and the progress of universal truth. In the Aesthetics he 
subsumes the particular in an accommodation with a teleological bourgeois 
rationalism and therefore fails to locate the question of the expressive truth of art 
within the question of the production of art: the philosophical redescription of art 
fails to return to the development of art itself. But if Hegel sacrifices art to 
philosophy (to Idea), his commitment to 'imageless truth' as a critique of the 
Kantian resolution of aesthetics in the judgement of beauty breaks up the 
synthesis of the sensuous manifold in perception for art. In this respect we need to 
make a distinction between the Hegel of post-Kantianism and post-Romanticism 
and the Hegel of the drama of misrecognition. Without this distinction, it is not 
clear why and on what basis Conceptual art uses the concept of' imageless truth' 
to attack Modernism. What characterizes Conceptual art, then, is that it 
emphasizes one Hegel at the expense of another: it rejects the Hegel of post-
Kantianism by reclaiming the Hegel of the critique of Kant's bifurcation of the 
Imagination and the Understanding. Hegel is used against himself, so to speak. 
Thus Conceptual art's critique of post-Kantian aesthetic ideology is as much 
about a critique of the' closed' Hegel as it is about the elisions in Kant's concept 
of Understanding. And this is why the problem of metaphor in art is so important 
for Weiner. In post-Kantianism aesthetics becomes identifiable with the 
sublimation of reason and epistemology in the interests of an ideology of 
aesthetic sponanteneity. Apprehension of the sensuous content of the artwork 
'stands in' for the loss reciprocity between humans and the world. By imputing to 
art the metaphoric power to reconcile sensuous experience and conceptual reason, 
art promises the restoration of the antinomies of consciousness and nature, 
subject and object. The result is that aesthetics is naturalised as a philosophical 
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idealism. In Modernism this naturalisation takes on a similar ideologically 
combative form, as a particular kind of historically ambitious abstract painting is 
identified with the very apogee of sensuous immediacy, although by the late 
1950s this is largely depoliticized and uncoupled from its Romantic origins. By 
WWII the residual philosophical content of this painting had become harnessed to 
a powerful capitalist art administration. Minimalism, and then in turn, Conceptual 
art, were forced thereby to polemically resist and undermine this dissociation, as 
its desocializing logic became the official ideology of Western bourgeois culture. 
Consequently, what distinguishes the ontological expansion of the artwork's 
identity in the late 1960s is that epistemological content is returned to aesthetic 
categories as a way of holding fast to judgements other than spontaneous 
emotivist ones. The introduction of geometric division into the organisation of the 
visual field, the use of diagrams, tabulation and taxonomy as 'compositional' 
principles, the application and display of modal logic as a means of assessing 
theoretical learning, the incorporation of scientifically exact descripta and 
measurements of objects and events into an expanded understanding of 
representation, and the identification of language and non-sensi ble realia with the 
content of the artwork, produced a fundamental de-pictorialization of 
representation and consequently expanded both the virtual and actual spaces for 
art. The studio-as-retreat is exchanged for the studio-as-office and drop-in-centre, 
the museum for the library, the easel and foundry for the kitchen table, drawing 
board and photocopier. 
This discursive reskilling or deaestheticization of art is usually taken to represent 
a radical extension of the Duchampian ready-made. The nomination, or quasi 
(appropriation), of language and non-sensible realia being an extension of 
Duchamp's principle to linguistic forms and to microscopic and implausibly large 
entities, like whole islands, cloud formations or fog banks. Although nomination 
or appropriation is falsely inflated by some as the cornerstone of Conceptual art, 
an expanded form of that notion was crucial in shifting artists out of one 
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(constrictive) place and into another (less constrictive) one, at a time when 
notions of artistic competence were repressively identified with the domesticated 
laws of 'expressive creativity'. Thus if the conservative price of nomination was, 
paradoxically, a return to the artist as possessive individual and beady eyed 
accumulator of primitive capital - "what is art is what artists say is art" - its 
progressive historical function was to dislocate judgements of art from matters of 
aesthetic taste. For it is through the gap between art and aesthetics, inscribed in 
the act of nomination, that Conceptual art is able to incorporate philosophy and 
critical theory into the relations which compose art's production. Hence, what 
distinguishes Conceptual art's discursivity is not that it systematises the 
nomination or appropriation of the ready-made as a mode of production. Such a 
systematization is no more than a positivistic version of Conceptual art: 
Conceptual art = concepts + appropriation and/or mechanical reproduction. 
Rather, the ready made is the means by which the relations of art's production are 
restored to their modern, interdisciplinarity and its objects to cognitive status. The 
readymade is the modal operator between, art and knowledge, art and other 
disciplines: between art and architecture, art and film, art and photography. 
Robert Barry is an artist whose work bears upon and is borne upon by the 
expanded readymade and by the notion of diachronic spectatorship. In the late 
1960s Barry explored the extensionality of the concept' art' through an extended 
repetition of' least events' or 'zero signifiers', in the form of books, or by 
nominating non-sensible entities (such as the inert gas Krypton) in the form of 
printed certifications or photographic 'evidence'. What drives the work is a gap 
between the compressed diurnal 'time' of the production of the art object and the 
vastly extended diachronic time - calendrical time in fact - of its reception. The 
form of the work clearly prevents any practically realisable cognition of its 
components and truth-value. Thus in One Million Dots (1968) and Olle Billion 
Dots (1971). dots are printed in tight lines on sheets of A-..f paper which are then 
bound into encyclopaedia-like volumes - in the case of Olle Billion Dots some 
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twenty five volumes. Counting one dot every second 24 hours a day it would take 
the viewer of One Million Dots approximately 115 days - an almost impossible 
and entirely worthless task. Indeed it is the utterly uneventful and unrewarding 
cognitive process - the complete absence of learning-outcomes - that gives these 
works the aspect of trauma. The liberation of art from the empirical into the 
unboundedness of imageless truth produces a horror vacui, the threat of a 
submission to an endless and uncontrollable profusion of the same. From these 
conditions Barry reduces mechanical reproduction to its most rigid, oppressive 
and bureauractic conditions: to a vast proliferation and unassimilable flow of 
information or 'noise'. This is a dark and unremitting view of imagelessness, a 
static imagelessness, in which the passage of time is without a significant event. 
In this way the loss of sensuousness, of the representable object, is not a 
summons to the 'critical-spectator' in the sense Weiner understands it. We are not 
asked to imagine the dots as symbolic mathematization of the cosmos for 
instance. Neither is it a zero-sum game of reductiveness in which the spectator 
marvels at the implausibility and audacity of the artist's use of exotic materials. 
Rather, by locking the viewer out of the traditional attri butes of aesthetic 
sensuousness, the propositional demonstration of art as cognitively expandable 
category invites the spectator into a consciousness of the limits of consciousness. 
By expanding the cognitive realm of the artwork Barry requires the spectator to 
think his or her relation to the art object in terms of the limitations of individual 
knowledge and the historical limits of the time and physical existence of the 
artwork. His version of imageless truth is a brooding on being-towards-death, 
producing, in the period of early Conceptual art's drive for a 'new spectator', an 
uncharacteristic meeting between an analytic practice and sense of homelessness 
on a cosmological scale. This homelessness is particularly striking in the 
imaginary exhi bition Barry staged at Art & Project in Amsterdam in 1969. Art & 
Project advertised that Barry would be exhibiting from the 1 ~ Decembt?f to the 31 
December, but that the gallery would be closed for the duration of the sho\\. 
Whether the artist actually exhibited in tht? closed space or not, the exhibition is 
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presented at the point of its inception as already a past event - a vacant space. 
Meaning has moved elsewhere. In this way Barry generates a conflict: by opening 
up the experience of the artwork to an expanded temporality, he at the same time 
empties this temporality of any specific dialogic content. In fact a disquieting 
reversal takes place: the greater the claims on the expanded material and 
cognitive field of art, the less is required of the spectator by way of engagement 
with the form of the work. Imageless truth becomes the completed dissolution of 
perception in the act of cognition. 
Yet, Conceptual art's critique of Modernist positivity is not without its own 
troubles. The most obvious of these is the transformation of that critique into 
another form of positivity. This is a difficulty that disturbs the claims of much 
formally advanced art of the late 60s. The vertiginous sense of possibility and 
historical impatience of the period produces a premature fixing - or rather 
institutionalization - of' conceptuality' as a response to the crisis of the Modernist 
object and spectator. The ideational' coherence' of concept-art acquires the 
privilege of a must-get-to-category which establishes the conditions of historical 
precedent and novelty: coercive Modernist determinations are replaced by 
coercive conceptualist ones. This is the overwhelming problem with one of the 
early attempts to define Conceptual art, Joseph Kosuth's 'Art After Philosophy' 
(1969).134 In an attack on what he calls the traditional morphologies of art, 
Kosuth seeks' imagelessness' in the presentation of art as "Proposition". 
Like Weiner, Barry and other Conceptual artists Kosuth takes the split between 
art and aesthetics in the theory of the ready made as the raison d' hre of modern 
practice: following Duchamp the artist is free to nominate what he or she judges 
134 Joseph Kosuth, 'Art After Philosophy', first published in Studio International, nO.915 
(October 1969), nO.916 (November 1969), and nO.917 (December 1969). Reprinted in 
Joseph Kosuth, Art after Philosophy and After: Collected Writings, 1966-1990, ed 
Gabriele Guercio, foreward by Jean-Frangois Lyotard, MIT 1991 
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to be or wants to be art. But, in a move that seeks to outreach and displace 
hitherto previous defences of the readymade, he extends its logic to the 
presentation of - what, in the spirit of Wittgenstein's Tractatus - he calls analytic 
propositions as art. The nominating powers of the artist are underwritten by, and 
incorporated into, its philosophical authorisation. Consequently he argues that 
with Conceptual art the ready-made is brought to philosophical self-
consciousness: by nominating a particular proposition as art, the artwork becomes 
simultaneously a definition of art. For example Titled (Art as Idea as Idea) 
[meaning] (1967), one of a number of dictionary definitions photographically 
enlarged as graphics. Kosuth describes this process or relation not surprisingly as 
tautological: what the artist intends in conceptual form to define as art is art. But 
for Kosuth this process is not necessarily connected to any kind of visual form. 
The propositional function of the Conceptual art object is not bound by the 
traditional dictates of material visualisation. "Objects are conceptually irrelevant 
to the condition of art" .135 
Given Kosuth's attack on post-Romantic aesthetics this would appear to be 
uncontroversial. Yet, his anti-aestheticism does not entail a subsumption of art 
under the discursive interests of philosophy or politics, etc. Although he attacks 
the traditional morphologies of art and the dissociation of the faculties in 
Kantianism, he defends the autonomy of Conceptual art - that is, he defends it as 
a practice, which does not perform a service, or which represents a set of interests 
external to its own immanent problems of realisation. Paradoxically, then, Kosuth 
dissolves the function of material and sensuous characteristics of art, only to 
reinstate them for the purpose of defining art as qualitatively different from other 
disciplines. In this way the semantic reductiveness of Kosuth's model is caught 
on the horns of a dilemma: how is it possible to theorize away the sensible 
dimension of art by divorcing the propositional truth of the object from its 
material support, at the same time as covertly relying on this dimension to define 
135 Joseph Kosuth, 'Art After Philosophy', Art After Philosophy, p26 
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art's autonomy?136 This is possible for Kosuth because the logic of his work is in 
fact closer to Modernist protocols than' Art After Philosophy' would want to 
recognise. For, Kosuth' s use of the proposition as a ready-made is itself an 
aesthetic act, insofar as the propositional content is naturalized in the form of 
textual display. The advanced status of Conceptual art is derived from the visible 
incorporation of propositional contents into the field of art - and it is this process 
of making-visible that guarantees the art's rigour. Kosuth's use of propositional 
content is a self-definition of art for Conceptual art rather than a self-critical 
interrogation of art within Conceptual art. The "Proposition" is. in fact. radically 
sundered from its linguistic and sensible form, while being confused with it at the 
same time in a strange hypostasis. This is because Kosuth's primary interest is in 
stabilizing the linguistic turn of Conceptual art in the image of the Modernist self-
definition of art and not in problematising the content of this self-definition. 
The irony of Kosuth' s practice then is that the expanded material and virtual 
character of Conceptual art is reduced to a model of semantics-plus-display and 
to a desocialised notion of artistic autonomy. Indeed, the model of imageless truth 
is harnessed to a neurotic defense of the purity of Conceptual art as a positivistic 
ideal: analytical propositions of art as art. In this way Kosuth' s work represents a 
technical and graphic version of the epistemologicalization of the art object, 
producing a Conceptual art which is actually at odds with Conceptual art's 
broader discursive cultural dynamic. This places his work appararently left-field 
of Wiener and Barry - where no doubt he would be pleased to find himself. It also 
put him in grinding, rebarbative conflict with Art & Language. 
136 For a discussion of this question, see Peter Osborne, 'Conceptual art and/as 
Ph 'l h' ds Jon Bird and Michael Newman, Rewriting Conceptual art: Critical and IOSOP y, e ' 
Historical Approaches, Reaktion Books, 1999 
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The original alliance that existed between Kosuth and Art & Lanouaoe soon o 0 
broke down when it became clear that Kosuth's Modernist containment of 
philosophy in art, conflicted with A & L's cultural encoding of philosophy as 
open-inquiry. Despite the disenchantments, which they shared in the late 1960s, 
by the early 1970s Kosuth and A & L were involved in two very different kinds 
of projects. This was because Art & Language's refused to bend their analysis of 
the propositions of art to the elaboration and pursuit of purified but gi ven visual 
practice~ rather, their analysis of the propositions of art becomes an analysis of 
the logical possibilities and entailments of language-use itself. This difference is 
fundamental, because it is the difference between seeing the categories of art as a 
transformable part of the dialectical process, and translating these categories into 
an ordinary propositional form: "art is ... ", as Kosuth does. Consequently, for Art 
& Language the emphasis is less on producing objects and of defining a look than 
on conversation, learning and writing. 
On this score there is a powerful sense in which the model of imageless truth in 
Conceptual art achieves a heightened theoretical and dialogical self-
consciousness in Art & Language's work of the period. Unlike Weiner, Barry and 
Kosuth, the discursivity of the 'art object' is dissolved for A & L into 
conversational activity, as if the stablization of art into any kind of iconic object 
would be the death of consciousness. In this way A & L transform the notion of 
art as 'event' into a first-order textual practice, breaking altogether with the 
residual perceptual ism of so-called stylistic conceptualism and establishing a 
fundamental ambiguity about the artistic status of their textual production. By 
practicing art-as-theory- as conversational practice - the material form of the' art 
object' is marginalized or disappears, or is owned up to as cheerful contingency. 
Accordingly, their categories and terms of explication and exemplification shift 
the discursivitiy of conceptual practice into an explicitly temporal or Hegelian 
mode. There is a core commitment to the notion that learning and con\efsation do 
not just involve transformations in logical space but actually entail the 
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transformation of logical space itself, recollecting Hegel's notion of the ex-post 
basis of knowledge. In other words, the production of meaning involves the 
transformation of the conditions under which the future production of the 
category 'art' is able to take place. This is generalised by A & L, variously, as a 
"dynamic transivity",137 "a dialogical continuum" 138 and "transformational 
derestriction ".139 Conversation and learning become a ceaseless performance of 
dissatisfaction, qualification and self-questioning. "The problems we face just 
cannot be sloganised"~ 140 "We still can't relax, we still don't relax".141 
From this perspective A & L's analytical philosophic insistence on the 
examination of language as the basis for inquiring how we are in the world, and 
what we can claim about it, becomes allied to a collective practice of inquiry with 
regard to the discourses of art. Making sense of meaning (of intention, agency 
and reference) becomes constitutive in making sense of the 'how' and the 'why' 
of art as necessary to sustaining art as 'event' - what A & L refer to, following 
Wittgenstein, as the vicissitudes of 'going on'. The result is a qualitati vely 
different understanding of art as cultural practice. The critique of the category 
'art' does not begin from the idealist rejection of a conception of artistic practice 
as a 'whole' - the language of abstract postulates, utopian projections and 
moralising proscriptions - but immanently from the critique of antecedently gi ven 
conditions of expression, reference and meaning. Artistic conversation is active 
and disputative, rather than ironic, supersessive or consensus building.
142 
The 
137 Art & Language, 'Why J.Kosuth Won't Work for Us & Other Trivia'. Art-Language. vol 
2 noA. 1974. p52 
138 Art & Language. 'Slogan Adaptation'. Art-Language, vol 3 no.2, 1975. p67 
139 Art & Language. 'Mr Yin Yutang Refers to "Fair Play" ... ·. Art-Language, ibid. p68 
140 Art & Language, 'Instruction Index a x: Transcription 21.5.73'. Art-Language. vol 2 
noA, 1974, p74 
141 Art & Language. ibid. p82 
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very practice of thinking about thinking about art becomes for A & L a means of 
attacking the positivization of art's social crisis in the traditions of social realism 
and Modernism, and by implication within Conceptual art itself - Kosuth' s 
identification of the linguistic turn of Conceptual art as 'solution' to the historical 
split between art and aesthetics. By opposing conversation and learning to 
hypostatised 'crises' and their hypostatised 'solutions', cultural practice in A & L 
is constituted as strategic, positional and project-led. The outcome is a dialogical 
practice, which is fundamentally asymptotic: conversation and analysis rests on 
self-transformative activity, which is essentially open and non-predictive. 
A & L were obviously not the only artists of the period to critique the de-
ontologicalisation of art within social realism and Modernism in such a way. 
They were, however, the only ones to pursue this with unrelenting rigour from the 
left. In a reversal of traditional responses to political representation, political 
activity in art for A & L exists in the self-transformative nature of the social 
relations of artists. Productive social activity "is whatever assists the' autonomy', 
solidarity and the self-activity of the class-for-itself": I-B "Socialisation has to be 
compresent in the dialectical history of the practice"; and not as the hypothetical 
projection of political volunteering or populist notions of effectivity or 
accessi bil ity .144 
In this regard A & L's conjunction of two seemingly opposed traditions -
Hegelian dialectic and the philosophy of language - was an attempt to produce a 
set of conditions that would allow a non-positivistic use of Marx to become 
culturally and politically available. In opposition to the conservative humanism 
and determinism of Marxism's orthodox allies, A & L set out to recover the 
I-U Irony, of course, finds a constitutive voice in A & L's later work. But if it is introduced 
as critical necessity it is also pursued with a sense of its inherent dangers. 
143 Art & Language, 'Mr Lin Yutang Refers to "Fair Play" ... ', Art-Language, vol 3 no.2, 
1975, p74 
144 Art & Language, ibid, p68 
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realist-empirical implications of Marx's dialectical method. The artist as emoting 
and universal-expressive subject was exchanged for the artist as causal agent and 
contingent representing subject. But, in the early 1970s, the idea of a realist and 
non-positivistic Marx had little cultural or philosophical resonance. 145 Such was 
Marx's philosophical banalization in prevailing Stalinist, orthodox Trotskyist and 
Maoist circles, that the use of Marx's philosophical realism to address questions 
of culture, meaning and intentionality, was considered to be either opaque or 
elitist. But by stressing the need for an analysis of language as the basis for a 
critique of art's historical categories, A & L were able to reconstitute the analytic 
and negative side of the dialectic for art theory, devalued in the purely logical 
form of 'imageless truth' and in the crude teleologies of orthodox Marxism. In 
this their cultural critique of positivism regrounds Marx as the materialist logician 
and scientific critic of capitalism, and not just as the great humanist nay-sayer of 
alienation. Some muscle and sinew is returned to Marx as the critic of identity, 
and as such to Marxism as dialectical critique. In this sense A & L's principal 
interest in Marx is in his critique of Hegel's logic, for it is the Marxian critique of 
identity that enables the group to resist the bad infinity of a positivistic imageless 
truth - of Barry's infinitude so to speak. As we noted earlier, in Hegel the 
production of knowledge moves beyond the realm of dead motionless substance 
to living substance. Hegel rejects the traditional relational model of logic - S 
(subject) is P (predicate) - by relativizing the subject-predicate relation. If 
substance is understood to be self-development then the traditional attributive 
basis of the S-P relation exists in a fixed relationship of superiority and 
subordination. The subject is taken falsely to be a fixed point.
l46 
Marx likewise 
relativizes the S-P relation of traditional logic. But for Marx this relationality is 
itself inadequate. Marx's logic is based on an understanding of the relational 
145 This changed with the publication of Roy Bhaskar's A Realist Th~ory of Science, 
Leeds Books 1975, and Derek Sayer's Marx's Method: Ideology, SCIence & Cnflque on 
'Capital', Harvester Press 1979. 
146 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, op cit. 
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development of the inner level (the essence) of processes. It is the 
contradictoriness of relations, that is their central property. By this lvlarx reveals 
the deeper relations of relations in terms of antitheses and contradictions 
immanently understood. Understanding substance as simply relational gives way 
to understanding its contradictory character within self-developing totalities. In 
this way Marx's conception of dialectic expresses a particular logical form: the 
intellectual reproduction of the inner arrangement or structure of the object in its 
origin, development, and decline. Hence, Marx's logical form unites the 
structural and the genetic. 147 
This relativization of traditional logic as the basis of a structural-genetic account 
of dialectic, is constitutive of A & L's theoretical project in the early 70s; and. as 
such, it forms the basis of their polemical attrition against Kosuth and the 
hypostatisations of the social realist and Modernist traditions. As former A & L 
member Philip Pilkington puts it: "The complexity of reference lin A & L's work 
of the time I is not mere logical form but is internally and externally historical" .148 
In other words A & L's critique of the generic and identitary categories of art is 
historically specific to the critique of capitalism and therefore contains an implicit 
transcendental content. In this respect, combining the philosophy of language and 
Marx and Hegel to produce a homespun version of negative dialectic certainly 
had few intellectual precedents or guidelines amongst artists at the time. Indeed, 
the renowned inaccessibility of their work in this period is not simply ascribable 
to the difficulty of the philosophical texts, but to the marginalised character of the 
political and cultural settings in which these texts appear. For the cultural map of 
most artists was determined overwhelmingly by the fixed opposition of 
Modernism and social realism. Yet, to speak of A & L's intellectual marginality is 
147 For a discussion of Marx and logic see, Jindrich Zeleny, The Logic of Marx, Basil 
Blackwell, 1980 
148 Philip Pilkington, 'Some Darwinian Conditions of the Art & Language Indexes', Art-
Language, new series no.2 1997 
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somewhat misleading. For what was extraordinary about this moment was not so 
much to be found in the intellectual ambitions of A & L - who were the first 
generation of artists since the revolutionary avant-gardists of the 20s and 30s to 
produce sustained theoretical work - but in the manner in which they incorporated 
their intellectual labour on the conditions of sense and reference into the relations 
of production of art so as to make it part of a wider cultural tendency towards art-
as-research. Their identification of art as 'event' with the 'thing-becoming-
another' of theoretical practice is homologous with the counter-cultural notion of 
artistic self-activity as an anti-bureaucratic research programme. This is why the 
relations between learning and conversation as a collective enterprise are so 
crucial to identifying the 'other' side of imageless truth at this time: its social 
dynamics. 
From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s radical collectives emerged within a 
number of artistic disciplines. To name but the most theoretically significant: 
Jerzy Grotowski's Poor Theatre group, Jean-Luc Godard's Dziga-Vertov group 
and the French literary group Ouvroir de Litterature Potentielle, or Oulipo. All 
were constituted in very different ways, with different aims and internal relations. 
Yet each was responding to the perceived crisis and loss of critical definition 
within their discipline at the time, which the demands of group activity were seen 
as being able to redress. For Grotowski this activity was held to strip away the 
actors' style and egotism in opposition to the spectacularity and decorativeness of 
the post-Brechtian Gesamtkuntswerk, or what he calls Rich Theatre. 149 For 
Godard it generates a working environment in which a political education has a 
collective impact on the practice of filmmaking in contrast to, and as a critique of, 
the depoliticised relations of production in Hollywood movies and the American 
avant-garde. For Oulipo it consists of the group development and pelformance of 
literary rules as creative constraints in the face of post-Surrealist expressionist 
theories of authorship: "An Oulipian author is a rat who himself builds the maze 
149 Jerzy Grotowski, 'Towards A Poor Theatre', in Towards a Poor Theatre, Methuen 
1969 
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from which he sets out to escape". 150 The formation of the group's artistic 
identity, therefore, is inseparable from a political sense of the discipline of 
collective activity. Indeed, as Godard argues in 1970 that there is no point in 
conceiving and sustaining an artistic group or collective unless from a political 
perspective: "If you don't go on and organise on a political basis, you have 
nothing more than a free discussion. Then collective creation is really no more 
than collective eating in a restaurant" .151 While this is not a cut-and-dried 
definition of the function of the' group' within the avant-garde (some avant-garde 
groups have existed in this political/self-disciplinary form others have not) it 
nevertheless presupposes a minimum condition for the artists' group: the 
politicisation of the relations of production of art (rather, that is, than the 
politicisation of art). In this sense the three groups above owe a good deal to the 
political avant-gardes of the 1920s and 1930s. But at the same time there is 
something historically specific about the relations of production that characterise 
this moment of artist group formation in the 60s and early 70s and that 
distinguish them from their precursors. Although these three groups share a 
number of the attributes of the classic avant-garde - rejection of immediate 
precedents; the clarification of formal decisions as ethical principles; the high-
value placed on collaborative practice - they also exhibit a strong sense of the 
group as a kind of imaginary community defined against a hostile background of 
mass cultural alienation and anti-scientism - experiences that were only on the 
periphery of artists' consciousness in the 1920s and 30s. The political identity of 
150 Jacques Roubaud, Introduction, The Oulipo and Combinatorial Art' [1991], Oulipo 
Compendium (compilers Harry Mathews & Alastair Brotchie), Atlas Press 1998. These 
constraints might include: N +7 (the replacement of each noun in a found text with the 
seventh following it in the dictionary), homoconsonantism (the retention of the sequence 
of consonants in a source text while all vowels are replaced) acronymic (a verse in which 
the letters of a given word supply the first of each word used in each line), tautogram (a 
text whose words begin with the same letter), rolling liponymy (a text in which once a 
word is used it can never be repeated). See the Ou/ipo Compendium. 
151 Jean-Luc Godard, 'Film and Revolution: Interview with the Dziga-Vertov Group' [1970] 
by Kent E.Carroll, in ed. Royal S.Brown, Focus on Godard, Prentice-Hall, 1972, p51 
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these groups then, is defensive. The tropes of scientific research appear in the 
form of an ideal research community. 
In a significant sense this period can be seen as the termination of the exoteric 
force of the political avant-garde tradition in the politically defensive group, 
despite the usual liberation rhetoric that surrounds the culture of the late 60s. 
Artistic self-definition becomes the focus for the freedom of self-imposed 
constraints as a prefigurative model of community. Or as one member of Oulipo, 
lacques Roubaud, puts it, "the freedom of difficulty mastered". 152 A & L's work 
functions in this way as a defensive political formation - as a bulwark of learning-
without-preconditions - against the managerial imperatives and reificatory 
functions of modernist culture. 153 From this perspective A & L politicise 
'imageless truth' as the movement of consciousness and praxis. The critique of 
the privatisation of the imagination in Modernism and social realism is identified 
explicitly with theoretical training. But this means, of necessity, that cultural 
deprivatization is driven by the esoteric demands of theory. Hence the seemingly 
contradictory role of the dialogical within the group: the fact that the anti-
positi vistic, transformati ve model of artistic socialisation stretches both 
participant and reader to the limits of their endurance in its unrelenting negation 
of artistic 'common-sense'. Learning-without-preconceptions puts an impossible 
burden on group and interlocutor alike. 
152 Jacques Roubaud, op cit, p41 
153 The group's anti-positivistic, transformative model of artistic socialisation should not 
be mapped mechanically onto a critique of Stalinist and Maoist bureaucracy, even if the 
political context of the group's early work derives from this oppositionalist space. The 
critique of a reified Modernism and social realism was born out of a process of 'betting 
and trying', rather than any attempt to model the activity of the group on an emancipatory 
political programme. The cultural effects of Stalinism and Maoism were seen by (the 
English section of A & L, at least) as the phenomenal forms of a wider and deeper 
privatisation of artistic practice. 
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In this way A & L's 'systematisation' of the asymptotic character of its practice 
in the form of a vast index of their conversations (Index 001, Documenta 5, 
1972) is the point where the structural and genetic conditions of A & L' s dialectic 
begins to reconstitute its criteria of operation. For, the Index is both the 
culmination of intense critical activity and the recognition of a looming problem: 
the diminishing use-value of the transformation of conversation into forms of 
symbol logic whose complex contents are irrecoverable conversationally. In 
short, the Index represents the point where the negations of Conceptual art (of the 
material object, the object as a work of a singular author, of the object's 
sensuousness and institutional value) are brought to the very limits of 
comprehensibility in the form of the work's presentation. By dissolving the 
distinction between artist and critic, producer and spectator, the Index's 
'homeless' artist-as-thinker becomes overdetermined, occluding any stable 
function of communication and exchange between the work and its audience. The 
radical insufficiency of the Index renders the notion of art as 'event' and process 
theoretically coherent, but practically non-translatable. However, if this produces 
the threat of dialogic implosion for A & L, the threat of incoherence is also seen 
as the opportunity to reassert the sensuous and aesthetic at a dialectically' higher' 
level. From 1973 the group reground the critique of aesthetics in a reapprehension 
of the object. 
The Index has significant implications, then, for Conceptual art beyond the 
trajectory of A & L's own practice. The Index is not just a collocation of A & L 
conversations, disputes and ejecta, but in the image of Hegel, it is an 
accumulation of the contradictions and hiatuses of Conceptual art itself - a vast 
mulch-box of Conceptual art's internal history. The limits to surveyable meaning 
experienced by participants in the development of the archive not only focus the 
criteria of competence of the group's own recently acquired dialogical expertise, 
but also question the cognitive field of which their expertise is nO\\ a defining 
part: the collection of objects and texts known and celebrated as analytical 
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Conceptual art. In this respect, by 1972-73 analytical Conceptual art experiences 
its own crisis of form in the shadow of the crisis of Modernism, as the 
divagations of the Index pressure A & L to find ways of grounding their critique 
of crisis-positivity and sensuousness. The crisis builds as an internal questioning 
of the function of the image in Conceptual art generally as the photograph is 
incorporated into Conceptual art's expanded field of reference - a development 
which is echoed in A & L's own turn to the graphic image. In terms of A & L's 
practice the asymptotic logic of dialectical transformation had to externalise itself 
visually order to 'stabilise' meaning. Or in another register, the dominant 
iconophobia of the Hegelian dialectic, which A & L embraced more than most, is 
annulled by the Kantian moment of cognitive reflection in Marx's dialectic. The 
functions of sense-experience and conceptual understanding are refigured as 
mutually interrogatory.154 
Conceptual art sought to define the production and reception of art in terms of 
'event' and 'process'. In its pursuit of 'imageless truth' as the materialisation of 
the movement of consciousness of consciousness, the temporal and spatial 
conditions of meaning in art were radically destablised. Art lost its routine sense 
of place for producer and audience alike. All the dialogic models I have looked 
at, from Weiner's metaphor-producing spectator, Barry's spectator contemplating 
death and infinity, Kosuth' s semanticist, to Art & Language's theoretical 
interlocutor, negotiate this dynamic through expanding the diachronic experience 
of art. That is, they all open out a space for the critique of interpretation as a form 
of spontaneous self-ascription, as codified in the post-Kantian Modernism of 
Greenberg. In this they recall Wittgenstein' s rejection of the view that the 
difference between the person who understands and the person who doesn't is the 
difference between mental states. ISS Furthermore, as I have pointed out in the 
154 For a discussion of the iconophobialiconophiliac dialectic in relation to photography 
and Conceptual art, see my, 'Photography, Iconophobia and the Ruins of Conceptual 
art', in John Roberts (ed), The Impossible Document: Photography and Conceptual art in 
Britain 1966-1976, Camerawords, 1997 
155 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty/Uber Gewissheit, ed, G.E.M Anscombe and 
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discussion of A & L, this notion of understanding as dispositional achieves a 
high-level of political self-reflection in the form of the artists' group, in keeping 
with the wider radical cultural relations of the period. In this, Conceptual art 
transformed the post-Platonic (Hegelian) scepticism about the derivation of truth 
from sensible form, into a thoroughgoing derealisation of the myth of sensuous 
immediacy and 'visual language'. However, this was not simply an attack on 
visual culture as addicted to illusion, as if the diagrammatic and textual were the 
genuine and sole bearers of truth. By historicizing art as an epistemological and 
cognitive category, Conceptual art forced Modernism to question its aesthetic 
privileges, its temporal and spatial prioritisation of spontaneity and its 
fetishization of the singular author. The 'end of art' - Conceptual art debate, 
therefore, suffers from too much Hegelianizing or not enough, or rather not 
enough of the 'open' as opposed to the 'closed' Hegel. Indeed, irrespective of the 
individual views of particular Conceptual artists, the outcome of Conceptual art 
was not the dissolution of the autonomy of art into the truths of philosophy or 
politics. On the contrary its historical significance lies in the fact that in the mid-
60s, aesthetic ideology overreached itself, disabling the interrelationality between 
reason and aesthetic judgement~ and therefore limiting what might be thought 
about art and said to be art. That analytic Conceptual art, in particular Kosuth and 
Art & Language, pushed this negation to its absolute limit, is not the same as 
saying they identified their work with the 'end of art'. For as I have pointed out 
the opposite in fact applies: there is a homology between the critique of aesthetics 
and the aestheticisation (naturalisation) of art-as-idea in their work. A & L were 
quicker and more rigorous in recognizing this problem given the Marxian turn of 
thei r Hegelianized dialectic, and consequently built this problem of the aesthetic 
into their work beyond the lifespan of Conceptual art. It is nevertheless 
undeniable that Conceptual art inherited a post-Platonic (Hegelian) distrust of 
sensible appearance and used it as the basis of self-reflection on art's alienation. 
G.H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M Anscombe, Blackwell 1969 
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In this Conceptual art embraced philosophical reflection on sensible form in order 
to produce a critique of aesthetic ideology and the alienated condition of art's 
autonomy. But, unlike in the 'closed' Hegel, Conceptual art attempted to 
integrate this reflection into a transformed praxis of art, and thus rigorously 
resisted a resolution of the antinomies between art and society in the 
'imagination' or in aesthetics or philosophy. The best of Conceptual art 
connected art with both knowledge and ideology, as a critical movement in 
consciousness and in praxis. 
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Chapter 4: Art, Autonomy and Virtualization 
What is strikingly evident since the 1980s, is how much writing on art and culture 
has been driven by issues of temporality and duration. It is as if the perceived 
accumulated crisis of the artwork's would-be loss of autonomy under late 
modernism and the loss of aesthetic experience that so many philosophers of 
culture have diagnosed in an early phase of modernism has entered a new phase 
of critical self-consciousness. 
This loss has been mediated, largely, in two ways: through a 'conservative' return 
to aesthetics from within the privileged space of the museum, as a refocusing on 
the object as a site of contemplation; and the dissolution of art itself into a post-
photographic telematics, in the wake of the digital revolution. The former is 
mostly associated with a philosophical critique of technology as the destroyer of 
aesthetic singularity - beauty, wonder and affectivity are unironic terms again -
and the latter with a defence of technology as the democratic and multifunctional 
basis for an art without physical boundaries, an art beyond objecthood, beyond 
the 'primitive', stabilising, context-bound aesthetics of galleries and their 
surrogates. This sense of art's expansion into the electronic everyday certainly 
accounts for why, since the 1980s, there has been an exponential growth in 
utopian literature on the potentially sanguine effects of the new technology. The 
new technology appears to enact, in glorious full-colour interactivity the dream of 
instant portability, access and communal exchange that an early generation of 
modernist artists and technophiles could only imagine as science fiction. 
This split between a defence of the artefactual integrity of the artwork and its 
potential dissolution into the technologically disseminated image is, of course, no 
stranger to debates on aesthetics and politics in the twentieth century. Benjamin· s 
and Adorno's well-known exchange in the 1930s over the place of photographic 
technologies in art is the template of so much critical reflection on art and 
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technology since the 1960s. Yet, with the advent of a new phase of capitalist 
accumulation and technological development over the last thirty years, claims for 
both of these positions have intensified, and in key aspects, as a consequence, 
have also been transformed. This is due, in part, to what is taken to be the radical 
changes in the experience of' lived time' through the impact of' virtual time' put 
in place by the new telematic technologies. 
In the 1920s and 1930s Benjamin and Henri Bergson were among the first writers 
to address the impact of modern forms of virtuality on consciousness and, as 
such, were among the first to explore the relations between memory and spatiality 
and consciousness. Both make clear' lived time' is always' virtual time', the time 
of contracted remembrance, of recollection. As Bergson asserts in Duration and 
Simultaneity (1923), the present and past are co-extensive, or, rather, mutually 
penetrate each other. 156 Hence we exist in the present, but Ii ve ill the past, in the 
past or pasts of others. "We don't have memories, we are memories", as one 
writer on Bergson has put it succinctly.157 But the anti-Cartesian phenomenology 
of' lived time' as 'virtual time' has come to mean something more threatening, 
more intrusive, more totalizing over the last 30 years than Bergson envisaged. 
That is, under the vast expansion of the commodity form and the globalization of 
an image-based techno-culture, 'virtual time' is now viewed by many as having 
completely subsumed' lived time'. The enormous technological extension of 
virtual time in the digital age - the culture of instant playback and the electronic 
archive, of computer generated interactive worlds and smart technology generally 
- has colonized everyday experience and collective memory in ways that 
Benjamin could barely imagine. And, this is why at the beginning of the modern 
origins of this process, Benjamin was so critical of Bergson in 'On Some Motifs 
156 Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, Bergson and the Einsteinian Universe, 
edited and with an introduction by Robin Durie, Clinamen Press, 1999 
157 Sean Watson, 'The New Bergsonism: Discipline, subjectivity and freedom', Radical 
Philosophy, No 92 1997, p13 
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of Baudelaire', 158 for in Benjamin's view our experience of historical time - in 
short, the experience of industrialization and the daily effects of commodity 
exchange - at no point shape the content of Bergson's virtualization of 'lived' 
experience. Bergson's duree is inert and desocialized: or memory without 
industrialized, collective experience, as Benjamin might have put it. 
But, if Benjamin saw forms of modern virtualization as having potentially 
progressive social effects, with the vast development of visual and production 
technologies since the 1950s, today we are also heirs to a large dystopian 
literature on technology. Indeed, since the 1980s, in response to the new digital 
phase of modern image-culture, the notion of virtualization-as-reification - an 
argument we are so familiar with from the Frankfurt School and the Situationists 
- has also been subject to a new and, even paranoid, critical language of 
constraint and dissolution. Whereas Benjamin used the word phantasmagoria to 
talk about the loss of experience which commodity exchange effected in its 
undermining of traditional forms of duration, writers such as Paul Virilio. Jean 
Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson now talk about the narcotic and hallucinatory 
functions of the new image-culture and the disappearance of historical 
consciousness, the autonomous art object, and the self-reflecting subject 
altogether. In fact. what distinguishes this literature from its immediate forbears is 
its focus on the interface between virtualization and reification and the increased 
speed of certain sectors of production and consumption under digital culture. In 
order for the profits of large-scale production to be sustained overall, the 
extraction of surplus value has to be maintained not just by the speed of 
manufacture, but through the speed of acquisition and production of raw 
materials. 159 
158 Walter Benjamin, 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', Illuminations, edited and with an 
Introduction by Hannah Arendt, Fontana 1973 
159 This is why genetic engineering is currently such a major site of commercial and 
ideological conflict, because of its massive importance as a new source of v~lue for the 
capitalist economy. Whereas it is generally difficult to speed up the reproductlo~ of 
labour-power in order to increase the extraction of surplus value. plants and animals can 
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The diurnal effects of speed were certainly central to the reception of early 
modernist culture; train, plane, telegraph and telephone are indi visi ble from the 
modernist imaginary and its own paranoias. Today, however. particularly in the 
writings of the Heideggerian Virilio, and writers influenced by him such as The 
Critical Art Ensemble, the cultural effects of the speeding up of technology and 
the speeding up of surplus-value extraction have taken on a black aura and 
hypnagogic power. Virilio has coined the word "picnolepsy"160 - the experience 
that 'nothing really has happened' for the subject, the human equivalent of gold-
fish memory - to describe a modern psychosis of the 'now'; of the subject who 
lives their life and past in the rapidity, repetition and compulsions of 
consumption-time. This loss of a sense of historical connection is presumed by 
many writers within this tradition to be the defining experience of the late 
capitalist age, an 'epoch of the ego'. And what generates and perfects this epoch 
of the ego is the capacity of late capitalist techno-culture to reinforce the 
psychosis of the subject by increasingly binding its energy to more and more 
commodities (as inert things and images) and their speeded-up consumption. As 
fixed points in the immediate environment commodities produce an hallucinatory 
anticipation of control for the subject: the fantasy of the abolition of 'waiting-
time'. As Theresa Brennan has argued, commodities deliver the fantasy of being 
waited upon, whether in the supermarket or in front of the TV.161 
It is inevitable, then, that the subject will reproduce the hallucinogenic powers of 
late capitalism, because commodity exchange in the age of its electronic 
dissemination enforces and rewards instant gratification over deferred 
gratification, a difference which Freud saw as the difference between achieving 
be forced to mature faster and in greater variety shortening their breeding and cultivation 
cycles. This contributes to a lowering of production costs across sectors. 
160 Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, Semiotext(e), 1991, p1 0 
161 Theresa Brennan, History After Lacan, Routledge, 1993 
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gratification through self-transformation in reality at a later point in time, and the 
narrow self-enclosing expenditure of immediate pleasure. Capitalism continually 
works to repress the moment of self-reflection in order for the reproduction of 
commodity relations to take place with maximum efficiency. From this 
perspective, it is no surprise that the ego and commodity exchange are mutually 
binding, and that "picnolepsy" becomes an alibi for experience. For the ego to 
survive it needs to dominate and control, and the most efficient means of 
achieving this is for it to see everything outside its boundaries as fragmented and 
without explicable order. The only thing the ego trusts is its own desires; 
consumption, therefore, blocks off truth through its reinforcement of the ego's 
survivalist wish 'not to know' .162 To avoid disappearing in the movement of 
historical time it has to reduce everything to its own place, a place of 'self-
defence'. Paul de Man called this, in a different register, the fundamental 
resistance to theory; Lacan, talking about the psychoanalytic encounter, called it 
the subject's resistance to its own historical rewriting. 
In general, what these positions presuppose is the disappearance or contraction of 
memory as self-reflection, as if historical time never existed, a "perpetually 
repeated hijacking of the subject from any spatial-temporal context", as Virilio 
puts it. 163 Accordingly, it is this sense, or phantasy, of disappearance - of history, 
of duration, of the subject - which electronic virtualization is claimed to 
reinforce, deepening the 'disreality' effect of the ego's epoch. As a result the 
current debate on the virtualization of aesthetics and art, derives its raison d'hre 
from what is perceived as the completed dematerialization of aesthetic experience 
itself. For what writers such as Virilio and Jameson, in particular, insist on, is the 
disappearance of a temporal order in which aesthetic evaluations can be generated 
and sustained by producers and spectators alike. But there is a crucial distinction 
162 Theresa Brennan, History After Lacan, op cit . 
163 Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, Semiotext(e), 1991 
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in their respective sense of loss which in turn underwrites the opposition between 
the conservative mourning for the aesthetic in contemporary philosophical 
aesthetics, and the transcendent anti-aestheticism of the telematicists. For 
Jameson virtualization finally removes the justification for aesthetic theory as a 
specialist discipline, opening up aesthetic attention to everyday perception as 
such. As he argues in the The Cultural Turn (1998): 
[I]n a strict philosophical sense, [the 1 end of the modern must also spell the end 
of the aesthetic itself, or of aesthetics in general: for where the latter suffuses 
everything, where the sphere of culture expands to the point where everything 
becomes acculturated the traditional distinctiveness or 'specificity' of the 
aesthetic (and even of culture as such) is necessarily bl urred or lost altogether.16~ 
Whereas in ViriIio the disappearance of traditional forms of aesthetic attention, 
and as a consequence the assimilation of art to the mere sending of information, is 
to the absolute "detriment of the object".165 
But where does this face-off actually leave art? Despite their opposed views on 
the effects and outcome of virtualization, Jameson and Virilio share a powerfully 
diminished sense of art as a source of counter-value and source of cognitive 
interruption into the time and space of capitalist relations. This is because both 
authors see the image-as-commodity as a totalizing process under digital 
virtualization, and therefore are both equally sceptical about the power of the 
artistic image now to arrest or disrupt the logic of the commodity. Thus, although 
Jameson prefaces his view with a call for new forms of cultural production and 
modes of attention this call is strangely shapeless and affectless. Despite 
Jameson's refusal to get caught up in the anxiety of conservative disappointment 
164 Fredric Jameson, The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-
1998, Verso 1998, p111 
165 Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance, Semiotext(e), 1991, p1 01 
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in technology his model of virtualization is remarkable for the absence of any 
sense of social agency and internal differentiation. Indeed, what connects 
Jameson to Virilio and to other writers within the terms of the conventional 
technophobic/technophilic opposition is the disinvestment of modern art of its 
customary language of cultural intervention. This is a significant omission. 
What largely defines and shapes modernism and the avant-garde in the twentieth 
century is the possible production and consumption of art as an act of 
interruption. Not just as an act of cognitive interruption within prevailing artistic 
conventions and institutional arrangements, but within the temporal and spatial 
orders of bourgeois culture itself: its modes of attention, its social rituals, its 
hierarchies of value. The extensive list of concepts and terms associated with this 
process is both startling and familiar: dematerialization, deconstruction, 
detournement, destruction, iconoclasm, deterritorialization, denial, effacement. 
adulteration, gaucherie, sabotage. We might call this the lexicon of negation that 
establishes the internal and external conditions of art's narration from Manet and 
Cezanne to Conceptual art and the Situationist International. For at least a 100 
years modernist and avant-garde artists and critics took it for granted that there 
was some active connection between producing certain kinds of painting, 
sculpture, photography and film and transformations in social experience. Artists 
may not have expressed this relation in directly political terms - although many 
did - but nonetheless they saw the modernist imperative to reground perception in 
the disruptively unfamiliar as the demand for other ways of being and doing than 
compelled by the would-be rationality of capitalist relations. It is easy to call this 
utopian - and a number of artists did speak in the language of utopianism - but, in 
many respects, the critical claims of the work were far more contingent than this. 
That is, it was assumed by these artists that, be it a painting, a photograph or 
event, art could establish the promise of another kind of social experience. no 
matter how temporary and faltering, than that associated with the dominant 
bourgeois culture of representational transparency and instrumental utility. 
149 
Accordingly, the modes of attention of modernism and the avant-garde. their 
obsession with location, form and context, were driven by a strong sense of 
interruption into what might be termed the three defining ideological forms of 
bourgeois society: historicism (the reduction of history to linear causality or 
'progress'), ocularism or mimeticism (the fetishization of representation as a 
window on truth), and humanism as a theory of the foundational self (the subject 
as a defensive ego, that we have already discussed). Now, this is not to say that 
artists took on these ideological formations programmatically. or even used such 
terms or their equivalents - although certain sections of the avant-garde, such as 
the Surrealists, the Situationists and Conceptual art made these terms their own 
philosophically. Rather, retroactively, we can now see clearly that the long 
formation of the modern in art was, and is, bound up with the negation of the 
temporalities of exchange value: its programmed chains of meaning, its amnesias 
and aporias. Indeed, remarkably, what defines the experience of much modern art 
is its attempt to slow down, or absent the "picnolepsy" of modern experience. For 
instance, Conceptual art's Hegelian reliance on imageless truth, and the 
Situationists use of the graffitied purloined media image, to cite the two most 
pertinent examples. 
Today though, for Jameson and many would-be postmodern art theorists and 
telematicists, this narrative of interruption is claimed to be at an end. However, it 
is not at its end because vulgar historicism, ocularism and the foundational self 
are at an end, but rather because such claims to interruption and delay can no 
longer be defined, it is said, in opposition to the bourgeois institutions of art. In a 
culture where artworks find themselves at 'home' in the museum. that is. adrift 
from the social forces that shaped early modernism such strategies are now held 
to be no more than cosmetic or style options. Accordingly, the defining modernist 
belief that the artwork can wrest some qualitatively different sense of time from 
the "picnolepsy" of modern experience is actually belied by the incorporation of 
the modes of attention of mass culture into the contemporary work of art, and the 
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incorporation of those modes of attention into the museum as place of 
entertainment and populist explanation. Increasingly the museum is a place of 
technological interactivity and connectivity, a place where the multimedia 
installation sits' peaceably' next to a Picasso and to a Matisse. From a broader 
perspecti ve, then, this process of accommodation is taken to be part of a deeper 
assimilation of the forms of modern production and modes of attention of mass 
culture into art and the museum over the last forty years: the reliance on the 
prefabricated found object and mechanically reproduced series, and the erotic 
submission to the sublime in the form of cinematic and photographic spectacle. 
The twenty first century artist may remain, on the whole, economically marginal, 
but he or she is no longer culturally marginal. The contemporary artist no longer 
sees himself or herself as the unforgiving enemy of popular culture and its 
technologies and pleasures. 
There is some truth in this picture. The classic forms of modernist distance from 
popular culture have been eroded. As such, art now defines its aesthetic 
'otherness' not in competition with the technological everyday, but through it. 
But the key issue is: do these new forces and conditions, occlude art's 
interruptive powers and autonomy or relocate them? There is a world of 
difference between recognising art's incorporation into the digital everyday and 
the new plugged-in museum, and assuming that this process represents a 
qualitative break with the past of art itself. For if the assimilation of art into the 
technological everyday is not new, neither is the conflict between technology and 
aesthetic experience as a condition of art's modern self-reflexi vity. 
Since the 1860s art has internalized the technological conditions of modern 
experience as the basis of its modernity and resistance to this modernity. 
Consequently, the' abbreviation' of time as a condition of art's modernity is not 
particular or peculiar to telematic culture, it is there ill the work of modernism 
from modernism's very inception. It is visible in Manet's quickly mapped flat 
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colours, in Van Gogh's rapid, ferocious handling of painterly surface, in 
Impressionism's fast application of adjacent strokes in order to avoid the 
laborious process of drawing, colouring in and glazing, in Degas's photographic 
sources, in Duchamp's readymades and of course in photography generally. 
Paradoxically there is an impatience and nervousness in modernism which 
underscores its attempt to slow down the rush to spontaneous ascriptions of 
meaning, as if the undisguised demonstratation of labour time in the surface of 
the work - hours and days rather than weeks and months - was to be mimetically 
matched by the work's ideal spectator. In a strange inversion, evidence of the 
work's speed of execution was the means by which the attentiveness of the 
viewer was to be secured. But by dissolving aesthetics as a separate discipline of 
reading into the general perceptual field of the technological everyday, Jameson 
and Virilio weaken this materiality of making and looking, and as a result erase 
the drive-to-delay immanent to modern art practice. The continuity between art's 
struggle for autonomy out of the alienating conditions of modern technology and 
art's relation to the virtual technologies of today is dissolved. In short, the refusal 
of aesthetics legitimizes a whole number of partial or undialectical responses to 
virtualization, responses which have now become a kind of telematic doxa: 
1) Because of the completed structural assimilation of art into the museum, the 
artist's bid for autonomy and the negative dialectic of the avant-garde are no 
longer functional. 
2) Because the production of art is now widely incorporated into new forms of 
di crital technolocry the artefactual character of art is no longer an aesthetic issue. 
b b 
3) Because the digital technology provides unparalleled forms of image-delivery 
and image manipulation art is now identifiable with the electronic everyday. 
From this basis, despite their different responses to virtualization, what unites 
Jameson, Virilio and the philosophers of aesthetics, is the fact that they all lose 
sight of the work of art, of the making of meaning as a process of discontinuity ill 
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continuity across forms. Jameson and telematicists such as The Critical Art 
Ensemble do this through over stressing the issue of dematerialization,l66 Virilio 
and the philosophical aesthetes, by mourning for a lost aesthetic object 
(invariably early modernism) and dumping on virtualization. In this sense their 
responses fail to present an adequate account of the immanent problems of the 
artwork in relation to art's life in historical time. In emphasizing the 
disappearance of the traditional aesthetic object they lose sight of the fact that the 
contingent problems of art making are always and already inside technological 
relations, and therefore, the opposition between virtuality and materiality, as an 
opposition between a defence of critical consciousness and the loss of critical 
consciousness, is a false one. In this sense it could be said that Jameson dissolves 
art's autonomy into virtualization, whereas the philosophical aesthetes oppose 
autonomy to virtualization. 
But either way the same outcome is established: the dilemma of modern 
artwork's continual renormalisation through its technological and cultural 
assimilation and repetition in the museum is treated as a dilemma that art has to 
overcome, and not a set of conditions which needs to be worked through as the 
basis of the risk of making art, looking at art and talking about art. In their 
separate ways both positions repress the moment of reflection in the production 
and reception of art as the continuous and discontinuous historical work of 
repetition, troping and recovery. In short, the art's complex and divided 
materiality is left stranded in a no-man' s land between aesthetic nostalgia for the 
lost object and a vapid technological futurism. 
166 Both the liberal and radical wing of the telematicist community - such as the CAE -
dissolve blocked social change and the 'elitist' aesthetic object into a virtual community 
politics. Unlike the liberals, though, the CAE retain some notion of the uneven distribution 
of use-values and a critique of the state, retaining a link between the category of 'art' and 
the concept of interruption. As they argue in The Electronic Disturbance, Automedia, . 
1994, "the vocabulary of resistance must be expanded to include the means of electronic 
disturbance." (p24). This distances them from the Virilian-Jameson axis on questions of 
intervention, but places them squarely within the orbit of these two authors on the 
question of art's autonomy. 
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This leaves us, therefore, with a significant philosophical problem to address. 
How are we to think art's critical function and reception, in conditions, as 
Jameson and Virilio, rightly insist, where the forces of reification prevail? For it 
would be foolish, as I have acknowledged, to downplay these forces of 
reification. Firstly, I would stress the need to reverse the relations between 
subject and representation inscribed in Jameson's and Virilio's postmodernism. 
In Jameson and Virilio the subject is construed as free within the orders of 
representation and unfree with regard to its preconditions and outcomes. A 
materialist account of language and aesthetics, on the other hand, asserts that the 
subject is unfree within representation, and is 'free' - has critical agency - beyond 
its presuppositions and outcomes. 167 In other words, the opposition between the 
totalizing power of techno-culture and its degraded others, is transformed into an 
understanding of the subject as in power - as having the power of judgement and 
agency - and out of power - subject to forces not of its own making -
simultaneously. Hence we may be inside a picnoleptic culture, but we are not all 
picnoleptic, or picnoleptic all the time, so to speak. Similarly, modernist claims 
about art's powers of interruption into the orders of bourgeois culture may have 
diminished, but this does not mean that they are foreclosed, for to imagine such a 
state of affairs is to imagine art without suffering and pain in a world of pain and 
suffering. 
One way of looking at the relations between art and technology is to think of the 
challenge and pursuit of art's autonomy as a freedom immanent to the production 
of art under capitalism. That is, it is a freedom constantly rewon out of the 
unfreedom of the logic of exchange value. Because of the perpetual threat of art's 
loss of use-value under the tyranny of exchange value - the emptying out of art's 
aesthetic and critical singularity by the museum and market - art is continually 
167 lowe this distinction to Gillian Rose. See Mourning Becomes The Law: Philosophy 
and Representation, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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compelled by its own conditions of alienation to find aesthetic strategies which 
might resist or challenge this process of dissolution. Art's renewal of its 
autonomy, therefore, is necessarily dependent - under present conditions of 
production - on the conditions which constrain it. Consequently, 'autonomy' is 
the sign under which art is forced to labour repetitively on itself and its 
institutions if it is to sustain its independence - independence not from the social 
world, but in the social world - irrespective of the demands of passing political 
conjunctures and the forces of technological change. The end of the avant-garde, 
then, is a techno-postmodernist myth, insofar as art cannot but be attached to its 
own renewal in the hope of becoming the "future's past". 168 
Ironically some of the better telematic literature offers subsidiary support to my 
defence of a materialist semisosis here, specifically William 1. Mitchell's recent 
work on virtuality. Although Mitchell's writing demonstrates a familiar 
telematicist undertheorization of cultural division and capital accumulation in its 
discussion of the new technology, the strength of his work lies in its resistance to 
the dominant historicism of our times, in which the 'new' transforms all previous 
history in its image - that enfeebled sense that the epoch we are living through is 
the time when everything ends and is begun again, and which under 
postmodernism has become the arrogant self-image of the age. Admittedly 
Mitchell is no Hegelian on this question. The sense of history as unfinished - as 
made and remade in the Hegelian sense as a drama of misrecognition - is largely 
a technical matter for Mitchell, not an ontological question, but nevertheless what 
he rightly defends is the notion that new technologies are to be used and 
experienced in terms of outcomes which are not predetermined in terms of their 
current exclusions and interconnections. For example, the new 
telecommunications may proliferate secondary and tertiary social relationships -
168 This is a phrase of Philip Fisher's. But I use it in a somewhat different way here. See 
Making and Effacing Art: Modern American Art in a Culture of Museums, Harvard 1991, 
p145 
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that is, indirect relationships - but this does not thereby mean that this prevents or 
diminishes direct social interaction or close readings of art objects. In fact, 
Mitchell persuasively claims the opposite: that the proliferation of indirect 
contacts actually creates an expanded need for face-to-face contact. In this, he 
argues, far from subsuming materiality under a universal and alienating 
virtualization the new digital sphere will generate "different balances of 
materiality and virtuality" in peoples lives. 169 This does not stop Mitchell, in a 
benign reversal of Virilio, from defending a crassly positivistic view of 
technological speed, in which rapidity of computer response produces a faster and 
more efficient flow of information, as if speed was the prerequisite of human 
emancipation. Yet his refusal to oppose materiality to virtuality - something, as I 
have explained, which Benjamin saw as central to critical and historical 
consciousness in modernity - has important aesthetic and epistemological 
consequences for the technological relations of art in the twenty first century. For 
in seeing the 'new virtuality' as an extension of technological forces already in 
place, he avoids the false arbitration of technophobes and technophiles.The result, 
for the purposes of my argument, is that living ill and with the new forms 
virtuality, will provide the new testing ground for the new forms of art's 
autonomy. 
An appropriate way of way of looking at the relations between art, autonomy and 
technology is to see them as a kind of "ceaseless comedy", to quote Gillian 
Rose.170 By "ceaslessless comedy" Rose means that our aims and outcomes 
maybe in a constant state of mismatch, but in being so they provoke yet another 
revised aim and action, or the possibility of action. Thus the hubris of reason is 
comic rather than tragic, so to speak, insofar as it is always, "full of surprises, of 
unanticipated happenings, so that comprehension is always provisional and 
169 William J.Mitchell, E-topia, MIT, 1999 
170 Gillian Rose, Mourning, op cit, p72 
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preliminary. This is the meaning of Bildung, of formation and education, which is 
intrinsic to the phenomenological process".171 But, it is the avoidance or 
suppression of the unanticipated effects of the reason-as-comedy of the 
phenomenological process that dominates the work of Jameson and Virilio and 
the philosophical aesthetes. The result: a writing that consistently enforces a 
binary opposition between technophobia and technophilia. 
In this sense we need a temporalization of art in the age of digital technology that 
does not oppose autonomy to technology, artefactuality to virtuality, the iterative 
to the interruptive, representation to the end-of-representation. And this is only 
possible by refusing to dissolve the moral and critical autonomy of the subject 
into, either, the unbounded aesthetic self, or into an unbounded technological 
community. We need, therefore, to refuse both the interminable mourning of 
postmodernism for the lost modernist object and the fantasies of unboundedness 
of the new technophiles, in order to proceed, as Rose says, through the fallible, 
comedic reason of the broken middle. 
171 Rose, ibid, p72 
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Part 2: Photography and Form 
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Chapter 5: Photography, Iconophobia and the Ruins of Conceptual art 
Conceptual art continues to underwrite the art of the present, as if what it 
discovered about power and aesthetics is the unspoken challenge of all serious 
art. But this challenge, of course, has no uniform inheritance, just as Conceptual 
art itself has no stable set of positions. If Conceptual art lives on today it is not 
because of the transmittance of any orthodoxy, but through its aporias, mistakes 
and misrepresentations. This is why it continues to fascinate: for all its 
megalomaniacal and messianic tendencies it destabilised certain conventional 
expectations about making and talking about art which remain the shared 
cognitive ground of advanced art today. It is no surprise that twenty years after it 
imploded and reassembled itself as a diverse range of disaffirmative practices, it 
should currently be the object of so much critical attention and dispute. Since 
1990 a wide range of publications and exhibitions have sought to historicise its 
challenges, bringing its intellectual allure into some kind of workable alignment 
with the problems of contemporary art. 172 That some of this writing and 
curatorship is either fuelled by nostalgia or by the business-as-usual packaging of 
the culture industry, does not alter the fact that the neuroses of Conceptual art 
continue to speak to us, and as such remain open to ideological contest. 
172 For example the exhibitions, 'l'art conceptuel, une perspective', ARC, Paris 1989, 
'Reconsidering The object of Art: 1965-1975', Museum of Contemporary Art, Los 
Angeles 1995, organised by Ann Goldstein and Anne Rorimer, 'You are Now in the 
Middle of a N.E. Thing Co. Landscape', UBC Fine Arts Gallery, Vancouver 1993, 
organised by Nancy Shaw and William Wood. See also Josepth Kosuth, Art after 
Philosophy and After: Collected Writings, 1966-1990, MIT 1991, Charles Harrison, 
Essays on Art & Language, Basil Blackwell 1991 , Terry Atkinson, The Indexing, The 
World War 1 Moves and the Ruins of Conceptualism, Circa publications, Corner House, 
Irish Museum of ModernArt, 1992, Artists Think: The Late Works of Ian Burn, Power 
publications, Sydney 1996, Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp, MIT, 1996, Benjamin 
Buchloh, 'Conceptual art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the Critique 
of Institutions', October 55, Winter 1990, Michael Newman, 'Conceptual art from the 
1960s to the 1990s: An unfinished project?, Kunst & Museum Journal, volume 7, number 
1/2/3 1996, David Green, 'Between Object and Image', Creative Camera, Number 340, 
JunelJuly 1996 
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What was Conceptual art has, therefore, become the major site of dispute of the 
new writing. This has brought all the old conflicts and wounds out into the open 
again as Conceptual art's leading disputants and supporters are given new 
vigorous identities or marked off as irrelevant or mere curiosities by the 
professional historians. Moreover, the disputants themselves have not been far 
behind the historians in wanting to derogate Conceptual art as mere curiosity or 
defend its founding ideals. In these terms, there are three discernible positions on 
Conceptual art: those who see it as a vast waste of time and energy, yet another 
example of sixties counter-cultural indulgence; those who want to defend some 
version of its founding critique; and those who want to pay tribute to the ambition 
of its mistakes; and put that tribute to to work in the reflexive spirit of Conceptual 
art itself. This latter position is what defines the tone and intellectual concerns of 
this essay and what carries forward any serious historical work on that which 
continues to arrest our attention from the past. 173 That is, it is easy to feel 
nostalgia for Conceptual art in a period where much of what it stood for 
politically has little life beyond academic art history. It is harder to treat it as 
something which might contain energies and insights that allow certain ideals to 
remain if not practically possible, then at least, intellectually defensible. 
Beyond this melancholic work of redemption though there are immediate 
problems of interpretation. To pay tribute to the instructive mistakes of 
Conceptual art is at the same time is to open up the question of what such a 
tribute might actually mean. Or, in other words, if Conceptual art is worth 
defending in terms of its mistakes and aporias, then what is it that underlies such 
things in the first place? Hence the concern of this chapter: photography. With 
photography we arrive at one of the paradoxes of Conceptual art. Linguistic or 
analytic Conceptual art was largely an attack on the primacy of the visual, yet the 
173 This essay was written for John Roberts, ed., The Impos~ible ~ocu:nent: Ph~t~9.raphy 
and Conceptual in Britain, 1966-1976, Camerawords, in conjunction With an exhibition of 
the same name, at Camerawork, 1997. 
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majority of the forms which went under the heading of Conceptual art were 
photographic, just as analytic Conceptual art was mediated through photographic 
reproduction. This can be construed in one way as a failure of analytic 
conceptualism to make its claims tell, but in another way it reveals what many 
artists wanted out of Conceptual art's critique of Modernist orthodoxy: a new 
reading of the pictorial. That this was to carry analytic Conceptual art before it as 
well by 1975, points, I would argue, to the subfusc function of photography 
within Conceptual art. Photography was the means by which Conceptual art's 
exit from Modernist closure was made realisable as practice. Yet photography 
itself was of little interest to most Conceptual artists, producing a situation in 
which critical agency is given to the photographic image without photography 
becoming theoretically self-conscious as a medium. Photography, then, had an 
indirect function: it allowed Conceptual art to reconnect itself to the world of 
social appearances without endorsing a pre-Modernist defence of the pictorial. 
But if the history of Conceptual art needs to be opened up to the disruptive 
presence of photography, this does not mean we have somehow explained 
Conceptual art or accounted for what made Conceptual art so damaging and 
exciting in the first place. For there is a tendency at the moment in the revisionist 
histories to use Conceptual art's relationship with photography as an excuse to 
'tidy up' up Conceptual art in the interests of making it more palatable to 
administrators and critics. Thus in emphasizing photography at the expense of 
analytic Conceptual art, some writers have wanted to 'save' Conceptual art from 
what they take to be its descent into bureaucratic theoreticism, that is, 'save' it 
from Art & Language. The reduction of Art & Language's analytic 
conceptualism to a caricature of reified reason maybe a convenient way of 
attacking the theoretical prolixity of Conceptual art as a whole, but as empirical 
evidence about what made Art & Language's practice so compelling as a 
contribution to Conceptual art it is inadmissible. What also needs to be brought 
back into the historical frame is how humorous and sardonic much of their early 
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work was; and how this impulse is what distinguishes the place of theory within 
Conceptual art from Modernism. This is important because the perlocutionary 
force of much of their writing against the' sins' of others was actually satirical. 
Consequently in opening up Conceptual art to the unconscious place of 
photography it is necessary to keep in mind that the dominant theoretical voice of 
Conceptual art was also, in a sense, not to be trusted, was not what it seemed to 
be. And to insert myself and my own intellectual formation into this history, this 
is what had the greatest appeal for me about Conceptual art reading Art-Language 
in the late seventies and early eighties. The mixture of theoretical exactitude and 
playfulness, political rectitude and irresponsibility, the language of the seminar 
and the pub, produced a highly toxic brew. Indeed, it was seductive to the point 
of wanting to be like that; for to be rude and rigorous, artist and philistine seemed 
the best of all possible worlds. Thus as analytical Conceptual art is rightly opened 
to criticism and the countervailing arguments of photography we need 
nevertheless to keep in mind what made Conceptual art's theoretical excursions 
so liberating: that seriousness and ambition in art might also be a form of 
delinquency and malingering. 
In the late sixties Conceptual art gave Modernism a "nervous breakdown".174 It 
did this by subjecting Modernism to a thorough-going epistemological and 
ontological demolition job. As if caught in the interrogative glare of both the 
psychoanalyst and detective, Modernism's claims to self-knowledge were shown 
to hide the aetologies of the repressive personality. Modernism's disinclination, 
or resistance, to examine what it understood as value and quality meant that the 
new art was continually forced to test its ambitions against what it perceived as 
arbitrary and authoritarian criteria. Consequently, the idea that incontestable 
quality in art was identifiable with certain kinds of 'optically vivid' abstract 
174 Mel Ramsden, 'Ian Burn's excellent adventure', Artists Think: The Late Works of Ian 
Burn, op cit p23 
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painting and sculpture was judged to be based on prejudice rather than reason. 
Moreover, such justifications could be exposed non-cognitively as connected to 
vested art-market interests. As a result what Conceptual art set out to reclaim was 
the identity of the artist as a conceptual thinker, as someone whose judgement on 
art and culture was not to be governed by unexamined notions of 'good taste' and 
aesthetic sensitivity. This meant a very different sense of the modern in art than 
Modernism was prepared or able to imagine; that is, Conceptual art rejected 
Kantian self-criticism in favour of a reidentification of self-criticism with the 
negative critique of the avant-garde. Thus whereas Modernism could only 
conceive of aesthetic transformation in terms of the internal modification of a 
restrictive set of formal contents (abstract painting), Conceptual art questioned 
the very coherence and legitimacy of these contents. In these terms the critique of 
the language of art was brought to bear on Modernism as a critique of art's 
historical identity. This involved shifting the primary function of the artist as the 
producer of discrete objects to the producer of ideas about ideas~ or rather, in 
order for the artist to feel historically confident about producing objects or events 
as art the artist had to become their own best critic and historian. Hence the 
emergence of Conceptual art in 1966 lies in the self-education of a generation of 
artists as a practical reassertion of the demands of artistic autonomy. It makes 
little sense to talk about Conceptual art as artists doing-theory-as-art, as if 
Conceptual art had the theory in place which they then designated as art. The 
theory took on a prominence because that is what artists necessarily had to do -
fitfully, pathologically even - in order to clear away a workable space for 
practice. 
In Britain and the USA in the late sixties the focus of this clearance was a 
philosophical enquiry into art's conditions of possibilit),. A number of artists 
began to use the tools and categories of analytical philosophy (and only later 
Marxism and Situationist theory) to detach art from presuppositions about what 
art is. This meant that there could be no talk of art but only' art' insofar as the 
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activity of art making could not be derived from what was taken to be art at a 
given historical moment. Thus the intellectual and aesthetic work of art out of 
which the art object or event is made is logically and ontologically prior to any 
pregiven supposition about the essence and unity of art. This rejection of any a 
priori identity of the artwork is the shared problem of the writing of all the early 
British and American conceptualists: Michael Baldwin, Terry Atkinson, Ian 
Burn, Mel Ramsden, Dave Bainbridge, Harold Hurrell, Joseph Kosuth. Vic 
Burgin, John Stezaker. However, if the problem is shared the response to it is 
very different in a number of the writers; and importantly it is these initial 
differences that come to define the development, fissure and dissolution of 
Conceptual art. For the critique of artistic a priorism is merely the substratum 
upon which debates about art and capitalist culture, language and art, image and 
text, the retinal and anti-retinal, get fought out in conceptualism. It is the dispute 
over what this critique of a priorism entails, therefore, which forms the 
fundamental ideological split in Conceptual art between analytic conceptualism 
and so-called stylistic conceptualism. 
I first want to look at three founding statements of analytical conceptualism, one 
by Joseph Kosuth, and two by Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden, before they joined Art 
& Language. 
One of the most notorious and quixotic statements of analytic Conceptual art is 
Kosuth's - now well known - 'Art After Philosophy', first published in 1969. As 
a contribution to the philosophy of aesthetics or cultural theory it is to say the 
least confused, but as a manifestation - and manifesto - of what analytic 
conceptualism demanded of art it is beautifully symptomatic. In a grandiose echo 
of Heoel' s thesis about the necessary subsumption of modern art under 
b 
philosophy Kosuth argues that since Duchamp art has failed to meet the exacting 
requirements of the truth of the ready-made: with Duchamp. art and aesthetics are 
finally seen to be different orders of experience. and therefore, art does not need 
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to identify itself with an aesthetic experience of the visual in order to be classified 
as art. With Duchamp art's focus of cognitive engagement changes from the 
morphological to the functional. The historical and teleological importance of 
Conceptual art, then, is that it makes visible and completes this process by 
dissolving art into the analysis of the concept' art'. Thus whereas Hegel talked 
about the end of art as the beginning of art's philosophical identity as 
intellectually revealed truth, Kosuth talks about the end of aesthetics as the 
beginning of art's virtuality as art-idea about art-idea. As he says, "Works of art 
are analytic propositions. That is, if viewed within their context - as art - they 
provide no information what-so-ever-about any matter of fact. A work of art is a 
tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist's intention, that is, he is saying 
that a particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art ".175 In 
effect analytic Conceptual art works should be self-referring as art, for all other 
references (to the world of human desires and social relations) are extraneous to 
the truth of the enquiry. With this he concludes that the operations of art are 
similar to the procedures of logic, mathematics and science. 
Beyond raising the seriousness of what artists do to the level of a 'research 
programme' it is not clear what this actually means practically. For faced with the 
internal contradictions of art as an abstract method of deduction about its own 
conditions of possibility, he is confronted with the immediate and ineradicable 
problem of how such propositional content is to be presented. He 'resol ves' this 
by recognising the necessity of the production of ideas in visual form but not as 
an 'art experience'! His use of photostats in One and Fit'e Clocks, for instance, 
(1965) is, he contends, merely a temporary home for the work's content. The 
photostat could "be thrown away and then re-made".176 This allows him then to 
claim that the art remains separate from its actual form of presentation. 
175 Joseph Kosuth, 'Art After Philosophy', Art after Philosophy and After, op cit p20 
176 Joseph Kosuth, ibid p31 
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This separation of art from aesthetics by intellectual fiat is expanded upon in the 
following year in 'Introductory Note to Art-Language'. Here though he is more 
explicit about what constitutes an adequate mode of presentation for analytic 
conceptualism: "Many artists working outside (deserts, forests, etc) are now 
bringing to the gallery and museum super blown-up colour photographs 
(paintings) or bags of grain, piles of earth and even in one instance a whole 
uprooted tree (sculpture). It muddles the art proposition into invisibility".l77 Or. 
in other words, work which incorporates bits of the world through the process of 
mechanical reproduction is pre-conceptual, a residuum of traditional forms of 
pictorialism, and therefore a subsumption of art ( propositional content) under the 
judgements of aesthetics. In order to firm this up as a model of 'good practice' he 
makes the distinction between the 'why' artist who works with ideas and the 
'how' artist who adopts a traditional craft base to production and identifies art 
solely with the morphological. Kosuth's model is different in certain respects to 
other analytic conceptualists, but this binary opposition between 'making' and 
'thinking' is certainly something that marks the early period of Conceptual art, 
and as such defines the ideological boundaries of the debate on the possibilities of 
art. The power of 'thinking' is what distinguishes the' good' (historically 
iconoclastic) from the' bad' (historically unreflective). 
Whilst Kosuth was finding good ways in New York of distinguishing' how' from 
'why' the journal Art-Language in England was pursuing a similar process of 
philosophical adjustment, or "radical surgery". 178 Before Art & Language 
emerged as a coherent group out of the collecti ve organization of the journal. Art-
Language became the intellectual home for the new writing on analytic 
conceptualism. Two artists and later members of the group. Ian Burn and Mel 
177 Joseph Kosuth, 'Introductory Note to Art-Language by the American Editor', Art after 
Philosophy and After, op cit p39 
178 Joseph Kosuth, '1975', Art after Philosophy and After, ibid, p135 
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Ramsden ( Ramsden is still a member) who, like Kosuth, were, sympathetic to 
the journal set up The Society for Theoretical Art in New York. In a number of 
co-authored papers they address themselves to a similar set of questions to that of 
Kosuth. I want to look at two papers in particular, 'Stating and Nominating' 
(1970)179 and 'The Grammarian' (1970Y80 . As with Kosuth they are indicati ve 
of what was being brought to bear on the visuaL photography and Modernism 
during this period. 
In 'Stating and Nominating' we are presented with a comparable split between 
work which acts on and analyzes the propositions of art, and art which reworks a 
received propositional content. Burn and Ramsden refer to this distinction as 
between art which states and art which nominates. Analytic conceptualism is art 
which reveals the propositional content of the work as a requirement of its 
making, and stylistic conceptualism simply points to things in the world as 
worthy of aesthetic legitimation. In contrast to analytic conceptualism stylistic 
conceptualism has been concerned with expanding an "observable range of non-
propositional qualities without being required to provide any conceptual account 
of this art-work's stated nature". In this regard conventional practices are the 
result of acting without knowing what the elements or grammar of the language 
being employed signify, practice is 'blind' to its own determinates. Thus like 
Kosuth, in distinguishing analytic conceptualism from the mere nomination of 
things in the world, Burn and Ramsden argue that the content of the work must be 
stated linguistically. However, unlike Kosuth, this remains syntactical rather than 
semantic. That is, it is the linguistic content embedded in the internal relationship 
between signs which forms the analytic content and not the externalized linguistic 
demonstration of that content (as in Kosuth's One and Five Clocks). This 
179 Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden, 'Stating and Nominating', inpublished paper, The Society 
for Theoretical Art, New York, 1970 
180 Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden, 'The Grammarian', un paginated pamphlet, The Society 
for Theoretical Art, New York, 1970 
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obviously introduces a somewhat different understanding of the relationship 
between aesthetics and art. Whereas Kosuth sees his art-as-propositional content 
as lying beyond reference to any aesthetic precedents, Burn and Ramsden see 
their analytical conceptualism as consistent with the intentions of the best of 
abstract art: as in Modernism, advanced art must make transparent to the 
spectator its own rules of operation. However, if this locates their analytic 
conceptualism in an actual formal tradition, distinct from Kosuth's ahistoricism, 
this does not mean Burn and Ramsden are any more favourable to the 
morphological bias of Modernism. Like Kosuth they see analytic conceptualism 
as authoring a radical enquiry into the formal boundaries of art. As they declare in 
'The Grammarian', because an artwork may need not be a denoted physical 
object, "the object simply becomes "less self-important". Hence the inquiring 
framework of proposition-based art should be linked to making moves from of 
questions to for questions (the securing of functional premises)". 
This move from is to why derives its content initially from two related sources: 
linguistic philosophy's emphasis on matters of truth as matters of sense and 
context, and minimalist sculpture's recognition of the importance of context as a 
means of 'seeing' the artwork. In this regard 'The Grammarian' points to one of 
the key ethical and cognitive demands of analytic conceptualism in its attack on 
the morphological and visual: the production of new conditions of dialogue 
between artists and their audience, or as Burn and Ramsden put it, "new spectator 
requirements". It is easy to idealise this politically, particularly when the move 
from is to wh.\' does not in itself entail any commitment to analyzing matters of 
sense as matters of ideology, just as it is easy to forget how indifferent Kosuth 
was to anything but an audience of learned artists. Yet it was these "new spectator 
requirements" that provide analytic Conceptual art with its self-esteem and binds 
it to the future. Thus the whole point of shifting attention away from art-as-
nomination to art-as-stating was to release the spectator from what was seen as 
the 'sleep' of Modernist spectatorship. To think about the artwork in terms of the 
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premises that govern its propositional content is to rewaken the viewer as 
intellectually attentive. Consequently, it was not just Modernism's aesthete which 
was the target here, but stylistic conceptualism's would-be creati vely imaginati \e 
spectator, the spectator as free-associating libertarian. The liberal mantra of 
"make of it what you will" was not something that analytic Conceptual art felt 
provided any stable conditions for self-emancipation. 
The production of the ideal spectator as reader and intellectual interlocutor and 
critic is eventually what brings Burn and Ramsden into Art & Language in 1970, 
and which sustains Art & Language's later understanding of the social 
implications of analytic Conceptual art. However, analytic Conceptual art's ideal 
spectator, in either its 'pure' or 'active' forms, brings with it certain costs. And 
it's these costs as they bear on the position of photography that I now want to 
discuss. 
Despite Kosuth' s early writing, analytic Conceptual art was not a rejection of the 
visual as such (philosophically defeasible anyway), but a rejection of its 
unthinking historicization as 'truth', 'pleasure' and 'beauty'. Modernism, 
therefore, was viewed as an historical blockage of the multivalent functions, 
applications and uses of the' visual'. But nevertheless, this does not answer the 
very real sense of disembodiedness which analytic conceptualism brought to bear 
on thinking about the visual. In the bid to extract artist and spectator from the 
sleep (and charms) of the aesthete it set cognition against bodily needs and 
desires. Separating 'stating' from 'nominating', 'why' from 'how', it turned 
sensual appearance into an enemy of knowledge. However, this is not an 
argument about how 'thinking' suppresses 'feelings' or how 'concepts' suppress 
bodily pleasure. Analytic conceptualism rightly demolished the positi vistic 
philosophic basis of these oppositions. But an acknowledgement that analytic 
conceptualism's - shall we say - distrust of the' visual' was part of a deeper 
philosophical and cultural dialectic that went largely unrecognised by its 
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participants: the conflict between iconophobia and iconophilia. Iconophobia, or 
the fear of images, and iconophilia, of the love of images, ground \\'estern' s 
philosophy's approach to epistemology. That is, images are either percei\'ed as 
deceitful and leading to the promotion of untruth, or they are held to pro\'ide a 
truthful connection to an object or state of affairs. In matters of philosophy it can 
be argued with some justification that analytic conceptualism held images to be 
deceiving, and as such aligned itself with the anti-empiricism of modern 
linguistic philosophers such as W.V.O. Quine, Nelson Goodman and 
Wittgenstein - the "heyday of meanings" to quote Ian Hacking. 181 Wittgenstein' s 
concern with how language describes, and his later anti-mentalist philosophy. 
undoubtedly underwrites Conceptual art's rethinking of perception and meaning. 
although the Philosophical Investigations themselves were not available in 
English until 1974. 182 Wittgenstein like Marx is treated as part of the intellectual 
foundations of Conceptual art's programme. But if the connection between 
Conceptual art and Wittgenstein is much cited, as if the philosopher was a 
Conceptual artist avant la lettre, the iconophobic implications of his philosophy 
are rarely discussed in detail. 
Wittgenstein was important for early Conceptual art because of one thing: his 
unswerving rejection of the notion that meaning is equivalent to something 
coming unbidden before one's mind. For Wittgenstein this mentalist theory of 
meaning is defeasi ble precisely because it puts a sensation of understanding 
before an awareness of a sign's use. Recognising a picture of a washing machine 
does not dictate an understanding of what a washing machine might be used for. 
Thus, understanding a sign is to have an ability to understand, to be a master of a 
technique, to possess a skilL and not a spontaneous process in which a image of a 
thing can be called on to give meaning to that thing. Abilities of comprehension 
181 Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter fo Philosophy?, Cambridge University Press 
1975 
182 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophicallnvesfigafions, Basil Blackwell, 1974 
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are not interior, hidden performances. Moreover - and this is characteristic of 
Wittgenstein's philosophical naturalism - understanding as a matter of rule-
following and the application of concepts is not a conscious intellectual process. 
What Wittgenstein calls 'seeing-as' (comprehension) is involuntary; 
understanding is coterminous with 'seeing-as'. In Wittgenstein then, the 
'moment of spontaneity' could be said to shift from the production of meaning to 
its application. 
This, by now familiar argument, was obviously a powerful theory to attack the 
occultist and magical theories of spectatorship and meaning in Modernism. For 
what Wittgenstein's anti-mentalist account of meaning demonstrated was the 
essential temporal nature of understanding, that is, a sign only comes to . speak' 
once it has been subject to a process of use through time. The act of 
understanding may be spontaneous but the process is not. This very simple - and 
now philosophically commonplace - point had enormous ramifications for art in 
the late sixties and early seventies, because it allowed artists to theorize "new 
spectator requirements" in ways that divested judgements of the' visual' from the 
requirements of aesthetic immediacy. Clement Greenberg's and Michael Fried's 
Modernism is largely inherited from an Enlightenment account of the separate 
and autonomous characteristics of the arts, in particular those arguments used by 
Gotthold Lessing in the Laocoon (1776) 183 to distinguish painting from 
literature. Lessing argues that literature is an essentially temporal art, whereas 
painting is a spatial art. The reading of literature occurs in time; the apprehension 
of painting is instantaneous. The visual arts are confined to corporeal beauty, and 
spiritual significance is confined to literature. Although this is not a hard and fast 
183 Gotthold Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Poetry and Painting, Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1969. For a wide ranging discussion of this essay in relation to 
iconophobia and the iconophobic tradition, see W.J.T Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text. 
Ideology, University of Chicago 1986. In conclusion to his book Mitchell asks a q~estlon 
that could be quite easily brought to bear on Conceptual art: " How can the rhetoriC of 
iconoclasm serve as an instrument of cultural criticism without becoming a rhetoriC of 
exaggerated alienation that imitates the intellectual despotism it most despises" (p204) 
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distinction for Lessing - he talks about certain kinds of painting representing 
temporal action indirectly - the distinction does hold as a matter of \vhat is 
essential to painting and literature. Thus painting may allude to the temporal but 
it is not it is not its proper realm because it is not up to the task. Hence the would-
be literariness of painting, for Lessing, offends natural law, producing a kind of 
monstrousness and arbitrariness. For Lessing the worst kind of painting is that 
which is allegorical. These "speaking picture(s)" are a mere "arbitrary method of 
writing".l84 In short they are forced. Thus whereas Modernism sought to shore up 
Lessing's space-time differentiation of the arts, Conceptual art was intent on 
breaking it down. Indeed Conceptual art's turn to the extended presentation of 
non-painterly forms severely tested the idea that the visual was anything but 
spatial. The identification of art's spectatorship with reading, the incorporation 
into the cogniti ve space of art the expanded time of serial photography, and as 
such the self-conscious expansion of the experience of art into interactivity-
through-time, are evidence of a radical new temporality. In effect, the demands of 
linear and non-linear scanning, retrodiction, memory and physical interactivity 
produce a spectator who is never at rest, who is always being called to account 
for things in terms of what they do or do not know, where they are standing and 
where they have just been standing, like and unlike. 
If this obliteration of the distinction between looking and' reading', knowing and 
feeling, produces an alertness in the spectator not seen since the avant-garde of 
the 1920s, it also brings with it an enormous amount of unconscious intellectual 
baggage. For the historical irony of Conceptual art's attack on spatiality in the 
name of temporality and textuality is that Lessing himself favoured literature 
above painting on strict iconophobic grounds. Whatever painting might make of 
itself formally, its sensuality was potentially deceiving. The sensual rendering of 
bodies in motion in painting always had the power to inflame the imagination, 
and distract it from art's spiritual quest. Translated into the politics of the 
184 Lessing, Laocoon, op cit, pX 
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spectacle of the late sixties the distrust of the visual in analytic conceptualism 
introduces a similar radical or even revolutionary iconoclasm. The cosmitiveh 
'-- . 
attuned spectator and critical collaborator of Conceptual art judges Modernism 
(and pictorial art) to bring about a degeneration of weakening of critical self-
awareness. The spectator is seduced by forms that are not in the interests of his or 
her autonomy as a thinking and acting subject. 
It is no surprise therefore, that Wittgenstein' s own prejudices against the' visual' 
should fill-out the iconophobic-iconophiliac dialectic during this period. For 
Wittgenstein's anti-mentalist subject is the perfect candidate for analytical 
conceptualism's ideal spectator: the spectator undistracted by the potential 
illusions of images. This is to say that Wittgenstein's anti-mentalist account of 
meaning in the use of ordinary language enabled the processes involved in 
perception to be given a basis in conceptual description rather than 'mere' sensual 
identification. Yet it is problematic to think that processes of identification do not 
playa determinate part in the reconstruction of meaning. For instance on 
occasions the perception of an object coming before one's mind can play an 
important role when the subject draws on his or her powers of reasoning. 185 
When someone mentions BSE for instance, I might think of the image of a 
Fresian cow. Clearly the image won't help me in understanding BSE or even the 
biology of Fresian cows, but it might prompt me to think of various physiological 
factors that might then stir my stored knowledge on the subject. But because 
Wittgenstein's anti-mentalism treats any image coming before the mind as a sign 
(as mere interpretation), there is little space in his philosophy of perception for 
mental images as relays to understanding. Thus although it is axiomatic that being 
able to point to or recognise something is not sufficient for understanding to take 
place, perceptual experience acts as input to the subject as a concept-applying 
entity. As such the important point is that our powers of recognition (of 
185 For a discussion of Wittgenstein and anti-mentalism see Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein 
on Meaning, Basil Blackwell 1984 
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nomination) occur within the context of a range of concept-applying abilities, 
and therefore is a necessary part of a complex-range of meaning-producing skills. 
As Gareth Evans has argued in The Varieties of Reference, in relation to the issue 
of knowledge by acquaintance: "when the subject wishes to make absolutely sure 
that his judgement is correct he gazes again at the world ... he does not in any 
sense gaze at, or concentrate upon, his internal state. His internal state cannot in 
any sense becomes an object to him."186 The powers of recognition then may be 
fallible outside of understanding use, but the retrieval of perceptual information 
functions as a constitutive part of our conceptual abilities. 
The reason I mention this is that the idea of knowledge through perceptual 
acquaintance is what haunts the debate on the visual in Conceptual art, despite the 
construction of an ideal spectator trained to resist the lures of empiricism. Thus 
all the moves made through photography against analytical conceptualism 
endorse some account of pictures as providing a means of connecting the 
spectator's cognitive skills to the naturalistic world of appearances, rather than 
simply to the philosophical categories of art. And it is this sense of photography 
as bringing art into reacquaintance with the physical world that defines the work 
of those who see Conceptual art as an opportunity to re-theorize art as a social 
practice. By this I mean that photography brought back from the critique of 
artistic a priorism a different set of expectations on knowledge and pleasure than 
analytic conceptualism. In a crucial way it reconnected art to the 'ordinary' and 
'everyday' . 
In 1966-67 there was no discourse on photography to speak of in avant-garde art. 
What discussion on photography there was in the culture remained confined to 
the professional institutions who were still fighting for photography to be 
recognised as an art in itself. John Szarkowski' s tenure as the head of the 
186 Gareth Evans, edited by John McDowell, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford 
University Press 1983 p227 
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Museum of Modern Art's photography department during the late sixties was 
driven by the need to displace the functionality of photography and create a great 
canon of American and European art-photographers.This Modernist 
aggrandisement of photography was, however, of no or little interest to avant-
garde artists using photography during this period. Indeed the majority of artists 
(in the USA and Britain) had no knowledge of the history of photography. \\'hat 
they were interested in was the very fact that photography was commonplace. as 
much at home with the amateur as the professional and therefore something that 
fitted quite readily into Conceptual art's anti-aesthetic and disaffirmati ve ethos. 
Thus in Ed Ruscha's photographs for example - considered to be a precursor of 
conceptual photographic activity - there is both an expulsion of the 
photojournalist's 'significant moment' through the repetition of everyday objects 
and an indifference to qualities of presentation subscribed to by the fine art 
professionaL The effect is to create a form of attention which is as 'ordinary' or 
unassuming as looking at a family album or in an estate agent's window. This 
'anti-professional' use of photography clearly feeds into early conceptualism' s 
rejection of fine-art pictorialism. For what was of concern for artists such as 
Bruce Nauman, Robert Barry, and Douglas Huebler in the late sixties was for the 
use of photography to be distinguished from its location within the history of 
photography. In this the fundamental difference between the uses of photography 
in early Conceptual art and the concurrent development of photographic 
Modernism under the aegis of Szarkowski, is that Conceptual art openly 
embraced photography's functional and anti-aesthetic character, whereas 
Modernism actively suppressed this through aestheticism. As such this 
reintroduces the distinction between Modernism as a practice of self-reflection on 
the formal limits of a medium and the avant-garde as a theory of positional 
negation. Nauman, Barry, and Huebler and others were using the photographic 
document or snapshot in order to negate dominant artistic notions of taste and 
sensitivity and not as an advanced form of photographic practice. This means that 
the very thing that Modernism in painting and photography found so problematic 
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- photography's indexicality and ubiquity - becomes one more resource to 
question the hierarchies of taste and genre which prop up conservative ontologies 
of art. In this respect, we see a familiar avant-garde move being made on the part 
of these artists: the indexicality and infinite reproducibility of the photograph 
becomes a source of the 'primitivistic renewal' of the artist's autonomy. There 
are many complex registers of' primitivism' in Conceptual art. Art & Language's 
intellectual delinquency, for instance, can be read as a good example of how a 
number of the tropes of the' primitive' (the ugly, the philistine, the behaving 
badly) seek to distinguish the official and received, as managed and 
homogeneous, from the unofficial as the awkward, incompetent and 
heterogeneous. But what unites most Conceptual art in its disaffirmation of 
official Modernist taste is the valorization of the amateur, and this is particularly 
evident in the use of photography. The 'primitivistic' use of the photographic 
document carries with it the same message that many other 'primitivist' moves in 
art have carried in the twentieth century: the idea that the work of art is closer to 
'ordinary' labour and the 'ordinary' skills of the artistic amateur than the 
dominant, professional institutions of art would have us believe. The use of the 
photographic in early Conceptual art, then, serves one overriding function: to 
question the concept of artistic sensibility enshrined in Modernist and traditional 
accounts of art practice. Thus we need to be clear that the use of photography in 
early Conceptual art is part of a continuing dialectic concerned with art and the 
di vision of labour that stretches back to the Russian revol uti on of 1917. 
Conceptual art's amateur is the direct descendant of Productivism's dissolution of 
aesthetics into artistic functionality. 
But what is striking, however, is that until the mid-seventies in Britain in 
particular, this legacy played no part in the self-understanding of these artists and 
other artists using photography' against the grain'. Consequently, the social 
content of early Conceptual art's use of photography has to be seen as very 
different in implication than the early avant-garde. Although Nauman et al rna) 
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identify demotically with the skills of the amateur and the non-specialist, the 
artists were not interested in replicating the social reportage of post-
Revolutionary culture. There is no interest in turning the camera on social 
subjects in order to say something about social power, etc. At no point did the 
early conceptualists want to return to, or want to be confused with. the social 
documentarists. This changes, and of course can be subject to counterfactual 
evidence in the work of some artists (Dan Graham for example), but overalL the 
opening period of Conceptual art embraces the culturally disruptive function of 
photographic reportage only to withdraw it from the social world. This is because 
photography is soon submitted to an internal critique. In turning away from the 
ethical demands of photojournalism and the aesthetic ambitions of Modernism, 
the indexical function of photography undergoes a process of realignment. In his 
essay 'Marks of Indifference' for the MaCA Conceptual art show 
'Reconsidering the Object of Art 1965-1975', leffWall refers to this as a process 
of subjectivization. 187 The reportorial capacities of photography are turned on the 
activity of the artist and his everyday social relations. But if this subjectivization 
is widespread we need to get from the fact of this shift to why it took place and 
with what ends in view. Wall overlooks most of the details of this shift because 
he is more concerned with dealing with the impact of performance on Conceptual 
art. 
I would argue that the turn to photography as a means of documenting the art 
event is a readjustment of the space of the 'real' within photography, and as such 
presages the idea, so prevalent in the 1980s, of the staged photograph as 
constructed biography. Thus it is not good enough to say that Bruce Nauman, for 
example, was using photography simply to document what he was doing in the 
studio as a 'scul ptor', and therefore was only concerned with transferring the 
studio activity into an image of that activity. Rather, Nauman' s early photographs 
187 Jeff Wall, "'Marks of Indifference": Aspects of Photography in, or as, Conceptual art', 
in 'Reconsidering the Object of Art', op cit p253 
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(Self-Portrait as a Fountain, 1966) present a readjustment in perception about 
where the photographer might situate himself or herself within the photographic 
process of 'truth-telling'. To enact something as an event for the camera, 
something as banal as spitting out a fountain of water, is not merely to produce a 
photograph of a 'performance' but to opt for the possibility that photography 
might have established a very different relationship to the' real' than 
conventionally supposed. These are photographs which also represent the 
externalization of states of consciousness. They therefore disrupt, in casual, 
humorous and at times inane ways, the privilege given to certain high-serious 
identities in art and photography, in particular the idea of the anonymous author 
in Modernism (as a rejection of the bad-form of self-description and 
autobiography) and the idea of the photographer as objective witness. Both these 
identities presume a relationship to truth which stands outside, or athwart, the 
representation of the everyday as 'microscopic' and pathological. As Nauman 
himself says, "It ... had to do with trying to make a less important thing to look 
at". 188 
This pointing at things that are 'less important to look at' reasserts photography's 
powers of ostension. By ostension I mean pointing out an object to someone by 
directing their attention to it. Now of course photography is the ostensi ve medi um 
par excellence. Its indexical relationship to the world of objects and events is no 
more nor less a form of 'pointing', and 'pointing to' and 'pointing at' necessarily 
189 I' d I' contribute to our knowledge of the world. But. as I have exp allle ,ana ytlC 
conceptualism tended to separate the ostensive act of 'showing something' from 
1BB Bruce Nauman quoted in Josepth Kosuth, 'Information 2', Art After Philosophy and 
After, op cit p59 
1B9 The camera, however, does not point in the same way as fingers point. I do not point 
out a particular kind of butterfly to a friend by showing them a photograph of that 
butterfly, although I might point to a photograph of the butterfly saying :'this i~ a Red 
Admiral, look out for it when we go for a walk". Painting by finger then IS a dIrect 
nomination of an object, in real time: "this is .. " or "look there ... " or "that ( ... ) seems 
dangerous" . 
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'meaning something'. If I have shown how difficult this is to accept once we 
acknowledge the part perceptual acquaintance plays in our conceptual abilities. 
this becomes clearer once we understand the singularly important part ostension 
plays in human communication. An ostensive act is always an inferential one. 
That is, to point something out is make a claim on its significance or value. Thus 
someone who engages in ostensive behaviour makes manifest a number of 
assumptions about his or her actions. Consequently it can be argued that the 
pointing out of something always entails the recovery of the intentions behind the 
act even if information about such intentions are minimal initially. From this we 
might then argue that even where the recognition of intentions are weak some 
recovery of meaning nevertheless does take place based on the ability of the 
subject to infer meaning from the available evidence. Thus, for instance. the 
illocutionary force of a gesture might provide the possible direction in which the 
relevance of the gesture is sought. 'Showing forth' and the recovery of meaning. 
therefore, are al ways part of the same cogni ti ve act. In thei r work on ostensi ve 
communication Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson draw on the implications of this 
to argue for a revaluation of human communication. In a suggestive commentary 
on linguistic theory they argue that verbal communication is never principally 
about the mutual understanding of intentions or the decoding of signs. "Human 
intentional communication is never a mere matter of coding and decoding. The 
fact is that human external languages do not encode the kind of information that 
humans are interested in communicating. Linguistically encoded semantic 
representations are abstract mental structures which must be inferentially 
enriched before they can be taken to represent anything of interest". 190 As such 
processes of decoding are never autonomous. They are always positioned within 
an inferential framework, particularly when those decoding processes are 
involved in forms of communication where information about intentions are not 
manifest, such as art. The implications of this for photography are obviollsly 
190 Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Basil 
Blackwell 1986, p174 
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enormous. The photographic document is not so much an inert nomination of 
things in the world, but a source of inferential complexity. I would argue 
therefore that subjectivization in early conceptual photography involves a 
recognition of this at the level of how it organizes its materials in front of the 
camera. To photograph yourself spurting out water is to draw on the ostensive 
powers of photography in ways that are expressly allegorical rather than 
descriptive. As such this refusal to invest in the would-be objective truth of 
photography or its aesthetic validation has important implications for the debate 
on iconophobia in Conceptual art. To nominate the 'pathological' and 'trivial' as 
the subjects of snapshot photography clearly shows that iconophobia is not only 
internal to analytic conceptualism; photo-conceptualism and analytic 
conceptualism are permeated by it in various ways and to various degrees. 
Nauman, Huebler and Barry all produce images, which in their resistance to 
pictorialism and spectacularization, take up a distance from an easy sensuality. 
Overall what unites the early American photo-based Conceptual art and analytic 
conceptualism is an ethics of amateurism. The absolute disregard for Modernist 
notions of high-seriousness and professionalism positions them in a similar kind 
of 0-1-Y space. Both treat the issue of art's autonomy as a matter of disabling the 
link between aesthetic performance and artistic value. This is why it is important 
to recognise that the American photo-conceptualists expressed their disregard for 
photographic history as avant-garde artists not as avant-garde photographers. 
What counted above all else was that the work looked as if it could be made by 
anyone; and this was the last thing that professional photographers wanted to be 
identified with. 
This disregard for photography as a medium, however, is very different in Britain 
during the late sixties and early seventies. In fact it is Britain during this period 
that photographic conceptualism undergoes a widespread social reevaluation. \Ve 
can point to precedents in the USA (for instance Dan Graham's Homes/or 
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America, 1966-67), but it is in Britain where photography and Conceptual art 
takes on a qualitatively different direction. The reasons for this are complex, but 
suffice it to say, the development of a sophisticated indigenous Marxist culture, 
the rise of film studies, the importation of French structuralism, and the energy of 
a popular counter-culture produced a context in which many kinds of interesting 
work on the social meanings of art could be pursued. In this respect from 1970-76 
we see a very different sense of how photography in art might distinguish itself 
from Modernism and photojournalism. Armed with a stronger sense of the 
historical development and contingency of the avant-garde than the Americans. in 
Britain avant-garde photography positions itself as a critique of the avant-garde 
itself. This leads to a more thoroughgoing assessment of how photography stands 
in relation to its wider conditions of production and consumption. 
In 1969 John Stezaker and Victor Burgin were both working with photography 
within the framework of analytic conceptualism, although Burgin never strictly 
adopted the voice of the philosopher-as-artist. His aversion to this was there from 
the start. Nevertheless in his early Photopath (1969) (a photographic trompe 
l'oeil of the gallery floor) there is a Kosuth-like play with different orders of 
reference and questioning of the formal boundaries of sculptural identity. Does a 
photographic representation of a section of the gallery floor constitute a sculptural 
'event' or is the photograph just a photograph of the floor? John Stezaker, 
however, is more direct about the need for an art of propositional critique. In 
photo-texts and essays between 1969 and 1971 he takes on the voice of the self-
scrutinizing Wittgensteinian. As he argues in 'The Necessity of Categories' 
(1971) "Art activity must...house theoretical conjectures concerning its own 
identity in the absence of a priori concepts of art. Thus discovery and 
construction must be reconciled within a single activity".191 In a photo-text book 
191 John Stezaker, 'The Necessity of Categories', Beyond Painting & Sculpture, works 
bought for the Arts Council by Richard Cork, Arts Council 1973, p29. See also 
'Introduction to 'Categories", in A Survey of the Avant-garde in Britain, Vol 2, Gallery. 
House London, 1972. "We cannot hope to forward at this point a precise and well-defined 
concept of the concept of art as this is logically subsequent to first developing some 
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completed in 1971, like Kosuth and Burgin, he deals with the non-identity 
between photography and its referents. At one point he writes: .. 1) Series of 
photographs each representing 1/000 sec of the history of a fountain. 2). 1 
photograph representing 1 sec of the history of a fountain".192 This sense of the 
instability of photographic representation is explored through the book in a series 
of images engaged reflexively with like and unlike. By 1973 though both artists 
had dropped the work on propositional content in order to open out a space for 
discussion of the social production of meaning. Burgin to a large extent got there 
'first', with less investment in analytic conceptualism he began to look at 
photographs as a source of connection to order of knowledge governed by the 
social function of photography under capitalism. As he was to say in 'Margin 
Note' written for A Survey of the A\'(lIlt-garde in Britain in 1972: "As the domain 
of art therefore is the domain of those sign systems by whose means social 
reality, that is to say ideology, is constituted and disseminated then it cannot be 
'value-free'''.193 Hence art (photography) is "useful" to the degree it 
"disarticulate(s)" social codes and contradicts ideological norms. 194 
This is a very different kind of language (borrowed principally from Barthes' 
Elements of Semiology) and proposes a different kind of critical function for 
photography. Photography is for the first time since the 1920s and 30s inserted 
into an explicitly politically counter-hegemonic space. As such the issue of use-
value is something that the American photo-conceptualists and analytic 
conceptualists had great difficulty squaring with their negation of the professional 
categories and aspirations of art. Burgin's alignment of photography with a 
semiotic critique of the rhetorics of mass culture appeared to restore an 
concept of art" (p1 0) 
192 John Stezaker, Works 1969-71, unpublished and unpaginated 
193 Victor Burgin, 'Margin Note', in A Survey of the Avant-garde in Britain, op cit p18 
194 Victor Burgin, ibid p18 
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unacceptable faith in the social function of art, even if Burgin was at pains to talk 
about the need for artists to act' as if' art was socially effective. This precipitated 
another ideological struggle within Conceptual art as Burgin (and later Stezaker) 
began to use photography not just as a way out of analytic conceptualism but as a 
means of critiquing the idea of the avant-garde itself. Indeed in Britain in the 
early seventies the debate on photography moves overwhelmingly into a 
discussion of popular culture and mass culture. 
If semiotics provides the initial point of theoretical access to this, it is the wider 
impact of Situationist theory (Debord's Societe du Spectacle had been translated 
in 1969), and the students' movement and the new counter-culture that provides 
the political framework. Situationism, with its emphasis upon the destablization 
of the sign as a political act, provided photography with a further set of 
interrogative tools. This in turn established a route back to the cultural debates of 
the 1920s and 1930s, although the serious genealogical work on the early avant-
garde wasn't done until the late seventies. One artist who pursued the Situationist 
turn was John Stezaker. But if Stezaker shares with Burgin a desire for a practice 
which rejects the iconophobia of the avant-garde, he does not share Burgin's - or 
the Situationists' - faith in the political use-value of photography. That is, he 
argues, that the political option of semiotic-practice reinvests art with the rhetoric 
of artistic exclusion and therefore continues to support an isolationist view of 
artistic practice and cultural politics. Touching on issues in the early seventies 
that now overwhelmingly preoccupy a younger generation of artists, he demands 
a practice which engages with the forms and images of popular culture as a 
shared realm of meaning, of pleasure and alienation. As he outlined in 1973 the 
job of a post-avant-garde art is "to expose social values inherent in modes of 
communication without using the avant-garde convenience of separating the form 
of exposure from the realm of social ideology".195 In other words, the artist must 
195 John Stezaker, Statement, Arte ing/ese oggi 1960-76, British Council/Comune di 
Milano, Palazzo Reale, Milan 1976, p399 
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drop his or her fear of the stereotype, cliche and worn-out in order to open out to 
the social world as lived by most people. As a consequence, it is the appropriated 
or found image which is at the centre of Stezaker's concerns. for it is the 
appropriated or found image which allows direct access to the realm of social 
ideology by virtue of the fact that such images are embedded within previous uses 
and histories. Hence particular forms of appropriated imagery such as advertising 
or the picture postcard, are highly suitable as triggers for collective experience. 
Thus what the appropriated image allows Stezaker to do is narrow the cogniti\'e 
and social gap between an experience of the popular in art and specialist forms of 
artistic attention. The result is that the rhetorics of popular forms of representation 
- the way images position the subject ideologically - are exposed through the 
process of re-contextualization and manipulation. 
In these terms Stezaker's turn to found imagery as a common source of myth and 
desire extends the debate on the ethics of the amateur within Conceptual art. For 
what Stezaker becomes is a collector of the photographic image and therefore. by 
implication, an archivist of the industrially produced image. This collecting of 
what has lost been lost or remaindered through consumption is systematic in its 
endeavours in a way that the early American photo-conceptualists transformation 
of the found photograph into a 'readymade' is not. In Ruscha, Huebler and Barry, 
in particular, there is a greater preoccupation with the interchangeable and 
repeatable possibilities of the found image. For what counted for those artists was 
how the minimalist principles of repetition and quantification might undermine 
issues of good taste and composition. They were not interested in the found 
image as a social resource. Moreover, despite their antipathy to professional 
categories of photography, they also remained photographers. Stezaker, on the 
other hand, only worked with found images. This is naturally not advantageous in 
itself, but the important issue, as regards the development and crisis of 
Conceptual art, is that as a collector and archivist of images Stezaker establishes a 
very different kind of subject position for the anti-l\lodernist and post-traditional 
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artist. As with all artists working under the mantle of Conceptual art. Stezaker's 
adoption of the voice of the amateur at this time is that of the anti-aesthete. But 
whereas analytic conceptualism substituted the critical nay-sayer and amateur 
philosopher for the connoisseur and sensitive 'emoter', Stezaker takes on the 
position of the 'fan' and memorialist. This of course owes something to Benjamin 
and the Surrealists; and interestingly it is the younger British Conceptual artists 
using photography who reintroduce this idea of the artist-as-rag-picker into the 
avant-garde arena in the early seventies. But more significantly, this deri yes from 
the idea of 'fan-knowledge' as a form of cultural capital which is not determined 
by academic standards of success. By this I mean that in the early postcard 
pieces and montages Stezaker places a priority on his own immersion in the 
popular culture of the image. Thus the crucial issue for Stezaker's post-avant-
garde artist is about how the artist might find a working relationship to the 
photographic image which is not intellectually superior to the culture which 
produced it. This is not to substitute Marx's or Wittgenstein' s sceptic for Peter 
Winch's anthropologist, but a recognition - as with Art & Language - that 
radicalism in art invariably comes with the privileges of education and class. 
In this respect concern about "new spectator requirements" becomes a debate 
about what relationship the artist is to have to what kinds of artistic materials. 
What Stezaker's archivist sets out to do is rewrite the ideological contest between 
'stating' and 'nominating' in the interests of common identifications. But rather 
than treating nomination as the avant-garde photo-conceptualist might as the 
transformation of the 'everyday' into art, he treats the incorporation of the found 
image into art as co-extensive with the pleasures of popular culture itself. Naming 
and identifying does not operate as the imprimatur of avant-garde brinkmanship, 
but as a relay to shared pleasures and know ledges. For Stezaker, at least, this had 
as much to do with his own perception of himself as a 'book artist', as much as a 
gallery artist. Working as an archivist of the 'culturally remaindered' his 
relationship to the image led him inevitably to organize his material as readable 
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sequences and series' and therefore to the problem of the most appropriate form 
in which to display the material. In this light Stezaker's interest in the book form 
is no different from many other artists using photography and text during the 
period. As Germano Celant boomed at the time "the book becomes the most 
accessible medium ... for creating art".I96 Of course it didn't, but as a means of 
collating the work of the image-archivist it at least proved very successful at 
undermining the Modernist preoccupation with the singular aesthetic experience. 
This opening up of Conceptual art through the found image to the insubordinate 
and seductive pleasures of popular culture had a radical effect on the use of 
photography in Conceptual art in Britain from 1973. A clear cultural reorientation 
takes place as a number of younger artists identify with photography not just as a 
negation of Modernist taste, but as the source of a wider debate on the social 
function of the artist and the social production of meaning. In the work of John 
Hilliard and Alexis Hunter, for instance, by 1973-4 there is a recognition that a 
critical understanding of the use of photography within popular culture might 
offer a way out of both Modernist aestheticism and the ironic forms of 
nomination of West-coast photo-conceptualism. Thus what distinguishes 
Hilliard's and Hunter's work is the actual extension of the photographic 
document into an engagement with popular representational practices 
(advertising, fashion photography, photo-romans) and popular genre derived from 
film and literature ( romantic drama, horror). In its view that the dominant forms 
of the culture industry demands from the artist something other than Frankfurt-
school disengagement or populist replication, this is close in spirit to Stezaker and 
Burgin. The post-avant-garde artist should, in a sense, work from inside the 
alienated materials of the dominant culture, and therefore trust the forms of art to 
their powerful collective focus. But unlike Stezaker, in particular, Hilliard and 
Hunter appropriate popular representional practices for their narrative seductions 
and literary inclusiveness. In effect their passage through Conceptual art is as 
196 Germano Celant, Book as Artwork, 1960172, Nigel Greenwood 1972 
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oblique story-tellers. 
Story-telling would seem to proscribe much discussion of Conceptual art. 
Nevertheless if we recognise the allegorical base of the story-teller's art we can 
trace its presence through the whole debate on photography in conceptualism. 
Nauman's early photographic studies are no more no less than autobiographical 
fragments, narrative glimpses from the studio. Similarly Keith Arnatt's work 
from 1969 offers an extraordinary subjectivization of the photographic document. 
From Self-Burial (1969) through to Portrait of the Artist as a Shadow (1971), he 
uses his presence or absent presence in a series of masochistically inflected 
studies on artistic alienation. In Self-Burial his gradual disappearance into the 
ground from one panel to the next is a pointed commentary on the thesis of art's 
so-called dematerialization under conceptualism. Here we see the artist quite 
literally enacting his own cultural marginalization. As Arnatt was to say in 1973: 
" I see no reason why the range of experiences that an artist can deal with should 
not include the difficulties he experiences as an artist".197 For Arnatt then, the use 
of photography was primarily a means of reflecting back on the pathologies of the 
artistic subject; and it is these pathologies as a story-board of the' everyday' that 
so obviously divides the ostensive powers of photography from its critics. 
Arnatt's photography fills out the de-differentiated subject of analytic 
conceptualism with all kinds of messy emotions and feelings that from the 
position of a strict rational critique of artistic a priorism would appear to be illicit. 
Both Arnatt and Hilliard began their careers as sculptors, and like many artists of 
their generation first turned to photography to document the temporal nature of 
their work. This idea of the photograph as a marker of the impermanent was 
initially a critical response to minimalism. The would-be sensitivity to the 
contextual reading of the artwork in minimalism was in fact belied by the 
restrictive monumentality of its geometric forms and its gallery-based location. 
197 Keith Arnatt, Statement, Beyond Painting & Sculpture, op cit, p38 
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The photographic document then offered a way of bringing back information 
about sculptural activities from contexts that were not restricted to the gallen, 
~ -
The photograph became an inseparable structural component of the art-
experience. However, this turn to the photograph as a first-order artwork was 
soon subject to a process of internal aestheticization. Richard Long and Hamish 
Fulton were happy to settle for a kind of conceptual-pictorial ism; a perfect 
example of photographic nomination as the reinscription of tradition painterly 
forms. Hilliard though, like Arnatt, broke with the incipient pictorialism of the 
photo-as-sculptural-document by incorporating his self-image into a commentary 
on the conditions of photographic production itself. In a series of moves 
reminiscent of developments in structuralist film-making at the time, Hilliard 
drew attention to the produced nature of photographic truth-telling by 
photographing himself photographing, or photographing the same object at 
different exposures and on different papers, (12 RepresentatiolZs of Colouf, 1971), 
The work from this period (1970-73) is perhaps the only photo-based Conceptual 
art which is actually discursively engaged with the mechanics and chemistry of 
the photographic document. 
By 1973, to return to previous comments, this singularly materialist emphasis on 
the construction of photographic-truth had been incorporated into the broader 
area of the social function of photography. Hilliard extended his concern with the 
potential misreading of images inherent in all photographic perception, to a 
concern with the narrative suggestiveness of image and text, reminiscent of 
photo-love stories. This produced a shift in the context of Conceptual art in 
Britain, which was as significant in its way as Stezaker adopting the role of the 
archivist: that is, the production of the photograph becomes a matter of its 
'filmic' staging. Of course the staged photograph is nothing new: and early 
photo-Conceptual art's turn to self-representation has a direct route back to the 
domestic photographs of the Surrealists, in particular Claude Cahun. But in this 
instance staging becomes a matter of employing and disarticulating the dramatic 
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forms of popular culture, of arraigning and simulating them. To stage the image, 
essentially, means staging the conditions of the photograph's mass consumption. 
and this usually means addressing issues of sexuality and sexual difference. The 
implications of this were not lost on Alexis Hunter in 1973, as the increasing 
dissolution of Conceptual art as the first generation of anti-Modernists, is helped 
on its way by the emergence of the first generation of feminists into art. In 
Voyeurism (1973), for instance, there is a qualitative transformation in the role of 
the staged figure, insofar the cinematic sequencing of Hunter disguising and 
revealing herself becomes self-consciously attached to issues of social and 
sexuality identity, prefiguring the whole development of late Conceptual art into 
the photo-conceptualism and identity politics of the 1980s. In essence, the staging 
of photographic and filmic genres is further evidence of the embodying of 
Conceptual art at the expense of its ideal spectator. The series of works Hunter 
made in 1976, Approaches to Fear, is a vivid example of the cultural tensions 
being played around this. Although Hunter's work is indebted to the alignment in 
the early seventies between Conceptual art, Marxism and feminism, Approaches 
to Fear derives its primary source of engagement with questions of gender and 
identity from the seductions and fascinations of popular culture. The burning of a 
high-heeled shoe in front of the camera is clearly the work of someone keen to 
align critical consciousness in art with non-specialist forms of attention. As a 
result it was characterized as the worst kind of capitulation to iconophilia. For by 
1975 the iconophobic impulses of early Conceptual art had passed into the 
feminist critique of popular culture as evidence of one of the princi pie sites of 
women's self-alienation. There was little space for work which commandeered 
some of the allure of popular genres such as the horror film. Thus, it is the turn to 
the conditions of consumption of images that contributes to Conceptual art's final 
crisis in 1975-76, as a whole number of demands about the reembodiment of the 
spectator and the need for the repositioning of the artist within the culture fill out 
the conceptual programme of cultural disaffirmation and artistic refle\ivity. and 
prepare the ground for a series of other struggles about the ethics of 
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representation. 
One artist who also represents this final playing out of the iconophobic-
iconophilia dialectic in Conceptual art is David Lamelas. Lamelas worked in 
London at the height of Conceptual art, arriving from Argentina in 1968. Like 
Hilliard he moves from a materialist engagement with photographic truth - in his 
early urban photographs of Brussels and Dusseldorf he deals with the instability 
of the representation of the photographic event - to treatment of the photograph as 
part of an imaginary film script or projection of his own fantasies of 
omnipotence, (Rock Star, 1974). For example The Violent Tapes (1975) is a 
sequence of 10 black and white photographs of a fictional chase, borrowed in its 
mis en scene from the seventies TV cop show. The man and woman are being 
chased by mysterious (corporate?) assailants who are intent on retrieving a film 
tape the couple are carrying. This tape consists of sensitive documentary material 
of a violent nature. We assume that the couple have either stolen the tape or have 
made it. The play with the unstable truth-conditions of the photographic event is 
still evident, but this is directed outwards to the conditions under which the 
dominant relations of capitalist culture exist: censorship, a prurient interest in the 
victims of violence, and the violent denigration of the culture's critics. What we 
see therefore is the threat of violence as the threat of censorship or even death. 
Thus, unlike TV Cop shows the violence is implied, leaving the representation of 
actual violence outside of the frame. What this presents, I would suggest is the 
iconophobic inclusion of the representation of violence within the iconophilic 
framework of a post-avant-garde art an art which in sense can no longer avoid 
the cultural evidence of such violence. For the question of violence is more than 
a simple matter of Lamelas's own artistic concerns~ it traverses the whole 
historical period. Conceptual art emerged out of violence, the violence of 
American imperialism and the Vietnam war. To say that Conceptual art saw itself 
in resistance to the cultural effects of American imperialism does not mean that 
Conceptual art was thereby concerned with the problems of political 
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representation in textual form ( although politics and the value of propaganda of 
course became a central point of dispute about the direction of analytic 
conceptual around 1972). Rather the politics of anti-imperialism were inscribed in 
the forms of iconophobia itself, as if the spectacle of violence could only be 
challenged by de-aestheticizing the visual. This may sound contentious in the 
light of analytical conceptualism's scepticism about the social function of art, but 
Conceptual art's rejection of the discourse of the aesthete was, I would contest. a 
negation of the social 'blindness' of the aesthete's sensitivity: the fact the aesthete 
can never tolerate the social fact of violence, even as he or she is consumin o it as 
b 
an image. Furthermore the end of Conceptual art coincides with the beginning of 
the women's movement and the 'beginning' - in public, legalistic, moral and 
cultural terms - of actual and symbolic violence against women. The 
representation of violence, therefore, hangs over Conceptual art. extending the 
iconophobic-iconophilic dialectic into areas where it never ventured before. 
Lamelas's The Violent Tapes is a product of this constellation of forces, turning 
to violence as the secret code of the image under capitalism, but rejecting in good 
iconophobic terms its actual representation. The pressures to do otherwise, of 
course, is the history of the last twenty years, as the embodied spectator of art has 
come to share the same place as the embodied consumer of popular culture. 
If this kind of work presages fundamental changes in the uses of photography, 
nevertheless it is around this time that Art & Language begin to attack what they 
describe as 'Semio-art'. In Dialectical Materialism (1975) and Abm'e Us the 
Waves (1976) they use photographic reproductions of Armenian Socialist Realist 
paintings and WWll illustrations respectively with ironic texts about the social 
claims of 'Semio-art', their specific target being Burgin. Although the group 
invariably use the skills of the graphic artist ( particularly around this period) the 
use of photo-text here is clearly designed to embarrass or . see-off' w hat they 
perceive as the idealism of photo-based conceptualism. In his history of the group 
and Conceptual art Essays on Art & Language. Charles Harrison re-endorses this 
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position. But there is a world of difference between the necessary rejection of the 
idealist claims of those who assume that photography is more democratic than 
painting, or that art can be a direct extension of ideological struggle, and 
reduction of all photographic practices to some amorphous' Semio art'. In doing 
'-
this Harrison can then conveniently identify this mythical' Semio art' with the 
crudity of advertising and propaganda, and therefore the suppression of reflected 
thought. The satirical voice of the work is not served by the comparison of 
'Semio art' to the "falsehoods of journalism".198 Whether Harrison is referring 
specifically and only to Burgin, or Burgin's followers, this kind of deflation is the 
kind of shibboleth which produces a history of Conceptual art without any 
dialectical self-consciousness. It is no surprise therefore that Art & Language 
experienced its own internal crisis over the identity of photography, image and 
text, when Terry Atkinson left in 1974. When Atkinson departed in dispute over 
the future of the group and the role of the Index, a vast' language community' of 
shared and disputed ideas presented in the form of index cards, he produced a 
series of photo-texts pieces, The Bridging Works, combining historical images 
(WWl and the commune) with long satirical captions mimicking the operations 
of the Index itself. If this was Atkinson's own version of Art & Language's 
"black propaganda", 199 unlike Art & Language at the time Atkinson was 
absolutely serious about exploring the possibilities of an ironized representational 
post-conceptual practice. As Atkinson was to write fifteen years later: "This 
bridging work appropriated A & L motifs from the Indexing and grafted onto 
them, capriciously and brutally, motifs which I took to be anti-A&L". 200 The 
ideological fall-out from this, however, has been to turn the shared iconophobic-
iconophilic conditions under which the initial dispute was played out into a 
matter of personal positioning. That is, both Art & Language and Terry Atkinson 
198 ibid, p137 
199 ibid, p139 
200 Terry Atkinson, The Indexing ... op cit, p12 
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were far more embedded in a wider cultural argument about the challenoes of 
e 
representation than they both could or were prepared to admit in 1974 and 1975. 
Thus far from reducing the Conceptual art to an inert pictorialism, photography 
actually opened out a range of working possibilities for art during the period 
1966-1976. In this I agree with Jeff Wall: "It could be said that it was 
photography's role and task to turn away from Conceptual art, away from 
reductionism and its aggressions". 201 The history of Conceptual art, therefore, 
will be traduced if the complex positioning of the photograph is not given its due. 
Because if we need to address the social and political contexts in which the 
iconophobic-iconophilic dialectic is embedded this in turn cannot be separated 
from the recurrent place and function of the photographic document within the 
twentieth century avant-garde. Through Constructivism, Productivism and 
Surrealism, photography has served to disinvest the voice of the aesthete in the 
name of the 'ordinary' user and spectator. This same sense of aesthetic 
disinvestment through the indexical and ostensive resources of photography 
passed through Conceptual art, although with the barest historical consciousness 
of what this disinvestment had stood for. As Benjamin Buchloh points out with 
some accuracy: it was precisely "the utopianism of earlier avant-garde 
movements ... that was manifestly absent from Conceptual art".202 If this is what 
constitutes the sorrows of Conceptual art, it also points to the fact that the artists 
who were involved were young - sometimes very young - and were mostly 
winging it. The problem with writing about Conceptual art, therefore, is that the 
moves it made, the strategies it adopted - across a range of artistic positions -
were contingent and messy responses to shifting and sometimes unfocussed 
questions and issues. This is why it is mistaken to hold Conceptual art as 
somehow responsible for the collapse of Western cultural values and cultural 
201 Jeff Wall, '''Marks of Indifference"', op cit p266 
202 Benjamin Buchloh, 'Conceptual art 1962-1969, op cit p141. 
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continuity, as Thierry de Duve does in Kant After Duchamp. Although for 
opposite reasons to Charles Harrison, like Harrison he flattens out the 
heterogeneity of Conceptual art in his defence of what he believes to have been 
eroded by its idealisms. He does this by conveniently eliding Conceptual art with 
Kosuth's suppression of aesthetics. So the failure of Conceptual art becomes the 
inability to suppress aesthetics in the name of art. As such Kosuth' s fantasy of 
exclusion is made to stand for a position that few other Conceptual artists actually 
held. The failure of Conceptual art is simply the disappointment experienced 
knowing that artworks cannot avoid being subject to aesthetic appraisal. This is to 
judge Conceptual art as if its only value is as a contribution to the philosophy of 
aesthetics. De Duve barely addresses Conceptual art as an artistic culture, as a 
conversation between specialist and non-specialist know ledges, and when he does 
acknowledge this he demeans it: "Those were the days my friend, enthralling 
days, liberating days, and yet, in the long run, sterile".203 Thus it is particularly 
revealing when he says "conceptualism remains unsatisfactory",20-l as if 
conceptualism claimed to offer anything other than its own lack of "satisfaction". 
On the contrary Conceptual art embraced dissatisfaction as a matter of principle. 
In this it provided a range of forms and strategies that opened up how art might 
make sense of its historical dysfunctionality; hence the importance of 
photography, particularly in the I ight of the art of the last twenty years. For the 
emergence of a reflexive photography out of the iconophobic strategies of 
analytic conceptualism made it possible to produce a representational art that 
avoided many of the problems of iconophilia. As such, far from conceptualism's 
unruliness delivering the absolute negation of art, it demanded that the artist (and 
critic) be attentive to their own conditions of production in the face of the 
increasing professionalization of the modern art institution. In this, its 
delinquencies continue to demand our attention. 
203 Thierry de Duve, Kant After Duchamp, op cit p300 
204 De Duve, ibid, p300 
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Chapter 6: The logics of deflation: the avant-garde and the fate of the 
photographic snapshot 
The widespread recourse in contemporary art to the scrappy snapshot (and text), 
or the wall of abutted snapshots, is marked by a set of moves familiar from the 
use of photography in the 20th century avant-garde: the derogation of aesthetic 
ideology in those forms where it most obviously and pervasively prevails. This is 
because photographic snapshots (both found or taken, on instamatics or 35mm 
cameras) are perhaps the quickest and most efficient means of deposing the 
traditional categories of art and the norms of artistic professionalism. Cheap, 
multiple and spontaneous the snapshot invests art with a non-al1istic 
'ordinariness'. In the 1980s, with the improvement of machine printing, the 
inscription of the snapshot with this deaestheticizing 'ordinariness' began to 
systematize itself as a post-conceptual move as artists began increasingly to 
exhibit the new higher-quality prints without framing or manipulation. Today the 
cheap machine print is now the ubiquitous form of the new neo-conceptual art. 
Indeed, the machine print snapshot is currently identified by artists as a kind of 
constitutive marker of avant-garde identity: the image that fails the test of 
aesthetic repleteness and creative' mastery'. The use of such photographs, then, 
has always been very much an issue of the ethics and economics of form and 
artistic identity. In denying the customary pleasures of scale, complexity, and 
sensuousness of surface, the snapshot, in its various manifestations, reflects on 
the institutional functions of advanced art and on aesthetic ideology. 
But today, crucially, the place where aesthetic ideology prevails is not where it 
has usually prevailed for much of the history of the avant-garde: the artisanal arts 
of painting. With the sUbsumption of the production and reception of art under 
new media, aesthetic ideology is now inscribed within the advanced technological 
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relations of art. Contemporary art's recourse to the photographic snapshot, then, 
is unprecedented. Its anti-aestheticism is based, not on a response to the 
institutional dominance of painting, but on the institutional dominance of 
photography, film and video. It is unable, therefore, to follow the usual strateGY 
eo. 
of negation of aesthetic ideology pursued by many of the avant-gardes last 
century: the appropriation of the non-art or anti-art character of documentary 
photography as a way of removing art from the institutional power of the 
'aesthetizing gaze'. For, in the light of the general incorporation of photography 
into the category of art, documentary practice itself has now become subject to 
the vast filmic transformation of the conditions of artistic production and 
reception. There has been a general convergence of interests between the 
ambitions of artists to transform the scale and mode of address of photography 
into that of the big-production modern technological image, and the 
systematization of the technological image on a vast, planetary scale. Thus, if the 
new filmic conditions of production have legitimatised a grand, staged or 
composite photographic History Painting, as in Jeff Wall and Andreas Gursky, it 
has also produced an upscaling of the snapshot itself, as in the 'transgressi ve' 
social realism of Nan Goldin, Richard Billingham and Boris Mikhailov. 205 These 
latter visions of abjection, self-hate, sexual disclosure and sub-criminality have 
shattered the boundaries between the public, appelative conventions of an older 
documentary photography and the illicit realms of pornography, the police 
archive and mass cultural voyeurism generally. The result is that the negation of 
aesthetic ideology can no longer be performed so easily in the name of 
photography, as it was for almost fifty years through the years of the early Soviet 
and German avant-gardes up to Conceptual art. The photographic document as a 
source of illicit or illicitly ordinary experiences is now thoroughly incorporated 
205 This does not mean, that the language of technologically advanced photography is 
necessarily uncritical of theories of auteurship; photographers such as Wall and Gursky 
are involved in a complex and collective division of labour, and this remains central ,to the 
view of themselves as critical practioners. The idea of themselves as collaborators IS 
crucial to the ambitious scale and content of their work. But, this ambition, nonetheless, 
is not an unmediated 'given' within the new institutions of art. 
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into the post-painting category of photography-as-art, photography-as-Histor) 
Painting. Hence, what is at stake now, is how photography might produces its 
critical differences and disclosures in world where the photographic document 
has been brought into alignment with the production of advanced art and its 
institutions. 
In this way the ideological role of the snapshot in art in the 1990s has been 
essentially deflationary. That is, the snapshot doesn't simply reverse or block 
photography's institutional aspirations to the status of painting, but challenges the 
spectacularization and the reification of the advanced technolooical imaoe as o 0 
such. Accordingly, the casual and low-key use of the snapshot reinscribes one of 
the significant and and unifying strategies of all 20th century avant-gardes: the 
testing of art's dominant modes of reception through various kinds of artistic 
deskilling or destablization. 
One of the key strategies of negation of modernism and the avant-garde is the 
self-conscious adoption on the part of the artist of various formal moves or 
conceptual strategies which test the competence of prevailing artistic skills and 
procedures. By failing to meet preconceived conditions of skill, the performance 
of' incompetence' becomes a means of challenging or qualifying the boundaries 
of would-be professional practice. Conceptual Art, as much as various versions of 
Expressionism, could be said to perform different kinds of 'incompetence' in this 
way, as I outlined in the last chapter. On these grounds, modernism and the avant-
garde, share, essentially, an understanding that the modern in art, is the place 
where notions of skill and value are continually tested and retested. This is why 
what largely mediates the question of deskilling is the artist's identification with 
the amateur - for it is the amateur who is practised, so to speak, in those skills that 
fail the test of dominant cultural validation. In aspiring and failing, aspiring and 
failing, the amateur becomes a symbol of authentic toil.206 However, the avant-
206 See 'The Practice of Failure', in this volume. 
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garde artist doesn't actually aspire to the status of the amateur. Rather, he or she 
borrows from, and performs, the amateur's lack of dominant cultural expertise 
metonymically as a critique of what is falsely excluded from the experience of 
art, or what is reified in its name. This is why photography, and in particular the 
snapshot, has played such a crucial role in the dialectic of anti-aestheticism and 
anti-art from Surrealism through to Conceptual Art. The snapshot's intimacy with 
the banal, the contingent and 'ordinary' not only challenges the hierarchy of 
artistic skills, but continually challenges which subjects are held to constitute 
legitimate aesthetic experience. 
In these terms the snapshot has been a highly efficient means of not only 
stripping down the inflated artisanal skills of the traditional artist, but of 
questioning the academic, professional aggrandisement of modern art. This is 
why it is no surprise that the snapshot has come into its own again in the neo-
conceptualism of the 1990s. For in the late 1980s and 1990s photography has not 
only experienced a rapid ascendancy into the older category of History Painting, 
but the various strategies of deskilling identified with the photographic practices 
of an older avant-garde (desubjectivization, masquerade, repetition) have 
themselves become, under the auspices of postmodernism, part of a new critical 
academy. Postmodernism's deconstruction of the author, identity and 
representation may have unblocked some of the cultural prejudices and 
infirmities of Modernist theory, but it also presented the contemporary artist with 
the disabling spectre of the academicization of critique itself as the museum 
opened its doors to the new postmodernist practices. The outcome is that a 
younger generation has had to reassess the photographic content of these 
strategies of deskilling in the wake of the fact that photography now finds itself 
inside the portals whose power it once criticised. The staged cibachrome and the 
upscaled snapshot, then, are only two aspects of the general assimilation of 
photography into the new museum. After Conceptual art, after critical 
postmodernism photography is now coextensive with the reinvention of the 
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modern art institution itself. This is why the current use of the snapshot (be it 
singularly or as part of a combinatory aesthetic) is not simply a return to the anti-
aesthetic informality of Conceptual art. It is a reengagement and repositioning of 
the snapshot's deflationary logic in a system where the history of such strategies 
are now institutionally familiar and canonically anointed. The deflationary 
content of the contemporary snapshot is something, therefore, that is constituted, 
framed and mediated by its own critical assimilation. 
On this score the casual, anti-aesthetic use of the snapshot today demonstrates 
two related functions: on the one hand, it reinscribes an older demotic, partisan 
view of photography as non-art and anti-art; and on the other, it attempts to 
deflate the theatrical-scaled, high-end ambitions of the new museum-based post-
conceptual art. It draws generally, therefore, on what historically has been one of 
the snapshot's self-proclaimed virtues: its intimacy and obdurate domesticity. If, 
in the world of the spectacle all images slide towards radical interchangeability; 
in the domesticated world of the snapshot the image is reconnected to specific life 
histories and everyday contingencies - hence the singular connection between the 
snapshot and the time and space of autobiography and biography. Principally, the 
snapshot is a conversational form. In its connection to the 'intersubjective' and 
the 'familial', the 'diaristic' and the 'confessional' it produces a performative 
intimacy with the political and cultural categories of the 'everyday', what 
Bourdieu calls the "instruments of intra-familial sociability".207 We should be 
wary, therefore, of overstating the discontinuity between the upscaled snapshot 
and the aesthetically 'evasive' contemporary snapshot - despite the latter's 
deflation of the former's ambitions. The contemporary snapshot actually brings 
into new forms of alignment those aspects of snapshot ideology in post-
conceptualism that the new 'museum-assimilated' photography has tended to 
207 Pierre Bourdieu, with Luc Boltanski, Robert Castel, Jean Claude Chambord~n, 
Domnique Schapper Photography: A Middle Brow Art, [Un art moyen, Les Editions de 
Minuet, 1965], Polity Press 1990, p26 
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submerge, or turn over to a spectacularized narcissism: the ethics of self-
narration. 
Since the late 1970s cultural theory and the new art history has placed a 
significant emphasis on photographic self-representation as a means of dissolvino 
::-
repressive processes of socialization. Consequently, when the critique of 
representation in cultural studies and the new art history dovetailed with the 
feminist critique of representation in photographic theory in the 1980s a 
generation of photographers who turned the camera on themsel ves did so on the 
basis of photography's powers of subjective disclosure. Nan Goldin is one such 
photographer, Jo Spence is another. This in turn owed something to the 
incorporation, after the 1960s, of the photographic self-representation of the artist 
and his or her milieu into an expanded sense of portraiture, as in Andy Warhol 
and Bruce Nauman. In this way, scaling down the image, turning the camera on 
oneself or one one's friends and colleagues, on the routines and scenes of 
everyday life, has constituted a familiar way for the artist to retain their autonomy 
over their production and reconnect with both the familiar and non-
conventionalised aspects of their immediate environment. Indeed, the power of 
these convergent traditions can even be seen in Gerhard Richter's work in the 
mid-1990s. In his huge photographic installation of found and taken snapshots, 
Atlas, Richter adapted Goldin and Spence-type notions of a counter-family album 
as a way of revealing the contingencies of his own working life in the studio and 
at home. The contemporary snapshot revisits these forms of self-representation 
and narration, but, significantly - and this is what extends its deflation of the 
aesthetic ambitions of the new high-end photography to a deflation of critical 
postmodernism proper - without the predetermining theoretical framework of the 
critique of identity and representation, and H'ifhout the idea, as in the case of 
Richter and WarhoL of the snapshot acting as a kind democratizing entry into the 
high-cultural domain of the artist. Today, rather, the art-snapshot today tenus to 
disperse itself anonymously into a post-conceptual world of deskilled skills. in 
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order to claim a broader democratizing and 'ordinary' identity between the art-
snapshot and the non-art snapshot, as in the work of Nobuyoshi Araki, and other 
artists who have sought to dissolve the consumption of the domestically produced 
snapshot into the public space of the gallery. This is because the boundaries 
between professional artist, occasional artist and non-artist have been eroded in 
the 1990s under the conjunction of post-conceptual aesthetics and popular access 
to new forms of visual technology, creating an elision between 'advanced 
aesthetics' and the aesthetics of the photographic amateur, and concomitantly a 
blurring between the' good photograph'(the result of extensive labour and editing 
in the darkroom) and would-be 'bad photograph'(the instantaneous photograph 
taken as a private love-token or momento mori). And this is why the deflationary 
content of the snapshot is functionally different in relation to the non-art and anti-
art content of photography in so much contemporary art. 
Whereas in the 1980s the use of the snapshot sought to displace the high-cultural 
assimilation of photography into art on the basis of pursuing photography in non-
art contexts (as in Spence), the high-cultural deflation of art today is shaped by 
the mass democratising function of the new visual technologies themselves: the 
producer of the snapshot in the gallery becomes coextensive with the producer of 
the snapshot outside of the gallery, and not simply the conduit through which the 
hierarchies of professional art practice are to be challenged or subverted. In this 
way the informality of the contemporary snapshot is evidence of a general 
ideological uncoupling of photography's democratic content from the critical 
photographic programmes within the professional domains of art; or rather, what 
has occured is transference of many of the critical impulses of these programmes 
in the 1980s from the confines of art theory into the popular domain of 
photographic production itself. Indeed, if the place of the snapshot in the 
contemporary artworld is characterised, in its reckoning with critical 
postmodernism, by its overwhelming withdrawal from the interventionist dictates 
and aims of content of the documentary tradition, this legacy of interventionism 
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now finds a systematic and critical voice in the widespread popular embrace of a 
counter-archival notion of snapshot photography outside of the artworld in the 
realm of the 'amateur' proper, in the emergence of the lomography phenomenon 
and indymedia. 
Lomography and indymedia represent the current and significant mass form of 
the deflationary logic of the art-theoretical snapshot. Lomography is the generic 
and critical name given to photographs taken on the Russian instamatic camera 
the Lomo Kompakt Automatic. A well thought of, but relati vely obscure camera, 
trading fitfully on the achievements of the old Soviet camera industry, the Lomo 
Kompakt was rediscovered by a group of young Vienna University students in 
the early 1990s. What distinguishes the camera is the high quality of the lens - for 
such an inexpensive camera - and the fact that the camera takes its snaps in 
quadruples, so on one print you can have four different views. Fired by the 
commitment to the camera, the students persuaded the company to allow them to 
be the sole distributors of the Lomo in Europe and North America. On the 
strength of this the St. Petersburg based company has expanded and is an unusual 
tale of post-communist market success. But most significantly, since the mid-
1990s, particularly with the development of the Web, the camera has become the 
basis for an extraordinary proliferation of Lomo photo clubs and Lomo events on 
a global basis under the collective title of the Lomographic Society International. 
The LSI - the echoes of the Situationist International are not fortuitous -
formulates various guidelines and procedures which each of the various Lomo 
organizations across the world host and develop. One of these is the A-Z City 
challenge, which involves would-be lomographers turning up at a prearranged 
place in a major city and being handed a roll of film, a map and a list of 26 
suooestions or challenoes which they must follow, as the basis for exploring and 
bb b 
photographing the city. Another is the idea of designating a particular idea of 
theme that the lomographers must pursue, for instance being asked to photograph 
all things red in a given city, as was the case in Singapore in September 2001. or 
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being told to photograph blindfolded. The inventiveness and ambition of these 
'shooting scripts' depends very much on the local organisers and circumstances. 
However, what unites all these events is their competitive and festive character. 
After the shoots, usually lasting two days, but sometimes longer, all the 
'lomographer's' work is exhibited and then judged, with the best being identified 
as the work of "lomolympic champions". The exhibition and competition then. 
invariably, becomes a party and celebration of the lomographic spirit. 
This events, publicized and archived on the Web, provide an extraordinarv 
reminder of the ethos of the early Workers' Photography movement in the Soviet 
Union, the Weimar Republic and Britain in the 1920s. Photography becomes, on 
the one hand, the basis for a mass social archiving, and on the other, a reflection 
on the relationship between photographic truth and who is standing behind the 
camera. But, if lomography embraces a popular politics of self-representation 
and the counter-archive, it is a popular politics without a determinate political 
context, or without direct reference to documentary traditions of dissent and 
resistance. The critical languages in evidence are either resolutely diffident or 
historically vague, as in the Ten Golden Rules of Lomography. I) Take your 
LOMO with you wherever you go; 2) Use it all the time. at any time - day & 
night; 3) Lomography does not interfere with your life, it's part of it; 4) Get as 
close as possible to the objects of your lomographic desire; 5) don't think; 6) be 
fast; 7) You don't have to know what's going to be captured on your film 
beforehand; 8) You don't have to know what's on the film afterwards either: 9) 
Shoot from the hip; 10) Don't worry about rule 10; or neo-Dadaist , as in the First 
International Lomoist Manifest (2002): "The lomoist cultural conspiracy 
encourages plagiarism because plagiarism saves time and effort, improves results 
and shows initiati ve on the part of the indi vidual plagiarist". "We demand an end 
to culture, ethics and inwardness". "We demand the abolition of capitalism at 
3pm on next Sunday". 208 
208 All quotes taken from Web 
Site.http://www1.lomo.com/orbiz/OigiTrade/0001/index.html 
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Clearly the Lomographic International is more than the sum of these parts. Those 
who participate in the organization obviously bring to it different commitments 
and interests, some of which will be critical of these proscriptions and guidelines. 
Yet the collected aper9us, manifestoes, and guidelines produce a certain 
philosophical and cultural tone, which is easily definable. Lomography conjoins 
the loucheness of Zen conceptualism ( Yoko Ono) and the neo-Situationism of 
the Plagiarist art movement with the positivism of Mass Observation 
('lomography is everywhere'). In this way lomography's refusal to name what 
lomography might pick out as critical, yet at the same time encourage the 
development of disciplinary guidelines within the framework of the 
representation of the 'city life', invokes the unitary urbanism of the Situationists, 
but without the group's incendiary notions of inversion, disruption and 
disturbance. On this basis, lomography is, rather, an immersive urbanism. Its 
commitment to the snapshot as a mass form is primarily about networking and the 
collectivization of creativity, and not to a model of vanguard cultural 
intervention. In this sense the loose collaborative ethos of lomography could be 
seen as a cultural expression of what Michael Hardt and Toni Negri have called 
the 'multitude': the constituent democratic power of the collective. 209 As an 
inclusive political category - the mass that refuses its constitution in law - Hardt's 
and Negri's concept of the 'multitude' is shot through with all kinds of 
indeterminacies and evasions, and gives away too much, despite its the authors' 
claims to the contrary, to conservative postmodern readings of class and identity. 
Nevertheless, what their notion provides, in fruitful ways, is an insight into how 
photographic technology is currently being used by a new generation of 
producers. For lomography photography is the space of the 'multitude': of 
209 Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 2000,For H,ar?t and 
Negri the 'multitude' is another name for the power which is immanent to all societies 
irrespective of their mode of production and forms of goverme~t. I~ oth~r words, the. 
'multitude' is a continuous and emergent principle of democratic diversity and negation. 
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multiple subjectivities, modes of attention, culturally strategies, but not because 
technology is ipso facto democratic, but because the ideals of lomography 
enables some notional kind of collective control over the photographic apparatus. 
Lomography's expression of the 'multitude', then - open participation without 
extended training - identifies possible new forms of cultural production with a 
democracy of intersubjective participation. Accordingly, the LSI links this 
democracy to view of itself as a continually expanding cadre of snapshot-
photographers who, collectively and individually, bring the forms, practices and 
subjectivities of the city' into view'. Significantly, then, lomography's 
deflationary logic is harnessed to a wider cultural dynamic: the production of 
'diffuse creativity' across cultural boundaries and competences. 210 
Lomography is one manifestation of the massive diffusion of cultural practices 
that have emerged since the mid-nineties, which owe nothing or little to the 
validations of the dominant symbolic economy of the artworld. This is the result 
not only of the diffusion of cheap forms of technology, but more importantly of 
the diffusion of cultural and critical competences outside of the confines and 
constraints of the artworld and the artmarket. Over the last twenty years 
thousands and thousands of occasional artists, some of who were once trained at 
art school and some of whom have learnt from those who trained there, continue 
to bring their symbolic skills and knowledge to bear on a wide range of activities 
that have no artworld institutional location or artworld exchange value. Most of 
these activities are temporal and have no life beyond their immediate conditions 
of production and display. Yet collectively these activities across many social 
locations and in many varied forms, represent an increasing reflexive awareness 
of representation and artistic content outside of the professional institutions of art 
and, as such, provide an informal culture of artistic production that' non-artistic' 
210 For a recent discussion of 'diffuse creativity', see Stephen Wright, 'Le des-oeuvrement 
de I'art', Mouvements, (Les valeurs of de I'art: entre marche et institutions) No 17, 
septembre/octobre 2001 
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producers participate in and learn from. Indeed, knowledge of the way the 
critical categories of art production have been dispersed into non-artistic locations 
has been barely addressed in current theoretical writing. Lomography (along 
with, for instance, the vast growth of new 'home' music production) is 
representative of these subterranean changes within the political economy of 
culture. 
This notion of the work of the 'multitude' as a deflationary ideological force, is 
also reflected in the more politically focused phenomenon of indymedia, or the 
Independent Media Center. Indeed, if the mass form of snapshot in lomography is 
harnessed to various strategies of political indirection, in indymedia the snapshot 
becomes the direct bearer of the notion of the counter-archive. Loosely linked to 
the current anti-globalization movement indymedia provides an on-line site for 
photographers, and in particular non-professional snapshot photographers, to post 
their images of events, activities, demonstrations that the dominant media do not 
cover, or cover perfunctorily or antagonistically. In this regard the site updates 
the many alternative news and picture agencies that developed in the 1980s. 
However, as a Web service, it obviously provides mass access and distribution in 
a way that the earlier organisations were unable to do, by offering an efficient 
means of pooling images and information. "Indymedia is a collective of 
independent media organizations and hundreds of journalists offering grassroots, 
non-corporate coverage. Indymedia is a democratic media outlet for the creation 
of radical, accurate, and passionate tellings of truth". "The Independent Media 
Center is [an I ... organization committed to using media production as a tool for 
promoting social and economic justice".211 The language maybe slightly 
awkward and politically pragmatist, and the assumptions about truth-telling 
straight out of 1930s documentary positivism, but the contemporary implications 
for the photographic snapshot are clear enough: the snapshot is what links the 
agency of the 'multitude' to the production of truth and the real. In this way the 
211 http://www.indymedia.org 
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Mass Observation tendencies of lomography are put on a more overt political 
counter-archival footing. In submitting your snapshots of demonstrations and 
public events to the site, you are not only providing a platform for' other ways of 
telling', but establishing the cultural validity of what you do as part a/the 
'multitude'. In lomography and indymedia there are no professional or amateur 
photographers as such, but, rather, photographers who take part in a collective, 
non-hierachical productive process. 
Yet the deflationary imperatives of the' amateur' do playa significant part in the 
self-identity of such organizations as the LSI and indymedia. The attachment to a 
sense of the snapshot-photographer as unconstrained by any of the inhibitory 
professional notions of quality is crucial to the inclusive ideal of indymedia. The 
indymedia contributor is interpellated as the redoubt of low-tech, unschooled 
authenticity. Similarly, despite the central importance of the internet in 
distributing the content of the LSI project, lomographers celebrate the Lomo 
camera as an analogue technology, operating in the face of the centralizing 
cultural logic of the new digital technologies. "Digital reproduction is but the 
delusion of memory ... come witness the fury of screw-up photography".:!l:! In this 
way the use of a cheap, ageing technology provides a democratic ethos for the 
avant-garde ideology of practised failure or incompetence. Lomography's 
democratic advocacy of the multitude over the singular is also the advocacy of 
the multitude as a space where mistakes are honoured and value is self-created. 
Failure, or rather, the deliberate avoidance of given or prevailing standards and 
criteria of high-cultural artistic success, is taken to be a virtue. On this basis, the 
snapshot photographers of the LSI and contemporary snapshots-artists share a 
familiar and compact ideology: that the critique of value through photography is 
an emancipation from cultural division and hierarchy. This ideology is very 
seductive and has driven so much avant-garde art and popular photographic 
practices during the 20th century. Today, however, it is not so much photograph) 
212 http://www1.lomo.com/orbiz/OigiTrade/0001Iindex.html 
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as such that stands as a 'placeholder' for the critique of value, but the 
photographic snapshot in particular. That is, in a culture where photography has 
become inscribed within the canon of modern art, the snapshot's residual 
informality and cheapness is taken to be the primary generator of a . diffuse 
creativity'. But with the 'multitude' of inclusivity and unburdened and productive 
failure, comes the unbridled 'multitude' of the same. In the world of the snapshot 
no image escapes its formal bond with all other snapshots. No image (ultimately) 
is better or worse than any other - to infinity. In this sense both lomography and 
much contemporary art provide a theory of counter-value in terms of the 
democratic proliferation of the same and the generic - although the impulses of 
one and the other are not exactly comparable. The art snapshot functions as a 
closing down or negation of aesthetic ideology in order to delimit notions of 
would-be real creativity, the lomographic snapshot etc, functions as a closing 
down or negation of aesthetic ideology in order to identify and expand notions of 
creativity within these limits. Nevertheless for both lomography and 
contemporary art the reproducibility and simplicity of the snapshot becomes the 
sine qua non of the democratization of form through mechanical reproduction. In 
these terms it might be said that the dream of the lomographer and the 
contemporary snapshot-artist is a world open to representation expanded to 
everyone, all the time. Indeed, by extension, at the heart of snapshot ideology is a 
utopian notion of the 'amateur' photographer as a reflexive artist-in-waiting. 
In this regard the deflationary logic of the snapshot hides a genuine 
democratizing impulse, an impulse that continually reconfigures itself in art and 
culture as the return of the repressed. But under conditions where the critique of 
value is simply a placeholder for the critique of value, its function easily becomes 
self-positivizing. There is no intrinsic virtue in the contingent and miniature itself. 
There is no intrinsic virtue in resisting the idea of quality in art as internal 
complexity. There is no intrinsic virtue in mass reproducibility itself. 
(Interestingly one of the recurring heroic figures in lomography literature is 
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Herman Melville's nay-sayer, Bartleby: "I would prefer not to"). The snapshot. 
therefore, is always caught in a dilemma, whether allied to an anti-aesthetic inside 
the institutions of art, or to the dictates of some notion of mass cultural 
democracy. It is called on to disinvest the image of congealed aesthetic 
ideologies, but necessarily cannot escape its own limited naturalism as a critique 
of value. In this way the snapshot performs a spectral function within and outside 
contemporary art: it haunts the self-identity of aesthetic ideology without being 
able to provide a counter aesthetic of its own. But paradoxically, it is because it 
cannot establish a counter-aesthetic of its own that it is able to continue to 
provide a critique of aesthetic ideology. 
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Chapter 7: Two Models of Labour: Figurality and Non-Figurality in Recent 
Photography 
An ambivalent relationship to authorship and creative skill has defined 
photography's very emergence and development as a medi urn since the 1840s. 
The fact of photography's mechanical reproducibility has made it difficult to 
place the photographer within traditional categories of expression and aesthetic 
facility, splitting photography, historically, between those who believe that this is 
what is important about photography, and therefore what distinguishes it from 
painting, and those who believe that photography represents a different but 
comparable, order of creativity. Indeed, this reordering of the creative 
relationship between subject and machine is at the heart of the legal valorisation 
of photography in the middle of the 19th century. By defining the mechanical act 
of photography as the mediation of a technique, (rather than an inert form of 
copying) the state brought photography into line with the intellectual rights theory 
of bourgeois copyright law. Under the protection of this legislation the 
photographer shifts from being a craftsman without social rank (and therefore the 
placeholder of common property rights) to the status of an artist. The 
photographer is now free to appropriate the real in his or her own name, rather 
than pass his or her labour on as the objective outcome of an undifferentiated and 
anonymous process of reproduction. As such photography becomes the 
expression of a subject.
213 
The representation of the real is only recognised in law 
if a photographer is shown to have produced a deliberative, intentional act. In this 
respect a fundamental transformation takes place in the representation of the 
213 • 
See Bernard Edelman, Le Droit saisi par la photographie, Franc;ols Maspero, 1973. 
English translation, Ownership of the Image: Elements for a Marxist Theory of the Law. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. 
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labour of the photograph: the mechanical function of photography is subsumed 
under the autonomous will and mark of the creative subject, discarding and 
suppressing the radical social value of photography: its unprecedented 
technological equalization of the process of image-making. One of the 
consequences of this culturally in the late 19th and early 20th century is the 
subjectivisation and aestheticization of the photograph, as a generation of artists 
using photography seek to shed all vestiges of its commercial workshop 
character. The photograph is taken to be the result of the supervention of the 
214 
photographer, the 'photographer's eye'. 
This drive to the aestheticization of photography out of the codification of the 
commodified subject in law has, in large part, formed the target for various 
attacks on aesthetic ideology in photography in the 20th century. Lewis Hine. 
Sergei Tretyakov, Walter Benjamin, Ed Ruscha, Allan Sekula, and photo-text 
conceptual art, for example, all represent various attempts at the de-
aestheticization of the agency of the subject-creator of photography, in order to 
reidentify the labour of the photographer with the mechanization of the 
photographic apparatus. In this way a very different model of labour in 
photography has underwritten the dominant aesthetic model in law during this 
period. What the aesthetes feared and expunged - the photographer as mere. or 
able, technician - Hine et aI, openly embrace and expand. Hine thought of 
himself first and foremost as an educationalist; Tretyakov and Benjamin, 
famously, of course, saw the revolutionary Soviet photographer as a producer: the 
early Ruscha and Sekula, in their respective ways, invoke the artist-as-
photographer as a counter-archivist. All these positions have their origins in very 
214 All aestheticized theories of photography as art stem from the legal codification of the 
photographer as creator - although this legal codification does not in itself produce the 
ideology of aestheticization. Aesthetic ideology and concept of the mod~rn, auto~omous 
artistic subject, preexists this new legislation, and as such shapes the kind of artistiC 
subject the law has in mind at the end of the 19th century. 
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different social spaces and ideological perspectives, but they all share a \'iew of 
the photographic process as something that is irreduci ble to the subjecti \ity of the 
photographer. The photographer produces the image as the outcome of a number 
of decisions and judgements, but he or she does not make the picture. The picture 
is produced in and by the apparatus. In fact, the notion of the machine's 'labour' 
here is itself questionable, for the photograph is produced instantaneously. Unlike 
in painting or sculpture, there is no recourse to a process of judgement, revision 
and manipulation in the process of production. In this lies photography's radical 
historical novelty, and the basis of its political and critical appropriation since the 
beginning of the 20th century: the fact that it is able to compress the skills needed 
to render the depiction of the world into an instant and infinitely reproducible 
form. 
Consequently, for the critics of the subjectivisation of photography, what 
distinguishes photography from the fabrications of art is its intrusive realism, its 
capacity to disclose the look of things in complex detail. In this regard, we might 
say that this mimetic function has the character of a trauma. Because photography 
has an indexical relationship to the thing depicted - because it is produced as a 
trace of the material world - it is a representation of the real before it is a figural 
intervention of the artist. This generates a disjunctive kind of embodied 
relationship between beholder and photograph. The beholder is confronted by the 
object as something that is recognisably part of their own experiential world, and 
not the fictive world of the artist. Many photographers and theorists have taken 
this indexical character of photography to represent the universal and unmediated 
truth of photography. The early history of photography is very much entranced b) 
this belief. But what this position obviously confuses is truth with verisimilitude. 
In a reversal of the aesthetic position the apparatus comes to subsume the 
intentionality of the photographer, leaving the photograph as an object without a 
history and ironically, as a mechanical image divested of the machine which 
produced it. Photographic theory played out various versions of this di\'ision, 
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down to the 1970s and 1980s. Barthes's and Gombrich's notion of photography 
as a system without a code is a reworking of the theory of photography as a 
natural language in Talbot; and Eco's insistence on photography as internally 
encoded is a philosophical version of Stieglitz's notion of the essential fi ourality o . 
of photography. The first position tends to retain a view of photography as 
involving a resistance to the figurality of painting, the second sees photography as 
identical to the figurality of painting. In this respect, both positions are torn 
halves of a whole, and, as a consequence seriously misunderstand the peculiar or 
estranged status of photography. Photography is neither figural nor non-figural. 
neither an art nor a non-art: it is both, insofar as in appearing to be non-figural it 
makes other systems of representation appear more figured. Photography, 
therefore, has been able to stand in successfully as a 'proper' (truthful) system of 
representation given its convincing appearance as truth. In this regard, the critique 
of photography as a natural, universal language is correct. But, as a 'stand in' for 
the real, photography is also the best or only representation of the real we have. 
The trauma of photography then is crucial to photography's truth claims. 
Photography's apparent capacity to suspend the figural is the means by which 
claims for the real can be made. Which is very different from saying such a 
process is identifiable with the real. On this basis, Richard Shiff has called 
photography a form of catachresis: that which can be two things and yet remain 
215 
neither. 
Treating photography as neither a 'proper' nor 'figural' system of truth-telling 
allows us, therefore, to avoid the sterile debates between art and the photographic 
document. In establishing photography as a form of catachresistic figurality is 
revealed to be as much a part of photography as painting. Yet for all the value of 
catachresis as a means of avoiding binary thinking, it does not resolve how we 
215 Richard Shiff., 'Phototropism (Figuring the Proper)', Studies in the History of Art, No 
20, 1989. See also, Steve Edward's The Machine's Dialogue', Oxford Art Journal, Vol 3, 
N01 1990 
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theorize the labour immanent to the photograph. For when photography is taken 
to be figural, it also annuls what continues to escape the figurality of the 
photograph: its indexical, automatic, 'proper' function. As such, seeing 
photography simply as figural also annuls the radical notion of the photographer 
as a non-artist or technician. Thus, despite the importance of thinking 
photography catachrestically, the residual tensions between the' non-fi aural' and 
t:' 
the 'figural' are not easily removed, and therefore retain their critical si onificance e 
for understanding how photography today mediates its recent history and its new 
institutional locations. For instance, although Allan Sekula accepts, like Shiff, 
that photography is a figured/non-figured language, he nevertheless sees the 
moment of photography's 'proper' relationship to the world as defining what is 
potentially destablizing about photography's artistic identity. By foregrounding 
the' non-figural' content of the image in the form of a continuous archive, he 
subordinates his activity to the documentation of the world, not in the knowledge 
that he is telling the truth of the world, univocally, but in the belief that 
photography's indexicality has a privileged relationship to the process of truth-
telling. 
This is a debate, then, about how the interrelationship between labour and 
machine is represented, how hand and mind come to produce the functions of 
photography in the light of what is held to be photography's defining 
characteristics. In this respect, I want to look at what I see as two radically 
opposed models of labour in the photograph in contemporary art, which reflect on 
this fundamental tension between claims to figurality and non-figurality in 
photography. Firstly, I want to look at Jeff Wall's work, whose cinematographic 
photographs represent a paradigmatic refiguration of photography through 
painting~ secondly, I want to look more generally at the exponential rise of the 
snapshot, which continues, in transformed ways, the radical anti-figural traditions 
of the photograph. In this sense, this essay is less a comparative study of two 
models than a discussion about the labour of the photographer in the epoch of the 
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global digitalization of the image and of culture. 
Modell) Pictorialism, figurality and aesthetic unity 
Since the late 1970s, Jeff Wall has presented his staged, back-lit photographs as a 
dissolution of two dominant theoretical dualisms: the fundamental opposition 
between montage as the advanced form of photographic practice and pictorialism 
as its regressive other; and the opposition between photography as something 
'taken' and painting as something 'made' .216 In this, his work, notionally at 
least, follows the idea of photography as a form of catachresis. But in contrast to 
Sekula, Wall has chosen to advance the claims of figurality as against those of the 
non-figural. Both his 'naturalistic' landscapes and his staged images invoke or 
refer directly to the pictorial forms of early modernist or pre-modernist painting. 
Extant paintings provide a model of pictorial composition. But this self-conscious 
figurality is not a reinvention of an aestheticist model of photography. On the 
contrary, his pictorial ism is subject to a process of internal disunity through either 
formal disfiguration (the use of the grotesque or enigmatic detail) or the 
fragmentary dispersal of figures and objects and the 'bending' or stretching of 
space. For example, in A Ventriloquist at a Birthday Party in October, 1947 
(1990), the perspective of the room is imbalanced, slightly skewed, just as our 
view of the scene is pushed to the rightside of the scene above the seated children 
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watching the ventriloquist. Moreover, the ungainly, dishevelled appearance of 
the ventriloquist's dummy and the fearful expressions on the face of the children 
conflict with the implied humour and happiness of the scene. This 'not quite 
making sense' within the pictorial space of the tradition of the' painting of 
216 By pictorialism, here I do not mean the painterly aestheticization of Stiegltiz and his 
followers, but rather the conventions of perspectival realism 
217 A 
For an extended discussion of A Ventriloquist see, '''Always Elsewhere": n 
Introduction to the Art of Jeff Wall (A Ventriloquist at a Birthday party in October, 194),' 
Lisa Joyce and Fred Orton, Jeff Wall, The Museum Moderna Kunst, Vienna 2003 
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modern life', identifies this work and others by Wall as being indebted to 
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Edouard Manet's paintings of the 1860s. As in Manet, in Wall's photographs 
pictorial space is represented as internally inchoate or unsurveyable from a single 
viewpoint. But if Wall is not reinventing aestheticist photography neither is he 
reviving Manet's modernism. Wall chooses to produce figurally complex 
photographs and not figurally complex paintings. This is because. for Wall. it is 
only photography that is now able to sustain the programme of what was once 
called realism. Any reinscription of disunity in Manet, therefore, can only be 
mediated by the very crisis of the 'painting of everyday life' itself. Furthermore, 
and perhaps more importantly, Wall's choice of photographic pictorialism is also 
mediated by what he sees as the crisis of the post-conceptual critique of 
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pictorialism . What he perceives as the limitations of the post-conceptual turn 
against pictorial representation is the basis for his mediated turn to pictorialism 
and Manet. Thus, although Wall's tropes of disunity are built from this critique of 
pictorialism, this critique has at the same time, he claims, led to the dissolution of 
the realist and public functions of early modernism. Post-conceptual practice may 
have opened up the cultural frame of art, but it has also entrenched conservative 
anti-representational prejudices - hence the reclamation of Manet's as a 
significant critical (allegorical) force. Manet's modernism is the point where 
modernism in realism is won and lost, as modernism passes into abstraction. On 
this basis, Wall's photography is an attempt to produce another modernist 
dialectic: the reintegration of a modern aesthetic of disunity and fragmentation (or 
montage) within the pictorial space of a 'painting of everyday' life, as a means of 
refiguring the closures of both positions. The prospect of aesthetic unity and the 
impossibility of such a unity as a modern problem of picture making is made 
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See, Jeff Wall, 'Unity and Fragmentation in Manet, Parachute, no 35, Montrea , 
June/July/August 1984 
219 Jeff Wall "'Marks of Indifference": Aspects 0 f Photography In, Or As, Conceptual Art, 
in Anne Goidstein and Anne Rorimer (eds), Reconsidering the Dbjectot Art:1965-1975, 
MIT,1996 
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conspicuous in the making of photographs - the new modern medium par 
excellence of the 'painting of everyday life'. WalL therefore, gives new form to 
an old question: in what ways is it possible to produce coherent representations of 
the everyday that also figure the fragmentation and alienation of capitalist social 
relations? 
As a result, in combining painting with 'theatre' from within the framework of a 
cinematographic photography, Wall pursues a very different set of ambitions for 
photography than customarily associated with post-conceptual art: the photograph 
becomes the complex site of a painterly, staged figurality. Many photographers in 
the 19th century and 20th century made photographs as if they were producing 
paintings, but this was largely governed by photography's insecurity in the face 
of painting's institutional prominence. Today, this insecurity has been dissolved, 
even reversed. As such, Wall is not producing a cinematographic photography in 
order to upgrade the status of photography as against painting, but rather in order 
to defend the preeminence of photography as a form of complex figurality which 
possesses a comparable status to that of painting. In this sense, for Wall the 
defence of the figurality of photography is about the terms under which the status 
of photography is to be secured. Thus, although the critical status of photography 
has been validated institutionally since the 1960s, for Wall it has been validated 
in ways that have underdeveloped the labour of the photographer. Despite post-
conceptual photography's deflation of cultural hierarchies, invocation of the 
everyday and critique of photography as a universal language, its material base 
has, according to Wall, been cognitively thin: that is, through identifying the 
critical form of photography with the non-figural content of the snapshot (with or 
without text) this work was unable to open out the embodied subjectivity of the 
photographer. 
In breaking with conceptual art then, Wall broke first and foremost with the 
inability or unwillingness of an earlier generation to break \\ith the limited 
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concept of productive labour enshrined in the conceptual document. In adopting a 
deskilled category of art through the use of the serial snapshot, the possibility of 
the photograph as the site of internal complexity was diminished or evacuated. 
This move, of course, had much to do with the overwhelming desire on the part 
of these artists to forge a new set of artistic relations and formal strateoies that e 
owed nothing to inherited high cultural pathways and the elitist baooaoe of 
ee e 
painting. But the genres of painting continued to form an unconscious residue 
within this work, a repository of unacknowledged figural traces. \Vhat \\' all has 
pursued, in this respect, in his break with the post-conceptual document, is the 
reassertion of the cultural legacy of painting within an expanded and multimedia 
modernism, turning these historical traces and cultural preconditions into a 
concrete aesthetic programme. He has pursued this, however, not in order to 
reinstate the primacy of pictorial art, but in order to develop a model of labour in 
photography which could be compared, in its productive complexity, to the 
figurality of painting and the mis-en-scene of film. Accordingly, in order to make 
the kinds of pictures he wanted, Wall had paradoxically to reinscribe photography 
within the modern relations of production. Although the modernity of the 
photodocument in conceptual art was disruptive of the canon and aesthetic 
ideology, its actual mode of production was largely small scale and artisanal. In 
fact conceptual photography was driven by the actual disidentification of itself as 
photography, in order to separate itself from what it held to be the conservative 
professionalism of fine art photography. Repositioning the genre of the 'painting 
of everyday life', then, within a 'cinematic' mode of photography, was a way for 
Wall both to open out the subjectivity of the photographer beyond his or her role 
of 'objective' witness and ascetic bearer of the critique of the commodity, and to 
expand the social relations of the artists through collaboration. In this way, the 
mediation of painting within a cinematic framework was an attempt to resocialise 
the mode of production of art in a period when a domesticity of production was 
the principal guarantor of radicality (although Wall retains the identity of sole 
author). 
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Many artists have taken this route after Wall, but Wall's work remains significant 
given its self-conscious theoretical position within this transformed, technological 
and material space of art. By this I mean that the emphasis on the 
prephotographic production of the photograph (the building of sets, finding of 
sites, hiring of actors, extras, etc) and on post-production labour at the computer. 
embeds Wall's work in an expanded conception of the time of the photograph's 
production and reception. By employing the panoramic, by installing complex 
internal relations between depicted figures, and by emphasizing the staged or 
contingent detail, Wall's large-scale ci bachrome lightboxes generate on the part 
of the beholder an unsettling and inquisitive mode of attention. Such an 
experience, however, isn't simply about the slowing down of perception. For this 
is exactly what conceptual art set out to achieve through the serial use of the 
photodocument and text. Rather, the use of an integrated pictorial ism encourages 
a form of empathetic attentiveness; and it is this experience of the empathetic that 
gets dropped not only out of post-war modernism and conceptual and post-
conceptual art, but also out of French modernism after Manet - that is, the notion 
of the beholder as the imaginative reconstructor of the depicted human 
interrelations and objects of a scene. Traditional forms of pictorial art do not in 
themselves secure this. But what they can do is integrate the processes of 
cognition within a determinate framework, allowing the eye to flow or circulate 
through the picture. Looking is driven not just by a process of discontinuous 
pattern making, but by the logic of causal detection. Hence by placing 
photography within a constructed model of labour the image is able to embed 
details and relations in story-telling form in ways that the photodocument is less 
able to do. 
Model 2) The snapshot, deflation, and creative diffusion 
Wall's model of labour has become very successful and has been much imitated 
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(if not his disruption of the viewing field of the spectator). This is because it 
brings modern photographic image-making in alignment with the contemporary 
conditions of the Gesamtkunstwerk. That is, it brings photography into alignment 
with the available resources and technical skills of the late capitalist technological 
sensorium. In this respect, Wall's move against conceptual photography in the 
late seventies was based, paradoxically, on what he perceived as its contri bution 
to the stultification of photography's non-figurality. But Wall's and others artists' 
attempt to return subjective control over the photographic image. to reinvest the 
hand of the artist in the extensive, prephotographic labour of fabricating and 
directing, has brought with it its own difficulties. With the emphasis on 
prephotographic production, the motility and spontaneity of photography is 
suppressed. If this, of course, is exactly what this kind of photography wants and 
demands ( on a non-dualistic basis), this does not mean that its effects are any 
less problematic. For what has accompanied the extensive institutionalization of 
this generation of a constructed figural photography, is the complacent ease with 
which the major institutions have celebrated this approach to photography as a 
form of prestidigitation which is able to take the place of painting. 220 The non-
figurality of photography is again suppressed in the name of the category art. This 
is why, at the point where the new figural photography has achieved a huge 
amount of institutional success ( Wall, Sherman, Gursky, Demand), there has 
been recently a strong non-figural counter move against this model of 
photography. In this respect. this work reasserts a model of labour in the 
photograph that is openly opposed to that of the prephotographic model of 
production. In turning to the tradition of the snapshot, it recovers and reinscribes 
the non-figural 'ordinariness' of the photodocument. Indeed, this model of 
production wholly rejects the centripetal ambitions of the new figural 
photography. In discarding the notion of the photograph as a space for panoramic 
image building, it reemphasizes the uncomposed and domestic qualities of the 
220 See for example, Peter Galassi, 'Gursky's World', Andreas Gursky, The Museum of 
Modern Art, New York 2001 
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snapshot. The small-scale, the contingent and serial or composite display are its 
defining characteristics - a reprise of the informal aesthetics of the late 1960s. As 
such, in contrast to the notion of the photographer as director, this photography 
also reasserts the photographer as technician and archivist. But if this returns 
photography to its 'proper' pole of attraction, this work does not fit so easily into 
the category of critical documentary or into Sekula's notion of the political 
archive. For what drives this work is a radical deskilling and deflation of art. that 
puts it at odds not only with the prephotographic model of labour but also with 
the tradition of documentary practice. This is because the return to the non-figural 
content of the photograph in the form of the snapshot is not only delivered as a 
critique of photography-as-painting, but as a critique of the institutional 
assimilation of photography into art itself. 
Aesthetic ideology today is no longer confined to a defence of the artisanal arts of 
painting. With the technological transformation and institutional ascendancy of 
photography, aesthetic ideology is now embedded within the advanced 
technological relations of art. The result is that strategies of anti-aestheticism that 
define art's autonomy are no longer based on the institutional domination of 
painting, but on the institutional dominance of photography. As photography is 
assimilated into the category of art, it is unable to adopt the usual avant-garde 
deaestheticizing strategies: the appropriation of the non-art or non-figural 
character of documentary photography as a way of removing art from the 
institutional power of the aesthetizing beholder. For, with the general 
incorporation of photography into the category of art, documentary practice has 
itself now become subject to the massive photographic and filmic transformation 
of the conditions of artistic production and reception. The photographic document 
as a source of illicit or transgressive non-figural content has been incorporated 
into the expanded category of art (for example, Nan Goldin, Richard Billingham, 
Boris Mikhailov). The outcome is that the negation of aesthetic ideology can no 
longer be performed so easily in the defence of photography, as it was for almost 
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fifty years from the early avant-gardes up to conceptual art. This essentiall:. is 
the basis of Wall's split with conceptual art. Thus, a division has opened up 
between photography and the institutions of art, forcing the hand of a generation: 
is it possible to defend the non-figural content of photography as a critique of 
aesthetic ideology, or should the photographer identify photography's critical 
function with the figural, accepting the inevitable assimilated aestheticized status 
of photography? Most artist-photographers (such as Wall) took the latter option 
because, they saw the alternative - the artist-technician - as too self-limitino and eo 
instrumental. 
There would seem to be little space left, therefore, in which photography can 
proclaim its non-figurality as a critique of aesthetic ideology without appearing to 
advance the redundant argument about the immanent radicality of photography. 
given that photography is now thoroughly enmeshed in the post-1960s expanded 
field of art. Hence, the critical status of the snapshot today is wholly 
unprecedented. Its deflationary logic is now framed and mediated by the 
institutionalization of photography. This is why there is a radical reversal of the 
prephotographic model of labour in this new snapshot photography. In reclaiming 
the domestic, noncompositional and contingent, the new snapshot reinvests 
photography with a non-professional ethos borrowed from Conceptual art and (to 
a lesser extent) workers' photography of the 1930s. This move takes two forms, 
or the two forms that interest me here: the notion of the photographer as part of a 
group or collective (in the spirit of Mass Observation) and the idea of the 
photographer as diarist of his or her domestic circumstances or social milieu. The 
former is perhaps best represented by the extraordinary rise of the' non-artist' 
group the Lomographic Society International (as discussed in the Chapter 6) and 
the latter by the artist Nobuyoshi Araki, who presents his gridded domestic 
snapshots on the gallery wall as testimony to the break down of the distinction 
between artist and non-artist in the realm of popular technology. Thus. although a 
global organization such as the Lomography Society I nternational produces work 
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in cultural contexts outside of the official or unofficial channels of the artworld, 
these photographic practices demonstrate a shared set of assumptions and ideals. 
The diffuse creativity of the snapshot is seen as as a means of evadino 
e 
constrictive professional decision-making processes and criteria of conventional 
artistic value. By relying on the spontaneity, intimacy and mobility of the 
instamatic camera, the unmanipulated snapshot is taken to be inherently 
democratic. In this way, the deflationary logic of the snapshot represents a model 
of labour in the photograph which draws emphatically on the small camera as a 
compact, flexible, non-hierarchical technology. This, in turn, is why these 
deflationary moves are not to be found in work which is of the same stature as 
that of Wall and Gursky. Rather, this model of labour is about a resistance to such 
ambitions, in the name of cultural access, collective participation and the 
transformed identity of the artist. 
Such a notion of deskilling through photography in 20th century art has been 
associated invariably with cultural democracy from below. In this, Lomography 
is no different. But if the group's decision to organize its activity on a collective 
archival basis is a political decision, its ideology of participation is not structured 
through any explicit political agendas (as in Mass Observation). Participation is 
not determined on the basis of an activist programme, but, as discussed, through a 
series of 'conceptual' guidelines or 'shooting scripts' prepared by the 
Lomographic organisers (photographing 'blindfolded', photographing in one 
particular location or things of a particular shape or colour. etc). Participants not 
only have to use the Lomo Kompakt camera but follow these guidelines to the 
letter. In these terms the turn to the non-figural content of the snapshot is itself 
figured through the category of art (through various conceptual strategies of 
creative self-limitation). This attaches another level of meaning to the 
fi ourallnon-fi oural tensions I have been exploring. The turn to the non-figural it) 
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of the snapshot as a critique of artistic hierarchy, the high-cultural artist. 
photography-as-painting, is itself subject here to the refle\i ye strategies of post-
223 
conceptual art. Lomographers may see themselves as non-professionals, but they 
also see themselves as 'non-artist artists'. Thus, this isn't a case of non-artists 
attacking art in the name of the non-figurality of photography (as was the case in 
the early avant-garde) but of non-artists defining an art in their own interests 
through photography. This reflects a wider set of cultural transformations since 
the mid-1990s: the massive diffusion of cultural and critical competences that 
owe nothing to the symbolic validation of the artworld and the market. Non-artist 
artists produce photographs in the name of an expanded category of art without 
seeking the approval of the institutions of art. The history of 20th century 
photography, of course, is the history of these ambitions for the non-artist. 
Benjamin's and Tretyakov's model of the author as producer is based on exactly 
these principles. But with the reinstitutionalization of photography as a figural 
practice, these (fragile) links between the non-artist and artist under the mantle of 
cultural access have been largely deposed or marginalized. Lomography's 
defence of the snapshot as the site of a diffuse, reflective creativity ( albeit 
depoliticized into the realm of the festive) revives this model. Similarly, by 
bringing' ordinary' modes of attention and display into the orbit of the gallery, 
Araki's home snapshots bl ur the boundary between professional artist and non-
professional artist. That is, the' ordinary', non-artistic modes of attention of the 
snapshot (the family album, for instance) are seen as a legitimate site of artistic 
reflection. By subjecting the intimate character of the domestic snapshot to serial 
repetition the spontaneous qualities of amateur photography are drawn into a 
cinematic frame of exposition and story-telling. 
Figurality, Non-Figurality and Value 
The deflationary model and the prephotographic model of labour represent, 
essentially, competing models of value. The prephotographic model insists that if 
photography is not to submit to the false democracy of mechanical reproduction 
or to the wider deskilling and nihilism immanent to the commodity form, it must 
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transform photography in the image of high-artistic ambition. The deflationan 
model, in contrast, insists that photography and art do not need to pursue these 
ambitions to secure their cultural identity, but need. rather. to recognise that 
photography's spontaneity, mobility and essential cheapness can be the basis of 
another, socially expansive model of artistic labour: the democratic inclusion of 
the non-artist into the production of the image. As such, this opposition returns us 
to an older cultural debate between the claims of aesthetic intearation as a 
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defence of aesthetic value and the notion of aesthetic dispersal and diffusion as a 
defence of democratic access to shared artistic skills. For Wall. the deflationary 
model cannot sustain a theory of value~ for Lomographers and post-conceptual 
defenders of the snapshot, the prephotographic model confuses value with the 
rehierarchisation of art. These positions are at one level incommensurable~ and as 
such represent the formalization of the catachrestic content of photography. 
Consequently, it is foolish to talk about one or other of these models of labour as 
progressive. The deflationary photographers are right about the prephotographic 
photographers and the prephotographic photographers are right about the 
deflationary photographers. The critical issue isn't about asserting one model 
over the other, as if the cultural and social divisions which produce this split at 
the level of the sign can be resolved at the level of artistic practices. Rather, the 
critical issue lies in seeing the split in photography between the figural and non-
figural as a productive source of different kinds of critical work - but with two 
important qualifications. Firstly, the pre photographic model of labour annuls 
itself when it bases its value on the suppression of non-figurality in photograph. 
because it is exactly the non-figurality of photography that renders photography's 
claims to the real as different from any other system of representation. And 
secondly, the defence of non-figurality as truth is always breaking down in the 
face of the assimilation of photography into art and the figural. The outcome of 
this is that the truth-claims of the non-figural and figural are both allegorical; 
however. the truth-claims of the figural could not exist without the prior claims of 
the non-figural. In this way. photography always leads us back to the trauma of 
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the real. This is the value of the non-figural. 
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Chapter 8: Photography and the Social Production of Space 
In The Production of Space (1974) Henri Lefebvre divides his analysis of space 
into three distinct categories: spatial practices, representations of space and 
representational spaces. 221 Spatial practices refer to the links between the routines 
of everyday life and the use and occupation of the various networks, sites and 
routes which make up the public and private, productive and non-productive, 
spaces of a given social formation. Representations of space refer directly to the 
'logic of capital': the production and reproduction of the built environment 
determined by the state and market. And, representational spaces refers to those 
spaces created, adapted or imagined by people either domestically or publicly, 
which are derived symbolically from the practices of art and counter-cultural 
modes. These might be, ambitiously, the taking over a disused site for community 
ends, or simply, the transformation of a teenager's bedroom into a fantasy space. 
Unsurprisingly the utopian content of these representational spaces - what 
Lefebvre calls space as work rather than commodity - forms the basis of his 
critique of the routinized character of daily spatial practice and the corporate 
character of the representations of space of planners, developers, architects and 
technocrats. Yet, if Lefebvre identifies representational spaces as involving a 
stake in a different kind of future, he is also quick to point out how weak and 
attenuated the collective and social function of such representational spaces 
actually are. Representational spaces may define the limits of the exteriority of 
corporate space, but they are nevertheless subordinate to capital. They may 
contribute to representations of space - that is, be allowed to humanize or gentrify 
various urban areas, figure imaginatively in the projects of architects, or in the 
fantasies of the tourist industry - but as the basis for any systematic confrontation 
221 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, [1974] translated by Donald Nicholoson-
Smith, Basil Blackwell 1991 
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with dominant property relations their productiveness remains largely symbolic. 
Lefebvre refers to the increasing dominance of representations of space as a 
process of social abstraction. The production of space is not a backdrop to the 
division of labour, the reproduction of the relations of production and the 
accumulation of capital, it is integrated into, and productive of. its monopolistic 
dynamic. 
This was Lefebvre's great theoretical advance in the analysis of space: space is 
not just what capital occupies, but what capital produces, reproduces and 
transforms. However, Lefebvre's discussion of this dynamic was written before 
current debates on globalization and is confined predominantly to a discussion of 
abstraction in terms of a cultural analysis of the phenomenological and somatic 
experience of space. This has fed into less compelling contemporary 
anthropological theories of spatial abstraction, such as Marc Auge's work on 
airports, supermarkets and motorways.222 What is missing from Lefebvre (and 
more significantly from Auge) is a strong sense that the abstractions of the world 
market, of what Auge calls supermodernity, are directly given in the concept of 
capital itself. Globalization, monopolization and abstraction are the logic of 
capital and as such the production of space is the perpetual outcome of the 
dynamic of accumulation and devaluation. This basic conflict is discussed in 
Lefebvre principally at the abstract level of the dynamic interrelation of totality 
and fraomentation and not in terms, for instance, of the distinction between fixed 
b 
capital and productive capital. The production of space under capitalism relies on 
fixed capital (factories, offices, etc) embedded in specific landscapes in order to 
realize the productive value of labour. But because capitalism requires a constant 
reduction in production costs and the time of movement of goods, fixed capital 
222 Marc Auge, Non-places: introduction to an anthropology of supermodernity, [1992] 
translated by John Howe, Verso 1995 
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becomes, to quote David Harvey, "the barrier to overcome".223 Hence new social 
geographies are constantly being produced at considerable cost to capital (the 
result of the general devaluation which occurs during the crisis of the realization 
of value) and, sometimes, at massive human cost. In this regard the continuous 
restructuring of spatial configurations through the crisis in the realization of value 
is the normal day-to-day dynamic of capitalist development. Accumulation and 
devaluation constitute the productive logic of spatial abstraction ( and its 
countervailing representational and cultural forces). But the more capitalism 
develops the more it faces geographical inertia. The circulation of capital 
becomes imprisoned in fixed infrastructures. Which is why the more these forces 
of geographical inertia prevail the more aggressive the spatial 'switching' 
solutions to the crisis of accumulation become - the rapid localized devaluation of 
capital in one area as one corporation pulls out, and the rapid localized expansion 
of value in another area as the same corporation moves in. 
The transformation of major metropolitan centres such as New York, London, 
Berlin and Barcelona, into predominantly non-productive, banking, tourist and 
administrative centres, the rapid growth of abstract space from out of town mega-
stores to the ubiquity of McDonalds and Starbucks, the rapid 'switching' of 
production from one area to another more favourable area, the growth of so-
called 'non-spaces' such as airports and motorways, have become the familiar 
topos of the new globalization. As such, it is not hard to see the connection 
between the sharpening of these forces on the production and control of space, 
and the huge expansion in the production of 'imaginary spaces' and the politics of 
space in contemporary art, and in the emergence of the documentation of the new 
'representations of space' of postmodern urbanization. The violence, sublimity, 
ugliness, and inertia of spatial abstraction have become the explicit cultural 
background to, and conceptual ground, of a number of recent photographic 
projects. 
223 David Harvey, The Limits To Capital, Basil Blackwell, 1982, p403 
229 
The most obvious and ambitious of these, of course, is Andreas Gursky. Gursk: 's 
large-scale chromogenic colour prints survey the forms of production, patterns of 
consumption, architecture and design of the new social geographies. In this his 
panoramas operate synecdochically as a synthetic visualization of globalized 
mass culture.
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By focusing on the commodity in its vast extensity, and on the 
uniformities of mass - individualised - consumption, the repetition of things and 
people stand in for totalization, for the global extensity of the market and the 
forces of the new modernity. The outcome is a photography that invokes the 
forces of spatial abstraction as much as documenting its forms. By adopting a 
topographical format, the effects of spatial abstraction in the public domain -
reproducibility of the same, non-relationality, the emptying of historical 
consciousness - take on the phenomenological boundaries of the imaginary 
spectator of the scene: "this is what it is like to be in this place, at this time, and 
as such, by extension, this is what it is like to live in this world of things and 
relations now". Photography, of course, is no stranger to these empathetic effects 
of scale of the view-camera photograph - think of the New Topographics in the 
1970s -but in Gursky's case the computer manipulations lend an unprecedented 
illusionism to the surface of the represented scene, heightening the spectator's 
imaginary sense of absorption.The force of this lies in the fact that the panoramic 
presence of the photograph appears to reproduce the sublimity and dread of the 
new abstract social geographies aggressive extensity, radically unsettling the 
domesticated conventions of the documentary photograph as an abbreviated 
description or notation of some part of the world. Gursky's photographs are not 
'enlarged snapshots', but the deliberate and composite (edited) result of extended 
study of a given range of typical settings and scenes. Gursky's photographs, then, 
ask significant epistemological questions about the representation and production 
224 All photographs operate synecdochically of course. Th.e synecdoche is not a spe~ial 
property of some pictures. However, some pictures, partlcul.a~ large-scale .panoramlc 
photographs that establish a strong connection between. their Internal relations and the 
extensity of these relations in space, invite a synecdochical reading. 
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of space in the contemporary photograph as much of the category of photograph: 
itself. It is as if the extensity of abstract space in late capitalism has forced 
photography to find new technical and cognitive resources to contain its effects. 
But if the attempt to contain the logic of spatial abstraction in the photograph, 
represents a significant challenge to the domestication of photography. the use of 
the' domesticated' conventions of photography are no less evident in other 
contemporary photography which addresses the effects of spatial abstraction. 
Indeed, Gursky's photography is, perhaps, the current exception to the rule, in 
that the representation of the representations of space in this latter kind of work is 
generated in the studio and through what continues to be the dominant mode of 
photographic practice: the staged image. 
Reliant on the conventions of the scene constructed for the camera in the studio, 
the effects of spatial abstraction in this work are figured metonymically through 
the interior or exterior detail, rather than synecdochically through the panoramic 
sweep of the fixed-view camera. For example, in the photographs of James 
Casebere, Thomas Demand and Jorge Ribalta the staged architectural interior or 
exterior produces a deliberately muted or anonymous space, in which the non-
relational effects of spatial abstraction are suggested either in abstentia, through a 
lack of external reference points, or through a kind of sinister constraint. But what 
marks out the non-relationality of these photographs, is not their oblique 
invocation of the' poetics' of space, but their discrete or miniaturized conditions 
of production: all the photographs are produced from models. Casebere's Gothic 
crypt-like interiors, Demand's bland, anonymous residential interiors, and 
Ri balta's graffitied, derelict exteriors are all photographed from small 
architectural sets made from painted cardboard. paper or wood. Furthermore, the 
referential chain does not stop at the model. In Demand and Ri balta the sets are 
themselves produced from photographs: respecti vely. grainy newsphotos (of 
si O'nificant historical or newsworthy sites such the corridor to Jeffrey Dahmer's 
b 
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apartment), and snapshots of the old Barrio Chino in Barcelona. An ambiguous 
chain of verisimilitude is established, based on the passage of the object into a 
photograph and, then, into an object resembling the referent of the original 
photograph and, then, back into another photograph. 
This production of sets by the artist-photographer is commonplace enough. and 
since the early 1970s with the advent of the staged self-image, has played perhaps 
the key role in figuring the crisis of representation: the fact that representations 
never seem to match up to their referents. But, this overfamiliar issue of 
photography's "incommensurability problem,,225 is not the central concern here. 
and as such the interpretation of these spaces is not simply a question of a 
semiotic reading of the would-be gap between representation and its referents. 
Rather, what is at stake here is how photography might interrogate the 
production of space. 
If there is an overarching assertiveness to Gursky's panoramic invocation of 
spatial abstraction, in the work of Casebere, Demand and Ribalta their 'stilling' 
of space is used counterwise, to produce a sense of intimacy and loss. This 
captures a very different set of responses to the effects of spatial abstraction. The 
photographs neither set out to replicate the surface appearance of the corporate 
abstractions of the contemporary world, nor do they, in their turn to illusionism, 
concern themselves with producing fantasy spaces. Rather, they are simulated 
naturalistic spaces in which the effects of abstraction are produced fictively . In 
this they sit somewhere between the representation of the representations of 
spaces and representational spaces. Or rather they integrate these positions. 
What is usefuL first and foremost, about Lefebvre's work on the production of 
space is that it is grounded in discussion of space as a problem of po\\t?r - of 
225 Richard Shiff 'Realism of Low Resolution: Digitisation and Modern Painting', in Terry 
Smith (ed) Im~ossible Presence, Sydney/Chicago University Press 1999 
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access, autonomy and relationality - and not as a hermeneutics or a poetics. The 
distinction he makes between representations of space and representational space 
is, essentially, about distinguishing between qualitatively different kinds of 
appropriation and control: appropriation and control in the interests of the forces 
of repetition and reproducibility, and appropriation and control in the interests of 
difference and relationality. In this way, for Lefebvre space is always an issue of 
who occupies or uses it, under what terms, and to what ends? On this score 
Casebere's, Demand's and Ribalta's are deceptively vacant: the implied 
connection between the setting and absent orders of power (of abstraction) invoke 
these places as spaces where certain (symptomatic or reified) experiences are 
produced and reproduced. These spaces maybe empty but they are nonetheless 
occupied. But what is significant about these 'dead spaces', is not that we can 
speak of them in terms of 'power' rather than 'poetics'(one does not necessarily 
exclude the other), but how the representation of spatial abstraction and 
representational space interconnect, and consequently, how space is produced in 
the photograph. What is distinctive, even perverse, about these photographs is 
that a complex process of fictionality is given over to the mimetic reproduction of 
the banal and nondescript. It is as if these artists are caught between two forces: 
the direct, objective need to submit to photography's powers of mechanical 
reproducibility (as the means by which the effects of spatial abstraction are made 
sensible to a modern audience), but at the same time, the need to insert their 
hand-based presence in the photograph and, as such, their need to assert an 
imaginary control over this process, as a critique of non-relationality. It is as if 
the utopian or negative content of representational space returns through the 
representation of the representations of space. The result is that, paradoxically. 
these images are highly crafted photographs of the effects of spatial abstraction. 
This is particularly resonant in Ribalta's photographs of the Barrio Chino, where 
the elaborate effort gone into replicating the look of the old worki ng class area 
prior to its recent' modernization' functions metonymically as an identification 
with the area's displaced labour. A symbolic link is established bct\\een the 
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labour invested by the artist in the reproduction of the dilapidated appearance of 
the Barrio, and the clearance of the area as a place of artisanal production. An 
area that once had a rich and variegated history is now designated as 
unproductive. Capital hates unproductive spaces and will do its best to transform 
them on the grounds that modernization is a technical requirement and moral 
necessity. In this sense these spaces are at the other end of Gursky's vision of 
globalization. These are images of devaluation. 
Of course the notion of saving photography from a would-be deadening 
rationalism by recognising and releasing the intentional and creative presence of 
the photographer has long characterised the contested status of photography in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The determining role of the photographer's 
hand has been repeatedly introduced into the discourses of photography to save 
photography from the 'merely mechnical' and inexpressive. But something 
different is emergent here. These are images in which the indexical powers of 
photography and the artist's productive manipulation of materials are evidently 
fused: in the case of Gursky, through the digital remastering of the photograph, 
and in the case of Casebere, Demand and Ri balta through the material and 
painterly construction of the pre-photographic referent. Making and reproduction 
converge without a sense that photography needs to be defended as less 'creative' 
than painting. In other words, although model-building for the camera is quite a 
different matter from the internal reordering of the photographic image, in both 
instances the means by which the photograph is arrived at possesses no less a 
complex figurality than painting. On this basis it is possi ble to see this 
convergence of making and reproduction as reflecting something more 
substantive: the extent to which photography now is held to have actually taken 
over the figural complexities of painting. Now. this a contentious claim. and a 
claim that is easily appropriated towards conservative ends. as is witnessed in the 
recent reception of Andreas Gursky. Indeed, the eagerness with which the new 
figural content of photograph has been promoted by the major art institutions. 
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such as the Museum of Modern Art, is not surprising, given the need on the part 
of such institutions to locate photography within the confines of aesthetic 
ideology. Despite the institutional emergence of avant-garde photography in the 
late1970s, the institutions have long felt uncomfortable about photography's 
destablization of traditional notions of authorship and the category of . art'. \Vhat 
makes photography so interruptive of aesthetic ideology is its mechanical 
reproducibility. Or rather what makes photography so destablizing is that it is 
neither figural nor non-figural, neither properly art, nor properly objective. But 
the location of photography within conservative ideologies of auteurship is not 
what concerns me here. What is engaging about this work is not its straining after 
some putative aesthetic status, but how photography's social claims have now 
passed into the figural complexities of form. There is no fretting and worrying on 
the part of these photographers that figurality might constitutes a loss of 
referentiality, although Casebere' s work is clearly, historically, a product of such 
a moment in early critical postmodernism. On the contrary, model making, 
staging and computer manipulation, function apodictically as the means by which 
photography is able to go about its job. Figurality in photography is not a retreat 
from the 'real', but produces a rupture or intervention into the real through the 
sensuous organization of form. 
My wider argument, therefore, is that this turn to the figural in the representation 
of space is a response to two sets of mimetic demands relating to the dominant 
forces of abstraction on photography's social and imaginary claims at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. On the one hand, the requirement to 
encompass or invoke the subliminal effects of abstract space, and not just point to 
these effects, and on the other, the need to reproduce and confront these effects 
through some counter-imaginary control over space. Snaphot and documentary 
modes are unable to do this, or do it in such as way as to render the abstractions 
as ambiguously homely and unalienated. In contrast. in order to denaturalize 
space, the new resources of figurality in photography employ either an ecstatic 
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exaggeration of form (as in Gursky) or a seductive illusionism (as in Casebere. 
Demand, and Ribalta). By producing an aberrant naturalism, a self-consciousl: 
fictive naturalism, the representation of abstract space in this work is made 
unhomely. 
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Chapter 9:Trauma, ostension and the photographic document 
In this chapter I want to look at what remains intractable, invasive and 
unassimilable about photography, or more precisely, about the naturalistic 
photographic document. This will mean addressing what I take to be the truth 
content of the photograph, rather than simply photography's avowed veridical 
truthfulness as a medium, although the latter is no less significant for my 
argument. 
By truth-content I mean the singular and distinguishing capacity of photography 
to 'bring something into view'. This characterization is simplistic, banal even, 
but it conceals what is surprisingly rarely remarked on in contemporary 
photographic theory: the fact that the photographer 'points at things' and in 
pointing at things' picks things out'. 
Pointing and picking out are essentially active, cognitive categories. That is, they 
operate on the basis of seeking, discriminating, categorizing.The obvious 
cognates of 'pointing to' and 'picking out' are 'surveying' 'pursuing', 'finding 
one's way about'. 
As such the meaning of a photograph is indivisible from the movement of the 
photographer through time and space, even if this movement is fragmentary or 
partially sedentary. Indeed, we talk about an accumulated range of photographs as 
an archive, a repository or laying down of temporal and spatial activities: we 
don't tal k about an archi ve of scul ptures. 
The photographic document is evidence of movement through and in the \\ arid, 
into the world; the photographer guides his or her camera across. above, to, and 
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around his subject with the insatiability and compulsiveness of the explorer. 
detective, predator, impassioned lover. In this respect photography's claims on 
the indexical truth of a given moment is always governed by the position of the 
photograph within an imaginary continuity before and after the shutter closes. 
The photographer moves, and moves on, and moves on again, in order to find and 
repeat a moment of satisfactory stillness. And, significantly, this is the paradox of 
photography: at the point at which photography fixes the world of appearances, in 
an image of the truthfulness of those appearances, it is also the uncertain, 
discontinuous space of the photographer's will, desire, intentions. It is an '1', a 
Cartesian eye, a restless accumulator of experience, a hub of hubris and 
frustration. 
The metaphor of the photograph as an external act of invasion has been much 
used and analyzed in relation to the category of violence. Photography and 
violence against identity, the self, truth, are never that far apart it is argued. 
Indeed, for critics of photographic naturalism photography of the 'other' 
presupposes the violation of the' other' , all others: photography is held to be an 
unwarranted intrusion, an imposture, the work of white, male Western 
malfaisance even. This blasting of the effects of power through the portals of 
photographic humanism decentred the photographic' I' and shattered its claims to 
free movement; the photographer was no longer able to speak so confidently from 
inside the space of naturalistic photography's good intentions. As such it gave 
pointing a point again, another point, other points, many points. 
But if the photographic document is in a position to violate in the interests of 
power, this violation is not unidirectionally negative, for violation is always the 
precursor to the production of knowledge. That is, there is no knowledge without 
the interruption of identity, of breaking sense, of a confrontation between subject 
and subject, subject and object. Knowledge is inescapably a process of 
contamination and diremption. Accordingly, to . point' and to 'pick out' cannot 
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but be violating, troubling in a productive way, for to 'point out' is to draw 
attention to something, and to draw attention to something or someone without 
the acknowledgement of the' other' is an affront, an impertinence, because it 
threatens the boundaries of decorum and autonomy, of what should not be seen. 
In fact pointing becomes literally unbearable: Ben Shahn and Walker Evans. for 
instance, both used cameras with a false lens that allowed them to face in one 
direction whilst photographing their subject from another. But, irrespective of the 
dissembling stratagems of photographers, this is exactly what the photographic 
document invites: an affront to the self-image of others. a running ahead of the 
self-control of others, a space where the other can be seen as other to herself. In 
other words a space marked by justice, revelation, discovery. In this sense, 
'pointing' and' picking out', comes with responsibilities to the other, but these 
responsibilities can only be vestigially governed by a respect for the other. For if 
it is violation that produces knowledge, then it is the truth of violation that has to 
be honoured, even when this violation produces images that subvert or weaken 
the dignity and autonomy of the other. 
The responsibility of the photographer is to be responsible to the truth of this 
conflict. The photographer must make a judgement, then. on the outcome of this, 
that is, decide on how far the results of his or her' pointing to' and' picking out' 
reveals truth (some truth, that is) or its opposite. 
In this regard the photo document is a critically ostensive medium, it points at and 
picks out things because the photographer judges these things to be worth 
attending to. Indeed, this is what is so successful about ostensive communication: 
to point out, to point at, arouses high expectations of relevance. By pointing. or 
some other ostensive act, the communicator implies that her action is significant 
enough to be worth attending to by her interlocutor. In this the ostensi ve act 
focuses the intentions of the communicator. and therefore invohes the 
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construction and presentation of conceptual representations. 226 
Photography's 'pointing to' as a means of 'pickin cr out' is of this order a makincr 
o 'e
manifest of the thoughts of the photographer. But, of course, the meaning of the 
things picked out is never co-present with the act of taking the photograph. This 
is why the temporality of 'pointing' in the act of taking the photograph and the 
'pointing' that takes place afterwards in the studio are divergent CI prefer this 
one! This one is boring. This is one is too ambiguous."). 'Pointing at' and 
'picking out' may be based on the best of intentions, so to speak, but this process 
is never self-evident once the shutter has closed. Pointing - at this point - is 
always inscribed within a retrodictive process of truth-telling. "My pointing at 
this seems better than my pointing at that". "Why did I point at that?" 
This is why' pointing at' in photography is blind to its own expectations. There is 
no stable correspondence between what gets 'picked ouf and what is ultimately 
judged meaningful about what is picked out. This is evidence of the much 
invoked, and the much theorized notion - after Walter Benjamin - of the 
photograph as an unconscious optic: the idea that the photographer and her 
interpetators 'find' meaning in the photograph retrospectively. The discrepant 
gesture, the untoward detail, the unbidden strangeness of a sign bring the 
workings of the unconscious to the surface: those things that the photographer 
could not prevent entering into the frame of the photograph. 
This process is undoubtedly what gives the photodocument its revelatory content, 
what shapes and motivates the spontaneity of 'pointing at' and' picking ouf: the 
recovery of the thing, the detail which lies beyond my rational control. However, 
the notion of the law of latent disclosure seems a partial understandi ng of the 
function of 'pointing to' in photography. This model of disclosure does not touch 
226 For a discussion of ostension and linguistic communication, see Dan Sperber and 
Deidre Wilson, Relevance, Basil Blackwell, 1986 
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on the photographic act itself, that is, what is disrupti ve about the photodocument. 
how the truth of' pointing at' and' picking out' forms, and is embedded in, the 
representation of the refractory content of reality. Photography does not just bring 
back more than we know as discrete signs, it is in itself an act of interruption, a 
break in the continuum of alienated appearances. This is why in an important 
sense 'pointing' is also involved in a conscious process of secondary ostension, 
by pointing at one thing we may in fact be making clear that we are pointing at 
something else, relating one thing metonymically, synecdochically, to another 
thing. W. V.O. Quine talks about "deferred ostension".227 A man points at an 
empty parked car covered in parking tickets and declares: "He'll be sorry when 
he gets back". That is, through pointing to a given state of affairs the man infers 
to another state of affairs. 
Photography is unimaginable without this process of indirect ostension, indeed, 
the substitution of a declared ostensive meaning for an undeclared meaning is 
essential to the social and discursive claims of photography. The 
photographer/camera' looks at' in order to look awry, look beyond, look 
elsewhere. Or rather in looking away after looking at, we look awry. Thus for 
instance, a photograph of a group of urban buildings might be taken as evidence 
of architectural interest, but, on the basis of our knowledge of the photographer's 
other work, the buildings might also might be taken as evidence of capital 
accumulation and the abstractions of space. 'Pointing to' as a form of' picking 
out', then, is pointing as means of pointing otherwise, pointing contra wise on the 
basis of pregiven social categories and conceptual distinctions. 
In respect of this notion of looking awry, of 'looking at' in order to begin looking 
elsewhere, we come into immediate contact with an aspect of 'pointing to' and 
the unconscious that is hardest to pin down in relation to photography, but is 
227 W.V.O. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia University, 1969 
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nonetheless crucial to understanding photography's intractability: the experience 
of trauma. 
Trauma is easily misunderstood. By trauma I do not simply mean the 
representation of a crisis, of a tragedy or injury, of the direct signs of pain and 
loss - a photography of atrocity or horror, so to speak - but trauma as an affect, 
something which is latent and invisible, a secondary manifestation of a prior 
event. 
This distinction, of course, is first formulated in Freud's and Breuer' s 
'Preliminary Communication' on hysteria and trauma in 1893. For Freud and 
Breuer a precipitatory event does not act like an agent provocateur in releasing 
the traumatic symptom, but, rather, as they argue, the psychical trauma is the 
memory of the trauma. In other words, the recognition of trauma is the 
knowledge of imperturbable but invariably undisclosed reminiscences of the 
founding, disruptive event. "It acts like a foreign body which long after its entry 
must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work".228 Trauma is 
transformed from its specific location in the nervous system and the somatic. into 
the operations of the symbolic. The trauma exists neither within the immediate 
recollection of an originary event or in the immediate recollection of physical 
symptoms, but in the memories of a memory ( or rather) memories of the 
precipitatory event. Trauma is a wound that is hidden, or constantly being hidden. 
displaced, aestheticized. 
This has implications in how we understand the unconscious and the act of 
'pointing' and 'picking out' in photography. 
228 Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer, 'On the Psychical Mechanis,ms of Hysterical 
Phenomena: Preliminary Communication' (1893), Studies in Hysteria, Penguin, 1974, 
p57 
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Essentially, the experience of trauma is the experience of language di vided from 
being. Putting the experience of trauma into language in analysis the subject 
continually fails to achieve a sense of psychological restitution or assimilation in 
the face of his or her painful reminiscences. The memory of the memory of the 
trauma resists integration. The damage caused by the trauma is constantly 
occluded by the repetitive processes of aestheticization and dissociation. 
This failure of assimilation is comparable to, or indicative of, the operations of 
the unconscious space of the photograph. The promise of pointing and the 
promise of knowledge and clarity, turns out to not to be the promise of 
objectivity, the 'proper' at all, but of the figural and the partial. In this way 
photography's drive to ostension, its ontology of 'bringing into view', is always 
marked by the failure to realise its desire for completion, transparency. totality. 
Yet the failure of knowledge, does not mean the failure of truth. For, 
simultaneously, the promise of pointing, of revelance, breaches this failure of 
objective knowledge and clarity by returning this failure to our critical gaze. That 
is, the processes of our looking shifts from what is being' pointed to' as the 
promise of rational assimilation (the incorporation of the world of appearances 
into our systems of knowledge) to the actuality of what is being pointed out. the 
resistance to the process of assimilation through the secondary processes of 
ostension (the notion of the photograph as a secondary representation of a break 
or a fundamental 'wound' in reality). Trauma here, then lies, in the exorbitant 
power photography has in returning to our vision the unassimilable, rebarbati ve 
nature of reality as appearance. Indeed, Roland Barthes touches on this traumatic 
character of photography when he talks about the enigma of the photograph as 
something that "pricks me", something that pricks me out of my indolence and 
ideological state, so to speak, that affects me, that makes it difficult for me to 
assimilate my knowledge of the photograph's details within the photograph's 
own descriptive or generic terms. As he argues: the photograph "Jllls the sight hy 
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force ... because in it nothing can be refused or transformed"?29 
This sense of being 'pricked' relates to the way in which the photodocument is 
able to bring me into close proximity to the symptoms of appearances, the living 
contradictions of appearances. This is the truth of photography: its unrivalled 
capacity to reveal the traumatic world of appearances, the fact that what we see is 
not convergent with what we know to be true, and that what we know about what 
we see we are unable to freely assimilate. 
Let us be clear here. Photography does not represent the traumatic event as if the 
traumatic event is some thing that is visible and knowable. Explicit in Freud and 
Breuer is the notion that we can never know what the trauma actually looks like, 
it is literally inaccessible to us as it is to the subject of the trauma, and therefore 
that we can only 'know' the trauma through its obscure symptoms. Rather, 
photography in 'pointing otherwise' in 'pointing to' points to the traumatic 
symptom (the gap between knowledge and being). This is why photography, 
through its ostensive function, is driven to mimic the repetitions, stasis, 
aestheticizations and dissociations of traumatic experience. In its movement into 
the world, in its 'pointing to' as a 'picking out', its drive to represent inhabits that 
compulsion to repeat which constitutes the gap between knowledge and being. 
In this regard, the important point to be made here is that photography's 
relationship to the unconscious is not reducible to that of historical memory, of 
the traces of things past. Rather, photography, in the sense Jean Laplanche has 
characterized Freud's and Breuer's revolutionary notion of the unconscious as a 
foreign body, represents a kind of alien possession or disruption, the thing that 
calls us back to the alienness of the world, and our alienated place in it. In this 
sense, photography represents a refusal of reality, a refusal of the assimilation of 
229 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, Jonathan Cape 1982, p91 
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reality to its historicization as a document, at the same time as it makes a claim on 
the real. This is why the compulsive-repetitive nature of 'pointing'. in order to 
find the point, to make a point, is characterisable as a kind of invasiveness, 
becoming a kind of decentring: the photograph decentres the consciousness of the 
spectator (and photographer), through the presence of the 'other', that is. through 
the presence of that which 'pricks' us. 
Accordingly, this is very different from a model of the unconscious in which the 
photograph simply exhibits or discloses the effects of the unconscious as hidden 
signs of the repressed, in order that those hidden signs then might be 
reassimilated into the creativity of the photographer, the ego of the spectator and 
the miraculous realistic powers of the camera. This view presupposes that there is 
something that is split off from me and from photography, that I and photography 
can reclaim, make amenable. Thus from this perspective the effects of the 
unconscious are reinscribed into a descriptive economy of the photograph as 
evidence (of the infinity of nature, of times past ). rather than as a means by 
which my 'looking awry', my looking otherwise, becomes a recognition of the 
failure of 'pointing to' as the promise of another truth. 
Photography, I would argue, then, is an alien body, an alien thing, precisely 
because its compulsive powers of ostension makes it difficult for the act of 
'pointing to' to settle down into the figural and the aesthetic, despite the repeated 
attempts to turn photography into a figural art. Photography always rebounds as 
an affect, as the memory of the unassimilable thing that the concept of trauma 
invokes. Photography disrupts us, moves us into a space of disequilibrium. As 
Laplanche puts this, in his writing on the decentring function of the unconscious: 
"Internal alien-ness [isl maintained, held in place by external-alien-ness: external 
alien-ness, in turn. I is I held in place by the enigmatic relation of the other to his 
own internal alien".~JO Photography participates in this logic, insofar as 
230 Jean Laplanche, Essays on Otherness, Routledge, 1999, p8G 
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photographer, photograph, viewer and the material world exist in a discontinuous 
and codeterminate set of relations. 
Where does the truth of photography lie then? It lies in this circle of ostensive 
attention. By 'pointing to' as a means 'picking out' as a way of 'pricking' us, 
photography inscribes the representation of real into a system of shock effects, 
disruptions to the equilibrium of the ego as the bastion of aesthetic ideology. In 
other words, photography possesses an alterity or otherness, that is, is unable to 
assimilate itself to dominant aesthetic categories because of its inability to hide its 
relationship to the alienated and material substrate of the world. This is the truth 
of photography. 
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Part 3: Deflation and the Popular 
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Chapter 10: Domestic Squabbles: Modes of Scepticism and Forms of 
Popular Culture in 1990s British and US Art 
"Some old Conceptual Art was often worked out on kitchen tables or in livin o 
:= 
rooms, in bed-sits and sometimes pubs. This was a world without studies. offices, 
libraries or museums. It often possessed a weird domesticity and lacked the 
swagger of big white man's culture" 
Art & Language231 
What is often forgotten about Conceptual Art is that it was made by young artists, 
with little money or resources, on the hoof. The McMoMA franchising of 
Conceptual Art in the 1990s as 'world historical event' was far from the self-
perceptions of that generation. Indeed the flailing around, the trying-on of things, 
the cantankerousness, the theoretical bravado, the antagonism or indifference to 
all the huffing and puffing of humanist art-loving, made Conceptual art 
remarkably low-fi in its ambitions. The megalomania and metaphysics came 
later. In fact the best of Conceptual Art was avowedly' amateur' in tone and 
ideals. That is, it offered a direct challenge to the moribund artistic 
professionalism of the time by contaminating the standards, val ues and artistic 
categories of the academy with the autodidact appropriation of non-artistic 
know ledges and procedures, making it impossible for the enraptured audience of 
Modernism to judge Conceptual Art by Modernism's existentially inflated 
standards. In this respect its own intellectual and cultural demands came before 
any spurious internationalism and modernity. If this meant a withdrawal from the 
claims of the Modernist aesthetic life, it also meant, by definition and extension, a 
withdrawal from the social relations and forms of association that determined the 
231 Art & Language, unpublished notes to Sighs Trapped by Liars, 1998, unpaginated 
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production and reception of Modernist art. The loose communal relations of 
Conceptual Art, its avant-garde critique of the studio as the primar) site of art's 
production and the museum as the 'home' of art's social value and mockin o , eo 
derogation of the artist as as robust 'primitive', posh aesthete or egregious 
entrepreneur, radicalized what artists did and said, how they worked and who 
they thought were important and worth talking to. The net outcome of this was 
that by the late 1960s Modernism's internationalism began to appear deeply 
parochial and had become the language of management, and thus unable to 
generate a critique of its own historical origins. 
The 'localism of conceptualism, therefore, can be seen as one more moment in 
art's negative dialectic this century; by declaring that a period of corruption or 
academicism has entered the production and reception of art the social relations 
of the art are held to be unlivable. When Cezanne moved back to Provence and 
began to paint Mont St.Victoire obsessively, the renewal of 'touch and 
perception' out of the forces of nature became the main focus of an attack on 
what he held to be the decadence into which the metropolitan themes of 
Impressionism had fallen. Those who mistrusted the metropolitan administration 
of art and its cliques would gather around Cezanne's example. Similarly the 
'parodic' destabilization of Cezanne in Cubism was at the expense of Cezanne's 
isolationism and anti-metropolitanism. Cubism was a return to painting as a 
metropolitan discipline, and the metropolitan studio as a site of social exchange, a 
place where artists, writers and dealers would meet and socialise. 232 
Thus, although speaking form very different social and geographical positions, 
the importance of locale and the local in Cezanne, and Braque and Picasso, are 
defended as the site of art's renewal. But since Cubism, of course, the landscape 
has played an increasingly remote part in this would-be dialectic of renewal and 
232 See Jeffrey Weiss, The Popular Culture of Modern Art: Picasso, Duchamp, and 
Avant-Gardism, Yale University Press, 1994 
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counter-renewal through the local. The last significant rejection of the 
metropolitan experience as an ideological critique of an 'academic 
metropolitanism was the work of Robert Smithson and other artists who rejected 
Conceptual art's 'technical' critique of Modernism in the name of a socialh 
renewed extra-gallery practice. Ironically, then, Conceptual art's own 'localism' 
was not local enough; getting your hands dirty, quite literally, negotiating with 
publics and agencies other than cultural ones, learning and applying know ledges 
other than those associated with the museum and the studio, was considered to be 
a far more socially engaged response to the crisis of Modernism than sorting out 
the logical consequences of what might or might not be considered an artistic act. 
Since then the local and the international have been played out through the 
internal conflicts of the metropolitan artworld itself, as the increasing 
globalization of capital and the culture industry has weakened modern art's 
symbolic relationship to nature and the symbolic naturalization of 
underdevelopment. 
There are two things to be considered as a consequence of this. Firstly, today the 
'local' is tied to a post-colonial understanding of African, Asian and South 
American metropolitan cultural identities as competing' localisms' on a world 
stage; and secondly with the rapid cultural administration of art, there is a greater 
and faster awareness of the assimilation and narration of the national and 
indigenously local as the international. That is the processes of capitalist 
monopolization in culture and education transform the' local' into the global with 
unrelenting efficiency. But, of course. this remains an uneven process, dependent 
on the strenuths of national economies. the international power of their cultural 
b 
industries, and the popularity of those cultural industries in a global market. In 
this way certain' localisms' have a quicker and more privileged access to these 
global circuits of power than others given their language of transmission and the 
'cultural capital' or 'exoticism' they provide for other national audiences. 
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Which brings me inevitably to the global reach and power of Anglo-American 
popular culture and its relationship to the global success of American art. and 
recently British art. With the vast economic penetration of American capital and 
culture, the 'localisms' of American and British popular culture become the 
common language and reference points of large stretches of the globe. This has 
meant that for much of humanity since the 1950s the actual and symbolic goods 
of global capitalism has been exchanged in the English language. Indeed. the 
success of American film, literature and popular music and British popular music 
has meant that the narration of social experience under late capitalism has been 
mediated largely through Anglo-American national identities. As Godard said in 
1980 of French culture in the 1950s, "we are living under the mythology of the 
American film".233 This maybe a commonplace. but it is a commonplace 
regularly forgotten when it comes to the global penetration of American, and 
recently, British art. For without the economic penetration of Anglo-American 
mass culture and popular culture, the cultural resources and status of American 
and British art in the latter part of the 20th century would not have the force they 
have~ just as, in turn, the 'localisms' of art in Britain (and Europe) are inseparable 
from their critical mediation of American art and mass culture itself. This is why, 
relative to the US, the 1990s has seen the reemergence of British art 
internationally. For a rising conjunction of economic and cultural forces has made 
it possible for British art to compete collectively on an international basis since 
the 1960s. In fact in the 1990s British art has achieved an unprecedented cultural 
ascendancy over American art, leaving a good deal of contemporary art in the US 
in the unenviable position of a supporting role, despite the shared cultural 
reference points, anxieties and spectres. 
As is now well know this rise to cultural prominence has been labelled 'Cool 
233 Jean-Luc Godard, Introduction a une veritable histoire du cinema vol. 1 (Paris: 
Editions Alabatros), 1980, p92, quoted in Kristin Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: 
Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture, MIT, 1995, p44 
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Britannia', Brit Art or yBa, in an orgy of nationalistic sentiment, \vhich eyen 
sections of the US media have embraced as they look to the \'ew Labour 
administration for tips on the new cultural industries. It doesn't take much effort 
to make a mockery of this, just as it is easy to point out how uneyen a lot of the 
new art is, and how self-regarding much of it has become. As the memory of 
'Sensation' at the Royal Academy of Art fades with the allure of Tony Blair's 
New England, the new art takes a dip below the horizon. However, in terms of 
the logics of the local today, and the continuing power of Anglo-American 
popular culture to define what's hip globally - the local at the global level - art in 
Britain in the 1990s represents an interesting set of responses to the 
local/international dialectic of the modern art institution. 
Clearly, the market success of (some) contemporary art in Britain lies in how its 
'localisms' - the ideological landscape of post-Thatcherite Britain - haye been 
narrated through the foci of youth and youth culture. Brilliant! (1995) the first 
major exposition of the new art abroad, at the Walker Art Centrer, Minneapolis, 
traded on a post-punk frisson of danger, hedonism and dole-queque anger, all 
those qualities, in fact, that have made British pop, design and fashion so 
successful internationally since the 1960s.234 The 'personalities' that emerged 
from this have in turn given a biographical focus to the artistic 'transgressions', 
'confrontations' and' outrages'. Thatcher's artists: mad. bad and dangerous to 
know! As a result the public consumption of the art has come to rest on a national 
version of a post-Warhol ian 'star' system. In order to make the art consumerable 
as 'style' the media is overwhelmingly driven by the imperatives of a culture 
industry keen to mix art and celebrity in the pleasures of the new music, ne\\ 
fashion, etc. An art celebrity pecking order is now in place. \vith Damien Hirst. 
restaurant owner, pop video maker and' national treasure'. firmly ensconced at 
the top, able to hold his own against other popular cultural icons. 
234 See Brilliant! New Art From London, Walker Art Center, Minneapolis and Museum of 
Fine Arts, Boston, 1995 
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This successful promotion and narrativisation of the art as a contribution to 
national popular culture, then, has much to do with the way the media has 
identified the art as conforming to its own anti-intellectual and popular-cultural 
agendas; and how many of the artists, such as Hirst, Tracey Emin and Sarah 
Lucas, are willing to go along with this (whether in the short-term or not). By 
divesting themselves of the professional rhetorics and ideolooical baooaoe of the 
b be e 
'modern artist' they talk down the critical discourse in exchanoe for media e 
anointment and' profile sexiness'. This has had conservative and radical critic 
alike frothing at the mouth, denouncing the art for its narcissism and commercial 
mendacity. Indeed, the success of the new art is a breath away. it is claimed, from 
a national Blairite conspiracy, in which Peter Mandelson, James Palumbo, the 
editors of Frieze, Loaded and GQ magazines meet regularly to decide the future 
of UK Cultural Industries PIc. In fact once Charles Saatchi is factored in, the art 
is no more nor less a phantasm of the market and the marketeers. 
This is a familiar response to the power of cultural industries to transform the 
'localisms' of a national culture into the cultural capital of national self-
definition. The value of the art is sustained only through public relations and 
tendentious opinion-making. But cultural industries cannot create cultural capital 
on this scale and with this reach without the art having a life and some quality 
beyond its spectacular mediation. Thus whatever corruptions may ensue from the 
monopolistic powers of one major collector or dealer, does not thereby mean the 
new art is only - and fragilely - sustained by the machinations of the market. The 
art embodies qualities, val ues, interests, voices that are the product of relations 
that exist prior to, and beyond, the dehistoricized and reified world of the new 
cultural industries and their artworld epigones. The law of value may acculturate 
art in powerfully conservative ways - particularly during periods of social crisis 
and national confidence building - but the meanings, ideals and practical 
implications that flow from the work. are not fixed by those who have the power 
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to speak for the art, whether they are employed at the Royal Academy, Channel .f. 
of Boundary Road. Consequently those who attack the market profile of the art 
have to take account of what it is about the new art in Britain that is collectively 
and socially significant. In short: what is it about the art's 'localisms' and their 
conditions of production and reception that are vivid and repay critical attention'? 
Crucially, then, any serious criticism of the new art has to reconstruct the moves 
and tropes of the' local' in art from out of a discussion of the intra and inter-
discursive struggles of the modern art institution. Which in turn means returning 
to the crisis of the art's national/international formation. 
I have argued recently on a number of occasions that the initial impetus and 
success of the new British art rests on its critical negotiation in the 1980s with the 
high-theoretical demands of critical postmodernism.235 The tenets of critical 
postmodernism - the critique of identity, representation and the Modernist art 
institution - as they emanated from New York galleries and art history 
departments and art history and cultural studies departments of British 
Universities, had a fundamental influence on shaping the development of art 
education in Britain in the 1980s. In fact, the production of serious art in the 
1980s, particularly in London, and specifically at Goldsmiths, followed the 
general institutionalization of postmodernism/post-structuralism in Western 
Europe and North America as the cultural and theoretical raison d' etre of the new 
movement politics, or identity politics. Accordingly the institutionalization of 
critical postmodernism represents the post-1970s secularization - in Edward 
Said's sense236 - of the critique of Western culture's 'exclusionary' and 
monolithic structures. 
235 See for example, 'Mad For! Philistinism, the Everyday and the New British Art', Third 
Text, No 35, 1996, and 'Livin' It Large', in ed., Silvia Eiblmayr, Zonen der ver-
storunglZones of Disturbance, Steirischer herbst, Graz, 1997, and 'Everyday Icons', 
interview with John Roberts by David Green, Creative Camera, No 347, 1997 
236 Edward Said, The World, The Text, and the Critic, Faber and Faber, 1984 
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In these terms the feminist and anti-racist critique of Modernism's' vulgar 
universalism' generated a massive re-narrativisation of the 'everyday' in art, as 
photography and video were theorized as the preeminent practices of late 
capitalist spectacle and technological expansion. With this the critique of 
representation bifurcated along sharp theoretical lines: between those who saw a 
critique of the everyday in terms of the counter-hegemonic and the recoding of 
dominant social ideologies ( 'social transformation' at the level of the sign), and 
those who saw the emergence of cultural difference more pessimistically against 
the wider and threatening backdrop of mass cultural manipUlation, and the 
destruction of meaning itself: the school of simulationists and cultural nomads. 
This familiar cultural split between 'commitment' and 'nihilism' - or the poetics 
of negation and absence - within the modern in the 20th century, between Sartre 
and Blanchot, so to speak, has in the late-70s and 80s, however, been grounded in 
very different political and theoretical circumstances than those of the 1920s, 
1930s, and even the 1960s. 
By the 1970s - after Stalinism and fascism, after Fordism and the vast extension 
of the commodity form post-1945, and after the mass cultural' perfection' of 
techniques of cultural control and the 'successful' assimilation of the labour 
movement into social democratic structures - the links between the politics of the 
avant-garde and social transformation were diminished and stunted, historically 
blocked. Indeed the two major manifestations of the 'classic' avant-garde after 
World War 11 - the Situationist International and Conceptual Art - were a self-
fulfilling confirmation of this historical blockage. Both groups theorized and 
criticized the bourgeois institutions of art with the confidence of revol utionaries, 
buoyed by a wave of working class unrest across Europe, yet by 1975 the 
institutions of capital had regained ground and strength (particularly after the 
'failed' Portuguese revolution of 1974), creating the conditions for the 
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widespread return to neo-liberalism and the free market in the 1980s.23 - The 
cultural impact of this was enormous. As welfare policies were dismantled. 
informal and formal networks of labour and the left thrown in disarray. older 
heavy industries broken up, new industries recapitalised, communications 
industries privatized, education re-hierachized, the last vestiges of the old a\ant-
garde were buried under a 'new realism'. But if the historic avant-garde became 
associated with the closure of an early phase of the debate on art and social 
transformation, countervailing forces emerged as the memory of the older avant-
garde fed into the radical-semiotic and counter-hegemonic moves and strategies 
of post-conceptualism. 
1973-1978, the period of transition out of Conceptual Art's critique of 
Modernism, was also the period when cultural studies redefined notions of 
'politics' and' culture', and the hierarchies of pleasure. Turning to popular culture 
and mass culture as negotiated sites of pleasure (and not just the work of 
'dominant ideology) cultural studies set out to dismantle both the high 
culture/popular culture divide and the idea of art as a set of practices centred on 
the development of 'expressive skills' rather than on representational and 
cultural-theoretical ones. The post-conceptual turn to ideology, specifically, the 
issue of mass-culture and the construction of subjectivity out of critical debates 
on film and photography, is co-extensive and co-present with this. Indeed it is the 
conjunction cultural studies/theories of ideology/post-conceptualism which lays 
the ground for the deconstruction of representation, identity and the museum in 
critical postmodernism and the post-70s' secularization' of art. 
Significantly, then, cultural studies is the point of transition between an older 
237 The last gasp of this politics during this period was certainly in Spain after Franco's 
death in December 1975. Between 1976-1978 a large number of wildcat strikes, 
autonomous working class activity took place across the. country in defi~nce of both the 
Stalinist and social democratic parties. See Wildcat Spam: Encounters m Democracy, 
1976-1978, North Star Press, 1979 
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culture of 'resistance' based on the metaphors of distance and exclusion from 
popular culture and mass culture (Modernism, social realism) to one based on its 
critical negotiation. As such this has mean, at a fundamental level. a shift in the 
self-perceptions of the artist. The artist is no longer seen as someone who defines 
himself or herself solely through pushing forward the boundaries of a gi ven 
medium (Modernism) or exposing injustice through the anecdotal rendering of 
the world (social realism), but as someone who is critically conversant with art 
and its histories as part of a wider engagement with questions of representation, 
power and ideology. By the mid-1980s this had been codified in critical 
postmodernism as the' politics of representation' , and therefore, by extension, 
had become aligned with feminist cultural criticism, post-colonial theory, and gay 
and lesbian theory or queer theory. As a result this is also evidence of the 
changed positions, demands, and expectations of cultural critique during this 
period of unfettered free market ideology. In conditions where labour's direct 
confrontation with capital has been severely weakened, and where feminism, 
anti-racism and gay and lesbian politics have transformed notion of the polity, 
politics and culture coalesce in the critique of identity and the sign. In effect. the 
new democratic forces of the current period represents the extensive politi('i~atioll 
of culture, in circumstances where mainstream politics are widely discredited and 
where 'collective' ideologies are roundly attacked by the right and the new left. 
By this I don't mean that we are living through a period of radicalized culture in 
the sense that the early avant-garde or Conceptual art in the 1960s understood 
this but that in conditions where the efficiency of capital and the hierarchy of , 
labour is defended at all costs, the politicization of culture is 'politics by other 
means', insofar as it is one area where non-dominant and disaffirmative values 
can be debated, and discursively reconstructed in everyday life and common 
exchange. 
In these terms the institutionalization of critical postmodernisrn is evidence of the 
democratic concessions conceded by capital under its new phase of 
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modernization, the period of transition from the end of the long post-war boom to 
the repressed continuum of the world economy we are now Ii ving through (1976 _ 
).238 At the level of state policy in social administration and education (including 
art education) in Western Europe and North America this is the period of 
widespread advances for women, gay and lesbians and black people. In higher 
education, for example, the radical changes in the curriculum and in non-white. 
non-male staffing and student quotas, are unimaginable for those who studied or 
came to maturity in the 1940s and 1950s. The unevenness of these developments 
are easily pointed to, as the gap between official rhetoric and the realities of 
racism, xenophobia, homophobia in so-called democratic communities across 
Europe and North America strengthens the hand of conservative politicians and 
cultural critics. The vicious struggles between a reactive, Christian 
monoculturalism and the new multiculturalism continues to split lower and higher 
education in the USA and France. 239 Reactionary forces are regrouping. However, 
in terms of cultural tendencies and their long-term collectll'e effects. these 
advances have radically transformed certain sectors of the cultural industries and 
education, particularly the humanities, bringing about an extension of bourgeois 
democracy unimaginable to its conservative supporters and radical critics alike 
fifty years ago. 
In these terms the new art in Britain in the 1990s represents both an assimilation 
to, and local divergence from, these uneven cultural tendencies. That is, the new 
art looks the way it does primarily because it is the product of the first generation 
of artists to experience at first hand the institutional critique of Modernism and its 
academicization. By the early 90s the successful incorporation of critical 
postmodernism into higher education in Britain was beginning to produce its own 
238 For an extensive discussion of this period, see Istvan Meszaros, Beyond Capital: 
Towards a Theory of Transition, Merlin 1995 
239 For an excellent overview of these struggles in the US, see Ismael Reed, 
MultiAmerica: Essays on Cultural Wars and Cultural Peace, Penguin, 1997 
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modes of dissension. By this I don't mean art students were beginning to criticise 
critical postmodernism for its philosophical idealism or political 
substitutionalism, or for its collapse of art history into cultural studies. These 
criticisms were never an issue or a possibility in a period of political and cultural 
consensus around critical postmodernism. But rather, there was an increasino 
e 
disappointment in the languages of postmodern critique itself. The high-
theoretical languages of deconstruction, the appeal to a second-hand Situationism. 
the affirmative politics of identity (of non-identity), the overarching theories of 
capitalist spectacle, the rhetorics of entropy and endism, seemed to build a 
conflicting and conservative barrier around the production of new work. For 
instance a new generation of black artists in Britain were no longer interested in 
having their identities as mediated solely through issues of race and ethnicity. 
Whereas questions of blackness had been crucial in shifting the race-blindness of 
Modernism, and as such restoring the content of black experience to modern art 
in the 1980s, by the early 1990s this had itself become a constraint on the art's 
development. 'Identity' was being used by the public sector to confine black art 
to notions of its own and others' idealised notions of 'blackness'. In this the 
disappointments in the commercial art market and state sectors became 
increasingly matched by disappointment in those concepts and theories that 
supposedly offered a way of negotiating with these forces. Thus, even if the 
nationalist promotion of the new art has sought to write out, or marginalize. the 
contribution of black artists in Britain to the new post-conceptual agenda - and as 
a consequence many black artists have been strongly opposed to the new art in 
Britain - some of these artists have seen a possible alliance - albeit temporary. 
Third-generation post-colonialist black artists such as Chris Offili and Yinka 
Shonabera have directed their own sceptical attentions to the first-generation of 
black artists which helped form them. The recourse to the rhetoric and themes of 
black nationalism have faded. Consequently. what is distinctive about the work of 
some younger black and white English artists is the \\ay they are willing to use 
d . th' nd emblems of official and unofficial En£lish national an mme e signs a ... 
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identities, identities that have long been submerged under the imperatives of Irish. 
Scottish and Welsh anti-metropolitanism and radical regionalism. Britain's 
imperialist special relationship with the US is no weaker and no less prone to old-
fashioned economic interventionism in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the (interrupted) cease fire in Ireland. the 
developing historical distance from forms of colonial administration. and the 
increasing presence of black and new immigrant cultures within the national 
culture, contestatory and popular national identities now have much more room to 
breath. Without saying the new art's English 'localisms' derive directly from this 
conjunction of forces, nevertheless these changes have brought about a 
discernible opening up of the national culture to its unofficial histories and 
unofficial popular forms. In this sense it is possible to see a shift of attention 
among younger non-white artists to the question of 'Englishness', a loosening of 
the usual ideological reserve. There is an attempt to extend what it might mean to 
be an English artist in confrontation with the old colonialist/paternalist and 
pastoralist identities that have consciously and unconsciously shaped the 
reception and development of modernism in Britain and the notion of English 
art's 'apartness', from Alfred Munnings through to Patrick Heron. Pop art in an 
important sense was the first post-war movement to question and shift these 
allegiances, largely as a result of the influx of working class students into the art 
schools in the 50s and 60s in the wake of the 1944 Education Act. The new art 
extends this process of scrutiny. In fact one of the outcomes of the new art is the 
way black and white artists have found ways of identifying and negotiating 
notions of 'Englishness' without recourse to conservative national myths of 
'exceptionalism'. If there is a 'politics' in the new art art, it lies here in the 
construction of a critical post-colonialist national identity for the artist through 
the absorption, from below, of the sceptical energies of a British popular (multi) 
culture.24o 
240 One artist who stands out as a transitional figure between the remnants of ,an older 
English national cultural formation and the construction of a p~st~colonlal one IS Mark 
Wallinger. Wallinger was perhaps the first post-conceptual artist In the 1980s to reflect 
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In these terms in the early 1990s there was a shaking free of the expectations of 
the new radical postmodern academy. But why exactly did this take off in 
Britain? Firstly language: the British art school system was a privileged 
transmission belt of American critical postmodernism; secondly, the weak links 
historically between the art market, the museum system and theoretical academy, 
unlike in the US, discouraging a bland culture of professionalism: and thirdly, the 
vitality and strength of a commercial popular culture in Britain, which was an 
immediate focus for dissent from what was perceived as the GrowinG Gap between e ee 
the realities of recession hit Britain and the failed ideologies of critical 
postmodernism. This meant that the disappointments in critical postmodernism 
were given a preemptive focus in Britain, where students had been exposed to the 
new radical academy through the late 80s and early 90s. But the dissent from the 
radical American academy, was not in itself an anti-American ideology: indeed 
the 'localisms' of the new art are largely a reworking of dissident US West Coast 
'localisms', which in the 1980s had resisted the intellectual dominance of New 
York. This replayed, in certain respects, the appropriation of West coast 
Conceptual art by British post-conceptual artists in the mid-70s, such as Victor 
Burgin, John Stezaker and John Hilliard, who, in key respects, provided the 
ideological ground for US critical postmodernism in the late-70s. Indeed this 
dialectic reveals how much of post-war British and American culture has been a 
process of exchange, contamination and negotiation, in which 'localisms' in one 
culture find their development in another. 
It is clear that the first notable punk bands were from the US (The Electric Eels, 
circa 1972), but it took the cultural impact of the Sex Pistols and the Clash in 
back critically on notions of Englishness, and English national ide.ntity, in a language that 
was confidently engaged in the pleasures and alienati~ns of English popular ?ulture. The 
narration of his own 'otherly-cultured' identity as an artist, undoubtedly fee~s Into the 
popular cultural concerns of the new art - despite his antipathy to many of Its moves and 
interests. 
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particular, across a relatively small geographical area, to define the use-values 
and critical tone of punk for other national cultures. Punk was 'collectivized', 
proletarianized in Britain and then exported to the States. This does not mean that 
Britain is a vast R&D department for the US market, but that the relations 
between popular culture, youth, and class identifications within a given national 
space, have proven again and again in Britain to solidify quickly, producing 
unprecedented levels of production and consumption of popular musics outside of 
the dominant cultural industries, giving a competitive edge to British popular 
culture. The continued success of this on the ground has partly to do with 
vagaries of the British social security system which until recently allowed artists 
and musicians to claim dole without too much pressure to find alternative work, 
and the penetration of popular culture as a dissident set of values and aspirations 
within wide sections of black and white working class youth and the lower-
middle class, This is exactly what happened in 1987-88 with the rise of 
techno/House/Acid, as the incorporation of new technologies into the production 
of new dance cultures, generating new popular cultures of resistance out of what 
initially was a reworking of disco. Although much of the music was developed 
out of the Detroit and Chicago dance scene (which in turn mutated out of British 
post-punk electronic rock) it was the cultural and collecti ve energies surrounding 
the music in Britain which established the diversity and significance of the new 
electronic dance culture (which is now being sold back to a mass audience in the 
US as forms of high-tech spectacle). 
In conditions of local/international dislocation artistic precedent cannot in itself 
secure national cultural significance and diversification. Which is exactly what 
happened to the art of the mid-to-Iate 80s on the West Coast of America. It is 
clear in terms of ethos, cultural reference points, neuroses, and mannerisms, new 
art in Britain in the 1990s owes its negotiation with New critical postmodernism 
to the abject and comical strategies of the West Coast school of' pathetic art'. In 
the 80s the art of Mike Kelly, Paul McCarthy, Lari Pittman in LA stood its 
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ground against East coast critical postmodernism from a position of a socially 
dissident humour.
241 
The mutant, the putrefied, the self-abnegated in this work. 
returned the representation of the body (particularly the male body) to a theatre of 
grotesque alienation. Without doubt the grotesque and aburdist ironization of the 
effects of commodification fill out the framework of critical postmodernism. 
Cindy Sherman is no slouch here. But in Kelly and McCarthy the ironized signs 
of physical and mental retardation and congenital 'stupidity' cut an abreactive 
line through official and intellectual languages of dissent, producing a grim 
mockery of critical postmodernism's claims to social interventionism. Indeed 
what marks out the LA scene is the reconnection of art to the rhetorics of 'rock 
'n' roll expressionism' and gothic nihilism, which New York critical 
postmodernism has turned its back on in favour of a photographic reworking of 
post-conceptual cool. Art in Britain in the 1990s shares this space of 'morbid' and 
'humorous' dissension, mixing popular genres and forms with interdisciplinary 
enthusiasm. But these precedents have, until recently, remained shadowy 
presences largely because of these artists own marginality within the US. It is 
only with the collective transformation of some of the interests of this art in 
Britain in the 1990s, that Kelly, McCarthy and Pittman etc, are now taken 
seriously, or taken seriously enough to be included in big international shows 
with younger artists and have glossy monographs written about them. Although 
we can point to artistic antecedents in the US in the 1980s it is the cultural 
extension and transformation of these tendencies under different social conditions 
in Britain that marks out what is significant about the art of the 1990s. That is, a 
particular explosive conjunction of social and cultural forces in Thatcher's Britain 
in the 1980s and 1990s made it possible to pick up and run with a number of 
issues and strategies considered marginal and trivial. 
241 On the West Coast the group show 'Helter Skelter' at MOCA had a comparable 
cultural - if not popular national impact - as 'Sensation'. This sh~w included both Kelly 
and McCarthy. For a brief discussion of the LAlLondon connectIon see, Peter Wollen, 
'Thatcher's Artists' London Review of Books, Vol 19, No 21,30 October 1997 , 
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When Damien Hirst and friends organized 'Freeze' in the London Docklands in 
1988 it didn't just represent a coming together of a new generation of artists, but 
a moment of economic and cultural resettlement for late 80s art. The last 
recession had wiped out the glory days and 'high-drama' of the mid-80s art 
boom, forcing younger artists to once again rely on their own organisational and 
promotional efforts to 'move the culture forward'. At the time younger artists 
were trapped between a moribund private sector showing the remnants of the 
'glitzy' new US and European painting, and a public sector driven by the new 
alliance between lens-based work and identity politics. The' Freeze' artists may 
have wanted a new place in the sun - which some of them got - but they also 
wanted a culture of practice and conversation which they could call their own. 
This did not mean that younger artists held no faith in public funding of the arts, 
but that the criteria of public funding was no longer able to reflect or coincide 
with the realities of art production in cost-cutting driven Thatcherite Britain. The 
need for an independent network of spaces and project-initiatives was an absolute 
imperative in order to reconnect the conditions of art's production with what was 
perceived as the 'lived experience' of the artist: the fact that the majority of 
artists, unemployed or on low incomes, are neither involved in social production 
nor exchange or consumption on any meaningful level. 
Revealingly, then, 'Freeze' was a show filled with the kind of work that was in 
abeyance: cool post-minimalism - the ironic art of an indefatigable ideological 
stalemate between a disowned past and an unfathomable future. As the new 
spaces proliferated in the East End, as a post-'Freeze' generation grew in 
confidence, as the new popular dance and club cultures began to identify a new 
sense of modernity and belonging, as the dissensions of dole-culture began to find 
a new ideological shape, a new collective sense of breaking with the professional 
claims of the academy based practice began to emerge. In this atmosphere of 
'retreat' and 'letting go', the high-theoretical demands of post-conceptual art 
rewritten by critical postmodernism out of French post-structuralism seemed to 
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prevent any affective engagement with the alienated boredoms. frustrations and 
pleasures of the culture that artists experienced on a daily basis: no money, bad 
housing, bad TV, and drugs. Indeed the double-ideological-whammy of zero-sum 
simulation theory and the critique of the subject made the truth of the artists own 
experience appear inauthentic and second-hand. 
Such everyday realities have been no different for innumerable previous 
generations, but such were the professional expectations of artists in the late 80s. 
that the available role-models and ego-ideals - aesthete, artist-intellectual. social 
interventionist - in conditions of widespread poverty and diminished prospects for 
artists seemed either strangely corrupt or ineffectual. The subjective outcome was 
a post-conceptual mediation of the 'crisis of art' and its institutions through a 
return to the alienations, reifications and fetishisms of everyday living. as a 
means of connecting art to what seemed to have a greater authenticity. According 
to Maurice Blanchot the 'everyday' challenges heroic living:242 and in this sense 
the cultural impact of the new art in its use of snapshots, cheap videos, the 
diaristic and confessional, and the genres and forms of popular culture, is a 
'realist' move. By this I mean the conditions of art's critical renewal are 
performed out of the social conditions which both seem to prevent the flourishing 
of art (daily material and cultural impoverishment) and reconnect the artist with 
his or her own experiences and desires (the imperatives of self-transformation). In 
these terms the new art "seeks to recapture the secret destructive capacity that is 
in play,,243 in the everyday, in a language without false pathos. As a result it is the 
'localisms' of the art that again serve notice on what are perceived as the 
unlivable social relations of the art of the dominant academy or prevailing culture 
of art. 
242 Maurice Blanchot, 'La Parole quotidienne', in L 'Entretien infini, Gallimard, 1959. 
Translated as 'Everyday Speech' in Yale French Studies, No 73 1987 
243 Maurice Blanchot, ibid, p19 
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One of the major conflicts of post-war art education and cultural studies has been 
the dispute between the idea of culture as a 'way of life' and culture as the 
specialist 'practices of art'. The former is largely identified with a . popular 
culture' from below (with everyday working class customs, traditions, and modes 
of resistance), rather than popular culture from' above' (commercial 
entertainment), the latter with the professionally trained skills and forms of high 
culture.
244 
The most palpable and destructive effect of this split has been the 
disjunction between education and the customary experience of the working class 
or lower-middle class student. Indeed the experience of art education for the post-
war working-class or lower-middle class student has been the 'trainino out' of the e 
common pleasures and experiences of popular culture. Pop artists though broke 
through this deracination by incorporating the pleasures of popular culture and 
mass culture into their work without condescension. Critical postmodernism 
continued this historical tendency, but situated the embodied pleasures of popular 
culture and mass culture in art as the site of social critique from within the space 
of the university, The new art, on the other hand, incorporates the commercialized 
pleasures of the popular without embarrassment or intellectual distance. As with 
Pop art the new art refuses to disown or patronise what it sees as a shared or 
common culture, which, as I have argued elsewhere, is the return of an 
assertiveness in being 'otherly' cultured amongst artists from working-class or 
lower-middle class backgrounds. 245 But, unlike Pop art, the new art is refracted 
through a post-conceptual performance of artistic scepticism. At the same time as 
the work incorporates non-specialist modes of attention it recognises, as Dave 
Beech, has put it: "that art is indefensible".246 Hence the pert'ormance of 
244 For a discussion of the history of these conflicts and disputes in Britain, see Tom 
Steele, The Emergence of Cultural Studies 1945-65: Cultural Politics, Adult Education 
and the English Question, Lawrence & Wishart, 1997 
245 For an analysis of the links between Pop art and the new art, see John Rob~rts, 'Pop 
Art, The Popular and British Art of the 1990s', in Dun~~n McCorquodale, Naomi Siderfln, 
and Julian Stallabrass eds., Occupational Hazard: Cntlcal Wntmgs on Recent Bntlsh Art. 
Black Dog, 1998 
246 Dave Beech, 'Strange Company', Artifice, No 3, 1995, p104 
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scepticism is exactly that, a petformance - it does not mean the unequivocal 
denunciation of art. The petformance of scepticism affirms the crisis of 
traditional principles, attributes and modes of presentation of art-making, while 
relying on them to determine the practice of the petformance itself. As Drew 
Milne argues: "the performance of a negative attitude or critical relation allows 
scepticism to undermine the condition of art's reality, but without undermining ib 
'-
own conditions as a performance of sceptical undecidability".247 As such, he goes 
on to say, "the performance is scepticism lisJ a defining problem in contemporary 
art".248 But this petformance produces very different kinds of practices. 
What is different about the new art's petformance of scepticism is its ideological 
shift away from an 80s counter-hegemonic performance of scepticism on the 
institutions of art and the Modernist conception of the autonomous artwork. 
There is little art in the 1990s being made on the mythos of the autonomous 
artwork or the crisis of the liberal inclusiveness of the museum. The performance 
of scepticism has shifted predominantly into the area of what Peter Sioterdijk has 
described as the pleasures of cynical reason.2-f9 The outcome of this is that the 
return to the everyday as a return to the customary pleasures of the popular 
reflects a general shift to an art which explores the alienations of the artistic 
apparatus through the alienations of the everyday. By this I don't mean that 
alienation has become a distinct subject area for the new art, a theme, but that in 
performing a sceptical understanding of art through the genres and forms of the 
popular this generation adopt a more inclusive view of popular modes of attention 
in the artwork. It is in the performance of the alienated pleasures of consumption 
that the embodied pleasures of popular culture are taken to be ethically 
247 Drew Milne, 'The Performance of Scepticism', in ed., Juliet Steyn, Act 3 - Endgame, 
Pluto Press, 1997 
248 Drew Milne, ibid, p58 
249 Peter Sioterdijk, The Critique of Cynical Reason, Verso 1988 
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ambiguous. This makes the purported' hedonistic subjecti \'it) . of the new art 
significant. For with the adoption of a post-conceptual framework of sceptical 
artistic reflexes and modes of address the boundary between art as a 'wav of life?' 
and art as a set of autonomous practices is weakened. The result is an art whOSe? 
scepticism about its own means is also performed on the identity of the artist as 
'distanced professional'. This represents the historically qualitative 
transformation of the new art, what David Perreau, has suggesti \'ely called the 
'belittling' of Modernism and the avant-garde250 - or in more openly 
disaffirmative terms, the revenge of being 'otherly' cultured on this art. There are 
innumerable instances of this, but a few will suffice: Jonathan Monk pissing on a 
Richard Serra, Gavin Turk's scrappy Robert Morris mirror boxes, Keith Tyson's 
casting of Kentucky Fried Chicken menus in lead, Damien Hirst's DIY suicide 
video, Rebecca Warren's and Feargal Stapleton's cum video. Sarah Lucas's 
sausage eating video, Richard Billingham's photographs of his self-brutalizing 
working-class family. In this way recapturing "the secret destructi ve capacity that 
is in play" in the everyday is about openly incorporating both the good and ugly 
aspects aspects of the artist's life into his or her practice. This is a generation who 
descent into the everyday has involved the remaking of the modern performance 
of scepticism as a narrativization of their own ordinary and routine experiences. 
Hence we might describe the new art as a kind of humbling of both Modernism 
and postmodernism in conditions where the social claims of art that it cracks the 
social exclusivity of the dominant institutions of art have seemed even more 
distant than the Situationists and Conceptual art ever believed. The outcome has 
been twofold from this: one, the production and reception of the art is directly 
associated with everyday activities (eating, meeting friends. idleness, sex, going 
to the pub, getting drunk, taking drugs), and two; an art that seeks a sceptical 
informality from inside the codes and conventions of professionalism. 
250 David Perreau, see his writings on Jonathan Monk, in particular 'L'imitateur, Chugalug 
the beer, don't swallow the rules', Artpress, no 236, June 1998 
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Overall the new art evokes a domestication of Modernl'sm and t d . pos rno ernl sm, a 
deflation of their forms, setting and themes that appears to cohere with the current 
vogue for micro-narratives: the histories of discrete objects or small-scale 
communities. In renarrativising the small-change of daily alienations the artist is 
shown to act in empathy with' what is at hand'. However. these processes of 
domestication meet up with, and transform and are transformed by the critical 
legacies they are working through. Despite the distance taken from the counter-
hegemonic machinery of critical postmodernism the new art is no less grounded 
in debates on the politics of representation and identity than the work of Cindy 
Sherman and Mary Kelly. The difference is that the reliance on theory is no 
longer attached to any programmatic social or artistic agenda. 
The extensive and distinctive participation of women in the formation of the new 
art, therefore, is not to be taken for granted. It is evidence of the increasing power 
of women artists to determine the public meanings of their art in a situation \vhere 
the performance of scepticism on the the institutions and prevailing professional 
categories of art has threatened the comfortable inclusion of the male artist: in 
this sense the re-narrativization of the everyday is inseparable from the counter-
narrations of history and subjectivity explored by women artists and writers from 
the late 1960s. But, at the same time, this is a generation of artists whose 
relationship to questions of femininity, gender and identity is not determined 
principally by the struggles of first and second generation feminists. That is. their 
relationship to the histories of feminism and women's art is as much conditioned 
by an awareness of its mistakes and hiatuses as it is by its strengths. Indeed the 
historical weaknesses of the categories 'feminist art' or 'women's art' - or any 
other instrumental category - is something that this generation of women artists 
have internalized. There is now a legitimate and widespread fear that such 
t . f' the work of women to a self-imaoe that no longer retlects the ca egones can me ~ L 
day to to day experience of women artists. But more pointedly sllch categories 
d k d' The prevent women experiencing their ml'lI dissonant feel i ngs and ar eSI res. 
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re-narrativization of the everyday for younger women artists, therefore, has meant 
a reconnection with both the prosaic-everyday as a space for re-gendering 
(football and competitive games seem to be a recurring subject) and the illicit-
everyday as a space for appropriation and recoding (pornography for example). In 
sum there has been a vigorous repositioning of the feminine as the cultural 
expectations of the feminine have been widely challenged at work, entertainment 
and culture in the 1990s. As Paula Smithard has argued in an article on Lucas. 
Emin, Lucy Gunning and Sam Taylor-Wood. The use of a "brutalizing vulgarity" 
in much of the new work by women "destabilises the cultural subject position of 
masculinity and femininity, forcing them to re-signify their meanings ... ~51 The net 
effect is the putative' masculinization' of the feminine-everyday. \\'here once the 
metaphors of hysteria, of female 'absence' or the 'other' dominated feminist 
cultural theory and art in the 1980s, today the feminine is performed as a 
troubling affirmation of women's sexuality, labour and social role. ~5~ 
The challenge to the feminine-as-absence has also brought about a comparable 
engagement with masculinity on the part of young male artists. One of the 
common complaints against much of the new art by men, is that it plays out. in 
various guises, a boorish masculinity: a New Lad attitudinizing: Matt Collishaw 
gobbing at the viewer; Bank simulating a cheap porn movie (with their clothes 
on). However, this is short-sighted and partial. In the 1980s the impact of second-
generation feminism on work by men and women directed a number of younger 
male artists to take a look at their own masculinity. l\luch of this work dealt with 
sexuality and was mostly by gay artists: heterosexual male artists were 
conspicuous by their absence. In the 1990s, though, younger heterosexual make 
251 Paula Smithard, 'Grabbing the Phallus by the Balls: Recent Art by Women', 
Everything, No 21, 1996, p5. 
252 For a discussion of these changes, see John Roberts, Chapter 9, ~he ~rt of 
. R I' Photography and the Everyday Manchester University Press, InterruptIOn: ea Ism, ' 
1998 
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artists have taken up the issue touching on the darkness of masculinity, its 
aggressions and morbidities as much as its frailties, in an attempt to work through 
the cultural options and possible identities for the de-heroicized, sceptical (white) 
male post-conceptual artist. Much of this work seems to have thrown off the guilt 
of men-in-feminism of the 1980s, as if the loss of conviction in the ideal of the 
Great Artist or artist-intellectual has allowed a space for men to stage both the 
impostures and pleasures of masculinity. In this sense to talk about the alienations 
of the everyday in this work is to recognise how much masculinity here is 
equated with the extension of adolescence into adulthood and emotional failure. 
Hence the work tends to divide between those who confess and play-out their 
own 'incompetence' as artists and men (such as Patrick Brill. aka Bob and 
Roberta Smith) and those - the larger group - who reflect on the rituals, customs 
and pleasures of extended male adolescence. For instance, Roderick Buchanan's 
serial portrait of a group of Scottish park-football players who chose to play in 
Italian club shirts. This group-bonding is as much about identification through 
cultural exclusivity as it is about the 'localization' of the international and 
internalization of the local. In this respect the register in which these reflections 
on the rituals of masculinity are performed stress the commodification of 
masculinity as series of defence mechanisms. In Buchanan's work this has a 
specific class focus. In other work the sense of modern masculinity as an 
extended adolescence draws on what might be called the feminization of 
masculinity, In this work it as if the link between hysteria and powerlessness in 
women's art of the 1980s has shifted to that of the experience of men. For 
instance in Graham Ramsay's 1996 video of his fictional figure John Saxon 
(named after a British B-movie actor from the sixties), male domestic 
incompetence - in this instance the grotesque inability to make a brevi! sancl\\ich 
_ becomes a moment of masculine self-destruction and emptiness. It is also more 
than a coincidence the number of artists \\'ho have used the obsessive school-
book type list of loves and hates (Simon Patterson, Douglas Gordon) or adopted 
d dl
' dl'awino (Paul Noble i\latthe\\' Higgs) as a way of ordering 00 lllg or scrappy eo ( , ~ L - C 
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their neuroses and fantasies. Gordon for example I'n the' L'f 'L' . ' h 'p' 
I e 1\ e s ow In an ~ 
and Lisbon in 1997 - the big European showcase of the new art - produced an 
autobiographical reading/listening room consisting of 30 songs released in the 
first few months after his birth in 1966.253 The song-list. which include The 
Byrds, The Beatles, The Small Faces and The Lovin' Spoonful. were played 
continuously on a loop. Naturally the making of lists is not gender-specific. but 
the way such lists passively order desire in male adolescence point to this work a~ 
another strategy of "belittling": the feminization of the masculine fetish of the 
index in Conceptual art. As in Jonathan Monk's explicit domestication of 
Modernism, the signs of masculine rigour and masculine' scienticity' are 
contaminated and given an informal, subjective identity, In fact this 
informalization is a more nuanced way of looking at the notion of belittlement. 
For what informalization acknowledges is the incorporation of the formal 
achievements of Modernism and the avant-garde within the orbit of daily social 
habits and fantasies, rather than their empty parody, This is why it is Bruce 
Naumann, Gilbert & George and Lawrence Weiner, conceptual artists who 
themselves adopted a more informal approach in the 1960s. and who to a certain 
extent played the role of the artist as . fai I ure', that perhaps ha ve had the greater 
impact on the new art. These artists' performance of scepticism through various 
mundane actions in everyday settings - walking around the studio. gctti ng drunk 
in a pub, announcing the linguistic commonplace as a way of talking about 
meaning itself - have provided much of the' cool' look and diffident cues of the 
sardonic styling in the new art. Indeed, as an internali:ation of the avant-garde' s 
strateaies of intellectual distanciation the new art's informality pulis the museum 
b 
reception of Conceptual art back into the familiar spaces of the domestic, In short. 
the new art is bedroom. kitchen or living room art, reinventing the "weird 
domesticity" of the 1960s, 
253, , A P' 1996 97 and Centro de Exposi<;6es/Centro Cultural de Balem. LIfe/LIve, re, ans, -, 
Lisbon, 1997 
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But unlike Art & Language's description of Conceptual art above, the bedroom 
and the living room are not just sites of art's production and renewal 'from 
below', so to speak, but also mis en scenes for the prosaic-and-illicit-everyday. In 
these terms not only is the bedroom perhaps the favourite mis en scene of the new 
art, but it establishes the bedroom as a place of fantasy and control. The various 
acts of personal disclosure performed in bedrooms in numerous contemporary 
videos and photo-installations (Georgina Starr, Gillian Wearing, Deborah 
Holland) is evidence of a suture between the site of the work's production and its 
content. What was simply a site of production in Conceptual art and a site of 
tension between the values of the collective and those of public culture, now 
doubles as means of reflection on the gendered and alienated content of the 
domestic as a site of fantasy. The' bedroom' and its mirrors and props, iconic 
mass cultural images and sounds becomes the primary scene of the mass cultural 
spectacle, a place where the fantasies of the feminine and the masculine are 
played out and reproduced. In these terms these artists stage the pleasures of 
infantalization and regression~ or what Slavoj Zizek has called that surplus of 
enjoyment out of which ideology produces its effects. 254 From this perspecti ve, 
therefore, the narcissistic self-display and voyeurism in the work of Georgina 
Starr, for instance, constitute the sceptical performance of an older feminine 
powerlessness: the desire to be valued and defined simply through your 
appearance. But to this end the image of celebrity is not ironized, but vampirized, 
treated as the legitimate extension of the artist's identity as someone-to-be-
looked-at-and-admired. This is the post-Warhol ian concept of the artist as 
celebrity performed as an authentic simulation. 
In oeneral the localisms of the new art are inseparable from those wider global 
b 
localisms of the mass cultural spectacle which currently drive the fantasies of the 
masculine and the feminine: the' magical' transformation of the ordinary and 
254 Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso 1989 
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anonymous into the celebrated and unique. Thus it is not fortuitous that the 
recourse to documentary video in much of the new' domestic' \\ ork has emerged 
at the same time as the TV confessional (predominantly sexual) and the 
voyeuristic real-time video or film of (working-class) people in distress or life 
threatening situations (Reality TV). In the 1990s the videoino and filmino of 
e :=-
tragedy and its aftermath, and the ordinary lives of those at work and playas a 
means of insight into' human conflict', have dominated the air-ways in the US. 
Europe and Britain. If this simulates celebrity for its willing participants and 
victims, the simulation of celebrity through mimicry has also become popular. 
The television programme Stars in Their Eyes and the emergence of the tribute 
band have become so popular in Britain in the 1990s, that there is now a 
successful circuit of fake performers catering to the pleasure of popular cultural 
nostalgia - or more specifically to that moment or moments in people's lives 
when youth, sexuality, and popular music promised everything. From a similar 
perspective the 1990s have also been the decade of Fantasy League football and 
its simulation of the decisive managerial decision, the decision that \vill win your 
leadership respect not just from your peers but from the nation! As with the TV 
confessional's mimicry of celebrity Fantasy Leagues order desire around taking 
pleasure from the simulation of power. As such Fantasy League football is 
evidence of the adolescent list writ large. With the increasing capital investment 
in football (particularly in Britain) and the increasing inter-club mobility of star 
players there has, consequently, been greater emphasis on individual players' 
market status and therefore on their value against other plays, reinventing the 
professional commentator and spectator alike as a keen maker of lists and 
predictions. 
The drive to hierachisize through consumption also shapes a great deal of popular 
cultural journalism. The exponential increase and diversification in musics and 
the niche production of films turned has turned cultural journalism into a kind of 
manic tabulation in which merit-stars and league positions' sort-out' what is 
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worthwhile or naff for the culture-saturated consumer. Likewise the rise of the 
celebrity questionnaire has also fashioned a space within the' partici patory' space 
of mass culture - those spaces in which the consumer feels he or she is being 
directly addressed - for fantasy list-making, the fantasy of being chosen to select 
those three top tunes, those three top films, those three favourite books that will 
convince people of your excellent taste. When Adorno talked about the seducti ve 
infantilizations of mass culture he could have had the charms of list-makin o in o 
mind. For the list establishes value with discursive justification: that is, it is 
cultural criticism without the effort. That contemporary art is awash with 
confessions - faked or otherwise - artist mimicking celebrities, (Edwin David 
posing as Nico), and lists and indexes and maps and charts posing as lists, does 
not mean that the art dreams itself to be popular, even if some artists would wish 
this true. But that the pleasures and modes of attention of popular culture have 
become a means of structuring the performance of scepticism without 
condescension to the popular. 
The new art is a product of a continuing wave of disappointment with art's 
internal critique of itself from the late 1960s and Conceptual art onwards. In these 
terms it represents an intensification of the performance of scepticism in 
conditions of capitalism's repressed continuum. The domestication and 
"belittling" of Modernism and critical postmodernism is further evidence of the 
historical split between the formal challenges of the avant-garde and social 
transformation. Yet out of these conditions of retreat, in the 1990s in Britain a 
new community of artists were able to dismantle the old academic fealties: as a 
result a shift of sorts took place from the power of artworld professionals to the 
artist themselves, from public and commercial spaces to artist-run spaces. This 
shift in comparable in its effects, in not in its intentions, to the moment of 
Conceptual art. The return of the alternative space, the informality of the art's 
production and reception, the promotion of popular know I edges and autodidactic 
pleasures, the inclusion of' otherly' cultured modes of address, of fan-based 
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pleasures, were necessary strategies in resecuring the autonomy of art against its 
educative, aestheticized or professional-radical incorporation. But the 
deflationary strategies of this art are the product of very different social and 
political circumstances than the deflationary strategies of the 1960s. This is 
generation of artists who in risking irresponsibility, imbecility, and dumbness in 
order to recover a sense of urgency and agency for art, have had to risk something 
more: the loss of historical consciousness. The result has been the aeneral 
~ 
incorporation of the withdrawal of legitimacy in the ideals of Modernism and 
critical postmodernism into a de-historicized framework of the' popular'. This is 
not to hold this work to ideological ransom, as if the job of artists is to be 
responsible to some overarching sense of the future; the travails of virtue are 
particularly well known from the institutional fate of critical postmodernism. The 
performance of scepticism in the new art is, essentially, a critique of the gap 
between the social ideals of critical postmodernism - art as counter-hegemonic 
practice - and the institutional power and bureaucratic prestige of such art. I n the 
end, however, to turn away from history by domesticating the larger horizons of 
art is to diminish the kind and quality of artistic conversation that might be had, 
and to deplete the available resources out of which art's negations can continue to 
be made. 
The new art's narrative if interruption in the academy and the market place is 
largely over. The community of practioners centred on a number of galleries in 
the East End of London is weakened and dispersed. Artists are moving on, and 
need to make a decent living. Artist run spaces are closing, some are prudently 
cutting back after funding cuts; some are now finding the job of sustaining a 
regular programme a burden when it once seemed a necessity. Moreover, as the 
new technological networks of artistic production and reception continue to open 
and diversify questions of aesthetic informality centred on the object loose their 
critical efficacy. The turn to the amateurish and the informal begins to look 
d d t l'lled as l't did in Conceptual art by 197-+. In one sense these are mannere an s ra , 
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the inevitable effects of cultural dispersal, in another sense though, they represent 
a loss of direction, as the inclusions of the market once again try to define the 
limits of the possible. The point, however, is to see the impact of the work 
beyond its market fate. What makes much of the art of the 1990s in Britain so 
compelling is not so much the informality of the work in and of itself. but the way 
it identifies a community of practioners who for a brief moment opened out a 
space for shared energies and aspirations outside of the professionalized 
academy. This is undoubtedly utopian, a fantasy of exclusion, but without these 
moments of unsettlement, imaginary or otherwise, we are all back in the museum 
waiting for the speeches and canapes. 
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Chapter 11: Trickster: Performativity and Critique in Rod Dickinson's 
'Crop Circles' 
Since 1991 Rod Dickinson has been involved in making crop-circles with other 
artists and friends. Under the cover of darkness, armed with string. simple 
wooden planks and an outline of their design, the group enter the field along the 
seed lines, taking care to avoid any crop damage. Once in position - far a\vay 
from potential surveillance from the edge of the field - they work fast by 
moonlight, working to a prearranged pattern, completing the design by sunrise. 2:':' 
Over the years these designs have become more complex, putting enormous 
strain on the group to finish the circles under darkness. This is risky, for there is 
now a 'price' on the heads of crop-circle makers. Pressure is being exerted by the 
National Farmers Union on local farming communities to prevent what is seen as 
a major irritant during the summer, although farmers themsel ves are not too keen 
to get involved directly as there are large amounts of money to be made opening 
up their fields to paying tourists. Moreover, there is some support from the UFO 
and crop-circle research, or Cerealogy, community itself for the' hoaxers' to be 
exposed. (As yet no one in Britain has been caught. no one arrested). For what 
divides the crop-circle watching community more than anything else is the 
division between the 'hoaxes' and the so-called authentic circles, those circles 
that are claimed by the Cerealogists to be made without human intervention. 
These designs, according to 'expert' opinion, are those which could not possibly 
have been completed in darkness within a few hours. In Britain these complex 
designs are invariably produced by Dickinson and his helpers: the' Dr\:\ Double 
Helix', the 'Koch snowflake' and the Julia-set fractal' amongst recent ones. 
255 The personnel of the crop-circle team changes on a regular basis; however, s.ince 
1994 Dickinson has worked in close collaboration with the artist and web-Site deSigner 
John Lundberg 
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In the Cerealogist literature any suggestion that these desions \\ere made bv 
e . 
humans is met with incredulity and passionate denunciation. In fact a great deal 
of' scientific' evidence is marshalled to prove non-human intervention, for 
instance: changes in the cell structure of flattened stalks; consistent absence of 
entrance marks to the fields; alleged malfunctioning of electronic equipment in or 
near the circles; migrating birds swerving away from the fields; observation and 
photographing of unexplained lights over the circles; positive or deleterious 
changes to people's metabolism or state of being inside or near the circle. 2)b This 
list is not exhaustive, but it gives a clear sense of what is of central importance for 
the Cerealogists: crop-circles are evidence of inexplicable forces which signal the 
wider impact of extra-terrestrial communications or paranormal intrusion in life 
on earth. 
When Dickinson began making circles he was entering a tradition that was at 
least fifteen years old. In Britain the first circles were made by Dave Chorley 
(who died in 1997) and Doug Bower in the early 1970s. Begun initially as an 
enthusiastic response to the early conflation of New Age environmentalism and 
Ufology, their producers soon became locked into outwitting the 'true believers'. 
In effect Chorley and Bower had initiated a new folk tradition of temporal' art 
events'. Drawing on country lore and mystical symbols they created the raw 
materials for a new paranormal mythology. It was the obvious success of this 
process of mythologizing which attracted Dickinson. With little physical effort 
and little financial outlay, Chorley and Bower were able to find an audience, and 
eventually a critical public, for their circles. But in a sense this is to make 
Dickinson's debt to their work too formal. For Dickinson came to the crop-ci rcles 
armed with post-Situationist theories of art and social intervention, modern media 
theory and a post-conceptualist critique of the art institution, and not just a love of 
256 See for example, Nancy Talbot, 'Crop Formations: The Biophysical Perspective', The 
Circular, no. 27, Winter 1996f7 
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the English countryside and a passion for a 'good joke'. Yet, despite this, it is the 
very anonymous status of Chorley's and Bower's, and all the other crop-circle 
work, that provided a basis for Dickinson's art: to rethink crop-circle making as 
the basis for an enquiry into the conditions of modern mythology. 
The anonymity of crop-circle making provides a perfect metonym for a critique 
of artistic authorship and artistic value, but in a social setting which remains 
outside of the art institution. This is because as a crop-circle maker Dickinson is 
able to operate without any of the constraints of appearing not to be an artist.The 
circles are, first and foremost, made for a non-art public made of Ufologists, 
Cerealogists, New Agers, etc. There is no question, therefore, of the circles being 
seen as a 'second-order' artistic activity before their primary validation as 
'unexplained phenomena'. That is, Dickinson produces crop-circles within a 
tradition of amateur art practice which makes no substantive claims for the 
artistic self-consciousness of its activities. In fact, amongst amateur practioners 
such as Chorley and Bower, the most important thing worth attending to was 
whether the circles had been noted and categorized by the Cerealogists. In this 
Dickinson stepped into a rich tradition of amateur art, which has the power, as 
with earlier forms of folk art, to secure intellectual and aesthetic investment on 
the part of an enthusiastic non-specialist public. 
But if all Dickinson wanted to do was make a new folk art, if all he wanted to do , 
was leave the art institution behind in the name of some spurious populism, then 
his activities would rightly be dismissed as opportunist and crass. What is 
sionificant about the crop-circles phenomenon is, paradoxically, their invisibility 
I:> 
as amateur art or otherwise within the paranormal literature. For with the failure 
of the crop-circle writers to attend to the realities of human agency the notion of 
the crop-circle or 'Conceptual art' becomes the absent cause of their arguments. 
This produces a cleavage which is highly suggestive in the discussion of ideolog: 
and modern cultural division. \\'hat is laid claim to amongst its practioners as a 
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form of folk art is unable to be recognized as such because of the overwhelmino 
e 
need on the part of 'true believers' to affirm the extra-human at the expense of the 
human. Hence what is important about the crop-circle phenomenon for Dickinson 
is not just its status as a modern folk practice, but its cultural reception and 
misperception. That Cerealogist writers are prepared to argue for either the 
extraterrestrial or paranormal creation of the circles is not simply perverse. but 
culturally significant, pointing to needs and desires which modern forms of 
rationalism cannot meet. 
Crop-circle writers can loosely be divided into two main camps: those who 
believe that the circles are produced by extraterrestrial forces, and those who 
believe they are produced by paranormal forces. The latter also include those \vho 
believe the circles are the result of 'energy points' on the earth's surface. What 
both camps share, however, is a belief in the spiritual importance of these 
manifestations. This is reinforced by the fact that all the major crop-circles - on 
the whole those made by Dickinson, such as the 'DNA Double Helix', 'Julia-set 
fractal' and 'Koch snow flake - were made in Wiltshire, the home of English 
paganism and New Age mythology. Covered in barrows. standing stones, tumuli 
and other earthworks (such as Silbury Hill), and numerous pathways, the area is 
claimed to be connected by an ancient network of sight lines. It is home, 
moreover, to a number of famous chalk figures, such as the Alton Barnes White 
Horse, which are etched into the county's hillsides. Wiltshire in. therefore. is a 
rich palimpest of ancient myth and historical record, a place literally pitted with 
arcane signs and significant remains. Crop-circles and ancient standing stones and 
tumuli form a 'metaphysical continuum'. This melange of paganism and the 
occult is a product largely of the 1970s. when Alfred Watkins' analysis of ancient 
lay lines (Anglo-Saxon for cleared strips of land) in The Old Straight Track 
(1925)257 was rediscovered and formed part of the counter-cultural revi val of 
257 Alfred Watkins, The Old Straight Track: Its Mounds, Beacons, Moats, Sites and Mark 
Stones, Abacus, London, 1974 
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Celtic fairy lore (fairy paths) and the developing interest in the ne'.\' earth 
sciences. The ley lines and other ancient markings were seen as 'energy centres' 
(places of magnetic force). Wiltshire appeared to possess more of these lines and 
markings than most making it the favoured place of occult lore, and one of the 
favoured homes of UFO' sightings'. As one theory of the UFO phenomenon put 
it: spacecraft were attracted to places such as Wiltshire because of the 
predominance of its magnetic pathways, which they used for navigation! 
It is no surprise that Dickinson and his colleagues chose to work here, for the 
location allows the crop circles to enter a preexisting mythological system of 
'earth mysteries'. Thus when Dickinson produced the enormously complicated 
'fractal' or 'Julia-set' design in a field adjacent to Stonehenge, the literature was 
quick to assume, given the occult importance of Stonehenge, that some 
extraterrestrial intelligence was trying to establish a significant connection 
between the two. This assumption is echoed in the way the literature analyses the 
crop-circle designs, claiming that ancient site lines and standing stones and crop-
circles not only share' unexplained' energy levels, but also a sacred geometry.258 
Moreover, in some instances where obvious icons of modern science are 
concerned, such as the' Julia-set', this' sacred geometry' is stretched to include 
the non-linear theories of nature of the New Physics, as if the earth was producing 
its own computer print out. 
What is absent in this literature is any awareness that the crop-circle makers are 
mirrorino back to the 'true believers' their own mythologies, know ledges and 
b 
histories. Dickinson is as well versed in historical lore and the occult of the 
Cerealogists and Ufologists as the writers themselves. This makes his 
interventions extremely context-sensitive, as the crop-circles are made with the 
desires, fantasies and occult' know ledges' of the 'true-believers' in mind. The) 
258 See for example, Jim Lyons, 'Gravitation plus Cavitation=Salvation?, The Circular, 
no.27, Winter 199617 
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are not ironic. Thus if the complexity of the recent desi ans is partlv a response t o . 0 
Dickinson's own technical and aesthetic ambitions, it is also a way of upping the 
ante in response to the Cerealogists theories. This play-off between producer and 
consumer, mythologizer and believer, is at one level very similar to the practices 
and rhetorics of art and its theory. Hence in a strange mutation of classic avant-
garde practice, Dickinson attempts to outmanoeuvre, or undermine. the claims 
and expectations of those theories that would seek to explain or predict the crop-
circle designs. Concomitantly, there is also a sense in which the anti-materialism 
of Cerealogist theories is ventriloquizing the idealism and special pleading of 
much art criticism - a set of practices which are notoriously malleable 
ideologically in the face of economic pressure and personal flattery. But if this 
something to be borne in mind when reading the crop-circle literature this is not 
what is of primary interest about the play-off, or co-presence, of mythologizer 
and Cerealogist. For Dickinson's crop-circles enact one of the most widespread 
psychological conditions to be found in late capitalist culture, iatrogenesis, or co-
dependence. 
In the therapy-situation between doctor and patient it is common to witness a 
process of narrative suggestiveness on the part of the doctor corne to shape and 
define the patient's illness in concordance with the social expectations of the 
illness itself. Thus the symptoms of the hysteric or neurotic can easily be 
produced out of the therapy situation - as Freud balefully recognized tmvards the 
end of his life. There is a strong evidence for this in the current outbreak of 
hysterical epidemics and imaginary illnesses (chronic fatigue syndrome. multiple 
personality disorder, recovered memory of sexual abuse). Multiple personality 
disorder is highly significant in this respect. Between 1922 and 1972 there \\ ere 
less than 50 cases documented in the medicalliterature?59 Today. particularly in 
the US. there are thousands, due largely to the popularization of an alternative 
259 See Elaine Showalter, Hystories: Hysterical Epidemics and Modern Culture, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1997, p161 
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therapy culture in conjunction with a professionally aggressive psychoanalysis. 
What this therapy culture has created, some would argue, is a widespread and 
unprecedented permission for individuals to make a narrative of their own 
unhappiness and disappointments. It is not that this unhappiness and 
disappointment is necessarily imaginary - far from it - but that its symptoms are 
either medicalized or projected onto an external agency, placing more and more 
individuals in positions of victim and accuser. As therapy culture widens, and as 
patients become more susceptible in therapy to the narrative suggestions of the 
analyst, iatrogenesis conjoins symbiotically with other agendas (such as forms of 
radical feminism, vacuous conspiracy theories and evangelical religious beliefs). 
In effect, the patient learns to tell his or her story from the narrati ves that are 
publicly disseminated by the therapists, extending and reinforcing the story in the 
therapy session itself. This is, no more nor less, than the mediatization of 
illnesses. What is produced is an unprecedented closed loop of believers who 
learn from real sufferers and then go on to produce more believers. This 
phenomenon might also be extended to include the huge increase in the number 
of alien abductees in the US, who shape their neuroses and fantasies in the form 
of narratives learnt from fictional abductions and the imaginary abduction stories 
of others. 
The overall result of this is an extraordinary diffusion and dissemination and 
mongrelization of therapy stories, as patients live out the confusions, paranoias, 
or threats of the moment. In this way the exponential rise of these symptoms can 
be seen less as a dysfunctional epidemic, or evidence of widespread irrationality, 
but, in accordance with a post-Freudian definition of hysteria, as an obi ique form 
of communication, and therefore, as Elaine Showalter has argued, as a "cultural 
f . t d stress" 260 Hysterical syndromes, therefore. are not symptom 0 anXle y an . 
marginal and prone to appear in the weak and feeble, but are part of ever) Jay 
260 Showalter, ibid, p9 
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experience. Their increase gives an indication of rising levels of internalized fear 
and crisis. Accordingly, hysteria is a mimetic disorder, in which the indi vidual 
ventriloquizes culturally acceptable expressions of distress. This is why patients 
increasingly present their symptoms in the way therapists define them as this 
allows the patient to give a legitimate or accultured voice to feelings of anxiet\, 
'- . 
This process of iatrogenesis, though, is rarely seen as a crucible of ston-makino . ~ 
in the new therapy culture itself, because hysteria as a cultural phenomenon is 
invariably subsumed under the rubric of 'self help' and personal redemption, 
These symptoms of hysteria are thus detached severed from any examination of 
the wider social forces that shape and sustain their and diversification, 
Iatrogenesis, then, is a suggestive way of accounting for how the narrati vization 
of anxiety in our culture is produced. For it allows us to see the production and 
reception of Dickinson's crop-circles as being closely modelled on the process uf 
co-dependence. As with the relationship between the hysteric and analyst, the 
condition (the phenomenon) is created out of the interaction between the doctor 
(artist) and the patient (believer). The artist recruits the 'true-believer' by 
providing a setting in which preexisting expectations can be confirmed, These 
expectations then take the form of speculations and hypotheses which then 
produce the need for the crop-circles themselves. If this process is, as I have said, 
not ironic, neither then is it cynical. Dickinson is not interested in how easily 
people are duped, but in how far the irrational is embedded in modernity, and, 
therefore, in how normative these processes of co-dependency are in a culture 
whose claims to reason and enlightenment are held to be self-evident. 
This places Dickinson's work self-consciously within a particular post-Freudian 
tradition of engagement with the irrational and ideological. Until Gramsci, and 
later Adorno and Horkheimer, ~larxist debates on ideology - deri\'ed largel! from 
'I d' f Marx's and Enoels' The German Ideolo£;v - equ;th .. 'd the a very partla rea IIlg 0 (.' e ' , 
. . I 'th 'false consciousness' with ideas that were insensible and IrratlOna WI ( , 
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chimerical and opposed to the long-term interests of the subject. But by the 
1930s, with developments in psychoanalysis and a greater social understandin ~ of 
consciousness as conflictual and divided, the idea of ideology as an opaque veil 
increasingly came under critical scrutiny. Men and women are not subject to a 
life of illusion through dominant ideological forces but fight them out in the 
realm of ideas and representations. This is commonly referred to the 'lived 
relations' or cultural model of ideology in which ideology is equated with the 
production and reproduction of everyday practices, forms and ideas. Largel: 
silent on questions of epistemology, it takes as axiomatic Freud's hypothesis that 
consciousness is opaque to its own workings and social effects, arguing that the 
ideological production and reproduction of everyday practices, forms and idea is 
subject to a fundamental process of misrecognition. It is this 'open' approach to 
ideology that is found both in Althusser's reworking of Freud in the I 960s and 
Adorno's reworking of Freud in the 1940s and 1950s. The workings of ideolog:. 
should not be understood in terms of falsification, but in terms of the encoding of '-
suppressed needs, wants and desires. In this respect there is a significant shift in 
the understanding of the relationship between reason and rationality; although 
ideologies may contain or promote falsehoods, this is not necessarily an irrational 
process. Such ideologies may express real needs and desires, and as such create 
and promote legitimate pleasures. It is this model that has now come to dominate 
current debates on ideology and the irrationaL particularly in the work of Sla\'oj 
Zizek, who seeks to close down the gap between ideology and reality?hl That is, 
if ideology is not an illusion, neither is it simply a place w here ideas get fought 
out, but a phantasmagoric support for reality itself. Ideology is co-extensive and 
co-present with the operations of fantasy. In effect this is Althusser driven into 
the arms of what Zizek calls the surplus of enjoyment played Ollt in ideological 
investments (nationalism being the main empirical concern in Zizek' slater 
writings). 
261 Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso 1989 
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Without doubt there are substantive problems with the 'open' model of ideology. 
By diminishing the idea of false consciousness and the demands of epistemology 
we would not recognize the 'enjoyments' of ideology in the first place _ 
nevertheless this 'open' model allows us to think the irrational rationalisticalh. 
That is it allows us to move - as Showalter does in her analysis of modern 
hysteria, and as Adorno does, in his discussion of astrology in the 1950s - to a 
position where the discussion of the irrational is immanent to the everyday. rather 
than its aberrant other. As Adorno says in his analysis of the Los Angeles Tilllcs 
astrology column 'The Stars Down to Earth (1952-3), irrational beliefs may 
"result from the processes of rational self-preservation". 262 Thus astrology, for 
Adorno, contains a pseudo-rational advocacy of human agency, despite its 
overarching subsumption of human behaviour under the benign and not so benign 
influence of the planets. Indeed, this is the very success of astrology, for without 
this minimal "encouragement of people to take decisions" 263 for themselves, the 
readers would derive little narcissistic gratification from its entreaties. Hence, 
under conditions of mass representative democracy, people may feel that they 
have little power, but they certainly do not want to be told so. Canni Iy, then, 
astrology invokes the Fates whilst stepping back from a crude fatalism. This core 
of the 'rational' is, of course, the work of the astrologist who carefully appeals to 
the problems and disappointments of its readers, without demeaning them as 
victims. In this, Adorno argues, there is a deeper set of instincts at play, which 
focus on how and why the irrational remains functional under modernity. The 
262 Theodor Adorno, 'The Stars Down To Earth: The Los Angeles Times Astrology 
Column' in Theodor Adorno, ed. Stephen Crook, The Stars Down to Earth and Other 
Essays ~n the Irrational in Culture, Routledge, 1994, p34. In the 1950s Carl Jung also 
became interested in modern manifestations of the paranormal. ,See Flying Saucers. A 
M d Myth of Things Seen in the Sky(1959), Ark, 1977. Jung s deSCription of UFO 
Si;ht7~~s as "visionary rumours" is built on a.co~servative view of the psyche as .the 
repression of the mythic unconscious. The slghtlngs become compensatory projections 
of 'spiritual wholeness'. 
263 Adorno, 'The Stars Down to Earth', p44 
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irrational is what Freud calls a residue of prehistorical animalistic practices. 
which, in a culture where such gratifications are held in check by the PO\\ erful 
social reinforcement of ego controls, release a host of repressed affecti Ve and 
emotional needs. But this dependency is never strictly what it seems. because it 
can only enact its disavowals of reason, science and materialism via an 
acknowledgement of the benefits (of at least some) of science's secular 
developments. The result is what Adorno describes as a form of bi-phasic 
dissonance, in which the subject believes something in spite of lwerwhelming 
counter-evidence because there is good reason to believe it - because it is . good 
for me'. Indeed, it is possible to go one step further and note the development of 
what Peter Sloterdijk calls 'enlightened false consciousness'. openly cynical 
defences of contradiction.264 "I may accept the advances of science. celebratt? 
them even, but I defend astrology, because it's a laugh". Adorno himself barel) 
considers this as a possibility in his analysis of the LA Times readership. This 
certainly has something to do with the limitations of his method - he assumes a 
homogeneity of response to the LA Times column - but it also reflects the limited 
self-conscious expression of this cynicism during the period he was \"Titing. 
Today 'enlightened false consciousness' - after the defeats of the left and the 
commodification of 1960s counterculture - is the dominant ideology of the new 
middle class. Blairism incarnate. "I may believe in free education for all, but I 
will send my children to private school anyway". 
Dickinson's crop-circles are a product of and response to these ideological 
conditions, and, as such, it is through the operations of iatrogenesis that they 
stage their primary forms of dependency. His work, therefore. goes to the heart of 
a bi-phasic tension between the irrational and rational within late capitalism. For 
what his work is also concerned to draw out is the huge intellectual and affective 
. d th part of the crop-circle writers in the lore and 111: tholog) 
lllvestment rna e on e 
264 Peter Sioterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, Verso, 1988 
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of the crop-circles through the work Of science itself. For all th' I . b'l' ~ 'J ' e Imp aUSI I It)' \ \1 
their hypotheses, the Cerealogists use the procedures of scientific field-\\ ork and 
analysis to 'verify' their findings, The result is a disarming parado~: the truth of 
the circles may, ultimately, be inexplicable to human reason, but nonetheless it is 
human reason which will eventually prove this, In this respect the full implication 
of Dickinson's work in revealed only with the presentation of the I iterature and 
photo-documentation of the crop-circles in the gallery - articles are taken directl~ 
from the crop-circle and occult magazines and exhibited on notice boards along 
with photographs bought form professional crop-circle photographers, :-\.S a result 
the sheer profusion of this material provides an immediate visual fi x on hcm 
extensive is the network of' scientific' analysts and helpers, \\rould-be 
professional scientists and amateurs rub shoulders together. This activity may be 
pseudo-science, or 'semi-erudition' as Adorno might put it. 265 but the extent to 
which it produces a culture of believers, is, as with the effects of astrolug), 
evidence of that surplus of enjoyment which the mechanisms of ideology enact. It 
would at the same time be foolish, therefore, to assume that Dickinson does not 
recognize the attractions of this enjoyment. for in producing the crop-circles he 
also recognizes his own pleasure in the production of the enjoyment of others, 
With this Dickinson is not out to shame his interlocutors - even if this might seem 
the inevitable outcome - but to show how the pleasures of the irrational produce 
their' rational' effects culturally, for Dickson's work reveals a complicity \\ ith 
the irrational as the means by which the power of the irrational can be made 
manifest. 
In these terms his work is distinguished by its extension and reworking a much 
older tradition of artistic engagement with the irrational and the rational: the late-
nineteenth-century practice of llsing photographic to fake paranormal 
'f ' 1ft 'f DI'ckinson's crop-circles openh identify with their mall! estatlOns, n ac, I -
265 Adorno, 'The Stars Down To Earth, p119 
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hidden amateur status, his general subterfuge and game-playing. identifies his art 
as part of a wider amateur tradition of artist-tricksters working on the edgeS of 
science. This is the artist as illusionist and mountebank, who - in appl) ing new 
technologies and optics via popular forms of entertainment - is able to produce 
complex illusions in the interests of a 'science' of the paranormal. Indeed. \\ ith 
the advent by the end of the nineteenth century of the telegraph. the telephone and 
photography - technologies characterized by their embodiment of the in\isible - it 
was believed that the' spirit world' existed in a parallel universe. \ loreo\er. it 
was believed that with the right equipment and through the hypersensiti \e senses 
of a gifted medium, communications channels could be opened up with that 
world. As the new technologies became the harbingers of the 'spiritual life' for 
believers, the technologies in turn were employed by illusionists to create a world 
that was said to exist just beyond the everyday senses. 266 
From the 1860s in Europe and the USA there emerged a professional 
photography of staged apparitions, in which the photographer, the scientist and 
the female medium - who acted as the embodiment of the spirits - colluded in the 
production of photographic documentation of things and persons from' beyond 
the grave' .267 Developing out of the Spiritualist movement of the 1840s, 
photographers employed the positivistic 'truth claims' of the new photography to 
announce the inexplicable power of photographic technique to render the 
invisi ble visible. Ghostly after-images, ectoplasmic clouds and spurts and other 
expulsive manifestations became the stock-in-trade of this staged photograph). 
266 For a discussion of the telephone and Spiritualism see Avital Ronell, The Telephone 
Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech, University of Nebraska, lincoln, 
1989 
267 See Tom Gunning, 'Phantom Images and Mode', in ed. Patrice Petro, Fugitive . 
Images' From Photography to Video, Indiana University Pre~s, 1995. For a dlSdcusslon °tf 
. . t e Logie Barrow The In epenrit"n 
Spiritualism and the early working-class movemen ,se . k h Journal 
Spirits: Spiritualism and English Plebeians 1850-1910, History Wor s op . 
Routledge, 1986 
290 
This generated not only a sizable following of 'true-belie\ers'::h~ but a learned 
Spiritualist literature in which the tricks employed by the photographers (double 
exposures mainly) were taken at face value As wI'th contempo ' I ' rary crop-clrc e 
literature, a similar picture emerges of the irrational' reasoned', 
But if this history allows Dickinson to treat his own moves as belonoino to a 
:=0 t=" 
popular tradition of illusions, it also allows us to connect this imaoe of the 
e 
trickster to its artistic role in modernism,269 That is, the trickster-as-illusionist 
takes on a broader critical function once it is attached to the modernist critique of 
authorship and artistic identity. This is why this tradition is not as marginal as it 
first appears, for the illusionism of spiritualist manifestations and photography 
fed directly into early modernism's obsession with the negation of empirical 
appearances and the rejection of the confusion between the sincerity and the 
subjectivity of the artist and truth in art. Both Marcel Duchamp and Andre Breton 
were fascinated by spiritualist activities and fake spiritual photography, and \\' hat 
this implied for the creation of the 'critical illusion' and the dissolution of the 
artist as expressive subject. For Breton the seance allowed for the production of 
the same kind of unconscious 'intelligence' as did automatic writing,270 But if 
Dickinson is fascinated by the trickster because of its destablization of artistic 
268 The popularity of Spiritualism, spiritualist photography and seances, in the second 
half of the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th century has been described 
as a 'war widow' phenomenon, With the death of so many young men in so many 
conflicts and imperialist wars during this period, spiritualism produced a co-dependence 
between wives and lovers seeking contact with their dead loved ones and the 
spiritualists, who, compelled by the effects of mass grief, were desperate to assuage 
these longings, 
269 For a brief discussion of the trickster as artist, see Rod Dickinson, 'It's Art for Folk's 
Sake', Fortean Times, January 1998 
270 See Andre Breton 'The Automatic Message', in Andre Breton, Paul Eluard, Philippe 
Soupa~lt, The Autom~tic MessagefThe MagnetiC FieldsfThe Immacu/~te Conception. 
translated by David Gascoyne, Antony Melville and Jon G~aham, ~nd Introduced by 
David Gascoyne and Antony Melville, Atlas 1997, For an Interesting anecdotal account 
of the connections between surrealism and the occult see also, Mark Pollzzottl. 
Revolution of the Mind: The Life of Andre Breton, Bloomsbury, 1995 
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identity, he is not interested in using illusionism as a means of access to the 
unconscious, or as a way of outwitting his audience. This is where his post-
Freudian trickster meets the demands of post-conceptual art practice. Dickinson' s 
faking of the paranormal identifies his trickster not just as an illusionist. as 
someone whose principle interest is in prestidigitation, but as a corrupting 
presence within preexisting value systems. 
In this respect, the idea of the post-conceptual trickster as a corrupting presence is 
not strictly the same as Duchamp's ironist or Breton's lover of dissemblance, 
although both artists use surrogate forms of production (the found object) to 
corrupt the idea that the artist is self-identical with his or her art. The post-
conceptual trickster, however, is far closer to the surrogate artist Hank Herron, 
the imaginary Frank Stella-like artist immortalized in Gregory Battock' s Idea Art 
in 1973.271 For after Conceptual art, one of the possible critical functions of the 
artist is the self-conscious dramatization of his or her own commodification and 
social marginality, turning the modernist confrontation with the administrati Ve 
power of the modern art institution and the culture industry into a simulation and 
staging of their processes and effects. Herron's author provides, perhaps, an 
interesting corollary for the ambitions of Dickinson's trickster. 
Hank Herron was a fake, but through the article in Idea Art his work entered the 
public discourse of post-minimalism, and therefore took on an extended life, 
fuellino the rumour that Herron was based on a living artist. Thus, despite the 
b 
uncertainty over Herron's existence, Herron's 'virtual work' and' virtual 
biography' continue as historical events. As an extant text the 'virtuality' of 
Herron's authorship is transformed into a first-order theoretical practice which is 
able to generate further theoretical work. In this sense, w here does the identity of 
the author of the essay and Hank Herron's 'authorship' begin and end? Herron's 
271 Cheryl Bernstein, 'The Fake as More', in ed. Gregory Battock Idea Art, Dutton. New 
York, 1973 
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work may have been invented by a pseudonymous writer (or two writers \\Titin~ 
under a single fictional name as it happens), but it continues to ha\'e meaning as 
the imaginary/critical practice of the two authors. An imaginar: set of artworks 
are no less able to produce discursive effects in the world, than a set of actual and 
displayable works. Dickinson's crop-circles are not faked in this sense. he is not 
trying to disguise his authorship behind a pseudonym or claim to do have done 
something he hasn't done. We know Dickinson to exist as the (co-)maker of the 
crop-circles. But like the producer of Herron's imaginary paintings his 
clandestine authorship nevertheless establishes an ambiguous relationshi p 
between the art, the name and origins of its author and the work's reception. For 
those who read the crop-circles as art, Dickinson's authorship is a non-
contentious possibility, given knowledge of the history of crop-circle making in 
Britain in the 1990s. The majority of his non-art world audience, howe\er, who 
do not read the work as art or anything like it, openly dispute his authorship. This 
leaves the reception of the work in a critically unstable position between two 
different publics. Dickinson's post-conceptual trickster is corrupti ng, then, 
precisely because his ambiguous identity as an artist stemmi ng from the 
production of the crop-circles, allows him to penetrate the processes of modern 
mythology 'under cover'. The clandestine authorship is transformed into an 
objective, disruptive force outside its initial conditions of production, which 
means ultimately outside his artistic control. 
In this way Dickinson's crop-circles and fake UFO photographs function 
essentially as a kind of virus within the belief systems of the Cerealogists. By dint 
of their extraordinary success as icons for believers, the revealed' uncertainty' of 
their origins remains a troublesome anomaly, reflected in the literature's constant 
return to the threat of the 'hoax'. And, in turn, this is where the post-Freudian 
trickster meets up with situational aesthetics. What is of primary concern for 
Dickinson is how the production of the crop-circles, and their representation in 
the Cerealogist literature and media, provides us with a kno\\Iedge of the 
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irrational immanent in everyday life through a partl'c' t' . . 
lpa Ion 111 Its processes. 
Situational aesthetics broadly can be defined as those pr t' h' h ac Ices w IC excl ude the 
authorial presence of the artist from the exhibition space, or deflate the notion of 
the artist's autonomy. Derived from both Situationism's and Conceptualism's 
defence of art as a site-specific intervention it views the artwork d' . . , as Isruptlon III 
a preexisting extra-artistic or artistic field of reference. This might take the form 
of the artist producing a work in conflict or tension with the social context in 
which it is seen. In this way, we might describe Michael Asher's and Hans 
Haacke's museum installations of the 1970s and 1980s as situational: above all 
else they promote the idea of the artist as a monteur of preexisting elements 
derived from the administrative functions, cultural identity and architecture of the 
institution, which through juxtaposition and superimposition, expose the liberal 
'neutrality' of the museum in the museum. 272 
One of the characteristics of situational aesthetics is an emphasis on reading 
interrelationally from one element to another, from one context to another (from 
the artistic to the extra-artistic, from the extra-artistic to the artistic). The modes 
of attention employed are inevitably discursive and interrogative. In this respect, 
Dickinson's non-linear presentation of his photo-documentation and crop-circle 
272 In the case of Asher this takes the form of the serialized presentation of items taken 
from the museum itself, as for example in his 1991 Pompidou show where he removed 
all the page markers from books in the psychology section of the museum's Bibliotheque 
Publique into the contemporary galleries. After the exhibition the elements are dispersed 
or destroyed, preventing the installation from yielding any exchange value. In Haacke's 
work the serialized presentation of photographs and texts on subjects bear directly on the 
corporate interests of the institution in which the work is being shown. These function 
dissonantly as a reminder of the speciousness of the art institution's claims to autonomy 
and as a would-be challenge to the 'comforts' of aesthetic contemplation, as in the 
Shapolsky real estate series (1971). In Haacke's case, however, the sequence of 
photographs and texts exist as discrete works for further exhibition and sale, See Michael 
Asher, Writings 1973-1983 on Works 1969-1979, ed. Benjamin H.Buchloh NSCAD 
Press, Halifax, 1983, and Hans Haacke: Unfinished Business, New Museum of 
Contemporary Art, New York 1986. For a discussion of their work see Claude Gintz, 
'Michael Asher and the Transformation of "Situational Aesthetics"', October no. 66. Fall 
1993 
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literature, along with video material of the crop-circles dra' db' , \\fIngs an \\ e -Site" 
recognizes the value of this legacy By making montaoes of d t . d 
. e pre e ermIne . non-
authored elements, 'author's meaning' is subordinate to social . 0 Th 
meanIn~. e 
demands of reading (and listening) take precedence over matters of aesthetic 
judgement. But what makes this process in Dickinson's work ver~ different from 
the museum-oriented version of this paradigm is the voice of the trickster itself. 
Dickinson's 'situational' voice is that of someone who is self-conscioush 
complicit in the production of the ideological processes in which the work is 
embedded. He provides, therefore, a set of motivations and cultural references for 
a discussion of cultural division, commodification, ideology and the art institution 
which are rarely encountered in the 'critically transparent' museum installations 
of post-conceptual art in the 1980s. 
As an artist who is interested in far more than the critique of the conventional 
'exhibition code', Dickinson's use of the trickster-ill usionist presents a picture of 
someone trying to work through some of the problems of 1980s museum-based 
situational aesthetics. For the situational aesthetics of museum-artists, such as 
Asher and Haacke, have not escaped the idealist legacy of post-conceptual ism's 
anti-institutional critique: the conflation of social transformation with the 
transformation of modes of exhibition and spectatorship. In the 1980s such 
strategies achieved a certain amount of critical prominence, as the art institution 
came under attack, this time from critical postmodern theory. The outcome. 
however, has been the incorporation of this anti-aesthetic modes of exhibition 
display into the postmodern transformation of the museum itself. In short. such 
efforts at 'internal critique' have been easily brought into line with the new 
manaoerial radicalism of the late 1980s and 1990s, Situational aesthetics. or sile-
o 
specific practice, has become the house style of the new postmodern museum. 
For a new generation of artists, therefore, who compare the corresponding critical 
claims of the work with its radical success, the critical value and aesthetic goals 
of museum-based situational strategies have appeared disappointing and 
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problematic. Indeed, most critiques of the 'exhibition code' from within the 
museum itself have seemed limply virtuous, part of a cultural politics that has 
become as bureaucratically self-administering as the institutions themsel ves. 
Dickinson's adoption of the trickster-illusionist is not a solution to these 
problems. But by adopting the role of the trickster as critical illusionist Dicki nson 
is able to perform the effects of cultural division and modern myth from within 
the confines of popular culture and popular' science' itself, rather than simply 
announce the consequences of their effects for a museum or oallerv ooin o eo .. e ~ 
audience. If this in turn produces an interesting set of problems for the true-
believer visitor to the crop-circles and the reader of paranormal literature, it also 
sets up an interesting viewing relationship for the sceptic and true-believer alike 
in the gallery and museum; the gallery viewers are presented with a complex 
array of documentary and scientific materials which have already been mediated 
culturally as the' paranormal'. In other words, before the crop-circles enter the 
gallery as art their value has already been established by the media as 
'inexplicable phenomena'. The result is that the acceptance or rejection of the 
mythological content of the materials is dependent on a primary process of 
mediation before their mediation as art. The spectator's relationship to the 
phenomenon is already sensitized, therefore, to the power of the media in this 
mythological process, insofar as the mainstream press and TV conspires with 
'true-believer' culture in the interests of ratings and popular appeal. By faking 
paranormal phenomena and owning up, Dickinson appropriates this Po\\ er. He 
thereby produces the viewing conditions for a knowledge of the irrational in the 
everyday out of the work's own necessary collusion with the media. 
To simulate the effects of the modern media in the work of art is, of course, 
nothina novel for art of the 1980s and 1990s. But in Dickinson' s work we are 
b 
. I t 'st l'Ilsofar as his practice successfully insinuates itsL'lf into gIven a comp ex WI , . . 
h I· d f th media as part of a preexistin o non-artworld culture. t e popu 1st agen as 0 e .. ~ 
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This allows him to montage the voices of the irrational in the rational and 
irrational 'reasoned' within the wider ideological setting of mass culture. In the 
gallery the performative contradictions of modern forms of ideology are 
themsel ves performed. 
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Chapter 12: The Practice of Failure 
"What a deep joy there is in making confessions of objective errors" 
Gaston Bachelard273 
In the late 19th century and early 20th century 'memory men' (and they were 
usually men) were a familiar act on the music hall and vaudeville circuits of 
Europe and North America. Though many of the acts were clearly scams relying 
on stooges in the audience to feed prepared questions to the performer, some 
featured performers who demonstrated, what we call, ordinarily, the power of 
'photographic memory'. However, whether an illusion or a prodigious feat, these 
acts were accorded a huge amount of respect. This is because the performers were 
appreciated as popular scholars, individuals who were capable of answering \vhat 
the audience wanted answering: invariably questions on sports, the miracles of 
nature and the histories of kings and queens and the rich and famous. In this they 
fulfilled, superficially at least, a similar role to the successful TV quiz winners of 
today, those who return week after week answering questions on the widest and 
most arcane subjects, or the person who can recite to order large chunks of the 
Guiness Book of Records. Both performers and contestants are admired for their 
spontaneously encyclopaedic knowledge. 
273 Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, p100. 
A history of the epistemological status of the error waits to be written both in philosophy 
and art. Schelling, Hegel, Engels, Wittgenstein, Raoul Vaneigem, Gillian Rose, Niklas 
Luhmann, and George Dickie are all companions to Bachelard here. "Error or other-
being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element.of truth: for ~ruth canonly 
be where it makes itself its own result", G.W.F. Hegel, The SCIence of LogIC (The First 
Part of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline), p212. 
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But unlike today the Victorian and Edwardian 'memory men' also performed in a 
culture where the formalization of knowledge was the province, largely, of the 
educated middle class. As such, for the Victorians and Edwardians the pleasure 
taken from the 'memory men's' spontaneous demonstration of knowledoe \\as 
e' 
the pleasure in being able to put questions to an expert without feeling shame for 
asking the question - even if in principle, the purpose of the entertainment was for 
the audience to outwit the performer and see him fail. Thus, under earlier 
conditions of mass illiteracy a significant part of the working-class's pleasure in 
watching memory men perform their prodigious arts was based on being in the 
presence of a knowledge that felt attainable, amenable, inclusive. Today, 
impressive acts of memory are certainly admired, but in the same way jugglers 
are 'admired' as a skill that astonishes through its dexterity. but nevertheless is 
viewed, ultimately, as being a skill without purpose, and therefore of abstruse 
value only. This cynical response is not because the popular arts of memory have 
become any less popular. 274 Working class autodidactism, as it gets played out in 
sports knowledge - lists, tables, dates - remains formidably extensive. But, rather. 
because of the way acts of human memory have been displaced by the ubiquitous 
and fast memory of machines. The exponential increase in computer memory has 
left human acts of memory trailing embarrassingly behind. Indeed, new 
technology has exposed how feeble human memory actually is even at its most 
careful and assiduolls. The human brain is not designed to recover large amounts 
information at will. Rather, what the human brain has proved to be efficient at is 
the creative and contextual application of knowledge, a set of skills at which 
computers are dismally poor. As Paul Churchland observes: "Ask us to add a 
column of random four-digit numbers a column thirty numbers high, and ten 
minutes later we will present the wrong answer at least half the time. A classical 
computer, on the other other hand, will get it right every time. and in less than 
274 There are still still many organized memory championships. The 2001 World Memory 
Championsip were held in London on 25-26 August 2001. 
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milliseconds. The shoe is on the other foot, however, if the development of new 
mathematical concepts and the achievement of fundamental mathematical 
insights are the skills at issue. Hence it is the human who seems to haye the 
d 't ,,275 I h' eeper capaci y. . . ntiS regard what computers have eliminated is the 
popular magical function of the (limited) arts of memory that the early music hall 
celebrated; no human act of memory today can come anywhere near in its speed 
or depth to the instantaneous recall of the search engine or the detail of the in-car 
navigational system. Now, obviously the erosion of oral systems of knowledge 
transmission is not solely the result of computer efficiency. Since the invention of 
the book and various technological developments in the recording of data and 
indexing, humans have been able to separate the storage of knowledge from its 
oral dissemination, widening the conditions of who produces and who 'onns' 
knowledge. With the routinization of knowledge through the use of the written 
document, knowledge becomes a shared entitlement (for those who could read 
and write), rather than a cultic experience. But with the advance of computers and 
the expansion of the sciences the separation between storage and use has widened 
to unprecedented levels. One of the consequences of this is that what is treated. in 
philosophical terms, as the fallible relationship between human memory and 
knowledge is now taken, on a social scale, to be irrevocable: memory fails 
absolutely because humans are simply unable to both digest the vast quantities of 
readily available information and compete with the computer's forbidding powers 
of organization; the interrelation between knowledge and memory has become, 
therefore, not just a problem of extensity and quantitity - as it always has been 
under a complex division of intellectual labour - but of the stark visibility of 
275 Paul M.Chuchland, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical 
Journey into the Brain, MIT, 1995 p249. See also On the Contra:y: Critical E~says, 
1987-1997, MIT, 1998. The cognitive slowness of the human brain, however, IS reversed 
in the development of an adequate and realistic ~no~ledge bas~ for AI. The computer 
needs an extraodinarily long period of programming In order for It replicate the most 
basic 'spontaneous' requirements of human conversation."This rel~tlve slowness of the 
simulations over the real thing was darkly curious; signal. pro~agatlon In a computer IS 
roughly a million times faster than the brain" (p50). The. I~ability of ~omputers to produce 
a realistic and relevant knowledge base remains the abiding stumbling block of AI. 
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memory's impotence. This is why in popular terms the perceived impotence of 
memory is seen as a crisis of storage capacity: the impotence of memory is 
gauged on the basis of the mind's cognitive limitations - an updated version of 
John Locke's theory of consciousness: human cognitive faculties are ne\tf quite 
up to the job of understanding or representing the world. 276 This does not mean. 
for Locke, that humans are incapable of producing scientific knowledge, but that 
there are limits to what humans might know, or are able to know. on the basis of 
humans' physiological limits. In the age of hyper-efficient memory machines, the 
imputed physiological limits of human consciousness, therefore. is made starkh 
evident, and as such veils a trauma: the impossibility of the individual's access to 
and control over knowledge in a world where knowledge no longer appears open 
to general assimilation and evaluation. 
Cultural reflections on cognition, knowledge and memory, however, are rare 
these days - despite the 'memory industry' and developments in artificial 
intelligence. Discussions of cognition and memory are usually confined to the 
philosophy of mind or cognitive psychology. Which is why the English artist 
Emma Kay's work on cognition, memory and knowledge is particularly 
engaging, given its artistic context. 
Kay's incorporation of various feats of memorization into her art - dra\\ing a map 
of the world from memory complete with place names, rewriting the Bible and 
the plots of Shakespeare's plays from memory - clearly recall the braggadocio of 
the music hall memory men, albeit mediated by the discipline of the junior high 
school class room. Indeed the powers of recollection on display here are those 
nominally associated with the school exam and class room recitation. But more 
pointedly, in the case of her use of the Bible and Shakespeare, they enact a certain 
276 John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged and edited by 
, 1993 For a Lockean-type update of a theory of 
John "!. Yolton, Evecryml.an
M
, cGin~ The Problem of Consciousness, Blackwell, 1991 
conSCiousness, see 0 In , 
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kind of lost or marginal cultural capital in the contemporary world of culture. 
Familiarity with the Bible in the West (discounting the beliefs and commitments 
of the religious) has long been an esoteric knowledge, just as the contemporar) 
readership of Shakespeare is largely professional. Thus despite the huge amount 
of cultural capital still associated with Shakespeare, and particular with the Bible 
on the grounds of its vast pedagogic influence, popular. attentive readers of these 
works are relatively few. Kay's acts of memorization, are attuned, therefore, to 
the social and ideological conditions under which cultural capital and tradition are 
produced. The Bible and Shakespeare may weigh in with a huge amount of 
cultural and educational force - state force in fact - but the popular conditions of 
reception under which the memory of tradition in which such work Ii yes. is 
diminished and fragmented. Hence there is an obvious gap between \\ hat the 
culture invites people to remember in order to attain cultural and social capital 
and what people choose to remember or are in a position to remember. Kay's 
point, though is not that of the cheap cultural studies jibe at high-culture and 
religious belief. Rather, what preoccupies her, and what interests me, is the 
conditions under which modernity produces, organizes and derogates 
memorization. In this her performance from memory of culturally sanctioned 
texts is concerned more significantly with the occlusion of memory and 
knowledge generally. For as with our popular user of computers her memory 
skills are produced out of a deflationary, Lockean sense of human consciousness 
as inadequate to the command of knowledge. Thus we might marvel. as with our 
imaginary juggler, at her rendering of the Bible and Shakespeare. but the act itself 
doesn't compel, it has no social function, it seems to be merely fanciful, the work 
of a frozen, artificial culture, a dead pedagogy. 
In this sense the work involves an intriguing contradiction at the heart of the 
interrelationship between knowledge and memory: in straining after a purported 
truthfulness it inevitably demonstrates its own incompetence. The outcome. 
therefore, is substantively not like the vaudeville 'memory men'. because her 
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appointed task is actually self-defeating and therefore an enactment of failure 
rather than its unconscious or incidental outcome. There is no illusion of 
exactitude here, even if the demonstration of memory skills remains impressi \ e. 
It is wrong to assume, then, that this work is simply an anti-art act of yiolation 
against high-cultural norms. Rather, the embrace of the failure of memon is 
wholly strategized. That is, the limits of memory here are transformed into a post-
conceptual act of cognitive closure. 
Forms of cognitive closure in art are strategies or acts of artistic self-disablement 
or self-constraint which test or expose the inherited skills or cognitive 
competences of dominant or prevailing practices. The character of these forms of 
cognitive closure can be elastic, but relevant examples might be Dieter Hacker's 
and Art & Language's 'painting by mouth' (in the 1970s and 1980s respectively), 
and Vito Acconci's blindfolded and earplugged documentation of his immediate 
gallery environment in 1971 and Ian McKeever's 'painting in the dark' of the 
1980s. The overriding aim of these strategies is to critique or derogate what are 
perceived to be culturally unproblematic notions of 'expression', 'representation' 
and 'authorship'. Such strategies of negation, therefore, should should not be 
confused, for example, with the use of syntactic and alphabetic constraints in the 
fiction and poems of Oulipo and Georges Perec. These self-imposed demands 
function as obstacles to be overcome in a display of wit and ingenuity. In this 
way the notion of cognitive closure has its intellectual and cultural home in the 
aesthetics of amateurism, rather than in the bravura realms of puzzle solving or 
game-playing. 
As I have argued in this book, amateurism is one of the means by which the 
deflationary drive of modernism and the avant-garde is embodied. It is the 
amateur artist - that is the artist who in some sense fails the test of 
professionalism and 'good' taste - that modernists and ayant-gardish hene looked 
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to in order to secure what is anti-bourgeois and anti-aesthetic. Of course the 
cognitive demands and social conditions of amateurism have chan oed _ the 
::-
bourgeois audience for art is longer troubled by the performed incompetences \)1 
Cezanne, Cubism and Abstract Expressionism - but nevertheless the performance 
of incompetence remains something that haunts the artworld's continual call to 
order and identity. Indeed the performance of incompetence is reflected in an 
enormous amount of contemporary art, in its widespread affection for poor 
materials and poor workmanship, juvenile symbols and childlike marking. 
misregistration of forms, bad spelling, camp obsessions and the DIY use of 
scientific hardware and scientific knowledge. Much of this work, though, does 
not adopt strategies of incompetence systematically as a cogniti ve constraint. This 
is because there is a darkness and deconstructive urge at the heart of the 
systematic use of cognitive constraint, which a lot of contemporary art is 
antipathetic to given its confusion of amateurism with a love of loucheness. Kay's 
use of the failure of memory as a cognitive constraint, then, occupies a different 
position, it is closer to the notion of constraint as a form of ideological exposure; 
that is, the notion of the failure of memory becomes a performative contradiction. 
The incompetence of the activity provides the conditions for critical reflection. 
One of Kay's most ambitious works recently is ~Vorld\'i(!H' (1999),277 a narrati ve 
written from memory of the history of the world. As an adolescent Jane Austen 
wrote an unfinished history of the world. Whether in sly homage to this or not. 
the text performs a similar manic ambition: the would-be narration of all 
significant events that fall under the description of' world history' from the 
origins of civilization circa 4000BC to the New Years eve millennium 
celebrations. It is claimed that Kay wrote the text without recourse to any study 
aids, relying solely on what she could remember from her school and university 
days, TV and general reading. What isn't clear though is whether this primary 
277 Emma Kay, Worldview, Book Works, 1999 
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process of memorization was supplemented prior to the writing by vast amounts 
of cramming which she then regurgitated: as if she was a student of a particular 
megalomaniacal history mastery sitting for a impossibly overarching exam _ the 
mother of all history exams. The issue here, however, isn't about the means by 
which she actually compiled the text - as if knowing she studied for its execution 
diminishes our admiration of the performance - but what finds its way into the 
text, on what terms and and under what assumptions. For this is where the 
performative work of the text begins to unfold. 
Kay has produced a narrative that is compiled unashamedly from received ideas. 
cliches, obvious mistakes, empirical experience, hearsay, but in a voice that is 
unswervingly confident about its own claims. The writing has an authoritati ve 
relentlessness as it passes from one period, one set of events, and one set of facts 
to another. But, coextensively, this relentlessness is always subject to a process of 
interruption and breakdown as Kay's evident lack of knowledge of a given period 
or event is reduced to few details and inconsequentialities leaving the narrative 
hanging in the air. In this respect the text is actually desperately bori ng and 
unrewarding in the claims for objectivity that it sets itself, as if, in order to signify 
to the reader the authenticity of her process of memorization the writing had to be 
untainted by theoretical argument, polemic or stylistic invention. Thus, what is 
remembered and noted down is written in such a way as to convince the reader 
that this is a work of laboured recovery, an exacting exercise, and not the 
underachieving commentary of an expert. Consequently the dullness is a trope: 
and, as such, functions in the text as a prerequisite of the reader accepting or 
appreciating the labour of the exercise. Literary invention would only foul up the 
imaoe of honest amateurism by concealing the frustrating inaccuracy and lack of 
b 
focus of the process of memorization. 
The banality of the text, therefore, is the key to the truth-effects of the memory 
exercise. By adopting the voice of an earnest compositor of facts, by 
305 
incorporating non-sequiturs and jumps in continuity. by excluding any reference 
to written authorities, by focusing principally on Britain for a large part of the 
book, the character of the historical narrative is self-evidently that of England-
domiciled autodidact As such the text's' memory work' is inseparable from its 
generic and provincial conditions of production. Worldview may have ambitions 
to be a world history, but its voice is clearly overdetermined by what Kay 
remembers from her education growing up in England in the 1970s and 1980s 
and what she herself remembers directly from this period. The historical detail 
gets denser and more expressly national when the narrative coincides with her 
own biological life span. In this light the book advertises itself as a world 
historical narrative, but it is actually written in the form of a memoir or diary. The 
idea that diaries or memoirs possess stronger claims to historical truth is 
commonplace. Indeed, on the basis that they are privileged sites of the truths of 
micro-history, the diary and the memoir have become perhaps the most popular 
genres of historical writing today. But the discrepancy between the localized 
knowledges of Worldview and the world historical ambitions of the writing. 
means that the local and generic are here revealed as theoretically insufficient to 
sustain the narrative. Hence by performing the failure of memory Kay exposes 
the relationality of her authorship and subjectivity and the limits of her 
knowledge, and, therefore, the conditions of her own ideological formation. For 
in demonstrating the failure of memory as a failure of knowledge the relationship 
between ideology and knowledge is foregrounded. The failure of memory as a 
failure of knowledge, then, becomes a means of exposing how historical 
knowledge is produced out of a shared cultural memory of historical 
representations over which we have little control. In other words Kay exposes the 
impotence of memory not just as the result of the limits of cognition, but as the 
outcome of certain processes of socialisation. This leads to a very different 
readin <Y of the text's would-be factual content. What appears to be the neutral 
b 
structure of Kay's powers of memory, becomes in its gradual unfolding. the self-
fulfilling liberal democratic ideology of history as a process of progressive self-
306 
enlightenment. Kay's voice becomes the' balanced' voice of liberal reason. 
And it is this which makes Worldview particularly intriguing. \\'e are never sure 
under what basis the failure of memory is taking place. Is Kay's indifference as a 
historian the actual outcome of the failures of memory and obvious lack of 
knowledge and theoretical reflection, or is her lack of knowledge being simulated 
at certain points in order to emphasis the myth of neutrality? This question is 
particularly pertinent when we compare Kay's surprising display of early 
mediaeval historical knowledge - "the best known shrines were at Santiaoo de :=-
Compostela on the route which led from England to Rome"2-S - to her knowledge 
of modern and ubiquitous media events, such as Kennedy's assassination and the 
American moon landing. Strikingly she gets the dates of these two events 
wrong.This is not to say she shouldn't get these dates wrong. but these mistakes 
look odd against the partial displays of erudition elsewhere in the te\t. 
Accordingly, such slips allow the performativity of the writing to be interpreted 
in two ways: either the book was written fast without much revision. or the 
finished text was then rewritten with added errors. To discover which path she 
took is not necessarily to make a value judgement here, but to realise that the 
display of memory's impotence is not just enacted but actually performed. On 
this score there is an obvious point to be made about the intertextual ity of the 
historical text, or any other text for that matter: Kay's historical narrati ve is a 
convocation of remembered lessons, reported speech, newspaper articles, film 
dialogue, TV narratives, and books, which are themselves, in turn, the compositt? 
remnants of remembered texts. But what is of principal interest about WorldricH' 
is not that it demonstrates the limits of historical objectivity - as if the whole 
project was an elaborate post-structuralist exercise - but, to return to my earl ier 
remarks, that it invests an enormous amount of intellectual effort into the 
demonstration of intellectual failure. All intellectual work in a sense demonstrates 
278 Worldview, op cit, p35 
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this paradox, in some capacity. But this is not something that writers. intellectuals 
and historians would willingly expose themselves to. It is hard to imaoine a 
e 
scholar, or anyone who takes their intellectual identity seriously, exposing 
themselves to memory's impotence by publishing a text without recourse to an\' 
written aids and citations. In this way Worldview, uses the impotence of memory 
to a field a number of questions about the function of intellectual expertise. One 
of the few critical functions that artists still possess is their access to modes of 
negation that deflate the conjunction of power and knowledge. This is because 
artists can lodge themselves into discourses without any social investment in 
those discourses. No one but an artist could have produced H'orldvi('~t'. because 
no one but an artist would have wanted to expose themselves to its intellectual 
embarrassments. Thus Kay's reworking of the notion of the amateur or autodidact 
is a reconfirmation of the deflationary powers of the artist. That is, artists must of 
necessity makes themselves masters of 'failure' in a culture where the truths uf 
the dominant and powerful perform an inflationary ideological role of tri umphant 
elucidation (Aufkliirung). In this sense Kay's employment of the impotence of 
memory as a cognitive constraint on her art can be seen as related, indirectly, to 
the politicization of a post-Freudian psychoanalysis. By recognizing the failure of 
memory as an acceptance of insufficiency we are able to confront the problem of 
knowledge as a comedy of critical struggle, rather than a tragedy of imperfect 
realisation. 
In this I detect a critical tension at play in Kay's recourse to memorization. As I 
have outlined, Kay's engagement with memorization seems inseparable from the 
trauma of knowledge. On one level her employment of the impotence of memor: 
is a direct response to complexities of the contemporary division of intellectual 
labour and the power of intelligence machines. In her performance of failure - as 
in other contemporary art - there is flight from the symbols of formalised 
knowledge. This is her 'Lockean' voice. But hidden in the performance of the 
failure of knowledge, and the deflation of knowledge's triumphant elucidation, is 
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a different understanding of pedagogy, one in which error is grounded in rea~lm. 
If claims to knowledge could only be made where there was no possibility of 
error, communication between humans would become inconceivable. Yet the 
possibility of error is used, invariably, by those with intellectual power and 
authority to silence or subordinate those without such authority and power. The 
fear of a making a mistake, of showing up one's lack of knowledge, is one of the 
most powerful determinates of daily conversation, with its evasions, platitudes. 
and alienated civilities. This is because the sense of social exclusion experienced 
by those who do not pursue critical or theoretical knowledge is minimal 
compared to those who do try and fail. 279 "I am not interested" ... I don't want to 
know," or, "that's boring", are invariably the self-protecti ve responses of 
someone who knows the penalty and does not want to be humiliated. The shame 
attributed to the possibility of error is a powerful servant, therefore, of bourgeois 
ideologies of 'spontaneous knowledge'. As such the fear of error is a means of 
socialising people out of certain critical intellectual skills into an acceptance of 
prevailing anti-intellectual and conformist ideologies. Recognising the intimacy 
between the pursuit of knowledge and the acceptance and acknowledgement of 
error can be liberating, therefore, in so far as it can expose the linguistic and 
ideological self-protection that dominates everyday discourse and exchange. This 
in turns means addressing ourselves to something that Jacques Ranciere has 
pursued in his extensive writing on working-class autodidacticism : there is no 
hierarchy of intellectual capacity that says who, or who is not, capabk of the 
pursuit of knowledge."There is inequality in the manifestatioll of intelligence, 
according to the greater or lesser energy communicated to the intelligence by the 
will for discovery and combining new relations~ but there is no hierarchy of 
intellectual capacit)'. Emancipation is becoming conscious of this equal it;. of 
lloture.,,280 In other words, the pursuit of knowledge is not simply an aquaintance 
279 See Trevor Pateman, Language, Truth & Politics: Towards a radical theory for 
communication, Jean Stroud, 1975 
280 Jacques Ranciere The Ignorant School Master: Five Lessons in Intellectual 
Emancipation, transl~ted, with an Introduction by Kristin Ross, Stanford University Press. 
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with ideas, but is an attribute of practice, even if practice leads to error and 
failure, as it surely will. On this basis we should all try writing a history of the 
world from memory. 
1991, p27 
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